"The legal presumption that computers are reliable"

[Adam Funk]

(Apologies if this has already been posted in one of the Horizon
threads but I missed it.)

Quote:

The legal presumption that computers are reliable stems from an
older common law principle that “mechanical instruments” should be
presumed to be in working order unless proven otherwise. That
assumption means that if, for instance, a police officer quotes the
time on their watch, a defendant cannot force the prosecution to
call a horologist to explain from first principles how watches
work.

For a period, computers lost that protection in England and
Wales. A 1984 act of parliament ruled that computer evidence was
only admissible if it could be shown that the computer was used and
operating properly. But that act was repealed in 1999, just months
before the first trials of the Horizon system began.

As a result, when post office operators were accused of having
stolen money, the hallucinatory evidence of the Horizon system was
deemed sufficient proof. Without any evidence to the contrary, the
defendants could not force the system to be tested in court and
their loss was all but guaranteed.

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/12/update-law-on-computer-evidence-to-avoid-horizon-repeat-ministers-urged>

[The Todal]

I think the Guardian have got that wrong. The above passage implies that
unless you can prove that the computer is defective you can't have it
tested to establish whether it is defective - which is plainly bollocks.

The question must be, did any of the lawyers acting for the sub
postmasters attempt to make use of expert evidence, from accountants or
computer experts? Was such an initiative rejected by the court?

It would not surprise me if the lawyers and the judge had felt totally
out of their depth during the criminal proceedings and had decided that
there was really no point in considering whether Horizon, an expensive
system with a seemingly impeccable pedigree, could be in any way faulty.

[GB]

Would the accused have had the benefit of Legal Aid? The time taken by
an expert to go through what I imagine is a very complex system might be
weeks - charged at somewhere between £100 and £1000 an hour. Would it
perhaps have been a problem to get Legal Aid to cover that?



dealing with a major sys

Would legal aid have refused the

[Pancho]

On 12/01/2024 19:29, Jethro_uk wrote:

>
> It sounds fanciful but I'm minded it was a solar flare.
>

Cosmic ray, is the standard excuse.

[Jon Ribbens]

I don't think it's "bollocks" at all. To have a computer system like
Horizon "tested" in any meaningful way would be an absolutely mammoth
undertaking, which would probably cost hundreds of thousands of pounds.
The idea that a mere subpostmaster could demand such a thing is bizarre.

The only plausible course of action is for them to ask for disclosure
of known bugs and problems from the Post Office, and if the Post Office
secretly fails to comply with this disclosure by denying the existence
of evidence then there's no way the subpostmaster could know about it.

The law they're talking about by the way is s60 of the Youth Justice
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which removed s69 of PACE as of 14th
April 2000:

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/23/section/60

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/69/1991-02-01

[The Todal]

A presumption does not amount to a prohibition against checking and
verifying the accuracy of a computer, breathalyser or other piece of
equipment.

There is a similar presumption in litigation that any document disclosed
is admissible as evidence of its contents - unless challenged by one's
opponent. Then it might be necessary to call someone to prove it.

I don't know if it would have been possible to challenge the Horizon
evidence during a prosecution. I don't think any criminal lawyers have
been interviewed about this. Yes, one could seek disclosure of other
complaints, of any bug reports, maybe require a Fujitsu person to attend
court to testify as to whether any staff ever alter the data inputted by
the sub postmasters without them knowing.

[Mark Goodge]

See also this excellent article by David Allen Green:

https://emptycity.substack.com/p/how-the-legal-system-made-it-so-easy

Mark

[Mark Goodge]

On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 20:33:57 -0000 (UTC), Jon Ribbens
<jon+u...@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
>
>I don't think it's "bollocks" at all. To have a computer system like
>Horizon "tested" in any meaningful way would be an absolutely mammoth
>undertaking, which would probably cost hundreds of thousands of pounds.
>The idea that a mere subpostmaster could demand such a thing is bizarre.
>
>The only plausible course of action is for them to ask for disclosure
>of known bugs and problems from the Post Office, and if the Post Office
>secretly fails to comply with this disclosure by denying the existence
>of evidence then there's no way the subpostmaster could know about it.
>
>The law they're talking about by the way is s60 of the Youth Justice
>and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which removed s69 of PACE as of 14th
>April 2000:
>
>https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/23/section/60
>
>https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/69/1991-02-01

See also this article by David Allen Green, which makes that very point:

https://emptycity.substack.com/p/how-the-legal-system-made-it-so-easy

Mark

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-12, The Todal <the_...@icloud.com> wrote:
> On 12/01/2024 20:33, Jon Ribbens wrote:
>> I don't think it's "bollocks" at all. To have a computer system like
>> Horizon "tested" in any meaningful way would be an absolutely mammoth
>> undertaking, which would probably cost hundreds of thousands of pounds.
>> The idea that a mere subpostmaster could demand such a thing is bizarre.
>>
>> The only plausible course of action is for them to ask for disclosure
>> of known bugs and problems from the Post Office, and if the Post Office
>> secretly fails to comply with this disclosure by denying the existence
>> of evidence then there's no way the subpostmaster could know about it.
>>
>> The law they're talking about by the way is s60 of the Youth Justice
>> and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which removed s69 of PACE as of 14th
>> April 2000:
>>
>> https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/23/section/60
>>
>> https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/69/1991-02-01
>
> A presumption does not amount to a prohibition against checking and
> verifying the accuracy of a computer, breathalyser or other piece of
> equipment.

Indeed, which is why I was talking about the practical obstacles
to "verifying" Horizon, rather than legal obstacles. Verifying an
individual breathalyser seems plausible (with the caveat that if
the claim is that the breathalyser reads wrong only very occasionally,
that's unlikely to be proved), verifying an enormous nation-wide
computer system like Horizon is simply not going to happen.

> There is a similar presumption in litigation that any document disclosed
> is admissible as evidence of its contents - unless challenged by one's
> opponent. Then it might be necessary to call someone to prove it.

A friend of mine was sued on the basis of a forged document, and as
far as I recall he had a very uphill struggle indeed to prove that
the signature was fake.

> I don't know if it would have been possible to challenge the Horizon
> evidence during a prosecution. I don't think any criminal lawyers have
> been interviewed about this. Yes, one could seek disclosure of other
> complaints, of any bug reports, maybe require a Fujitsu person to attend
> court to testify as to whether any staff ever alter the data inputted by
> the sub postmasters without them knowing.

I was under the impression that the *whole point* is that exactly this
was done, and the evidence was not disclosed and the witnesses lied.

[Theo]

Adam Funk <a24...@ducksburg.com> wrote:
> For a period, computers lost that protection in England and
> Wales. A 1984 act of parliament ruled that computer evidence was
> only admissible if it could be shown that the computer was used and
> operating properly. But that act was repealed in 1999, just months
> before the first trials of the Horizon system began.
>
> As a result, when post office operators were accused of having
> stolen money, the hallucinatory evidence of the Horizon system was
> deemed sufficient proof. Without any evidence to the contrary, the
> defendants could not force the system to be tested in court and
> their loss was all but guaranteed.

Such has been rumbling on for a considerable time:
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/1905/1842

X said his card wasn't used in an ATM, bank said it was. Bank couldn't
produce sufficient evidence to prove the transaction had taken place.
Because X lived in chaotic circumstances and the transactions were from an
address near to X's home, judge concluded that X made the transactions.

Some more discussion from the barrister in that case:
https://barristermagazine.com/evidence-from-computers-the-unreliable-legal-presumption-that-without-more-it-can-be-relied-upon/

Theo

[Theo]

The Todal <the_...@icloud.com> wrote:
> The question must be, did any of the lawyers acting for the sub
> postmasters attempt to make use of expert evidence, from accountants or
> computer experts? Was such an initiative rejected by the court?

In the original prosecutions, at least some of them the defendants had to
represent themselves (the prosecutors being from the Post Office).

> It would not surprise me if the lawyers and the judge had felt totally
> out of their depth during the criminal proceedings and had decided that
> there was really no point in considering whether Horizon, an expensive
> system with a seemingly impeccable pedigree, could be in any way faulty.

Since it appears the Post Office stonewalled the whole way through, how was
the defence supposed to extract any details of Horizon being faulty?

Also, I note this comment on Mr Bates' original website:

"The Minister commented that I could seek legal redress through the courts.
On this point I have had numerous comments from senior lawyers that should I
take my case to the courts then there is every likelihood that the case
would continue to be contested until I ran out of money. An approach often
used by major corporations against individuals whereby those with money can
effectively buy the result.

Also a warning to those with legal insurance which I actually had in place,
or thought I had. My policy was a subpostmaster policy promoted by the
National Federation of Subpostmasters. The catch is, you had to be a
subpostmaster before you could have a policy and to be a subpostmaster you
had to sign the Post Office contract. Though when you try and use the legal
insurance you are told that the contract was signed before the policy came
into effect and therefore it did not cover the dispute about the contract.
Even though you had to sign the contract to be eligible for the policy."

https://web.archive.org/web/20060831041620/http://www.postofficevictims.org.uk/

[Jon Ribbens]

Oh, I do like it when clever people agree with me ;-)

[The Todal]

His point being

"If it were for the prosecution to show that the evidence was sound -
with, say, certification on pain of perjury and full disclosure of error
logs, and so on - then it is unlikely that many of the Post Office
prosecutions could have taken place. It is certainly the presumption on
which the Post Office relied upon in many prosecutions and in respect of
which the Post Office resisted adverse disclosure".

But I don't think this solves anything at all. Method one: adduce the
computer evidence with a certificate signed by Paula Vennells to say
that the evidence is reliable. Method two: defendant challenges the
evidence forcing Paula Vennells to serve the exact same certificate.

Result: exactly the same. The said Paula Vennells, who relies totally on
what she is told by her obsequious underlings, sincerely believes that
the Horizon evidence is reliable because she prefers not to challenge or
question or arrange an internal inquiry. Perjury only arises if she
certifies something she knows to be false or does not believe to be true.

So I would still like to hear from a criminal lawyer explaining whether
attempts were made during any prosecution to challenge the Horizon
evidence by serving witness summonses on Fujitsu staff thereby bypassing
the prosecuting staff who deliberately keep themselves in ignorance. And
if there is a judgment from a Crown Court judge saying that he refuses
to permit such evidence to be adduced, then that in itself is a scandal
that deserves examination.

[Brian]

While you are correct- indeed there are parallels in speeding cases where
challenged and, as a result, significant numbers of related cases cancelled
/ quashed etc, there is a subtle difference here.

NOTE, I am not suggesting those involved were guilty etc or the system was
correct, simply in many cases the ‘process’ seems to have been less clear
cut that simply convincing a Court the computer was correct.

It appears, many of the victims - and I mean victims- were convinced there
was a computer issue, at least initially. However, they were ‘persuaded’
to plead guilty, perhaps on the basis ‘computers don’t make mistakes’ (note
the quotes), at least in part. In the absence of evidence, they may well
have been ‘bam boozled’ into this. I repeat, I am not suggesting they were
guilty, just unable to prove their innocence.

I can imagine they were distraught - I certainly would be.

In summary, I suspect, many cases were never reviewed in a Court from the
view point of the system integrity.

The question in my mind is why no one asked why there seemed to be a sudden
increase in ‘errors’ under the new system. That should have immediately
raised questions.

That should not have needed an IT expert, just basic good management.

[Martin Brown]

On 12/01/2024 21:10, The Todal wrote:

> A presumption does not amount to a prohibition against checking and
> verifying the accuracy of a computer, breathalyser or other piece of
> equipment.

Realistically though you are looking for a needle in a haystack here and
without white box testing where you can see all the code it is very
difficult to find the right combination of input data to elicit faulty
behaviour. It is likely the code did the right things 99.999% of the
time (perhaps even one or two more 9's on that). But when you have
hundreds of millions of transactions a day those flaws quickly add up.

> There is a similar presumption in litigation that any document disclosed
> is admissible as evidence of its contents - unless challenged by one's
> opponent. Then it might be necessary to call someone to prove it.

Part of the problem was that the PO did not offer full disclosure of
what they knew internally about the shortcomings of Horizon.

I didn't find the guy who testified as their senior prosecutor a
credible witness YMMV. He is either very very clever pretending to be
dumb on legal advice or simply not up to the job he was doing.

> I don't know if it would have been possible to challenge the Horizon
> evidence during a prosecution. I don't think any criminal lawyers have
> been interviewed about this. Yes, one could seek disclosure of other
> complaints, of any bug reports, maybe require a Fujitsu person to attend
> court to testify as to whether any staff ever alter the data inputted by
> the sub postmasters without them knowing.

I think the defence lawyers had their work cut out since the PO
presented their evidence in such a way that it was completely cut and
dried that their client was guilty and plea bargaining was all there was
on offer. I doubt if many sub postmasters could afford to take on expert
witnesses of the calibre needed to tear Horizon apart in court.

There was the other big problem of a backdoor whereby Fujitsu employees
could doctor the accounts of a branch remotely and without leaving any
footprint or audit trail of what had been done and why.

--quote from Panaorama interview--
Panorama journalists Matt Bardo and Tim Robinson were invited to Post
Office HQ for an on-the-record briefing about the Horizon system.

Network manager Angela van den Bogerd joined PR boss Mark Davies and
another senior manager, Patrick Bourke.

Ms van den Bogerd insisted nobody could change the sub-postmasters'
accounts without their knowledge.

She said any alterations "would leave a footprint. And that's the
important bit."

Matt Bardo asked: "So in sum, it is not now and never has been possible
for anybody from Post Office or Fujitsu to interfere with transactions,
without the clear knowledge of the sub-postmaster?"

Mr Bourke said: "It is 100% true to say we can't change, alter, modify,
existing transaction data, so the integrity is 100% preserved."

"And that's true now and has been for the duration of the system?" Mr
Bardo asked. "Yeah," said Ms van den Bogerd.

That wasn't true. Not then, and not for the duration of the system.

Since then, the Post Office has been forced to accept that Fujitsu staff
could access and change accounts without the sub-postmasters' knowledge.
--end quote--

from : https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67884743

Some of these big players should face criminal prosecution and I see no
reason why we need to wait until the Horizon enquiry is completed. The
only thing they regret is that they have finally been called to account.

--
Martin Brown

[Dr Dave]

I think that part of the problem here is the small subset of subpostmasters who found themselves with problems. A defence of “It’s picking on me/us” wouldn’t have been very credible. I still don’t understand how certain postmasters came to be in this mess and not others (and FTAOD, I am not suggesting that they were guilty).

[Brian]

I’ve just done some Googling.

It seems there are about 9000 sub branches and around 900 people were
prosecuted.

My first reaction is, someone should have ask themselves if that was a
plausible rate of dishonesty. It seems rather high to me.

[Roland Perry]

In message <unu6gj$3v9vd$1...@dont-email.me>, at 14:25:12 on Sat, 13 Jan
2024, Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> remarked:

>Realistically though you are looking for a needle in a haystack here
>and without white box testing where you can see all the code it is very
>difficult to find the right combination of input data to elicit faulty
>behaviour. It is likely the code did the right things 99.999% of the
>time (perhaps even one or two more 9's on that). But when you have
>hundreds of millions of transactions a day those flaws quickly add up.

Back in the day when I was project-managing early i386 designs, we used
to get bug reports through from Intel saying "one in every 100 million
instructions will fail if you don't implement this hardware fix".

My hardware designer explained that he MUST do this, otherwise the
desktop PC we sold would crash every ten seconds.
--
Roland Perry

[AnthonyL]

You'd have expected a commensurate increase in customers complaining
that they never got their giro payment.


--
AnthonyL

Why ever wait to finish a job before starting the next?

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-14, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
> People - especially the great unwashed which includes politicians - have
> fuck all grasp of statistics and the associated calculations involving
> them.
>
> Just a quick swab of all the people who claim to have had their drinks
> spiked reveals that about 60-70% of men who go clubbing must be guilty.
> No one stops to think what that actually means, and the fact that being
> *very* drunk is similar to having your drink spiked might be a factor.

Speaking of statistics, where does that one come from? Government
statistics say that around 7,000 people a year claim to have been
spiked, and that 10% of women claim to have been spiked at least
once in their lives. How do you get from those figures to "60-70%
of men who go clubbing must be guilty"?

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spiking-factsheet/spiking-factsheet

[Roger Hayter]

On 14 Jan 2024 at 10:42:38 GMT, "Jethro_uk" <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

> People - especially the great unwashed which includes politicians - have
> fuck all grasp of statistics and the associated calculations involving
> them.
>
> Just a quick swab of all the people who claim to have had their drinks
> spiked reveals that about 60-70% of men who go clubbing must be guilty.

I've never been clubbing, nor wanted too. I don't know what sort of men do.
Is that an implausible figure? I gather the relevant drugs are fairly freely
available.

