Idealism, Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy
FACE
and dry treatise on the title subject.
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Idealism, Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy
By George Friedman
Iran says it has enriched uranium. Hosni Mubarak is claiming that Shia in
Sunni states are traitors to their countries. The French are in political
and economic gridlock. With all these urgent things going on, it seems to us
that it is time to talk of something important, something that has driven
and divided American politics for centuries and will continue to do so: the
argument between those who have been called idealists and those who have
been labeled realists in U.S. foreign policy.
When the United States was in its infancy, France experienced a revolution
that was in many ways similar to the American Revolution. Some Americans
wanted to support the French revolutionaries, arguing that the United States
had to pursue its moral ideals and stand by its moral partner. Others
pointed out that the American economy was heavily dependent on Britain, the
major market for American goods. Moreover, the young country relied on its
ability to send exports to Europe, and the waters were controlled by
Britain. Whatever moral inclinations the Americans might have had toward
France, prudence required that they not take on Britain. The idealists tried
to frame their arguments strategically and the realists tried to create a
moral cast for their argument, but the problem, in the end, was simple:
America's survival depended on not alienating a country that was everything
the colonists had fought against.
This argument has constantly torn apart American thinking about foreign
policy. Consider this example from the more recent past: In World War II,
the United States was allied with the Soviet Union, which was ruled by a
genocidal maniac, Josef Stalin. At the time that the United States allied
with Stalin, Adolf Hitler was only beginning to climb into Stalin's class of
killer. There were those who argued that the alliance with Stalin was a
betrayal of every principle Americans stood for. Others, like Franklin
Roosevelt, recognized that unless the United States allied with Stalin,
Hitler likely would win the war. Those who opposed an alliance with Stalin
based on moral ideals certainly had an excellent point -- but those who
argued that, apart from an alliance with the devil, the Republic might not
survive, also had an excellent point.
Consider a final example. In 1972, the United States appeared to be a
declining power. It was losing the war in Vietnam, and its position globally
appeared to be deteriorating. The Soviet Union had split from China years
before, and their confrontation along their frontier had, on occasion, been
bloody. War was possible. Richard Nixon created an entente with the Chinese
that was designed to encircle the Soviet Union. In retrospect, the strategy
worked. However, in establishing relations with Mao's China, the United
States once again aligned itself with a murderous regime. The alternative
was an unstoppable Soviet regime.
In each of these cases, the United States confronted this dilemma. On one
side was the argument that unless the United States stood for its moral
ideals, it would survive but lose its soul. Siding with Britain, Stalin or
Mao might have been prudent, but it was a shallow prudence that would
eliminate the raison d'etre for the American regime. On the other side was
the argument that there could be no moral regime unless there was a regime.
The United States did not have the strength to resist, on its own, Britain,
Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Without such questionable allies, the
moral project would be impossible because the United States either would not
survive, or would survive as a spent force.
It is important to note that these arguments cut across political and even
ideological grounds. In 1972, people on the left celebrated Nixon's alliance
with Mao, and it was the right wing that raised moral doubts. Of course,
many on the right supported Nixon and some on the left, not taken by the
romance of Maoism, were appalled at the alignment. Similarly, it was the
left in World War II that wanted an alliance with the Soviets, and Winston
Churchill -- far from a leftist -- stood with them. In other words, the
debate has never been an ideologically coherent argument. It has been all
over the place.
The current incarnation of this argument concerns the U.S.-jihadist war, and
the ideological complexity shows itself quickly.
There are two flavors of idealists here. First, there are those who argue
that in waging its war against the jihadists, the United States should never
do anything that would violate basic principles of human rights -- and that
it should avoid alliances with states that are themselves oppressive. So,
for example, some argue that working closely with Saudi Arabia, a kingdom
they regard as antithetical to American moral standards, is unacceptable.
There are also those who argue that the primary reason for going to war in
the Middle East is to create democracies there. There are two sorts of
idealists here. There are the neoconservatives -- some of whom sincerely
believe the prodemocracy argument, and others who have adopted it as a
justification for military campaigns they supported for other reasons. But
alongside the neoconservatives, there are liberals who argue that the
protection of "human rights" -- often used interchangeably with "democracy"
-- should be the primary justification for any war. Recall liberal support
for the Kosovo war as an example.
On the other side of the rhetorical divide are those who make two arguments.
The first is that -- as in the historical cases involving Britain, the
Soviet Union and China -- the practical reality is that the United States
must always work with allies when fighting in the Eastern Hemisphere, and
that those allies frequently will be morally repugnant to Americans. In
other words, whatever you may think of the Saudis' view of women, an
alliance with Saudi Arabia has been indispensable for fighting the war
against al Qaeda, regardless of whether the later Iraq campaign was
justified. In other words, the argument for alliance in the past remains
valid today.
This is extended to the argument that the United States should have as its
goal the creation of democracy in the Middle East. The counterargument goes
like this: Democracy in the Middle East may be, in some moral sense, a good
idea, but American power -- though enormous -- is not infinite. The
jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere have not been crushed, and the United States
needs regional allies. The Americans, the logic goes, cannot simultaneously
seek alliance and try to overthrow regimes.
