Here is the British way to handle catastrophe. First, deny there is a
crisis. Next, react with caution. Finally, when events are going out
of control, call in the army.
The entrance of the army into the theatre of foot and mouth last week
was deeply impressive. The ingenuity with which the disease is now
being tackled stands in unhappy contrast with what went before. Yet
the operation in Cumbria, the region with the worst outbreak, was
planned only nine days ago, and plotted out on the back of a cigarette
packet.
Full article at
http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2001/04/01/stifocnws02006.html?
--
Peter D.
I think that is very fair comment. I would imagine that the military, having
familiarised themselves with the situation, are now slowly taking effective
control.
Blair knows that any moment now he is going to have to instruct Special
Branch to make the first arrests of senior MAFF officials. No option
really - that is why the election has been delayed.
He already has all the information. The Conservative Party missed their
chance. They have had all the evidence that senior officials attempted to
intimidate a witness before a Select Committee of Parliament for weeks. That
is serious stuff. The writer was that witness. The file is sitting in the
Conservative Party HQ in Diss Norfolk waiting collection.
The problem is that no sensible person, including most politicians, wants
anything to do with MAFF. MAFF SVS are corrupt to the core. Incompetent,
very dangerous and frequently criminal.
Both the MOD and the Home Office are well aware of what has been going on.
There is no real argument about the facts - just an unwillingness to act. I
think that hesitancy may now be coming to an end. I've been trying since
September to get some action and, at last, sense that something is
happening.
Watch this space and be thankful for the integrity of the army
--
Pat Gardiner
Demand an investigation into MAFF
see http://www.users.waitrose.com/~patgardiner/
"Pat Gardiner" <Patgardiner@no spambtinternet.com> wrote in message
news:9a7egj$hqn$1...@taliesin.netcom.net.uk...
> From the Sunday Times:
>
> Here is the British way to handle catastrophe. First, deny there is a
> crisis. Next, react with caution. Finally, when events are going out
> of control, call in the army.
>
> The entrance of the army into the theatre of foot and mouth last week
> was deeply impressive. The ingenuity with which the disease is now
> being tackled stands in unhappy contrast with what went before. Yet
> the operation in Cumbria, the region with the worst outbreak, was
> planned only nine days ago, and plotted out on the back of a cigarette
> packet.
Eh? Seems unlikely that the army had the faintest clue what to do -
the main effect seems to have been to relieve MAFF vets and officials
from logistics tasks that were taking too much of their time. That and
providing people on the ground who can think straight under stress and
without the emotional involvement the farmers inevitably have.
I'd be a bit suspicious of all these media stories of how much better
things are now that Tony Blair is in 'command' if I were you.
--
===============================================
Chris Game <chri...@bigfoot.com>
===============================================
I doubt that last phrase very much. Until 1995 I was employed at RMCS
instructing officers how to use spreadsheets - they caught on very quickly:)
Pat
>
>"Peter Duncanson" <ma...@peterR3M0VETH1Sduncanson.net> wrote in message
>news:aqbect8ncjt41bbek...@4ax.com...
>> From the Sunday Times:
>>
>> >
>> The entrance of the army into the theatre of foot and mouth last week
>> was deeply impressive. The ingenuity with which the disease is now
>> being tackled stands in unhappy contrast with what went before. Yet
>> the operation in Cumbria, the region with the worst outbreak, was
>> planned only nine days ago, and plotted out on the back of a cigarette
>> packet.
That particular urban legend was denied this morning on BBC's
Breakfast with Frost by Brigadier Alex Birtwistle - in charge of
operations.
Here's an exerpt from the transcript of their conversation (available
in full at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/audiovideo/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/default.stm
"DAVID FROST:
Fascinating, then one of the papers today says that part of it was
mapped out, such was the haste and need for haste, mapped out on a
cigarette packet, is that right?
ALEX BIRTWISTLE:
Well I think that's a bit of a colloquialism but I think that also
refers to my filthy habit of smoking, but certainly in the early days
we, the Prime Minister came up on Thursday, it was apparent in
conversation then that there was going to be a change of pace and on
the Friday I summoned a logistic team up and whilst they were doing
that not having an office and not wanting to disturb anybody I walked
up and down the car park having the odd cigarette and making the odd
notes, I think that's where that's come from. "
>
>I doubt that last phrase very much. Until 1995 I was employed at RMCS
>instructing officers how to use spreadsheets - they caught on very quickly:)
They do. But army types also often need huge amounts of re-training to
make them useful to the business world (after they leave the service).