> No one stops to think what that actually means, and the fact that being
> *very* drunk is similar to having your drink spiked might be a factor.
>

> See also: paedophiles in every bush.


--
Roger Hayter

[AnthonyL]

On Sun, 14 Jan 2024 10:42:38 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

>
>People - especially the great unwashed which includes politicians - have
>fuck all grasp of statistics and the associated calculations involving
>them.
>
>Just a quick swab of all the people who claim to have had their drinks
>spiked reveals that about 60-70% of men who go clubbing must be guilty.

>No one stops to think what that actually means, and the fact that being
>*very* drunk is similar to having your drink spiked might be a factor.
>
>See also: paedophiles in every bush.
>

The lack of analytical thinking and understanding of modern technology
amongst policiticians in the public eye is frightening.

And the depth of innumeracy and illiteracy (comprehension) among the
public including teachers bodes ill for the future.

So many people with a platform to spread their message and no
substance.

And having been involved in IT in one way or another since the late
'60s I increasingly have grown distrustful of systems being introduced
and the lack of ability for them to be administrated. Roll on AI.

[Jon Ribbens]

Whether it's implausible depends on your definitions. I think "buying
someone a double when they asked for a single" may count as "spiking",
especially if you then forget to mention it when you come back from the
bar. In which case it's my experience that an awful lot of people do
that at least sometimes, and they of course generally think they're
being generous rather than criminal (although personally - despite
liking alcohol - pressurising people into having more alcohol than
they want is a pet hate of mine).

If the definition is instead rapists stalking women in bars and spiking
their drinks with rohypnol or GHB or something and then raping or
assaulting them while they are incapacitated then obviously no, 60-70%
is not remotely plausible, but neither do I think that Jethro will be
able to come up with any sources that claim a figure anything like that.

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-14, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

> On Sun, 14 Jan 2024 12:15:34 +0000, Jon Ribbens wrote:
>> Speaking of statistics, where does that one come from? Government
>> statistics say that around 7,000 people a year claim to have been
>> spiked, and that 10% of women claim to have been spiked at least once
>> in their lives. How do you get from those figures to "60-70%
>> of men who go clubbing must be guilty"?
>

> OK, possibly a tad hyperbolic. But ...using the official statistics of
> "claimed" spikings means we have to accept that a bunch of less than
> bright guys have managed to source perfectly titrate and administer a
> potentially lethal drug 20 times a day with no deaths, allergic reactions
> or indeed being caught.

Eh? Drugs such as GHB are not hard to source or administer. People take
them deliberately all the time. And I'm not sure why you think that no
deaths or allergic reactions have resulted, or why you think nobody has
been caught. (Convictions are low but certainly not zero, and of course
it may well be a very hard offence to prove most of the time.)

> *OR* a lot of people who think they were spiked weren't.
>
> I know where I would start looking.

I'm sure it must happen sometimes that people honestly think they've
been spiked when they haven't. Alcohol has affected me much more than
usual on occasion and I'm not entirely sure why - perhaps tiredness
or something. But I don't see any reason to think that a *significant*
number of spiking claims involve the victim not in fact having been
spiked at all.

> Just for the slower readers, I'm not saying spiking hasn't, doesn't and
> won't happen.

[pensive hamster]

On Sunday, January 14, 2024 at 2:49:12 PM UTC, AnthonyL wrote:

> The lack of analytical thinking and understanding of modern technology
> amongst policiticians in the public eye is frightening.
>
> And the depth of innumeracy and illiteracy (comprehension) among the
> public including teachers bodes ill for the future.
>
> So many people with a platform to spread their message and no
> substance.
>
> And having been involved in IT in one way or another since the late
> '60s I increasingly have grown distrustful of systems being introduced
> and the lack of ability for them to be administrated. Roll on AI.

There is a recent BBC news report, which outlines some of the history
of Fujitsu's involvement with the UK, and also suggests that Horizon is
not the only Fujitsu product which has had problems:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-61020075

'Fujitsu Japan remains tight-lipped on the Post Office scandal

'... Horizon was not the first Fujitsu-developed software that has
created problems for the UK government.

'In 1999, the firm won a £184m contract to develop Libra - a
software meant to standardise case management transactions
across more than 300 magistrates' courts.

'In the end, it cost nearly three times more than expected, and
the National Audit Office concluded that it was not able to produce
even basic financial information.

'... Fujitsu was one of four companies tasked with digitising the
NHS in 2004. But after repeated delays and failure to deliver the
promised product, the NHS terminated its contract with Fujitsu in
2008.

'The Japanese company sued and won the case in 2014, which
cost the UK government £700m.'

[AnthonyL]

Horizon is likely one of many and only high in the public's view due
to the recent documentary.

Try googling
failed large it projects

or add uk to narrow the search

https://www.theregister.com/2021/07/23/nao_govt_it_projects/

But the issue isn't limited to IT is it? We don't do large projects
and there must be common factors: poor technical skills, poor
management skills, poor budgeting skills, over reliance on
sub-contractors and I'm sure the list goes on.

[Simon Parker]

Bear in mind that both the SRA and BSB are not going to bring charges
against any of their members until the Horizon Inquiry has concluded.

I anticipate more than a few such charges being brought.

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

ATMs have cameras in them. Why wasn't the camera evidence adduced by
either side? (Asking for a friend.)

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

Intermittent bugs are, by their nature, intermittent.

A good friend started his career in software development as a
play-tester at a major software house that produced well-known titles.
(This was a part-time role whilst he was getting the relevant
qualifications to enable him to move into software development.)

It seems like the ideal job, but he assured me at the time (30-ish years
ago) that it was mind-numbingly boring.

Typical Bug report:
"Alpha testing has reported a sprite collision in level <a> around
location <b>, investigation required."

Brief to play-tester.
"Here's a save file for level <a>. Suspected sprite collision at
location <b>. Load the save file and repeatedly play around location
<b> using all possible avenues and see if you can replicate the
collision and report what sequence causes it."

Result:
He spent most of the day playing the same five minute sequence of the
same level over and over (and over and over and over) again.

His reward, should he find the error was to be given a save file for
level <c> and location <d>.

It seems that both the testing, support and bug fix cycles within
Horizon were woefully inadequate.

I've previously mentioned the Dalmellington Bug, but here's the timeline
for the identification and resolution of that bug [1]

Timeline of Events from 2015

8 Oct: Sub postmistress (SPM) at Dalmellington branch sees that Horizon
(HOL) has replicated the same transaction she has just entered three
additional times. The value of the transaction was £8k. The result of
the 3 replicated transactions meant her branch accounts as calculated by
HOL had £24k more in cash than actually existed. At that moment in
time, because of the SPM contract she had signed, she was liable to POL
for that £24k.

8 Oct: SPM requests help on a Facebook site from fellow SPMs. Advice
given is to call the help line and report the problem. She does this
and according to the SPM the help desk advise her that it must be a
"system" problem and to call the technical support team.

8 Oct: SPM calls the technical help desk and reports to the Facebook
group that they did not understand the problem. They state that it
will 'probably' be rectified remotely.

8 Oct: The CWU Subpostmasters branch emails the Service Manager at ATOS
with details of the problem and asks for assistance on behalf of the member.

9 Oct: SPM reports to the Facebook group that no one has called back
from POL help desks.

9 Oct: The ATOS service manager replies to the CWU saying that he asked
someone to look into it.

12 Oct: The SPM receives a brief call from ATOS stating that they are
looking into it and she should receive a call from NBSC.

13 Oct: Five days after the error occurred and after close of business
the SPM advises the Facebook group that no one has called back. This
results in another member of the FB group suggesting that she contact
directly a person in the Financial Services Centre (FSC) that has helped
her with a similar problem in the past.

13 Oct: CWU reminds ATOS that nothing has been done about the error

14 Oct: An early morning discussion on FB discloses worrying
similarities between previous Horizon errors that had to be corrected
manually by the FSC for other FB subpostmasters.

14 Oct: The SPM phones the contact at the FSC and explains the problem.
The person from the Cash Currency Stock Control Team finds the
transactions that have caused the error and attempts to 'fix' the
problem in Chesterfield. Unbelievably he explains that he was not able
to do this because the branch where the error occurred does not have a
'unique' number! He advises the SPM to 'move' the missing money from
the branch where the error occurred to another of the sub postmistress's
branches. He would then be able to 'fix' the problem centrally. The
SPM refuses to do this as it would be a fraudulent transaction.

14 Oct: Tim McCormack[2] sends an email to Paula Vennells telling her of
the problem.

15 Oct: CWU send a detailed synopsis of what has transpired so far to
ATOS and the complete lack of action on the part of ATOS to resolve this
matter.

19 Oct: SPM reports on FB that the matter still has not been resolved.
From a financial viewpoint it is understand this to be down to the need
to get a unique code allocated to the branch.

23 Oct: CWU receives email from ATOS "explaining" what has happened and
how they are going to make sure it doesn’t happen in the future.

The email suggests the 'root cause' of the error occurred because of a
process that SPMs familiar with HOL say simply could note have happened
in this branch. It goes on to suggest that they have had the same error
in other branches and it is likely "across the whole estate" (i.e.
affects the whole of HOL).

They say they can prevent this happening again by a code fix that they
will introduce into Horizon next March.

The SPM received a transaction correction for the missing £24k and then
successfully completed a similar transaction to the one that she had
noticed the error on. The SPM commented on Facebook that prior to the
error she had performed the same transaction hundreds of times
previously with no error.

3 Nov: After carefully checking and double checking the full facts of
this case, the CWU Subpostmasters branch issue a warning email to its
members to be on the lookout for such an error.

3 Nov: Tim McCormack sends another email to Paula Vennells pointing out
to her that she needs to get personally involved in this chain of events.

5 Nov: Computer Weekly publish a front page article highlighting the
memo that the CWU felt necessary to send out to their members.
Computer Weekly asks POL for comment but POL re-iterate there are no
errors in Horizon, despite CWU having received written confirmation that
the error (that the POL PR team remain blissfully unaware of) is going
to be fixed next March.

Regards

S.P.

[1] From
https://problemswithpol.wordpress.com/2015/11/10/the-error-in-horizon/

[2] https://problemswithpol.wordpress.com/about/

[Simon Parker]

On 12/01/2024 15:29, Adam Funk wrote:
> (Apologies if this has already been posted in one of the Horizon
> threads but I missed it.)
>
> Quote:
>
> The legal presumption that computers are reliable stems from an
> older common law principle that “mechanical instruments” should be
> presumed to be in working order unless proven otherwise. That
> assumption means that if, for instance, a police officer quotes the
> time on their watch, a defendant cannot force the prosecution to
> call a horologist to explain from first principles how watches
> work.
>
> For a period, computers lost that protection in England and
> Wales. A 1984 act of parliament ruled that computer evidence was
> only admissible if it could be shown that the computer was used and
> operating properly. But that act was repealed in 1999, just months
> before the first trials of the Horizon system began.
>
> As a result, when post office operators were accused of having
> stolen money, the hallucinatory evidence of the Horizon system was
> deemed sufficient proof. Without any evidence to the contrary, the
> defendants could not force the system to be tested in court and
> their loss was all but guaranteed.
>
> <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/12/update-law-on-computer-evidence-to-avoid-horizon-repeat-ministers-urged>

I disagree with the Guardian's claims and do not think this is the way
forward.

If there is, as claimed, a "legal presumption that computers are
reliable" then it is a rebuttable presumption and one that will be
covered by the rules of disclosure.

The problem with the Post Office cases isn't that the Horizon system was
presumed to be reliable, but that the Post Office and Fujitsu knew that
it wasn't reliable but failed to comply with the rules of disclosure and
continued adducing statements from expert witnesses which they knew to
be false, thereby hiding issues. They also failed to acknowledge that
there were similarities in the discrepancies of certain cases which
could be down to Horizon.

They recognised internally that they had an issue should Horizon's
accuracy by questioned and so sought to protect that at all costs,
rather than focussing on their primary core duty which is to the court
in the administration of justice.

I've just made a post elsewhere on the so-called "Clarke advice" which
maps directly onto this subject.

The problem wasn't with the rules. It was that people were deliberately
flouting them for their own advantage.

I hope the experts and lawyers concerned are hung from the nearest
symbolic yard arm when the time comes as they have, IMO, brought
disgrace on the legal profession with their behaviour.

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

In numerous Post Office cases, the defence called for disclosure of
known bugs (the so-called IKE log) within Horizon prior to the cases
going to trial.

The Post Office refused to disclose it on the grounds that it was too
expensive to do so. (See the Hamilton judgment I've just referenced in
an earlier post elsewhere.)

The Post Office had to pay a fee to Fujitsu for each document they
provided so there would be a fee for the log itself and an additional
fee for every bug report listed in the log, and an additional fee for
each update to each bug report listed in the log, and an additional fee...

It is easy to see purely from a cost perspective why the Post Office
didn't want to disclose it, and it is arguable that it is reasonable for
them to have taken this stance. (I am not saying that I agree with it,
or even that it *is* reasonable. Merely that it is *arguable* that it
is reasonable.)

However, when the matter proceeded to trial, something along the
following lines should have transpired:

Defence Counsel (DC): Mr Expert Witness (EW), are there any known bugs,
failings, shortcomings, or otherwise irregularities as to the correct
and proper functioning of the Horizon system that could give rise to the
discrepancies in the account balances other than through the actions of
my client?

EW: Yes. We have a bug list as long as your arm. Longer than your arm
even. We have known bugs with cash deposits whereby at intermittent and
as yet undetermined times the same cash deposit is processed multiple
times giving rise to a shortfall. Similarly, we have a bug where a
sequence of transactions, either from earlier in the day or from the
previous day, is processed for a second time by the Horizon system. Oh,
and we know that Fujitsu technical support operatives can access the
Horizon system and change the balances both of individual terminals and
of the branch's closing balance without leaving any kind of forensic
footprint within the system - only what is recorded in the call logs.
And we have no idea how often they're doing this as we haven't asked for
the logs because it is too expensive to ask Fujitsu to confirm how bad
the system is and how often they're having to do it. We're aware of at
least one case where a SPM was being trained to use the Horizon system,
which means that each transaction entered was observed by the trainer to
ensure no mistakes were made, and despite this careful scrutiny of each
transaction, there was a shortfall of £200 with the closing balance at
the end of the day. The SPM called Horizon tech support, as they were
instructed to do by the trainer, and the tech support intervened.
Unfortunately, their intervention resulted in the sum doubling from £200
to £400 at which point the trainer advised the SPM to accept the
incorrect balance on the terminal and the trainer would make a note of
what had happened and rectify it the following day.

The actual answer given was:

EW: No. None whatsoever.

>> There is a similar presumption in litigation that any document disclosed
>> is admissible as evidence of its contents - unless challenged by one's
>> opponent. Then it might be necessary to call someone to prove it.
>
> A friend of mine was sued on the basis of a forged document, and as
> far as I recall he had a very uphill struggle indeed to prove that
> the signature was fake.
>
>> I don't know if it would have been possible to challenge the Horizon
>> evidence during a prosecution. I don't think any criminal lawyers have
>> been interviewed about this. Yes, one could seek disclosure of other
>> complaints, of any bug reports, maybe require a Fujitsu person to attend
>> court to testify as to whether any staff ever alter the data inputted by
>> the sub postmasters without them knowing.
>
> I was under the impression that the *whole point* is that exactly this
> was done, and the evidence was not disclosed and the witnesses lied.

Indeed. See the so-called "Clarke Advice" referenced elsewhere.

Regards

S.P.

[Pancho]

On 18/01/2024 16:40, Simon Parker wrote:

>> <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/12/update-law-on-computer-evidence-to-avoid-horizon-repeat-ministers-urged>
>
> I disagree with the Guardian's claims and do not think this is the way
> forward.
>
> If there is, as claimed, a "legal presumption that computers are
> reliable" then it is a rebuttable presumption and one that will be
> covered by the rules of disclosure.
>

I think the problem is with the understanding of reliable. We knew a
policeman's watch might run slow or fast. So it wasn't expected to be
exact. Any sensible person would not expect computer software to be bug
free. In particular, when presented as evidence, courts should remember
the prosecutor's fallacy, conditional probability. Courts should not
confuse the probability of the computer being correct in general, with
the conditional probability of the computer being correct in a dispute.

A sensible maxim for the court to adopt would be that a computerised
system designed to be used as evidence, such an accountancy system, or
ANPR, should be expected to produce independent verification, an
explanation of why it is correct. e.g. speed camera photos with lines in
the road.

[Tim Jackson]

On Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:46:21 +0000, Simon Parker wrote...

> A good friend started his career in software development as a
> play-tester at a major software house that produced well-known titles.
> (This was a part-time role whilst he was getting the relevant
> qualifications to enable him to move into software development.)