The idealist argument -- that a country that pursues only its physical and
economic security will lose its moral foundation -- is not a frivolous
argument. At a certain point, the pursuit of security requires the pursuit
of power, and the pursuit of power is corrupting. At the same time, pursuing
justice without a sufficiently large sword will get you whipped. And staying
out of the fight does not mean that the fight won't come to you. The
American moral project can be lost in two ways: through opportunistic
corruption or through annihilation.
Politicians do not have the luxury of contemplating the paradox of being.
They must make decisions, and inaction is very much a decision. George
Washington decided that safety trumped political principle and broadly
steered clear of the French revolutionary regime. Franklin Roosevelt saw the
path to preserving democracy through alliance with Stalin. Nixon swallowed
political principle by flying to Beijing. In retrospect, it is very
difficult to see how any of them could have chosen differently. A doctrine
emerges in looking at these three examples: the pursuit of political
principles is possible only when one is willing to look at the long term;
the near term requires ruthless and unsentimental compromise.
Had the idealist demand that the United States never work with oppressive
nations been honored, Hitler well might have won World War II. The pursuit
of democracy that forces the United States beyond its military and political
resources ultimately will weaken democracy. Moral demands that are not
rooted in political and military reality achieve the opposite of the desired
end. But the realist position also has its weakness. Sometimes being
ruthless becomes an end in itself. Sometimes the defense of the national
interest becomes a justification for defending one's own interest.
These are not simple matters but, as noted, politicians do not have time to
contemplate them for very long. Their natural inclination is to act, and the
action they gravitate toward is the pursuit of power. It is interesting to
note that the president most often associated with the pursuit of human
rights, Abraham Lincoln, was -- in the course of its pursuit -- a ruthless
violator of those rights. No one violated constitutional protections more
systematically than Lincoln, and no one was more dedicated to those
protections. The paradox, however, is simply solved: The path from Point A
to Point B is almost never a straight line. Anyone who heads in a straight
line will fail. This is a lesson that is equally applicable to the
neoconservatives and Amnesty International.
This discussion becomes important now because the United States is
pirouetting between factions in the Islamic world. The United States won
World War II by pragmatically taking advantage of the totalitarian states
and allying with Stalin. The United States won the Cold War by taking
advantage of a split between Communist states and allying with China. And
viewed from a high level, the United States is in the process of trying to
win the jihadist war by taking advantage of the split between Sunnis and
Shia and allying with Iran.
There are excellent moral arguments in favor of fighting a war to bring
democracy to Iraq. There are excellent moral arguments for never having
gotten involved in Iraq in the first place. There are excellent moral
arguments for not having gotten into Desert Storm -- against having based
troops in Saudi Arabia and getting al Qaeda furious at the United States in
the first place. >From all directions, the world is filled with outstanding
moral arguments, and they have their place.
But first there is the reality that exists now. The United States has too
many enemies and too few forces through which to impose its will. As in
World War II and the Cold War, splitting the enemy is a practical imperative
that precedes all moral imperatives. In this case, that means playing off
the various factions within the Muslim world and making the best deal
possible with one power or another. In any deal, the United States will wind
up allied with someone that the Americans disapprove of, much as their
future ally will disapprove of them.
The United States may well wind up making a deal with Iran over Iraq.
Alternatively, a Sunni coalition led by Saudi Arabia might give Washington
the opportunity to negotiate with the Baathist guerrillas in the Sunni
Triangle. Whichever path is followed, it will be condemned by both left and
right for dozens of excellent moral reasons.
Bush has been pursuing the path of pragmatism, however clumsily or adroitly,
for months now. He will make a deal with someone because going it alone is
not an option. The current situation in Iraq cannot be sustained, and all
presidents ultimately respond to reality. Bush might have to eat some words
about democracy and the United States' commitment thereto, but if Roosevelt
could speak of the Four Freedoms while working with Josef Stalin, all things
are possible.
Send questions or comments on this article to anal...@stratfor.com.
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FACE
Joe Horrowitz
news:uf9t32d5lsgq7nhoi...@4ax.com:
> Had the idealist demand that the United States never work with
> oppressive nations been honored, Hitler well might have won World War
> II. The pursuit of democracy that forces the United States beyond its
> military and political resources ultimately will weaken democracy.
> Moral demands that are not rooted in political and military reality
> achieve the opposite of the desired end. But the realist position also
> has its weakness. Sometimes being ruthless becomes an end in itself.
> Sometimes the defense of the national interest becomes a justification
> for defending one's own interest.
>
Thanks for posting this excellent essay, Face.
FACE
Horrowitz <h...@mps.com> scrivened:
Glad you enjoyed it. I did.
I thought it to be interesting in explaining some of the alliances made over
the years that apparently on the face are not good, but represent -- to be
trite -- "caught between a rock and a hard place" or "between the devil and
the deep blue sea". I think the article title captures the essence
concisely and the article body explores the differences between 'idealism'
and 'reality'. -- where it would be idealistically best to remain heavenly
stainless insofar as principles, but realistically (such as the allied
alliance with Stalin in WWII) it is realistically expedient to align with
those that we would not normally countenance.
FACE