Why?
LNM
>In an earlier post, Peter Duncanson said.....
>
>> From the Sunday Times:
>>
<extract snipped>
>
>Eh? Seems unlikely that the army had the faintest clue what to do -
>the main effect seems to have been to relieve MAFF vets and officials
>from logistics tasks that were taking too much of their time. That and
>providing people on the ground who can think straight under stress and
>without the emotional involvement the farmers inevitably have.
>
>I'd be a bit suspicious of all these media stories of how much better
>things are now that Tony Blair is in 'command' if I were you.
Chris, here is the complete article so that you and others can judge
it in perspective:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Here is the British way to handle catastrophe. First, deny there is a
crisis. Next, react with caution. Finally, when events are going out
of control, call in the army.
The entrance of the army into the theatre of foot and mouth last week
was deeply impressive. The ingenuity with which the disease is now
being tackled stands in unhappy contrast with what went before. Yet
the operation in Cumbria, the region with the worst outbreak, was
planned only nine days ago, and plotted out on the back of a cigarette
packet.
The strategy is the work of a brigadier who admits he knows nothing
about the virus. In 24 hours last week he solved one big problem that
had defeated the government and the civil service. And his involvement
came about in a way so casual, so arbitrary, that one must wonder
whether cool Britannia, our supposedly modernising nation, will always
be this amateur.
It was last Thursday that the country woke up to newspaper pictures of
Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, and Sir Michael Jackson, the army's
top general, standing on a Cumbrian airfield with an unknown
brigadier.
This was Alex Birtwistle, a soldier who is due to retire shortly,
whose final duties include the mass cull of healthy animals that the
nation has hesitated over for so long.
This weekend, with infections diagnosed at 840 farms, the official
figures are that 340,000 animals are awaiting slaughter. Of the
570,000 already killed, 162,000 are awaiting disposal. But the true
scale of the destruction we shall witness is greater.
In Cumbria alone, Birtwistle is planning to kill between 250,000 and
500,000 sheep. His aim is to destroy "every living thing" in the
L-shaped zone of infection - from the coast to Carlisle and south to
Penrith - whether it has the virus or not. Not even the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Maff), knows how many sheep graze
there.
Officially, the operation is being run by Maff and the army is "giving
assistance". Birtwistle praises the Maff officials he works for as
"superb", but in practice the army is now the driving force.
His involvement dates from the day the prime minister visited Cumbria.
Tony Blair met him by chance. At the time, more than a month into the
crisis, the army's role was to visit infected farms, to find
slaughtermen and equipment, and try to comfort the farmers.
The brigadier's chief of staff, Major David Holt, was in charge of
this in Cumbria. When Holt heard that Blair was visiting, he asked his
boss to deal with the VIP.
The prime minister was under pressure. Nick Brown, the agriculture
minister, was still trying to assert that matters were "under control"
even as experts were saying the opposite. In Cumbria, Blair was told
that farmers were dropping their resistance to a mass cull. He asked
Birtwistle if the arrangements for killing animals were satisfactory.
"I was forced to tell him," said the brigadier, "that in my
professional opinion they were not." The two talked over coffee, and
Birtwistle started work.
The planning was done in a car park with two mobile phones and a
cigarette packet. Go there today and you will find the brigadier in
his "body box", a camouflaged four-ton Bedford truck parked at the
back of an industrial estate.
First impressions are misleading. He is a smoker, an English graduate,
and he turns out to be cursed by melancholy. He loves the country: at
22, an age when most people move to cities, he bought a house in
Swaledale, Yorkshire. Now he lives with his wife and two children in a
17th-century cottage in Cumbria, with two labradors that, to his
embarrassment, are called Bunty and Plum. There are also six hens. The
effect is of an endearing British amateurism. The effect is wrong.
Birtwistle's background is in planning counter-terrorism. Behind the
nicotine and melancholy lie problem-solving skills that this crisis
needed from day one.