A long time ago [1] in a land far, far away, my wife got an admin job at
a small software development company.

She wasn't a software engineer, but they soon realised she was good at
using computers.

So when they had written a new program (business software) they would
give it to her and ask her to play with it. The brief was to do stupid
things that a user might do, but the developers hadn't thought of. And
see what broke.

For the avoidance of doubt, my wife is far from stupid. But she was a
user who thought differently from the softies.


[1] Long before we met. She had recently left college.

--
Tim Jackson
ne...@timjackson.invalid
(Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

[Pancho]

On 19/01/2024 10:04, Tim Jackson wrote:

> A long time ago [1] in a land far, far away, my wife got an admin job at
> a small software development company.
>
> She wasn't a software engineer, but they soon realised she was good at
> using computers.
>
> So when they had written a new program (business software) they would
> give it to her and ask her to play with it. The brief was to do stupid
> things that a user might do, but the developers hadn't thought of. And
> see what broke.
>

That was standard practice, with any good admin staff.

> For the avoidance of doubt, my wife is far from stupid. But she was a
> user who thought differently from the softies.
>

There is no doubt. When a programmer asks someone to do stupid things,
it is because intelligent people understand and avoid issues, which is
not what you want in testing. Really speaking, a lot of it isn't about
intelligence, more about knowledge of software. Naive admin staff were
good because they had the intelligence to recognise and communicate
problems without the knowledge of how to unthinkingly avoid them.

[Clive Page]

On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:
> However, when the matter proceeded to trial, something along the following lines should have transpired:
>
> Defence Counsel (DC): Mr Expert Witness (EW), are there any known bugs, failings, shortcomings, or otherwise irregularities as to the correct and proper functioning of the Horizon system that could give rise to the discrepancies in the account balances other than through the actions of my client?
>

[snip]

>
> The actual answer given was:
>
> EW: No.  None whatsoever.

It is a great pity that lawyers are so naive about software. Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled with bugs.

Software is written by humans and humans often make mistakes. Hence software is inherently unreliable, unless proven otherwise. And proving otherwise can be very difficult. Software errors can be reduced by a culture which includes code reviews and the enforcement of coding standards followed by a comprehensive and rigorous testing programme. But the examples of appallingly written code brought to light in the current enquiry suggest that for significant parts of the Horizon system none of this was in existence.

Would a compulsory computer science module as part of every law degree help lawyers to challenge assertions about the robustness of software? I'm not sure, but it might.

--
Clive Page

[AnthonyL]

I ran a small computer company and whilst being reasonably technically
literate I was far from a good programmer. I would however spend time
testing, and where applicable, using software that we had written and
I've had programmers near to tears when they've said a routine was
finished and I'd crash it within 10 minutes doing exactly as your
wife, going into options or make entries in a non-obvious way. One
programmer took a while to accept that I didn't have a special key
under the keyboard that caused crashes.

We had one bug in the accounting software that took a long while to
track down and in the end we were able to reliably reproduce it. The
fault was in the Clipper language version we were using and did not
occur if we ran and compiled in an older version. Nantuket (creators
of Clipper) eventually accepted and corrected their software and we
got a free upgrade to the next new version.

As I've said elsewhere, and before, I don't trust computers and I
certainly don't trust people who do.

[Roland Perry]

In message <l0v3nq...@mid.individual.net>, at 11:11:54 on Fri, 19
Jan 2024, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> remarked:

>Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled with bugs.

I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of line
editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped millions of
copies on what were at the time the market leading products.

No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.

It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
pre-launch testing regime in place.
--
Roland Perry

[Mark Goodge]

On Fri, 19 Jan 2024 11:11:54 +0000, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> wrote:

>It is a great pity that lawyers are so naive about software. Every programmer
>knows that all programs of any size are riddled with bugs.

That's not really true. There's a lot of software out there that works
perfectly well. And it's demonstrably easy to write software that is
bug-free. I can guarantee that pretty much any programmer can write a
flawless "hello world", for example :-)

It is true that the more complex the software, and the more features it has,
the more likely it is to contain bugs. And that's also why proper testing is
an essential part of the process. But that's not the same as saying that all
software is inherently bug-ridden. Most software that most people use on a
day to day basis isn't buggy.

Mark

[Fredxx]

Sorry, but your experience is not typical. Your code probably had one
thread on one CPU.

I have worked in teams, writing code and testing for a safety critical
system. These will be a multiprocessor system using a safety qualified
multitasking OS.

Bugs abound, some very subtle indeed, for example where a byte goes AWOL
every few million or so, and the like. The secret is to detect such
errors and to log them. You can test every aspect you can possibly think
of, where there may be several thousand tests, some involving the manual
reading/verification of code, others 'hardware in the loop', but still
some bugs slip through.

When it goes into the wild it's fingers crossed nothing goes wrong or
anyone killed. The only thing the company can say it wasn't negligent,
but any failure leading to death is a marketing disaster.

It's easy to gloss over bugs. This is a case I looked into out of
personal interest:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration#Sudden_acceleration_in_Toyota_vehicles

Even NASA couldn't see any issue. Whereas the study by Michael Bar found
numerous issues with the Toyota software.

In Aviation there is a belief that memory can become corrupted at any point:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-event_upset
A system must cope with this.

This makes interesting reading regarding a 737 Max flight control
software bug:
https://www.theregister.com/2019/08/02/737_max_cosmic_bit_flipping_test/

In short, I wonder the integrity of the Horizon software. Yet the
software must be simple in comparison to software I have worked on!

[Simon Parker]

On 19/01/2024 11:11, Clive Page wrote:
> On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:
>> However, when the matter proceeded to trial, something along the
>> following lines should have transpired:
>>
>> Defence Counsel (DC): Mr Expert Witness (EW), are there any known
>> bugs, failings, shortcomings, or otherwise irregularities as to the
>> correct and proper functioning of the Horizon system that could give
>> rise to the discrepancies in the account balances other than through
>> the actions of my client?
>>
> [snip]
>
>>
>> The actual answer given was:
>>
>> EW: No.  None whatsoever.
>
> It is a great pity that lawyers are so naive about software.   Every
> programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled with bugs.

*Every* programmer? *All* programs? Of *any* size? *Riddled* with bugs?

I think you meant "Most competent programmers appreciate that programs
that are large and / or complex are likely to contain bugs, errors and /
or defects." (since a 'competent programmer' is likely to recognise the
difference between the three classes of problem that should be caught
in-house and refer to them using the correct nomenclature. :-) (The
fourth class being "faults" in case anyone is taking notes.)

Hyperbole aside, I don't believe lawyers are naive about software, nor
hardware for that matter. (Pedantically, the issues with Horizon were
not confined to software issues. Some of the problems identified were
with the terminals themselves, i.e. the hardware. That too can
malfunction and cause issues. And then there's the third set of issues
that arise from a combination of errors in both hardware and software.)

I am not aware of any lawyers that do not use technology in their day to
day operations. Any regular user of technology knows that it does not
always function as intended.

I would even go so far as to suggest that some of those with whom I'm
acquainted in the legal profession have an understanding of technology
that I would describe as above average as they make extensive use of
technology both to simplify and standardise their operations and to
leverage an advantage over their competitors. (Full disclosure: a good
friend that lives in a nearby village and that I see every few weeks
(and therefore with whom I "talk geek" regularly), used to work for the
company responsible for one of the software platforms used by many legal
firms. He's recently moved to a new company that is in the process of
writing a new solution which will launch later this year, hopefully
capturing a significant portion of the market, so I am familiar with
both current and emerging solutions through discussions with him.
Additionally, I have personal experience of working for a large "magic
circle" law firm and I would describe their knowledge and use of IT as
"close to cutting edge". (Depending on your level of interest, I invite
you to research "Harvey" which is the latest technological innovation in
which they have partnered.) In case it isn't clear from this and some
of my historic posts, I am keenly interested in the intersection between
the legal profession and IT.)

In the recent Post Office cases, both legal teams and the court were
using electronic bundles. That requires a certain proficiency in IT so
to suggest the people in court were naive and ignorant technophiles that
believed everything they were told about technology has no basis in reality.

The key word in the sample question I posed is "known" and this is the
fact around which the conclusions of the inquiry and future disciplinary
and legal actions against those involved are likely to revolve.

(Tangentially, I note that the SRA have issued a new statement [1]
yesterday concerning their Horizon investigation which reiterates that
their "rules set out that solicitors must work to high professional and
ethical standards. This includes upholding the rule of law, acting with
integrity, and in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the
profession. As officers of the court, solicitors should never put other
interests - such as the outcome for their client - above the law and the
proper administration of justice. We are investigating, with live cases
into a number of solicitors and law firms who were working on behalf of
the Post Office/Royal Mail Group.")

A system that is the size and complexity of Horizon is expected to have
bugs, errors, defects and faults. But when that particular system has
tens of thousands of end points installed at over 13,000 locations and
has gone through multiple iterations of development and numerous major
improvement cycles then when the experts charged with providing details
of the operational integrity of the system state to the court that it is
"robust", then the court must conclude that this is the case unless and
until evidence to the contrary is adduced.

And in the case of Horizon, it was extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the defence to adduce the "smoking gun" demonstrating
that Horizon was not "robust" as the Post Office would not provide
details of any known bugs, errors, defects and / or faults to the
defendants as they claimed it was too costly to do so. Similarly, even
as issues were becoming known about, the Post Office went to great pains
to detail why the issue was not relevant in the instant case, informing
the court that this was nothing more than a smear campaign to discredit
Horizon and cast doubt upon the guilt of the accused.

Taking one case as an example to demonstrate this, that of R v Seema
Misra In written evidence to Parliament's Justice Committee, the
barrister who had started her representation at her appeal in the
Hamilton case said, that at "Mrs Misra's criminal trial, on ... three
separate occasions, the defence applied to three separate judges to have
the prosecution stopped on the basis that the disclosure given by the
Post Office was woefully inadequate and the prosecution an abuse of
process...".

(Tangentially, I question his use of the word "applied" as the
transcript (note: transcript not judgment) from the case shows that the
judge remarked that whilst they had written to the Post Office and asked
for certain items to be disclosed, their request was too large, (they
wanted a copy of every single transaction ever made for every terminal
for the branch concerned) and that they did not make a formal
application to the court for disclosure when the Post Office was not
forthcoming with the documents for which they were asking.)

And even if the Post Office were minded to disclose what had been
requested, there is no guarantee that they would have been able to
provide the defendants with everything they needed as Paul Patterson,
the Fujitsu CEO and Head of Northern & Western Europe, admitted
yesterday in his evidence to the Horizon Public Inquiry that Fujitsu
edited the logs before sending them to the Post Office. He also
admitted that Witness Statements made by Fujitsu employees were altered
by the Post Office to remove incriminating references to bugs, errors
and defects before being adduced.

I invite everyone to re-read that last paragraph and remind themselves
that the first duty of any and all officers of the court is to the court
itself.

And even if the legal presumption on the reliability of computers is
reversed, as some are requesting, edited logs and altered Witness
Statements aren't going to be much use in proving anything besides what
Fujitsu the Post Office wanted to prove.

In short, this is about what was known by whom and when, and who was
hiding what from whom? The presumed reliability (or otherwise) of
computers is neither here nor there and would not have made much
difference in this case.

> Software is written by humans and humans often make mistakes.  Hence
> software is inherently unreliable, unless proven otherwise.  And proving
> otherwise can be very difficult.  Software errors can be reduced by a
> culture which includes code reviews and the enforcement of coding
> standards followed by a comprehensive and rigorous testing programme.
> But the examples of appallingly written code brought to light in the
> current enquiry suggest that for significant parts of the Horizon system
> none of this was in existence.
>
> Would a compulsory computer science module as part of every law degree
> help lawyers to challenge assertions about the robustness of software?
> I'm not sure, but it might.

As above, and with the greatest of respect, I believe you're looking for
a solution in the wrong place.

Lawyers aren't expected to be experts in all disciplines which they need
to present in court. That's why there are expert witnesses.

The primary responsibility of the expert witness is to the court, the
same as it is for the prosecution and defence teams / claimant and
respondent.

The testimony from the Post Office's expert witnesses appears to have
been less than accurate and certainly some way short of meeting the
levels of disclosure required.

I'll avoid saying more than that and instead quote the words of (the
then) Mr Justice Fraser from the judgment in Bates v Post Office Ltd (No 3):

Of Angela van den Bogerd (Head of Partnerships, Post Office): she "did
not give me frank evidence, and sought to obfuscate matters, and mislead
me."

Of the evidence given by Stephen Parker, Head of Post Office Application
Support, Fujitsu: "I do not consider that Mr Parker was interested in
accuracy in any of his evidential exercises. ... I do not consider his
evidence in his witness statements to have been remotely accurate, even
though he stoutly maintained that it was".

Of the evidence of one Post Office witness: "The Post Office appears, at
least at times, to conduct itself as though it is answerable only to
itself. The statement that it is prepared to preserve documents – as
though that were a concession – and the obdurate to accept the relevance
of plainly important documents, and to refuse to produce them, is
extremely worrying."

As I've said previously, this wasn't a case of the courts not
understanding technology but of the courts being deliberately fed
inaccurate and incomplete evidence.

To my mind, the solution therefore is to deal with those responsible
using the relevant legal and regulatory channels.

The Metropolitan Police has already been investigating the potential
offences of perjury and perverting the course of justice in relation to
investigations and prosecutions carried out by the Post Office.

Scotland Yard has subsequently said that officers are "investigating
potential fraud offences arising out of these prosecutions", for example
"monies recovered from sub-postmasters as a result of prosecutions or
civil actions".

Then there's the statements from the SRA and the BSB.

If, and only if, the above actions do not produce suitable results do I
think the British Computer Society's proposal to change the legal
presumption on computers being reliable becomes necessary.

But let's let the relevant existing systems complete their work before
introducing knee-jerk legislation.

Regards

S.P.

[1] https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/post-office-update-2024/

[Roland Perry]

In message <uoe47j$36kii$1...@dont-email.me>, at 15:24:35 on Fri, 19 Jan
2024, Fredxx <fre...@spam.invalid> remarked:

>On 19/01/2024 12:33, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <l0v3nq...@mid.individual.net>, at 11:11:54 on Fri, 19
>>Jan 2024, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> remarked:
>>
>>> Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled
>>>with bugs.

>> I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of
>>line editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped
>>millions of copies on what were at the time the market leading products.

>> No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.
>> It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
>>pre-launch testing regime in place.
>
>Sorry, but your experience is not typical. Your code probably had one
>thread on one CPU.

COUGH! The proposition was "all programs".

I probably spent FTE a week writing/testing it for the Z80, and another
porting it by hand to 8086 (for PC Clones).
--
Roland Perry

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-20, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

> On Sat, 20 Jan 2024 09:32:56 +0000, Simon Parker wrote:
>> (Tangentially, I note that the SRA have issued a new statement [1]
>> yesterday concerning their Horizon investigation which reiterates that
>> their "rules set out that solicitors must work to high professional and
>> ethical standards. This includes upholding the rule of law, acting with
>> integrity, and in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the
>> profession.
>

> Well that's well and truly shot now. It's the while legal system that
> failed here. Tell me why I should have any faith in it whatsoever.
> Bearing in mind my choice in the matter.
>
> The bottom line is I don't trust anyone because of their profession. And
> nor should I. Or you.

That would seriously complicate many things. Many systems are set up on
the (on the face of it, not unreasonable) premise that if a person is a
member of a (potentially) lucrative profession that takes many years to
study for and enter, they will be strongly incentivised to stick to the
rules of that profession lest they be kicked out of it.

Of course, the balance between kicking people out too readily (and thus
disincentivising people from joining that profession to start with) and
not kicking people out readily enough (thus making the regulation of no
practical use) is a fine one.

[Owen Rees]

Roland Perry <rol...@perry.uk> wrote:
> In message <uoe47j$36kii$1...@dont-email.me>, at 15:24:35 on Fri, 19 Jan
> 2024, Fredxx <fre...@spam.invalid> remarked:
>> On 19/01/2024 12:33, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <l0v3nq...@mid.individual.net>, at 11:11:54 on Fri, 19
>>> Jan 2024, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> remarked:
>>>
>>>> Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled
>>>> with bugs.
>
>>> I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of
>>> line editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped
>>> millions of copies on what were at the time the market leading products.
>
>>> No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.
>>> It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
>>> pre-launch testing regime in place.
>>
>> Sorry, but your experience is not typical. Your code probably had one
>> thread on one CPU.
>
> COUGH! The proposition was "all programs".

“All programs of any size” where “of any size” is usually interpreted to
mean larger than some particular but unstated size.

I generally consider statements that say “all X have vaguely specified
property Y” to be of little value.

>
> I probably spent FTE a week writing/testing it for the Z80, and another
> porting it by hand to 8086 (for PC Clones).

I suspect that any program that can be written by one person in a week is
probably below the size threshold in the proposition.

I have written relatively small programs is a relatively short time that
did not have any known bugs last I heard but I do not think that means that
all the programs I write are bug free.

[Spike]

Simon Parker <simonpa...@gmail.com> wrote:

<snip>

> A system that is the size and complexity of Horizon is expected to have
> bugs, errors, defects and faults. But when that particular system has
> tens of thousands of end points installed at over 13,000 locations and
> has gone through multiple iterations of development and numerous major
> improvement cycles then when the experts charged with providing details
> of the operational integrity of the system state to the court that it is
> "robust", then the court must conclude that this is the case unless and
> until evidence to the contrary is adduced.

<snip>

Picking up on this point, there is nothing at all that is the product of
human endeavour, be it transport systems, banking systems, Moon landers,
economies, nuclear ballistic missiles, vaccinations, bridges, sewage
systems, special military operations, or whatever, that is free from one of
bugs, errors, defects, or faults.

Unless the term ‘robust’ has been legally defined as e.g. some level of
performance that is acceptable but less than perfect, then surely it has no
relevance when presented as evidence, and should not be accepted prima
facie by anyone.

Note that legal systems are also the product of human endeavour <cough,
splutter>

--
Spike

[The Todal]

On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:

I see that in many cases the postmaster pleaded guilty. Was this because
the lawyer had tried and failed to obtain disclosure of relevant
documents or was it because the lawyer actually thought that the
client's protestations of innocence were a desperate bluff?

Is the Hamilton judgment this one?
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2021/577.html

When considering the various appellants, this phrase comes up more than
once: "There was no proof of an actual loss as opposed to a
Horizon-generated shortage". I wonder whether it was wrong to advise
the defendant to plead guilty and whether that point could have been
argued more strongly and taken to appeal if necessary.

I wonder whether defence lawyers should have objected strenuously to the
terms of the plea bargains whereby the defendants are required to
withdraw any criticism of Horizon. Maybe it should have been brought to
the attention of the trial judge. After all, the Post Office accepted
before the Court of Appeal judges that the condition was improper ("POL
accepts that it was improper to make the acceptability of Mrs Hall's
basis of plea to fraud conditional on not making any criticism of the
Horizon system"). Did defence lawyers meekly comply with the request,
believing that their plea bargain was a good strategic move for a client
who had no real defence?

The case of Seema Misra is interesting inasmuch as the defence made
"numerous disclosure requests". Experts gave evidence at the trial.
Evidently they did so with inadequate information about the Horizon system.

The Post Office resisted full disclosure because of the cost of getting
the information from Fujitsu. That's no excuse and the defence should
have demanded the documents and the trial judge should have supported
such a demand. And there is this important passage in the Court of
Appeal judgment:

quote

Seema Misra had been appointed an SPM in 2005. We note that in a report
prepared by Second Sight in April 2015 (in connection with the
possibility of mediation), the appellant is recorded as saying:

"she was surprised to find that discrepancies occurred on each day
of her onsite training, particularly as the trainer had watched every
transaction she carried out that week. She adds that in the second week,
an unexplained shortfall of approximately £200 occurred whilst
balancing, and that the trainer rang the Helpline for assistance. She
says that the trainer followed the Helpline's instructions, which had
the effect of causing the shortfall to double, after which the trainer
told her "we have to make the till good now and you might get an error
notice". She says that this 'doubling' of a loss also occurred on
another unspecified occasion in relation to a £2,000 discrepancy. Post
Office states that there are no records in the NBSC call logs of the
call that the Applicant asserts was made by the trainer and that 'due to
the time that has elapsed there are no transaction logs available for
the Applicant's training period'."

We observe that this appears to be a striking instance of a problem with
Horizon, of which independent evidence was or should have been available
from the person who was training the appellant in its use.

unquote

I wonder whether the defence could and should have witness-summonsed the
trainer to give evidence.

[The Todal]

On 20/01/2024 14:21, Jethro_uk wrote:

> On Sat, 20 Jan 2024 12:35:44 +0000, Jon Ribbens wrote:
>
>> On 2024-01-20, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
>>> On Sat, 20 Jan 2024 09:32:56 +0000, Simon Parker wrote:
>>>> (Tangentially, I note that the SRA have issued a new statement [1]
>>>> yesterday concerning their Horizon investigation which reiterates that
>>>> their "rules set out that solicitors must work to high professional
>>>> and ethical standards. This includes upholding the rule of law,
>>>> acting with integrity, and in a way that upholds public trust and
>>>> confidence in the profession.
>>>
>>> Well that's well and truly shot now. It's the while legal system that
>>> failed here. Tell me why I should have any faith in it whatsoever.
>>> Bearing in mind my choice in the matter.
>>>
>>> The bottom line is I don't trust anyone because of their profession.
>>> And nor should I. Or you.
>>
>> That would seriously complicate many things. Many systems are set up on
>> the (on the face of it, not unreasonable) premise that if a person is a
>> member of a (potentially) lucrative profession that takes many years to
>> study for and enter, they will be strongly incentivised to stick to the
>> rules of that profession lest they be kicked out of it.
>

> I'll believe it when I see it.

I think there can be a strong incentive to protect a client's interests
even if that means withholding important evidence (some lawyers are
intimidated by pushy clients and by threats to take their future
business elsewhere if the lawyer does not perform). And then an
incentive to cover up any actions that might be professionally
questionable. The SRA and the Bar Council might yet take action, if the
outcome of the Inquiry puts lawyers in the firing line.

[pensive hamster]

On Saturday, January 20, 2024 at 9:33:05 AM UTC, Simon Parker wrote:
[...]

> And even if the Post Office were minded to disclose what had been
> requested, there is no guarantee that they would have been able to
> provide the defendants with everything they needed as Paul Patterson,
> the Fujitsu CEO and Head of Northern & Western Europe, admitted
> yesterday in his evidence to the Horizon Public Inquiry that Fujitsu
> edited the logs before sending them to the Post Office. He also
> admitted that Witness Statements made by Fujitsu employees were altered
> by the Post Office to remove incriminating references to bugs, errors
> and defects before being adduced.
>
> I invite everyone to re-read that last paragraph and remind themselves
> that the first duty of any and all officers of the court is to the court
> itself.
>

[...]

> The primary responsibility of the expert witness is to the court, the
> same as it is for the prosecution and defence teams / claimant and
> respondent.
>
> The testimony from the Post Office's expert witnesses appears to have
> been less than accurate and certainly some way short of meeting the
> levels of disclosure required.

As a layman / non-lawyer, I am wondering, shouldn't editing computer
logs and altering Witness Statements be some kind of crime? Contempt
of Court, or falsifying evidence, or something?

[...]

[Fredxx]

On 20/01/2024 09:39, Roland Perry wrote:
> In message <uoe47j$36kii$1...@dont-email.me>, at 15:24:35 on Fri, 19 Jan
> 2024, Fredxx <fre...@spam.invalid> remarked:
>> On 19/01/2024 12:33, Roland Perry wrote:
>>> In message <l0v3nq...@mid.individual.net>, at 11:11:54 on Fri, 19
>>> Jan 2024, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> remarked:
>>>
>>>> Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled
>>>> with  bugs.
>
>>>  I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of
>>> line  editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped
>>> millions of  copies on what were at the time the market leading
>>> products.
>
>>>  No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.
>>>  It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
>>> pre-launch testing regime in place.
>>
>> Sorry, but your experience is not typical. Your code probably had one
>> thread on one CPU.
>
> COUGH! The proposition was "all programs".

Yes, that is the point I have issue with. Software complexity and
numbers of bugs are not a linear relationship with lines of code, but a
strongly exponential function.

> I probably spent FTE a week writing/testing it for the Z80, and another
> porting it by hand to 8086 (for PC Clones).

That's the exception rather than the rule. Most software I've worked on
the investment is measured in man-years by numerous people, each with
their own style. I'm sure the Horizon software took more than a man-week
to write and test.

[billy bookcase]

"Jethro_uk" <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote in message
news:uogkt0$3k5jd$3...@dont-email.me...
>
> My only intimate experience of a legal professional was buying my home.
> They managed to cock it up right royally, and then lie about it. This was
> before a firm my then employer hired who similarly managed to mess up
> their brief. At which point Oscar Wilde applies.

They had nothing to declare but their genius ?


bb

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-20, Jethro_uk <jeth...@hotmailbin.com> wrote:

> My only intimate experience of a legal professional was buying my home.
> They managed to cock it up right royally, and then lie about it. This was
> before a firm my then employer hired who similarly managed to mess up
> their brief. At which point Oscar Wilde applies.

Conveyancing is a perfect exmaple, though. How do you transfer ownership
of a very high value item, bearing in mind if the buyer goes first then
the seller might refuse to hand it over after they've received the money,
and if the seller goes first then the buyer might refuse to pay after
they've received it.

The answer is that members of a regulated profession - solicitors -
make the exchange. Because solicitors in general don't want to risk
losing their livelihoods, they're generally fairly trustworthy (at
least on matters which would get them in trouble with their regulator).
And you personally don't need to trust the specific solicitors involved,
because their statistical trustworthiness means that their professional
body can (and will) arrange insurance to repay you in the unlikely event
of them turning out to be crooks.

[Jon Ribbens]

Sounds like perverting the course of justice, which is in theory
punishable with up to life imprisonment.

[Roland Perry]

In message <uoghf2$3me2g$1...@dont-email.me>, at 13:22:42 on Sat, 20 Jan
2024, Owen Rees <or...@hotmail.com> remarked:

>Roland Perry <rol...@perry.uk> wrote:
>> In message <uoe47j$36kii$1...@dont-email.me>, at 15:24:35 on Fri, 19 Jan
>> 2024, Fredxx <fre...@spam.invalid> remarked:
>>> On 19/01/2024 12:33, Roland Perry wrote:
>>>> In message <l0v3nq...@mid.individual.net>, at 11:11:54 on Fri, 19
>>>> Jan 2024, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> remarked:
>>>>
>>>>> Every programmer knows that all programs of any size are riddled
>>>>> with bugs.
>>
>>>> I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of
>>>> line editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped
>>>> millions of copies on what were at the time the market leading products.
>>
>>>> No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.
>>>> It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
>>>> pre-launch testing regime in place.
>>>
>>> Sorry, but your experience is not typical. Your code probably had one
>>> thread on one CPU.
>>
>> COUGH! The proposition was "all programs".
>
>“All programs of any size” where “of any size” is usually
>interpreted to mean larger than some particular but unstated size.
>
>I generally consider statements that say “all X have vaguely specified
>property Y” to be of little value.

I've got the source code somewhere, and it's much longer than "PRINT
'Hello World".

The most complicated part wasn't doing the editing itself, but the logic
behind saving the previous version as a .BAK file, even if the media
also had the more previous version on it [generally, at that point, you
don't want to start asking person doing the editing if they mind
deleting the latter, or renaming it as $foo.BAK.BAK; although I have
some recent video editing software which does].

>> I probably spent FTE a week writing/testing it for the Z80, and another
>> porting it by hand to 8086 (for PC Clones).
>
>I suspect that any program that can be written by one person in a week is
>probably below the size threshold in the proposition.

You suspect wrongly. A programme used by millions of people is a
programme, even if it only took a week to write.

>I have written relatively small programs is a relatively short time that
>did not have any known bugs last I heard but I do not think that means that
>all the programs I write are bug free.

Your usenet postings are not bug-free either.

--
Roland Perry

[Roland Perry]

In message <uogvpu$3opve$1...@dont-email.me>, at 17:27:25 on Sat, 20 Jan
2024, Fredxx <fre...@spam.invalid> remarked:

>> I probably spent FTE a week writing/testing it for the Z80, and
>>another porting it by hand to 8086 (for PC Clones).
>
>That's the exception rather than the rule.

If that's your proposition, the rule needs redrafting.
--
Roland Perry

[Roland Perry]

In message <l129tj...@mid.individual.net>, at 16:15:47 on Sat, 20
Jan 2024, The Todal <the_...@icloud.com> remarked:

>I see that in many cases the postmaster pleaded guilty. Was this
>because the lawyer had tried and failed to obtain disclosure of
>relevant documents or was it because the lawyer actually thought that
>the client's protestations of innocence were a desperate bluff?

Oh for heavens sake. Have you even watched the TV programmes?

They pleaded guilty to false accounting, viz ticking a box saying "yes I
did steal this money, but will pay it back" because if they hadn't, they
would not have been allowed to open for business the following day.
--
Roland Perry

[Andy Walker]

On 19/01/2024 12:33, Roland Perry wrote:

> I have written very useful software (a screen editor in the era of
> line editors) which across Z80 and i286/386 platforms shipped
> millions of copies on what were at the time the market leading
> products.
> No-one has ever reported a bug, let alone later shown it had a bug.

Pride cometh before a fall. In the late 1970s, I too wrote a
screen editor, for our shiny new Unix system, intended to be much the
same as the screen editor that, at the same time, the Computing Centre
was developing for the University's mainframe. It came to ~6500 lines
[inc all features of the Unix "ed", all those of the CC editor, and
a large number of extra goodies]. It was essentially complete by
1980, was re-jigged a couple of times, eg to use the "curses" library
of VDU facilities, but was finalised in 1985. The source was then
untouched for over 20 years, during which time computers came and went,
OSs came and went, support staff came and went, C compilers came and
went. We just re-compiled when necessary.

So for over 25 years, it was the main editor in the Department,
exported to other depts and univs, used by thousands of students and
staff. In all that time, no-one ever reported a bug. Then, literally
two days before I retired, a colleague came into my office: "Andy, what
am I doing wrong, ...", and there was a 25yo bug, plain as a pikestaff.
Half an hour later, another colleague came into my office: "Andy, what
...", and a different 25yo bug. I have absolutely no idea how the two
bugs escaped detection on initial testing and in 25 years of development
and wide use.

If only I'd retired two days earlier, the colleagues would have
shrugged their shoulders and assumed they had misread the documentation.
Moral: retire earlier than you intend.

Since retirement, I still use my editor every day, and I have not
heard of any further bug.

> It just needs a sufficiently conscientious programmer, who has a
> pre-launch testing regime in place.

These things are easily seen to be necessary but not sufficient,
at least for projects of any decent size.

ICBA to chase it down [it has expired from E-S], but late last
year there was an article in "comp.risks" with a comment along the lines
of:

" A good programmer perpetrates ~1 bug per 1000 lines of code.
" The space shuttle was ~150 000 LoC.
" A modern fighter jet includes ~20 000 000 LoC.
" A modern electric car includes ~250 000 000 LoC.
" Go figure. "

[Similar articles have appeared elsewhere.] Numbers not guaranteed. I
don't know where Horizon fits on this spectrum, but it seems I may still
have ~4.5 undetected bugs in my editor. Second moral: limit your code
to 500 lines, then it will probably be bug-free, as long as you are a
good programmer.

--
Andy Walker, Nottingham.
Andy's music pages: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music
Composer of the day: www.cuboid.me.uk/andy/Music/Composers/Bucalossi

[Fredxx]

The general rule is that if it takes a week to write and test an
application then that's more a hobby rather than a typical professional
piece of work that will often take man-years of effort.

I'm sure the Horizon software investment is measured in man-years and
has several orders more complexity that anything that can be written and
tested in a week.

[The Todal]

Amusing, but obviously nothing to do with the legal process whereby the
defendants appeared in court and were advised whether or not to plead
guilty. Pleading guilty did not enable them to open for business the
following day or forever afterwards.

[Nick Odell]

On Sun, 21 Jan 2024 20:41:33 +0000, Andy Walker <a...@cuboid.co.uk>
wrote:

I too wrote a "perfect" computer program but it nearly brought the
house down anyway.

It was around 1967. I was at school, doing A-Level maths and our
teacher thought it would be a useful and interesting diversion to have
a go at assembly language computer programming. I was already mad
about musical instrument making and the obvious choice for me was to
write a programme to calculate the distance between the frets on one
stringed instrument and then go on to calculate the same for a range
of other possibler instruments. (I think you can see where this is
going....)

I wrote the program, somebody else punched holes in the paper tape and
then, along with my classmates, all clutching their paper tapes we
made our way to the county education office where "the educational
computer" was sat in a large caravan in the car park. Someone fed in
their paper tape. There was a lot of computery noise, then the
teletype in the far corner of the caravan started to chatter. It was
done. Somebody else had a go and then it was my turn.