He met Blair on Thursday, March 22. A day later he was in Carlisle. By
6.30pm on Saturday he not only understood the basics of foot and
mouth, including the complexities of compensating farmers, but had
found an airfield where a pit could be dug, had secured the agreement
of the Environment Agency to bury 500,000 animals there and had taken
a one-year lease.
On Sunday, using two bulldozers hired on a handshake, his team started
digging pits and building a slaughterhouse.
At 10.20am on Monday the first 2,000 rotting carcasses were buried. By
Thursday he was exceeding his own target for the disposal of animals
and was planning "the counter-attack". His logic is simple. Instead of
putting resources into the worst-affected area, he is focused on the
edges of the infection. The aim is to stop new outbreaks.
There are exceptions, however. "We made an exception for a lone mother
with 1,600 dead sheep and 575 dead cows." At this point, just for a
moment, his voice cracks. "We moved the cows onto pyres that were
burning elsewhere, and lifted the sheep."
He had other concerns. Birtwistle has tried to use local contractors,
to put money back into the communities' economies. And he thinks about
animal welfare.
No killing started until he had seen for himself that there was water
even for animals that had a minute to live. His sergeant-major parades
the civilian slaughterers daily to make sure weapons are clean and
oiled for an efficient kill.
As the week passed, he witnessed the emotion of this tragedy.
Cumbria's farmers are being organised for him by a National Farmers'
Union official who has lost his own farm, whose son has lost his farm,
and whose married daughter has lost her farm.
"I thought I'd be totally unemotional," the brigadier said. "But
although I have shot and fished, and have had no problems slaughtering
animals for food in Africa, I was touched by the waste of it. There
are so many questions out there. I don't have any answers."
He is aware of the debate over how far animals travel and how they are
traded.
"It goes further, into things such as whether animals have souls. But
all I know is . . . that . . . all I know is . . ."
Suddenly, the man organising the slaughter of a quarter of a million
creatures was unable to finish his sentence. He bit his lip, then
struggled to control his face. He kept trying to speak, but could not.
He asked me not to report what happened, but there are good reasons to
ignore him. Like you, perhaps, I rarely give the British Army much
thought. Now I feel warm towards the institution because of this
compassionate man. His show of feeling is an assurance that the death
of these animals will be humane. The RSPCA can relax.
Later, he explained his distress. Anyone who lives in the country
knows the short-sighted gaze of sheep. They stare at passers-by,
trying to puzzle out if you are there to feed them or eat them.
Two days before our interview, Birtwistle went to the airfield at
Great Orton near Carlisle. As he stood with the defence secretary and
Britain's top general, a sheep looked his way. It had been stunned
twice, its spinal cord was severed and it was dead. "But it fixed me
with a stare and it caused me to think, perhaps we can do these things
differently in life."
He is speaking personally now. The sheep made him think about how
animals are hauled and traded, often in distress; the common
agricultural policy; and about "the fact we pay farmers for animals,
rather than for what we really want them to do, which is to preserve
the countryside".
He added: "We should be making a differentiation between the large
farms, which are pension-fund industries, and the small farmers. If we
want to maintain the landscape of the lakes, dales or the Highlands,
we should be putting animals on to manage the ecology, not for this
thing."
I came away shocked and relieved. I live on a farm in the Pennines. I
am not a farmer. But I know what the farmers know: that the nearest
infection is just over the hill; that dead cows lay on the ground for
five days; that, during those days, foxes and badgers fed at night on
the udders.
According to Maff, this is nothing to worry about. Jim Scudamore, the
chief vet, says the virus dies a few hours after its host. In the
south Pennines, we do not understand this. The virus arrived in
infected meat.
Meeting Birtwistle was a relief. But the sheer amateurishness of our
response to the disease is breathtaking, and our talk brings a new
example.
The cycle from suspicion to disposal should take 24 hours. Instead, it
can take 10 days. Among the causes of the delay is a shortage of vets,
caused by the "clean vet, dirty vet" system. Because the virus can
live in the throat, any vet who diagnoses foot and mouth cannot work
for three days.
Last week Birtwistle asked a vet to brief him "in terms a bog-standard
infantryman would understand, on what the bloody problem is of getting
vets out". He learnt that a gargle was available to kill the virus in
the throat, but not the one in the nose. Birtwistle pondered this for
24 hours.