I fed the paper tape into the machine. Nothing happened. Nothing
happened again. In fact nothing continued to happen for several
minutes until the technician said they would have to abort the
program. Just as his hand reached for the switch, the teletype started
to chatter and reams and reams of fan-folded paper spewed out. The
program hadn't stalled: it had been silently working things out all
along but with a double recursion it had just been taking a hell of a
long time to deal with it.

Many years later, when I got my first BBC Micro, I wrote the same
program in BBC Basic and it finished work about ten seconds later.

A few years after that I spent close on £4000[1] to buy my first 386DX
machine and I wrote the same thing out again in Microsoft's GW Basic.
As far as my eye could tell, the PC finished processing all the
instructions before the <Enter> had fully completed its downward
travel.

Nick
[1]£4000? I was running a business then and it was an allowable
expense

[Pancho]

Beyond these threads, I'm ignorant of the case, but I guessed at the
type of scenario Roland outlines. It is what people do, human nature.

A Google confirms my suspicions. Here is a ref to a specific case:

<https://evidencebasedjustice.exeter.ac.uk/case/lynette-hutchings/>

===
Horizon indicted a shortfall of £10,814.83 in Ms Hutching’s accounts and
she was investigated on that basis. She had called Horizon multiple
times for help, and when interviewed she made it clear that problems
with the accounts had arisen since her branch had transferred to Horizon
online. She had believed that the incorrect balances would be sorted out
by transaction corrections in time, although she admitted that she had
balanced the books to put off having to short out the problem. There was
no investigation into her complaints and she was charged with fraud and
false accounting. She pleaded guilty to one count of false accounting.
No evidence was offered against her on the fraud charge, and a not
guilty verdict was entered on that charge.
===

So technically this was a correct conviction.

I guess a possible defence could have been that she was induced to
submit false accounts by Horizon's errors and the Post Office's
unreasonable working practices. I've no idea about the legal viability
of such a defence. Possibly the threat of the fraud charge discouraged
her from defending the false accounting charge.

[Roger Hayter]

If one makes accounts to the best of one's ability, but then, in the face of a
so-called infallible computer program, says there must be mistake in my
accounts but I can't find it, I really do not see how one can be charged with
false accounting. Surely that requires intent? And it is not the repudiation
of her own accounts she is being charged with but he making of the original,
accurate account. So I strongly disagree that her guilty plea was justified.


--
Roger Hayter

[The Todal]

False accounting involves a mens rea.
"dishonestly, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent
to cause loss to another"

This would not be the case if a postmaster, trying to make the accounts
balance and knowing that he/she had not appropriated any of the funds,
altered the figures so that the accounts did balance at the end of the
day but indicated that there was a large sum of money as cash in hand
when there wasn't. Not only should they not have pleaaded guilty to
false accounting, their solicitors should (I think) not have recommended
that they plead guilty to that offence.

[Roger Hayter]

That really shows the evils of plea bargaining. People say we don't have it in
this country, but clearly we do. Apart from the statutory allowance in
sentencing for pleading guilty, it is very frequent for more serious charges
to be withdrawn in return for guilty pleas to lesser charges. We may not have
the American system (offering very major sentence discounts for a plea or for
incriminating others) but the effect of the system here can be just as
pernicious.



--
Roger Hayter

[Pancho]

On 22/01/2024 09:00, Roger Hayter wrote:

That isn't the way it works.

It sounds like she didn't declare the deficit to the PO. Her
"transaction correction" was opaque to the PO. £10,000 pounds of the
PO's money was missing and she deliberately concealed that fact from the
PO. (I understand it probably wasn't real money, but that was not known
when she acted). Alan Bates did the correct thing in reporting the problems.

Even if there wasn't money missing, if the books don't match there is a
duty to declare it. It would be foolish to trust someone incompetent,
who was incapable of balancing books, with large amounts of your money.

>
> Surely that requires intent? And it is not the repudiation
> of her own accounts she is being charged with but he making of the original,
> accurate account. So I strongly disagree that her guilty plea was justified.
>
>

There was an obvious personal gain from deliberately concealing account
discrepancies, it allowed the sub post master to continue trading. The
ability to trade as a sub post master was worth a considerable amount of
money.

This is the same as concealing errors in other professions. A doctor who
mistreats a patient, or a lawyer who messes up contract terms, and then
lies to avoid the consequences of their error.

There are strong mitigating factors, but she appears to have committed
the crime. There also appear to have been crimes committed against her
by the PO, and hence she should be entitled to damages, but... false
account is, and should be, a crime.

Possibly her crime could be considered under the same sort of principle
as a battered wife who snaps and kills her husband, i.e. her crime was
excused by the crime committed against her.

[Clive Page]

On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:

> However, when the matter proceeded to trial, something along the following lines should have transpired:

>

> Defence Counsel (DC): Mr Expert Witness (EW), are there any known bugs, failings, shortcomings, or otherwise irregularities as to the correct and proper functioning of the Horizon system that could give rise to the discrepancies in the account balances other than through the actions of my client?

>

> EW: Yes.  We have a bug list as long as your arm.  Longer than your arm even.  We have known bugs with cash deposits whereby at intermittent and as yet undetermined times the same cash deposit is processed multiple times giving rise to a shortfall.  Similarly, we have a bug where a sequence of transactions, either from earlier in the day or from the previous day, is processed for a second time by the Horizon system.  Oh, and we know that Fujitsu technical support operatives can access the Horizon system and change the balances both of individual terminals and of the branch's closing balance without leaving any kind of forensic footprint within the system - only what is recorded in the call logs. And we have no idea how often they're doing this as we haven't asked for the logs because it is too expensive to ask Fujitsu to confirm how bad the system is and how often they're having to do it.  We're aware of at least one case where a SPM was being trained to use the Horizon

> system, which means that each transaction entered was observed by the trainer to ensure no mistakes were made, and despite this careful scrutiny of each transaction, there was a shortfall of £200 with the closing balance at the end of the day.  The SPM called Horizon tech support, as they were instructed to do by the trainer, and the tech support intervened. Unfortunately, their intervention resulted in the sum doubling from £200 to £400 at which point the trainer advised the SPM to accept the incorrect balance on the terminal and the trainer would make a note of what had happened and rectify it the following day.

>

> The actual answer given was:

>

> EW: No.  None whatsoever.

This is exactly the point where I think that a competent lawyer should have refused to accept such an answer, since it is such an obvious nonsense. No complex computer program in the history of the world has been bug-free and Horizon was said to be one of the largest non-military software projects in Europe. The defence should have insisted on access to the entire set of bug reports and bug fixes for Horizon, so that some defence expert witness could assess which of them might have been responsible for the observed behaviour of the system. My view is that the lawyers collectively failed the postmasters very badly.



It also upsets me that of the compensation paid so far by the Post Office about two-thirds has been absorbed in legal fees. The lawyers no doubt see this scandal as a cash-cow and hope that it will carry on for some time. That is surely the explanation for so many legal experts being against the proposed act of parliament to exonerate all of the postmasters affected: it will largely cut the lawyers out of the loop.







--

Clive Page

[Roland Perry]

In message <l15nn7...@mid.individual.net>, at 23:29:43 on Sun, 21

Jan 2024, The Todal <the_...@icloud.com> remarked:
>On 21/01/2024 19:49, Roland Perry wrote:
>> In message <l129tj...@mid.individual.net>, at 16:15:47 on Sat, 20
>>Jan 2024, The Todal <the_...@icloud.com> remarked:
>>
>>> I see that in many cases the postmaster pleaded guilty. Was this
>>>because the lawyer had tried and failed to obtain disclosure of
>>>relevant documents or was it because the lawyer actually thought that
>>>the client's protestations of innocence were a desperate bluff?

>> Oh for heavens sake. Have you even watched the TV programmes?

>> They pleaded guilty to false accounting, viz ticking a box saying
>>"yes I did steal this money, but will pay it back" because if they
>>hadn't, they would not have been allowed to open for business the
>>following day.
>
>Amusing, but obviously nothing to do with the legal process whereby the
>defendants appeared in court and were advised whether or not to plead
>guilty. Pleading guilty did not enable them to open for business the
>following day or forever afterwards.

OK so you haven't watched the programmes (or if you did, failed to
understand the sequence of events).

They did the "false accounting" in order to open for business the next
day. They ended up in court charged with theft, because eventually they
ran out of money to reimburse the Post Office (with money they hadn't in
fact pocketed), so the shop was raided and closed, and they were
prosecuted.

The Post Office, who didn't want too bright a light shone on the theft
allegations, allowed them to plea-bargain down to the false accounting
charge.
--
Roland Perry

[Roland Perry]

In message <l16p51...@mid.individual.net>, at 09:00:17 on Mon, 22
Jan 2024, Roger Hayter <ro...@hayter.org> remarked:

They deliberately signed daily returns which were inaccurate (so they
could open for business the next day).

>And it is not the repudiation
>of her own accounts she is being charged with but he making of the original,
>accurate account. So I strongly disagree that her guilty plea was justified.

They pleaded guilty to stay out of jail. They'd lost their business,
their reputation, and thousands of pounds. And couldn't cope with the
idea of losing their freedom too.
--
Roland Perry

[Roland Perry]

In message <l16pv9...@mid.individual.net>, at 09:14:17 on Mon, 22

Easy to say with 15yrs hindsight.
--
Roland Perry

[Simon Parker]

On 20/01/2024 09:44, Jethro_uk wrote:
> On Sat, 20 Jan 2024 09:32:56 +0000, Simon Parker wrote:
>
>> (Tangentially, I note that the SRA have issued a new statement [1]
>> yesterday concerning their Horizon investigation which reiterates that
>> their "rules set out that solicitors must work to high professional and
>> ethical standards. This includes upholding the rule of law, acting with
>> integrity, and in a way that upholds public trust and confidence in the
>> profession.
>
> Well that's well and truly shot now.

Yes, it is. Which is why the SRA have numerous live investigations into
the conduct of their members.

> It's the while legal system that
> failed here.

Including the part of the legal system that Alan Bates and the others
used to appeal their convictions and have them overturned? Did that
part of the legal system fail too? Granted, you may have preferred that
the convictions were overturned more speedily and with less effort, but
overturned they were.

> Tell me why I should have any faith in it whatsoever.

Faith requires belief without concrete evidence or proof whereas trust
is built on reliability and predictability and requires confidence in
the consistent performance of the object which is trusted.

A lack of confidence in the part of the legal system concerned with
private prosecutions should not lead to a total lack of confidence in
the entire system.

The same as with any miscarriage of justice, which are mercifully rare.

But it is not for me to build your faith and confidence in the legal system.

It will continue existing with or without your faith and confidence in it.

> Bearing in mind my choice in the matter.

You are free to believe whatsoever you choose about any subject matter
regardless of whether or not that belief has any basis in reality.

> The bottom line is I don't trust anyone because of their profession. And
> nor should I. Or you.

If you have children did you perform background checks on everybody
working at and connected to the schools to which you sent them?

When you send your car for an MOT, do you do so only after you've
checked out all the mechanics at the garage in question?

When you bought your house, what checks did you perform on the solicitor
you used for the conveyancing?

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

I can but repeat that the Met Police have on-going and active
investigations for perjury, perverting the course of justice and fraud.

And that the SRA have live files concerning their members involved in
Post Office / Royal Mail prosecutions.

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

On 20/01/2024 16:15, The Todal wrote:
> On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:
>> On 12/01/2024 22:26, Jon Ribbens wrote:

>>> Indeed, which is why I was talking about the practical obstacles
>>> to "verifying" Horizon, rather than legal obstacles. Verifying an
>>> individual breathalyser seems plausible (with the caveat that if
>>> the claim is that the breathalyser reads wrong only very occasionally,
>>> that's unlikely to be proved), verifying an enormous nation-wide
>>> computer system like Horizon is simply not going to happen.
>>
>> In numerous Post Office cases, the defence called for disclosure of
>> known bugs (the so-called IKE log) within Horizon prior to the cases
>> going to trial.
>>
>> The Post Office refused to disclose it on the grounds that it was too
>> expensive to do so.  (See the Hamilton judgment I've just referenced
>> in an earlier post elsewhere.)
>
> I see that in many cases the postmaster pleaded guilty. Was this because
> the lawyer had tried and failed to obtain disclosure of relevant
> documents or was it because the lawyer actually thought that the
> client's protestations of innocence were a desperate bluff?

I can do no better than quote what the CCRC said on the matter [1]
paraphrasing comments from the Hamilton case, namely: "The Court [said]
they had no doubt that all the guilty pleas of the successful appellants
in the Horizon cases were founded upon Post Office Ltd’s failures of
investigation and disclosure and that many of the sub-postmasters may
have felt they had no real alternative but to plead guilty."

The SPM's were guilty of false accounting in that the had made a false
declaration concerning the cash and stock on hand and / or had made up
"shortfalls" in cash where the amount on hand differed from what Horizon
said should have been there.

As understandable as this might be in the circumstances, it was still
wrong to do so and they were guilty as charged on that count and had
little option but to plead guilty to false accounting.

But that didn't make them guilty of theft.

> Is the Hamilton judgment this one?
> https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2021/577.html

Yes. But there's so many judgments and material to read that I've been
using the PDFs rather than the HTML so I can read them offline.

The PDF version is here:
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Hamilton-Others-v-Post-Office-judgment-230421.pdf

> When considering the various appellants, this phrase comes up more than
> once:  "There was no proof of an actual loss as opposed to a
> Horizon-generated shortage".  I wonder whether it was wrong to advise
> the defendant to plead guilty and whether that point could have been
> argued more strongly and taken to appeal if necessary.

In the Hamilton judgment, the Court of Appeal concluded that in all
cases in which the reliability of Horizon data was essential to the
prosecution and in which there was no independent evidence of an actual
loss, the trial process could not be fair. It went on to state that it
was "satisfied that a fair trial was not possible in any of the Horizon
cases" and that "...the failures of investigation and disclosure were in
our judgment so egregious as to make the prosecution of any of the
'Horizon cases' an affront to the conscience of the court".

I found it interesting to compare the Hamilton case with that of Seema
Misra. Firstly, because barrister Stephen Mason requested and received
permission to obtain a full *transcript* of the case, and secondly
because having done so, he has written an index and commentary on it.
(Unfortunately, the link for the full transcript appears to be dead, but
Mr Mason's commentary can be found here: [2])

In the commentary, he notes: "the difficulties with determining whether
software code has failed or is in error, as set out in chapter 5 of
'Electronic Evidence' (3rd Edition, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012)." [3]
He goes on to add: "It is interesting that few lawyers know of this
text or are aware of the significance of the content [sic] chapter 5,
even though the legal practitioner and scholar George L. Paul emphasized
the importance of this chapter when he reviewed it in 'Jurimetrics, The
Journal of Law, Science, and Technology, Volume 53, Number 4, (Summer
2013), 467-481.'

I would be interested to hear the views of those clamouring for new
legislation, (Ed: BCS, I'm looking at you in particular!), on this
chapter, and the preceding one, and to see why they think new
legislation will 'solve' a problem that might not have existed had the
procedures governing electronic evidence been followed. Unfortunately,
it seems many of those defending SPMs were not aware of these procedures
and so couldn't follow them.

The solution, therefore, seems to be to advertise better these
procedures and insist they are adhered to in future cases, rather than
introducing knee-jerk legislation which, as history teaches us, has a
tendency to swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.

I'll leave you, (and only else so minded), to read the entire Commentary
by Mr Mason, but as a bare minimum I consider the sections titled
"Comments regarding computers" and "The evidence of expert witnesses" to
be required reading for anybody that wants to comment on the evidence
adduced in the Post Office in Horizon cases.

In Ms Misra's case, the Post Office argued that it would be
prohibitively expensive to produce the evidence requested by the defence
(as previously observed, the Post Office had to pay a fee to Fujitsu for
each entry from a log they sent to them). Additionally, they argued
that it would take the expert witnesses around 45 days to review that
evidence. Their mantra remaining, as it had throughout all the cases,
"Horizon is 'robust'. This is a needless expense and a waste of
everyone's time. Nothing to see here. Move on please..."

It is therefore no wonder that the court concluded, as it did, that this
would have been an expensive and time-consuming exercise that would not
alter the facts of the case and was little more than a fishing exercise,
used to cast doubt on the reliability of the Horizon system thereby
undermining the prosecution's case.

I can put it no better than Stephen Mason's "Concluding observations" in
his Commentary on the Seema Misra trial transcript:

<quote>
A range of problems were faced by those taking part in this prosecution:
judges that had to hear preliminary applications regarding appropriate
disclosure of evidence; busy solicitors and barristers that had to try
and take time out of busy schedules to understand the issues, formulate
theories of the case and then present and challenge the evidence called
at trial; the expert witnesses for the prosecution who was in turn
constrained in obtaining relevant evidence; the defence expert in
testing what little evidence was made available; the members of the
jury, the ultimate finders of fact, for having to assess the evidence
presented at trial – inadequate as the evidence relating to the computer
system appeared to be – in order to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

It must also be noted that the first firm of solicitors appointed to
defend Seema Misra, as well as the barrister, were wholly unaware of the
complexities of the Horizon system, and did not appear to have even
considered that the Horizon system might have been at fault. It was only
when Seema Misra dramatically found such evidence for herself on the day
set for trial, that the first trial was abandoned and she obtained
alternative legal representation (Day 6 Monday 18 October 2010, 138 –139).

Dealing with evidence from computer and computer-like devices is very
expensive. The system of evidence, procedure and disclosure has not
adapted to the complexities of digital data, even though it is now
ubiquitous. The legal profession needs to concern itself with becoming
sufficiently knowledgeable about the delicate nature of the networked
world in which we live today–and that includes teaching future members
of the legal profession about electronic evidence.

If there is a student looking for a possible topic for a PhD, the
disclosure of digital evidence in legal proceedings and the need for
fairness of the parties is one such subject
<end quote>

The Seema Misra trial is indeed interesting as neither the original
solicitors nor the barrister even considered that there might be a fault
within Horizon. Ms Misra discovered this for herself!

I think the trainer should have been called to testify and her legal
team should have insisted on disclosure. (The full transcript reveals
remarks from the judge saying that if the defence were so concerned with
the lack of disclosure they should have lodged the relevant paperwork
with the court and it would have been dealt with.) My conclusion is
that asked for disclosure, were rebuffed and were not then insistent enough.

On the opening day of the trial, the two expert witnesses were in
discussion as the case was proceeding in court. During those
discussions Gareth Jenkins disclosed logs to the expert witness acting
for Ms Misra to demonstrate that the discrepancies at her post office
were not as a result of the "Callandar Square" (aka "Falkirk") bug.

Again, I'd have insisted this was introduced as proof that the bug
wasn't relevant was still proof that the bug existed, and proof of the
bug is proof that Horizon wasn't as 'robust' as was claimed.

But it is easy to be wise on these matters when blessed with hindsight.

Regards

S.P.

[1] https://ccrc.gov.uk/news/the-ccrc-and-post-office-horizon-cases/
[2] https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/2217/2151
[3] He is the general editor of this publication, so is more than
familiar with the contents. :-)

[Adam Funk]

On 2024-01-21, Anthony R. Gold wrote:

> On Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:44:15 +0000, Simon Parker <simonpa...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/01/2024 22:31, Theo wrote:
>>
>>> Such has been rumbling on for a considerable time:
>>> https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/1905/1842
>>>
>>> X said his card wasn't used in an ATM, bank said it was. Bank couldn't
>>> produce sufficient evidence to prove the transaction had taken place.
>>> Because X lived in chaotic circumstances and the transactions were from an
>>> address near to X's home, judge concluded that X made the transactions.
>>>
>>> Some more discussion from the barrister in that case:
>>> https://barristermagazine.com/evidence-from-computers-the-unreliable-legal-presumption-that-without-more-it-can-be-relied-upon/
>>
>> ATMs have cameras in them.
>
> Was that universally the case in 2006?

And do/did they universally work all the time?


>> Why wasn't the camera evidence adduced by
>> either side? (Asking for a friend.)
>

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-22, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> wrote:
> It also upsets me that of the compensation paid so far by the Post
> Office about two-thirds has been absorbed in legal fees. The lawyers
> no doubt see this scandal as a cash-cow and hope that it will carry on
> for some time. That is surely the explanation for so many legal
> experts being against the proposed act of parliament to exonerate all
> of the postmasters affected: it will largely cut the lawyers out of
> the loop.

Well, possibly, but there is also the very significant principle that
MPs should not be deciding peoples' criminal guilt or innocence.
I mean, we've all seen what a shower of complete wankers inhabits
the Commons, they're not qualified to judge a bonnie baby competition
let alone peoples' lives.

[Simon Parker]

On 20/01/2024 11:41, Spike wrote:
> Simon Parker <simonpa...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>> A system that is the size and complexity of Horizon is expected to have
>> bugs, errors, defects and faults. But when that particular system has
>> tens of thousands of end points installed at over 13,000 locations and
>> has gone through multiple iterations of development and numerous major
>> improvement cycles then when the experts charged with providing details
>> of the operational integrity of the system state to the court that it is
>> "robust", then the court must conclude that this is the case unless and
>> until evidence to the contrary is adduced.
>
> <snip>
>
> Picking up on this point, there is nothing at all that is the product of
> human endeavour, be it transport systems, banking systems, Moon landers,
> economies, nuclear ballistic missiles, vaccinations, bridges, sewage
> systems, special military operations, or whatever, that is free from one of
> bugs, errors, defects, or faults.
>
> Unless the term ‘robust’ has been legally defined as e.g. some level of
> performance that is acceptable but less than perfect, then surely it has no
> relevance when presented as evidence, and should not be accepted prima
> facie by anyone.
>
> Note that legal systems are also the product of human endeavour <cough,
> splutter>

The statement that Horizon was 'robust' shouldn't have been accepted on
the face of it. There are systems in place for demonstrating to the
court the 'robustness' of systems.

The Post Office never saw fit to demonstrate it and, to the best of my
knowledge, none of the early cases insisted that the Post Office did so
either.

But we don't need a change in the legislation to do this. We just need
to ensure that those currently working in the legal profession are made
aware of the existing legal framework so that they can be used should
there ever be another issue like Horizon.

Regards

S.P.

[Simon Parker]

On 22/01/2024 11:17, Clive Page wrote:

> On 18/01/2024 16:43, Simon Parker wrote:

>

>> However, when the matter proceeded to trial, something along the following lines should have transpired:

>

>>

>

>> Defence Counsel (DC): Mr Expert Witness (EW), are there any known bugs, failings, shortcomings, or otherwise irregularities as to the correct and proper functioning of the Horizon system that could give rise to the discrepancies in the account balances other than through the actions of my client?

>

>>

>

>> EW: Yes.  We have a bug list as long as your arm.  Longer than your arm even.  We have known bugs with cash deposits whereby at intermittent and as yet undetermined times the same cash deposit is processed multiple times giving rise to a shortfall.  Similarly, we have a bug where a sequence of transactions, either from earlier in the day or from the previous day, is processed for a second time by the Horizon system.  Oh, and we know that Fujitsu technical support operatives can access the Horizon system and change the balances both of individual terminals and of the branch's closing balance without leaving any kind of forensic footprint within the system - only what is recorded in the call logs. And we have no idea how often they're doing this as we haven't asked for the logs because it is too expensive to ask Fujitsu to confirm how bad the system is and how often they're having to do it.  We're aware of at least one case where a SPM was being trained to use the Horizon

>

>> system, which means that each transaction entered was observed by the trainer to ensure no mistakes were made, and despite this careful scrutiny of each transaction, there was a shortfall of £200 with the closing balance at the end of the day.  The SPM called Horizon tech support, as they were instructed to do by the trainer, and the tech support intervened. Unfortunately, their intervention resulted in the sum doubling from £200 to £400 at which point the trainer advised the SPM to accept the incorrect balance on the terminal and the trainer would make a note of what had happened and rectify it the following day.

>

>>

>

>> The actual answer given was:

>

>>

>

>> EW: No.  None whatsoever.

>

>

>

> This is exactly the point where I think that a competent lawyer should have refused to accept such an answer, since it is such an obvious nonsense. No complex computer program in the history of the world has been bug-free and Horizon was said to be one of the largest non-military software projects in Europe. The defence should have insisted on access to the entire set of bug reports and bug fixes for Horizon, so that some defence expert witness could assess which of them might have been responsible for the observed behaviour of the system. My view is that the lawyers collectively failed the postmasters very badly.

It is easy to judge the situation from the lofty position our hindsight

now affords us.



I've explained in previous posts why access to the logs was not granted.

It is all too easy to say, "I would have demanded it" because we now

know that these logs were the "smoking gun".



But that wasn't known at the time and when you make your statement

demanding access to the data and the prosecution respond: "The cost for

producing it is £x and it is going to take our expert witness 45 days to

look at it which will cost £y. Additionally, we have wasted costs of £z

in preparing the case to this point. We'd therefore like £x+y+z paying

into court to secure our costs in this matter before producing the

evidence."



Are you going to dip your hand in your pocket and pay the £x + 2y + 2z

(bearing in mind your expert witness will need to look at it too, so the

cost of y is doubled), and then your own legal team may need to start

over which will be an additional cost close to z too. So that's the

cost of producing the reports, two expert witnesses for 45 days, a

wasted costs order for the prosecution, and the cost of your own legal

team reviewing their strategy for the case once they have the information.



Please hazard a guess at the likely figure involved to the nearest ten

thousand pound to demonstrate your understanding of the matter.



And then explain from where the SPMs were supposed to getting money of

that nature when, in many cases, they'd already borrowed tens of

thousands from friends and family to make up the shortfalls declared by

Horizon and only escalated things when they ran out of cash to keep

doing this.

> It also upsets me that of the compensation paid so far by the Post Office about two-thirds has been absorbed in legal fees. The lawyers no doubt see this scandal as a cash-cow and hope that it will carry on for some time. That is surely the explanation for so many legal experts being against the proposed act of parliament to exonerate all of the postmasters affected: it will largely cut the lawyers out of the loop.

Point of order: the Post Office didn't pay compensation.



The Post Office agreed to pay costs of £58million, without admitting

liability and compensation was therefore not awarded.



The SPMs had been funded by a litigation fund operated by Therium. As

the trials became increasingly more complex, the costs increased.

Therium had increased the amount they paid into the fund on no less than

three occasions. The initial estimate of costs was around £6million.



A clear strategy from the Post Office was to "starve out" their

opponents so it is no surprise that £46m of the £58m paid by the Post

Office went to the backers. It is to be noted that this is less than

the amount to which Therium were entitled. Additionally, they could

have insisted that they receive a percentage of future compensation

payments but they didn't. Therium wanted as much of the money as

possible to go to the SPMs. But if Therium took too little, there would

be no way of securing such funding in future as the financiers would not

be interested. Therium are not the "bad guys" here - far from it.



Rather than begrudging them what they took, without which similar cases

will not be able to obtain funding in the future as the backers simply

won't advance the funds, instead, be thankful that they took the gamble

they did because without their funds, the issues with which we are all

now so familiar may never have come to light.



That said, and in case you're not aware, (I haven't seen the TV

dramatisation so don't know if it was covered in the programme), but

following the costs payment from the Post Office, it is said that Alan

Bates sent the government an invoice for the £46m that it had cost to

get justice.



The government initially ignored him, as the Post Office had done at

their peril, be he and his fellow litigants - and their MPS - continued

the pressure on the government until the Treasury was, eventually,

forced to agree the funds.



In March 2022, the then PM Boris Johnson and the then Chancellor Rishi

Sunak issued a joint statement.



Mr Johnson said: "We'll be introducing a new compensation scheme for

those who led and won the landmark legal case over the failings, so they

can receive their fair share... Whilst it cannot take away the years of

distress, the postmasters who have suffered terribly over the Post

Office Horizon scandal deserve to be fairly compensated."



Mr Sunak said: "Without the efforts of these postmasters, this terrible

injustice may have never been uncovered so it is only right that they

are compensated fully and fairly. That is why we have set up this new

compensation scheme for those who played a crucial role bringing this

scandal to light."



The SPMs will receive more than their initial cut of the £12m but these

things will likely move at a glacial pace because, well it is the

government.



Following the watershed moment at which it was realised the Post Office

would need separately to compensate all Horizon victims, not just pay

the cost of those involved in the GLO, the Post Office originally set

aside £1b for compensation payments but it halved the amount it expects

to pay late last year, but that's still £500m.



Finally, any SPM affected by this miscarriage of justice is free to

launch an action against the Post Office for malicious prosecution if

they do not want to be part of the group actions being dealt with en masse.



Regards



S.P.

[Simon Parker]

On 21/01/2024 15:49, Anthony R. Gold wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:44:15 +0000, Simon Parker <simonpa...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/01/2024 22:31, Theo wrote:
>>
>>> Such has been rumbling on for a considerable time:
>>> https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/1905/1842
>>>
>>> X said his card wasn't used in an ATM, bank said it was. Bank couldn't
>>> produce sufficient evidence to prove the transaction had taken place.
>>> Because X lived in chaotic circumstances and the transactions were from an
>>> address near to X's home, judge concluded that X made the transactions.
>>>
>>> Some more discussion from the barrister in that case:
>>> https://barristermagazine.com/evidence-from-computers-the-unreliable-legal-presumption-that-without-more-it-can-be-relied-upon/
>>
>> ATMs have cameras in them.
>
> Was that universally the case in 2006?

Universally? No. But all "traditional" ATMs installed at banks, etc.
will have had them whilst 'the majority, but not all' of the stand-alone
machines in shops will have had them.

If you want me to take an educated guess what percentage will have had a
camera around that time, I would suggest it would have been well over 90%.

Regards

S.P.

[Andy Burns]

Jon Ribbens wrote:

> there is also the very significant principle that
> MPs should not be deciding peoples' criminal guilt or innocence.

I'd be concerned if MPs wanted to pronounce anyone as guilty, or to
pronounce an individual as innocent, but to correct a wrong and
pronounce a class of individuals as innocent? I think many would
support that ...

[Roger Hayter]

That seems a somewhat contrived argument. Donating a large some of one's own
money to the PO does not seem to me to be done for gain.

And the gain of being allowed to continue operating is not a direct result of
the false accounting, but caused by an arbitrary PO rule to prevent any
dispute over Horizon results by making refraining from dispute a condition of
continued operation. The gain was a result of circumventing that arbitrary
rule, not a direct result of false accounting. I do not think that that
necessarily makes out the crime of false accounting for gain.

> This is the same as concealing errors in other professions. A doctor who
> mistreats a patient, or a lawyer who messes up contract terms, and then
> lies to avoid the consequences of their error.
>
> There are strong mitigating factors, but she appears to have committed
> the crime. There also appear to have been crimes committed against her
> by the PO, and hence she should be entitled to damages, but... false
> account is, and should be, a crime.
>
> Possibly her crime could be considered under the same sort of principle
> as a battered wife who snaps and kills her husband, i.e. her crime was
> excused by the crime committed against her.

--
Roger Hayter

[Roger Hayter]

Well I wouldn't. Legislation to give the courts a streamlined way of dealing
with a series of cases at once might be more justifiable.

--
Roger Hayter

[Jon Ribbens]

I mean I'm not necessarily against legislation in this instance,
but we should certainly be cautious about the principle.

[Martin Brown]

That was the insidious part of the Horizon software. Those questions
were along the lines of "When did last stop beating your grandmother?".

Ticking the box required to open the next day meant that they had
certified that the balance and stock were as shown by the computer.
Technically I think that may qualify as false accounting if it isn't true.

There was no possibility to tick a box to say that there was an
unexplained discrepancy of X amount in the accounts so you either had to
balance it out of your own pocket or simply pretend that the balance was
OK and hope that it would go away. Some errors were far too big to
ignore. And asking for help merely got them into more trouble.

>> And it is not the repudiation
>> of her own accounts she is being charged with but he making of the
>> original,
>> accurate account. So I strongly disagree that her guilty plea was
>> justified.
>
> They pleaded guilty to stay out of jail. They'd lost their business,
> their reputation, and thousands of pounds. And couldn't cope with the
> idea of losing their freedom too.

I wonder about all the others who stayed below the radar but had to give
money to the post office to make good the "losses" that Horizon showed.

--
Martin Brown

[Simon Parker]

I would not be on that list of supporters. And I note that many judges
and lawyers feel similarly.

I feel a better solution can be found based on the conclusions of the
Court of Appeal in the Hamilton judgment wherein it was said that in all

cases in which the reliability of Horizon data was essential to the
prosecution and in which there was no independent evidence of an actual
loss, the trial process could not be fair.

Based on that, the government can give the Post Office a reasonable, but
not excessive, amount of time (and by that I mean a few months, six at
most), to identify all the cases that meet the above test. (So cases
which didn't turn on the reliability of Horizon data or in which there
was independent evidence of loss are outside the scope for these
'fast-tracked appeals.) When the Post Office has compiled the list of
cases, the Post Office can pass it to the CCRC who in turn can invite
the Court of Appeal to overturn each case.

There are a couple of legal wrinkles with this. Firstly, an appeal
needs the consent of the applicant so the applicant, or a close living
relative if they have died, will need to give permission for the case to
be appealed. The CCRC would be able to sort this quite quickly, it
would be hoped.

Secondly, the Court of Appeal doesn't have the capacity to hear all
these appeals in full so rather than there needing to be a full hearing,
the Post Office can state it does not wish to contest the appeal
whereupon the Court of Appeal can overturn the original conviction and
make a costs order against the Post Office to cover the cost of the
brief hearing.

Whilst the CCRC and CoA are carrying out the above legally necessary
"rubber stamping" exercises, the Post Office can continue working
through the data they have and propose a reasonable figure of individual
compensation for each individual SPM.

The Post Office can then pay for each SPM to receive independent legal
advice, from a lawyer of the SPM's choosing (but at the Post Office's
expense, providing the cost is "reasonable"), to confirm that the
compensation payment is adequate and the SPM can be paid that amount
without the need for formal "Miscarriage of Justice" applications.

I propose this system because it places both the majority of the work
and the costs associated with this firmly at the doors of the Post
Office. They made the mess. They can do the spade work and incur the
costs in clearing it up.

No extra legislation required. No guilty parties slipping through the
net. And yet it can happen quickly and effective compensation be paid
before the year is out.

What's not to like?

Regards

S.P.

[Fredxx]

On 22/01/2024 11:17, Clive Page wrote:

Competent lawyers spell out the cost vs fighting any other charges
imposed on the SPM. In most instances it was cheaper to simply please
guilty to false accounting and pay back the money. Their job as SPM was
toast at that point anyway.

I don't have an issue with Legal Aid being offered to all defendants.

> No complex computer program in the history of the
> world has been bug-free and Horizon was said to be one of the largest
> non-military software projects in Europe.

If you can find an attribute like that I would find it useful. TBH I
don't know why the software had to be that complex as it seems
transactions were actually make direct to or from the relevant
organisation and Horizon was simply an accounting package.

> The defence should have
> insisted on access to the entire set of bug reports and bug fixes for
> Horizon, so that some defence expert witness could assess which of
> them might have been responsible for the observed behaviour of the
> system. My view is that the lawyers collectively failed the
> postmasters very badly.

If the defendant had bottomless pots of money, they could. Alan Bates,
by example, could still afford to move and buy a house and live
comfortably with seemingly no further income.

> It also upsets me that of the compensation paid so far by the Post
> Office about two-thirds has been absorbed in legal fees. The lawyers
> no doubt see this scandal as a cash-cow and hope that it will carry
> on for some time.

The underwriters took the risk. That is indicative of their investment
and the time to realise their profits. I was of the impression this
wasn't about money but call the PO to account.

> That is surely the explanation for so many legal
> experts being against the proposed act of parliament to exonerate all
> of the postmasters affected: it will largely cut the lawyers out of
> the loop.

That is a cynical suggestion too far. Politician only care about their
popularity. Difficult issues are kicked into the long grass. Look how
long the Grenfell Inquiry is taking! The answer is too painful.

[Roger Hayter]

On 22 Jan 2024 at 12:18:15 GMT, "Jon Ribbens" <jon+u...@unequivocal.eu>
wrote:

A law allowing the courts, and in particular the court of appeal, to deal with
class actions might be an interesting line for legislature to take.

--
Roger Hayter

[Adam Funk]

Someone mentioned in one of the other threads that there had been an
option to report the computer's balance as wrong but still open for
business, but it was removed (I assume because "too many" people were
using it).

[Simon Parker]

I recommend putting the phrase "Group Litigation Order" into Google, or
another search engine of your choosing.

If the results of the above search surprise you, you might be even more
surprised if you add "Post Office" and "Horizon" as search terms. :-)

Regards

S.P.

[Andy Burns]

Roger Hayter wrote:

> Andy Burns wrote:
>
>> I'd be concerned if MPs wanted to pronounce anyone as guilty, or to
>> pronounce an individual as innocent, but to correct a wrong and
>> pronounce a class of individuals as innocent? I think many would
>> support that ...
>
> Well I wouldn't. Legislation to give the courts a streamlined way of dealing
> with a series of cases at once might be more justifiable.

Depends how streamlined, if it could be a 5 minute job for the former
postmaster to confirm their identity, a senior PO official to admit they
were negligent in bringing the prosecution with insufficient evidence
and the judge to automatically overturn the guilty verdict, allocate an
initial amount of compensation.

One court could crank out 100 appeals per day.

[Jon Ribbens]

Those are for civil litigation aren't they, and here we are talking
about criminal law.

[Simon Parker]

The point I was making is that whilst we do not have so-called "class
actions" this side of the pond, we do have "Group Litigation Orders" as
item number 97 on this list demonstrates:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/group-litigation-orders/list-of-group-litigation-orders#the-post-office-group-litigation

Additionally, the full title of 'the Hamilton judgment' referenced
numerous times in this thread is "Josephine Hamilton and Others v Post
Office Limited".

The key part of that title for this post is "and Others", (sometimes
abbreviated to "& Ors"). The hearing concerned 42 SPMs, 39 of whom had
their convictions quashed as a result of the hearing and 3 of whom had
their appeals dismissed.

In short, no need for "A law allowing the courts, and in particular the

court of appeal, to deal with class actions might be an interesting line

for legislature to take." as advanced by Roger Hayter.

Regards

S.P.

[1] https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2021/577.html

[Roger Hayter]

On 22 Jan 2024 at 22:25:05 GMT, "Simon Parker" <simonpa...@gmail.com>

In which case why is the whole thing taking so long?


--
Roger Hayter

[Jon Ribbens]

Sorry, I'm failing to understand what point you're making. Are you
or are you not saying that Group Litigation Orders can be used in
criminal cases? If not, how does their existence help exonerate all
the postmasters, which is what we were talking about, and why would
there be "no need" for new law or procedures?

[Simon Parker]

Because it is a complicated and messy situation and affects a large
number of people - the largest miscarriage of justice in history.

It will therefore take time to unpick everything correctly. There is no
magic wand that can be waved that magically "fixes" everything.

When the government makes a knee-jerk response to speed things up, it
typically has unintended consequences.

For example, the government decided it would be "a good idea" to
fast-track interim compensation payments to SPMs in the middle of the
inquiry.

What's wrong with that, you ask? Get some money to the SPMs so they can
start to rebuild their lives whilst the difficulty of quashing the
convictions and awarding a more substantial compensation payment further
down the line can be sorted out, but at least they've got something to
be helping out for now.

Except that TPTB didn't think of the effect of this on the SPMs that had
been declared bankrupt as a result of what had happened.

Any money received by a SPM that has been declared bankrupt interim must
legally be given to the Official Receiver who has a legal obligation to
use it to repay their debts.

The most extreme example of this I know is a SPM that was awarded a
payment of £259,000 by the historic shortfall scheme of which they
received just £8,000.

Do you think that SPM, and others like them, was pleased to hear that
the government had fast-tracked payments using the historic shortfall
scheme or do you think they would have preferred that things had first
been thought through even if that meant taking more time?

Waving the proverbial magic wand may appear to fix some problems but it
creates other problems too.

Personally, I'd much rather that things were unpicked properly and
professionally rather than being rushed in an attempt to be seen to be
doing "something", because in some cases, that "something" will do more
harm than good.

Regards

S.P.

[Pancho]

I don't think POL legally pursued a SPM when they personally covered all
losses.

The ability to act as a SPM clearly was an asset, something that had a
very real tradeable value.

> And the gain of being allowed to continue operating is not a direct result of
> the false accounting, but caused by an arbitrary PO rule to prevent any
> dispute over Horizon results by making refraining from dispute a condition of
> continued operation.

The rule is clearly not arbitrary. It was designed to allow POL to
protect themselves from unreasonable losses caused by negative behaviour
of the SPM. In general, it is a sensible type of rule to have. POL
needed some rule to protect against money going missing.

The operation and enforcement of the rule was oppressive, not the rule
itself.

> The gain was a result of circumventing that arbitrary
> rule, not a direct result of false accounting. I do not think that that
> necessarily makes out the crime of false accounting for gain.
>

You can think that if you like. Nevertheless, we do not have the right
to unilaterally break rules or contractual obligations just because we
don't like them. Financial reporting has very strict rules, for good reason.

[Roger Hayter]

Indeed, but neither is necessarily a crime.


--
Roger Hayter

[Simon Parker]

A prolific and somewhat argumentative poster is currently taking the
break from Usenet that he takes around this time every year which leaves
ULM a much more harmonious place. Not only do I not see a void left by
his absence but I see no need to be argumentative seemingly just for the
sake of it in an effort to fill the void I have just said I do not
acknowledge exists.

It is therefore my aim to enjoy the 'Pax Normana' whilst it lasts and
avoid engaging in what I consider to be useless point scoring exercises.

To that end, I recommend re-reading my post above, which is still quoted
in full as, I believe, it answers everything you are asking.

It certainly did so to the satisfaction of the person to whom I was
responding as they've gone on to pose a subsequent question which I've
also done my best to answer.

If you require more detail, may I point you in the direction of
Message-ID: <l17d4q...@mid.individual.net> in which I detailed what
I consider to be the most expedient and cost-effective way of
unravelling the mess that is the Horizon prosecutions.

A couple of points I didn't cover in that post, but which I will take
this opportunity to expand upon here:

The Post Office should not need much time, if indeed any, to identify
cases that pass what I'll call the "Hamilton Test" (detailed in the
message referenced above) as advice received by the Post Office from
Simon Clarke, Barrister and Senior Counsel at Cartwright King
Solicitors, on the 15th July 2013 [1] referenced previous advice "on the
need to conduct a review of all POL prosecutions so as to identify those
who ought to have had the material disclosed to them. That review is
presently underway." A review that was "underway" in 2013 must surely
be completed by now, one would hope?

Secondly, as referenced in my further reply in this sub-thread, some
SPMs were subject to bankruptcy proceedings following their conviction.
Those bankruptcies will need unravelling too as part of the "solution"
and this will need to be done prior to any award of compensation to
these SPMs. In cases where the bankruptcy was as a result of civil
suits instigated by the Post Office they should be easier to unravel.
But where the bankruptcy came at the hands of other debtors this will be
more difficult. However, the Post Office will need to go "the extra
mile" in resolving these cases.

For the avoidance of doubt, I do not see how a "one size fits all"
approach to compensation is going to work but I still see no need for
new laws or procedures in addressing these additional points.

Regards

S.P.

[1]
https://www.postofficescandal.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Clarke-advice-re-Jenkins.pdf

[Fredxx]

I don't see it as messy.

It's not rocket science for the rest of those prosecuted, or the loved
ones on their behalf, to appeal against their prosecution in the
knowledge that the PO will not oppose their appeal.

> It will therefore take time to unpick everything correctly.  There is no
> magic wand that can be waved that magically "fixes" everything.

It just takes the PO to rescind their claim that the Horizon system was
infallible.

Knowledge from the Hamilton experience should speed things up to for
those appealing, so they can use the same forms and claims, simply
changing names and dates.

> When the government makes a knee-jerk response to speed things up, it
> typically has unintended consequences.

I might agree. but it may be necessary of the courts and PO drag their feet.

> For example, the government decided it would be "a good idea" to
> fast-track interim compensation payments to SPMs in the middle of the
> inquiry.
>
> What's wrong with that, you ask?  Get some money to the SPMs so they can
> start to rebuild their lives whilst the difficulty of quashing the
> convictions and awarding a more substantial compensation payment further
> down the line can be sorted out, but at least they've got something to
> be helping out for now.
>
> Except that TPTB didn't think of the effect of this on the SPMs that had
> been declared bankrupt as a result of what had happened.
>
> Any money received by a SPM that has been declared bankrupt interim must
> legally be given to the Official Receiver who has a legal obligation to
> use it to repay their debts.

Even after 18 months after the declaration? For an ex-gratia payment?

I didn't think this was how bankruptcy worked?

> The most extreme example of this I know is a SPM that was awarded a
> payment of £259,000 by the historic shortfall scheme of which they
> received just £8,000.

Do you have further details?

[Simon Parker]

On 24/01/2024 17:49, Fredxx wrote:
> On 22/01/2024 23:55, Simon Parker wrote:
>> On 22/01/2024 22:56, Roger Hayter wrote:

>>> In which case why is the whole thing taking so long?
>>
>> Because it is a complicated and messy situation and affects a large
>> number of people - the largest miscarriage of justice in history.
>
> I don't see it as messy.

That's likely because, with the greatest of respect, you do not fully
understand what it is involved and therefore see it as easier and
simpler than it actually is.

> It's not rocket science for the rest of those prosecuted, or the loved
> ones on their behalf, to appeal against their prosecution in the
> knowledge that the PO will not oppose their appeal.

One cannot rock up at the Court of Appeal and insist one's case is
heard, regardless of how obvious and egregious a miscarriage of justice
it may be.

There are procedures that must be followed, mostly contained in the
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 [1], something with which, I assume, you are
familiar as you have stated that you "don't see it as messy".

The first wrinkle you're going to need to deal with is those SPMs who
pleaded guilty at the Magistrate's court.

That's probably the first issue you've overlooked as appealing a guilty
verdict at the Magistrate's court is not as simple as you might think it
to be.

Therefore, please outline how you plan to sort out those cases using the
existing legal framework. (Yes, yes, I know the government has promised
new legislation to deal with the Horizon cases and when it exists, we
can use it but right now we're stuck with what we have. Unless, of
course, you're recommending that the SPMs wait until the promised new
legislation appears, but my understanding is that you "don't see this as
messy" and have a fix up your sleeve you're about to reveal...)

So, about those SPMs that pleaded guilty at the Magistrate's court.
How, precisely, do you plan on dealing with them using the existing
legal framework?

Moving on, let's now focus on those that were convicted in court.

As hinted at above, permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is
required before one's case can be heard there. An "Appellant's Notice"
has to be lodged within 21 days of the original decision along with the
grounds of appeal. After having submitted the above, shortly
afterwards, the SPMs will then need to supply full documentation and a
skeleton argument in support of their appeal.

Which nicely introduces the additional wrinkle of needing to submit a
skeleton argument. How many SPMs do you think are capable of drafting a
skeleton argument without assistance? Who is drafting it on their
behalf? Who is paying them for drafting it, or do you suppose they
should do it without charge?

I'd say, "So far, so simple(ish)". There's some curved balls, but we
can bat them away. Except the question arises of how many of the SPMs
are appealing within 21 days of the original decision?

Which is the next issue you have probably overlooked.

That said, the SPMs can ask for permission to submit the appeal out of
time. Thankfully, the application form caters for this and they will
need to explain why they did not submit their appeal within the 21 day
time limit whereupon the judge will need to consider the reasons for the
delay and the effect of the delay on the case.

Alternatively, it is possible to apply to the Court of Appeal to extend
the 21 days retrospectively, but this is treated as a relief from
sanctions and therefore the three-stage test in Denton v TH White
Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906, (aka "The Denton Test") will apply.

Do you recommend the SPMs ask for permission to submit the appeal out of
time or apply for a retrospective extension to the 21 days, or do you
recommend a different course of action? Please provide relevant details
as to why you have given the answer you have. Your answer will need to
include details of the party that will be drafting either the reasons
for the delay in applying and skeleton argument, or making the
application to extend the time and details for how that party is to be paid.

In a spirit of helping you, Tim Moloney KC, (and in case that name
doesn't ring any bells, he's the silk that represented the SPMs in the
now famous Hamilton judgment - more on him later...), reckons that one
should apply out of time to the CoA, but only if one is within the terms
of the Hamilton judgment. But that's just his opinion. What's yours?
And how does one determine "if one is within the terms of the Hamilton
judgment"?

A third option is to approach the Criminal Cases Review Commission
(CCRC) who can send the case back to the courts for a fresh appeal.

Anyone can apply to the CCRC to have their case reviewed however,
there's a key phrase there: "to have their case reviewed".

The CCRC won't just punt the case to the CoA automagically. They need
to review the case to ensure it meets the relevant tests and, if it
does, they do all the "heavy lifting" outlined above, that you, FTAOD,
"don't see as messy". To date, the CCRC have referred 70 Horizon cases
to the appeal courts.

You appear to be in the camp wanting the CCRC to refer every Post Office
conviction in one fell swoop, or at least to automatically refer the
convictions of SPMs who apply to the CCRC.

This is an FAQ for the CCRC so permit me to give you their two part
answer (from https://ccrc.gov.uk/post-office/why-not-automatically-refer/):

<Begin Paste>
1. Consent needed from applicants

We do not force a review upon people

o It is the individual choice of each former SPM whether they wish
to challenge their conviction or not
o A significant number of potential applicants have told us that
they want to close the chapter on a painful period of their life
o Even if the law were to allow it, it is doubtful whether appeal
proceedings should be forced upon a former SPM who has made clear that
they do not wish to appeal

What would happen without consent to a review?

o If the person with the potentially unjust conviction or sentence
chooses not to participate, an appeal court would not agree to hear an
appeal
o As there can be no appeal unless there is someone to pursue it,
without a consenting applicant there can be no ‘real possibility’ of the
conviction being quashed
o If they have died, a family member may be able to act on their
behalf
o If there is no-one interested in pursuing the matter, we cannot
refer the case as there is no possibility of an appeal (successful or
otherwise)

2. The law behind referrals

The Criminal Appeal Act sets out the framework for appeals

o The CCRC makes referrals to the Court of Appeal to consider
quashing convictions or sentences
o Decisions whether to refer are made following the legislation
set out in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995
o This requires us to carefully evaluate each individual case to
see if there is a real possibility that the new evidence or argument
will lead to a successful appeal
o The bar is relatively low – a real possibility may be less than
a probability or a likelihood – but each individual assessment is
crucial to ensure the integrity and fairness of the review process

Court of Appeal

o The Court of Appeal has been clear that Post Office Horizon
convictions will only be overturned if the Horizon evidence was
essential to each prosecution and conviction
o In some cases the key evidence behind a conviction is
independent of Horizon
o Therefore, before making a referral, the CCRC must meticulously
analyse the evidence presented in each case, ensuring that it meets the
necessary threshold for reconsideration by the appeal courts

The complexity of the Post Office Horizon cases and the intricacies of
the CCRC’s legal obligations highlight the challenges faced in referring
every case simultaneously.

While the desire for speed is understandable, rushing the referral
process without proper evaluation could jeopardise the chances of
successfully rectifying any injustice suffered by the individual.
<End Paste>

Those last two paragraphs are worth repeating:

The complexity of the Post Office Horizon cases and the intricacies of
the CCRC's legal obligations highlight the challenges faced in referring
every case simultaneously.

Whilst the desire for speed is understandable, rushing the referral
process without proper evaluation could jeopardise the chances of
successfully rectifying any injustice suffered by the individual.

Hey, but that's just the view of the CCRC who have successfully referred
70 Horizon cases to the CoA. What do they know? You clearly know
better. Perhaps you could remind me how many cases (they don't need to
be Horizon ones) you've successfully referred to the CoA.

>> It will therefore take time to unpick everything correctly.  There is
>> no magic wand that can be waved that magically "fixes" everything.
>
> It just takes the PO to rescind their claim that the Horizon system was
> infallible.

No it doesn't. There is legislation that must be followed. Unless and
until it is replaced with alternative legislation. At the moment we are
where we are and we have the legislative framework we have.

Wishing things were different is of no use to the SPMs.

> Knowledge from the Hamilton experience should speed things up to for
> those appealing, so they can use the same forms and claims, simply
> changing names and dates.

The CCRC's e-mail address is info at ccrc dot gov dot uk

I am sure they would welcome your input on the matter as you clearly
know better than them.

Alternatively, and I'm just throwing this out there as a hypothetical,
but maybe, just maybe, you don't understand the situation as well as you
think you do and it is actually more complicated than you think it is.

>> When the government makes a knee-jerk response to speed things up, it
>> typically has unintended consequences.
>
> I might agree. but it may be necessary of the courts and PO drag their
> feet.

I am not aware of any instances of the courts dragging their feet. Do
you have cites please?

>> For example, the government decided it would be "a good idea" to
>> fast-track interim compensation payments to SPMs in the middle of the
>> inquiry.
>>
>> What's wrong with that, you ask?  Get some money to the SPMs so they
>> can start to rebuild their lives whilst the difficulty of quashing the
>> convictions and awarding a more substantial compensation payment
>> further down the line can be sorted out, but at least they've got
>> something to be helping out for now.
>>
>> Except that TPTB didn't think of the effect of this on the SPMs that
>> had been declared bankrupt as a result of what had happened.
>>
>> Any money received by a SPM that has been declared bankrupt interim
>> must legally be given to the Official Receiver who has a legal
>> obligation to use it to repay their debts.
>
> Even after 18 months after the declaration? For an ex-gratia payment?
>
> I didn't think this was how bankruptcy worked?

Perhaps your knowledge of bankruptcy has some holes in it too? The
alternative is that the submissions made by a KC to the Horizon Inquiry
were incorrect.

I wonder which of those two options should be considered more likely?

>> The most extreme example of this I know is a SPM that was awarded a
>> payment of £259,000 by the historic shortfall scheme of which they
>> received just £8,000.
>
> Do you have further details?

It was stated by Tim Moloney KC (remember him!) during a compensation
issues hearing during the Inquiry on the 8th December 2022. There was a
problem with the video and audio feed that day so it was not possible to
watch proceedings live, but the transcript [2] and video [3] are available.

Before continuing, note that Mr Moloney states that "it was predicted"
that "most of the damages, under the terms of such settlements, are
being paid for the benefit of the Official Receiver", i.e. this wasn't a
surprise and was actually expected but TPTB pressed ahead regardless.

Read / watch the section where Mr Moloney states: "As the Inquiry is
aware, one major area of concern was the significant delays in the
making of offers for compensation in claimants in the HSS scheme who
have been declared bankrupt. Offers in those cases have now begun to be
made but, regrettably and as predicted, most of the damages, under the
terms of such settlements, are being paid for the benefit of the
Official Receiver." whereupon he gives two examples. An award of
£259,359 of which the SPM received just £8,000 (Case 4) and another
where from a compensation award of £24,999.32 the Official Receiver
received £20,400.32 (Case 5).

Regards

S.P.

[1] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/19/contents
[2]
https://postofficeinquiry.dracos.co.uk/compensation-issues-hearing/2022-12-08/
[3] https://youtu.be/jaeq3CT8J-0

[Fredxx]

1) Ask the crown court for leave to appeal
2) Claim the prosecution was brought against you as a means of not
fighting a charge of theft, therefore under duress.
3) Hearing date set
4) PO Offer no rebuttal at claims for a faulty Horizon system and the
corporate fraud perpetrated by the PO

> Which nicely introduces the additional wrinkle of needing to submit a
> skeleton argument.  How many SPMs do you think are capable of drafting a
> skeleton argument without assistance?  Who is drafting it on their
> behalf?  Who is paying them for drafting it, or do you suppose they
> should do it without charge?

Hence the need for standard documents, where each SPM needs to add dates
and amounts as necessary.

> I'd say, "So far, so simple(ish)".  There's some curved balls, but we
> can bat them away.  Except the question arises of how many of the SPMs
> are appealing within 21 days of the original decision?
>
> Which is the next issue you have probably overlooked.

No, you can ask for leave to appeal. Again a standard document, just
enter dates, magistrate's court details etc.

> That said, the SPMs can ask for permission to submit the appeal out of
> time.  Thankfully, the application form caters for this and they will
> need to explain why they did not submit their appeal within the 21 day
> time limit whereupon the judge will need to consider the reasons for the
> delay and the effect of the delay on the case.

Again a standard paragraph all SPMs can use.

> Alternatively, it is possible to apply to the Court of Appeal to extend
> the 21 days retrospectively, but this is treated as a relief from
> sanctions and therefore the three-stage test in Denton v TH White
> Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906, (aka "The Denton Test") will apply.
>
> Do you recommend the SPMs ask for permission to submit the appeal out of
> time or apply for a retrospective extension to the 21 days, or do you
> recommend a different course of action?  Please provide relevant details
> as to why you have given the answer you have.  Your answer will need to
> include details of the party that will be drafting either the reasons
> for the delay in applying and skeleton argument, or making the
> application to extend the time and details for how that party is to be
> paid.

while I get your point, however I fail to see the substantive difference
for all SPMs, and why they can't use a common set of documents, or
simply refer to them.

> In a spirit of helping you, Tim Moloney KC, (and in case that name
> doesn't ring any bells, he's the silk that represented the SPMs in the
> now famous Hamilton judgment - more on him later...), reckons that one
> should apply out of time to the CoA, but only if one is within the terms
> of the Hamilton judgment.  But that's just his opinion.  What's yours?
> And how does one determine "if one is within the terms of the Hamilton
> judgment"?
>
> A third option is to approach the Criminal Cases Review Commission
> (CCRC) who can send the case back to the courts for a fresh appeal.
>
> Anyone can apply to the CCRC to have their case reviewed however,
> there's a key phrase there: "to have their case reviewed".

Is that open to those who were coerced into pleading guilty?

I agree with you in principle but the Hamilton case isn't unique. And I
see no reason why the vast majority, if not all, can't use her argument.
After all she also pleaded guilty.

>>> It will therefore take time to unpick everything correctly.  There is
>>> no magic wand that can be waved that magically "fixes" everything.
>>
>> It just takes the PO to rescind their claim that the Horizon system
>> was infallible.
>
> No it doesn't.  There is legislation that must be followed.  Unless and
> until it is replaced with alternative legislation.  At the moment we are
> where we are and we have the legislative framework we have.
>
> Wishing things were different is of no use to the SPMs.

With respect, the process for the SPMs is not muddy where standard
documents are used, and where the PO publicly admit the Horizon software
was flawed.

>> Knowledge from the Hamilton experience should speed things up to for
>> those appealing, so they can use the same forms and claims, simply
>> changing names and dates.
>
> The CCRC's e-mail address is info at ccrc dot gov dot uk
>
> I am sure they would welcome your input on the matter as you clearly
> know better than them.
>
> Alternatively, and I'm just throwing this out there as a hypothetical,
> but maybe, just maybe, you don't understand the situation as well as you
> think you do and it is actually more complicated than you think it is.
>
>
>>> When the government makes a knee-jerk response to speed things up, it
>>> typically has unintended consequences.
>>
>> I might agree. but it may be necessary of the courts and PO drag their
>> feet.
>
> I am not aware of any instances of the courts dragging their feet.  Do
> you have cites please?

Given any hearing is generally 3 months away, any number of hurdles can
make cases last years. Yes, for a simple case of Parental
Responsibility, yes I know a different court, but that still took 30
months.

>>> For example, the government decided it would be "a good idea" to
>>> fast-track interim compensation payments to SPMs in the middle of the
>>> inquiry.
>>>
>>> What's wrong with that, you ask?  Get some money to the SPMs so they
>>> can start to rebuild their lives whilst the difficulty of quashing
>>> the convictions and awarding a more substantial compensation payment
>>> further down the line can be sorted out, but at least they've got
>>> something to be helping out for now.
>>>
>>> Except that TPTB didn't think of the effect of this on the SPMs that
>>> had been declared bankrupt as a result of what had happened.
>>>
>>> Any money received by a SPM that has been declared bankrupt interim
>>> must legally be given to the Official Receiver who has a legal
>>> obligation to use it to repay their debts.
>>
>> Even after 18 months after the declaration? For an ex-gratia payment?
>>
>> I didn't think this was how bankruptcy worked?
>
> Perhaps your knowledge of bankruptcy has some holes in it too?  The
> alternative is that the submissions made by a KC to the Horizon Inquiry
> were incorrect.

You don't have to be condescending. I asked a simple question and you
chose not to explain where I might be going wrong.

From:
https://www.gov.uk/bankruptcy/when-bankruptcy-ends
Debts that will not be written off

When you’re discharged you’ll be released from most, but not all, of the
debts you owed at the date of the bankruptcy.

Debts you will not be released from include:

debts arising from fraud
anything you owe under family proceedings - unless the court
decides otherwise
damages for personal injuries to anyone - unless the court decides
otherwise
debts which were not included in the bankruptcy itself, for example
a debt to the Student Loans Company

>
> I wonder which of those two options should be considered more likely?

Again, you don't have to be condescending. This is supposed to be a
legal group and I am always happy to be told where I am wrong, but
prefer to be put right rather than being obliged to quote a government
website that reinforces my beliefs.

>>> The most extreme example of this I know is a SPM that was awarded a
>>> payment of £259,000 by the historic shortfall scheme of which they
>>> received just £8,000.
>>
>> Do you have further details?
>
> It was stated by Tim Moloney KC (remember him!) during a compensation
> issues hearing during the Inquiry on the 8th December 2022.  There was a
> problem with the video and audio feed that day so it was not possible to
> watch proceedings live, but the transcript [2] and video [3] are available.
>
> Before continuing, note that Mr Moloney states that "it was predicted"
> that "most of the damages, under the terms of such settlements, are
> being paid for the benefit of the Official Receiver", i.e. this wasn't a
> surprise and was actually expected but TPTB pressed ahead regardless.
>
> Read / watch the section where Mr Moloney states: "As the Inquiry is
> aware, one major area of concern was the significant delays in the
> making of offers for compensation in claimants in the HSS scheme who
> have been declared bankrupt.  Offers in those cases have now begun to be
> made but, regrettably and as predicted, most of the damages, under the
> terms of such settlements, are being paid for the benefit of the
> Official Receiver." whereupon he gives two examples.  An award of
> £259,359 of which the SPM received just £8,000 (Case 4) and another
> where from a compensation award of £24,999.32 the Official Receiver
> received £20,400.32 (Case 5).

Perhaps what you're eluding to is the HSS scheme is not fit for purpose,
where the Official was not approached for their claim on compensation.

I still don't see any referral to a cite or statute that requires
belated compensation to be paid to the receiver. Hence my previous
supposition.

[Clive Page]

On 12/01/2024 15:29, Adam Funk wrote:
> (Apologies if this has already been posted in one of the Horizon
> threads but I missed it.)
>
> Quote:
>
> The legal presumption that computers are reliable stems from an
> older common law principle that “mechanical instruments” should be
> presumed to be in working order unless proven otherwise. That
> assumption means that if, for instance, a police officer quotes the
> time on their watch, a defendant cannot force the prosecution to
> call a horologist to explain from first principles how watches
> work.
>
> For a period, computers lost that protection in England and
> Wales. A 1984 act of parliament ruled that computer evidence was
> only admissible if it could be shown that the computer was used and
> operating properly. But that act was repealed in 1999, just months
> before the first trials of the Horizon system began.
>
> As a result, when post office operators were accused of having
> stolen money, the hallucinatory evidence of the Horizon system was
> deemed sufficient proof. Without any evidence to the contrary, the
> defendants could not force the system to be tested in court and
> their loss was all but guaranteed.
>
> <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/12/update-law-on-computer-evidence-to-avoid-horizon-repeat-ministers-urged>
>

There was a good letter in the Financial Times earlier this week from Harold Thimbleby, a distinguished computer scientist and Emeritus Professor at Swansea University. In it he says:

"We all use amazing technology, like our phones, and then wonder why government and NHS IT systems can't just catch up. ... The answer is that companies like Amazon and Apple employ thousands of very competent developers who are clear what they are doing. Contrast that with, for instance, Horizon. The Post Office is so complex it wasn't even sure what it wanted; Fujitsu (as has become evident from the Post Office inquiry) wasn't competent to program anything reliably; and the government contracted Horizon regardless, despite warnings".

Thimbleby goes on to say:

"If I was prime minister I'd rewrite the Medical Act 1858 which outlawed quack doctors, so as to outlaw quack IT practitioners. And we also need to replace the common law presumption that computer evidence is reliable. Evidence can't be reliable while we have so many quack IT systems."

I find it hard to disagree with that.

--
Clive Page

[Jon Ribbens]

On 2024-01-26, Clive Page <use...@page2.eu> wrote:
> There was a good letter in the Financial Times earlier this week from
> Harold Thimbleby, a distinguished computer scientist and Emeritus
> Professor at Swansea University. In it he says:
>
> "We all use amazing technology, like our phones, and then wonder why
> government and NHS IT systems can't just catch up. ... The answer is
> that companies like Amazon and Apple employ thousands of very
> competent developers who are clear what they are doing. Contrast that
> with, for instance, Horizon. The Post Office is so complex it wasn't
> even sure what it wanted; Fujitsu (as has become evident from the
> Post Office inquiry) wasn't competent to program anything reliably;
> and the government contracted Horizon regardless, despite warnings".
>
> Thimbleby goes on to say:
>
> "If I was prime minister I'd rewrite the Medical Act 1858 which
> outlawed quack doctors, so as to outlaw quack IT practitioners.

What's the betting though that the actual result of that would be
that more rather than fewer IT projects would end up in the hands
of companies like Fujitsu?

[Pancho]

Yes, much of winning contracts is about political bullshit.

University IT departments seemed to want IT to be like structural
engineering, where plans are drawn, certified procedures followed and
quality assured products are produced. This was tried, it did not work.
That is why we now have Agile.

Big companies, like Fijitsu, are realatively better at producing
certificates, jumping though hoops, etc, but this have very little to do
with producing working systems.

When I was at university they drummed into us that 90% (pick a big
figure) of software cost was mainainance/bug fixing. The obvious
implication being better initial design would save money, in the long
run. What they did not discuss is the cost of cancelled projects.
Projects that took too long to deliver, or delivered the wrong thing.