Our interview was interrupted by a knock on the door. It was the vet,
to tell the brigadier that a spray with a pH of less than 5.5 would
kill the nasal virus. Right, said the brigadier, get the army medical
corps to make up a spray.
"I am not an expert," he said, returning to the interview. "All I did
was, 'Only connect,' as E M Forster said. You have to understand that
six weeks ago we were planning for a petrol crisis."
Three months before Britain's outbreak of foot and mouth, health
officials in America, Mexico and Canada held a dress rehearsal to test
their ability to respond to a similar epidemic. The disease was
eradicated from the United States in 1929 and from the rest of North
America by the 1950s, yet America has practised for an outbreak three
times in the past decade.
One day, when the election is over, there will be an inquiry into
this. It should answer three questions. We always knew we were
vulnerable to foot and mouth. Why, then, did the detailed plans for a
mass cull in Cumbria wait until more than one month into the outbreak?
Why were they made using a mobile phone and a fag packet by the
endearing Brigadier Birtwistle? Why was someone of his tactical skills
not seconded to Maff at the beginning?
--
Peter D.
I had assumed that it was a colloquialism, similar to plans being
sketched out "on the back of an envelope" or "on a paper napkin in a
cafe". Sometimes this is literally true, sometimes not. It indicates
that the planning started immediately wherever the planner(s) happened
to be and was not delayed until the 'proper' facilities were
available.
>refers to my filthy habit of smoking, but certainly in the early days
>we, the Prime Minister came up on Thursday, it was apparent in
>conversation then that there was going to be a change of pace and on
>the Friday I summoned a logistic team up and whilst they were doing
>that not having an office and not wanting to disturb anybody I walked
>up and down the car park having the odd cigarette and making the odd
>notes, I think that's where that's come from. "
>
>>
>>I doubt that last phrase very much. Until 1995 I was employed at RMCS
>>instructing officers how to use spreadsheets - they caught on very quickly:)
>
>They do. But army types also often need huge amounts of re-training to
>make them useful to the business world (after they leave the service).
>Why?
>LNM
>>
>>Pat
>>>
>>> Full article at
>>>
>>http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/2001/04/01/stifocnws02006.html?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Peter D.
>>
>>
--
Peter D.
>On Sun, 1 Apr 2001 16:38:29 +0100, Chris Game <chri...@bigfoot.com>
>wrote:
>He asked me not to report what happened, but there are good reasons to
>ignore him. Like you, perhaps, I rarely give the British Army much
>thought. Now I feel warm towards the institution because of this
>compassionate man. His show of feeling is an assurance that the death
>of these animals will be humane. The RSPCA can relax.
>
All very touching. Perhaps the Brigadier is one good man but I want
and demand independent RSPCA inspectors to attend and observe all of
the killing operations.
LNM
Same reason that members of the RCVS make rotten managers. Wrong leanings,
wrong education, wrong training, wrong motivation. Eventually, they get to
covering up their mistakes...
Most ex Army officers (and Navy etc.) never make it in business, whatever
retraining they get. No one seems suprised either. Why are we suprised when
220 vets heavily criticised in two previous disasters, do it again?
It is largely the fault of the farming community for being too afraid of
them to stand up for themselves. Although, bearing in mind what happened to
me, I can understand their fear of the State veterinary Service.
--
Regards Pat Gardiner
Demand an investigation into MAFF
see http://www.users.waitrose.com/~patgardiner/
> >
I read the full article, and it sounds like a bit of good story-telling
by a journalist, rather than literal truth. I can believe the
Brigadier, and his chief of staff, standing in a MAFF car park with
their mobile phones, making a few calls and taking notes. But I doubt
they'd have to rely on the back of a fag packet.
--
David G. Bell -- Farmer, SF Fan, Filker, and Punslinger.
If I were to go back to my schooldays, knowing what I know now, I would
pack cheese sandwiches for lunch.
> I had assumed that it was a colloquialism, similar to plans being
> sketched out "on the back of an envelope" or "on a paper napkin in a
> cafe". Sometimes this is literally true, sometimes not. It indicates
> that the planning started immediately wherever the planner(s) happened
> to be and was not delayed until the 'proper' facilities were
> available.
All the best engineering drawings have been done freehand on the table
cloths at Joe's. Usually after empirical tests of optical
transmission...
>On Sunday, in article
> <k1nectgoivt0u3ebd...@4ax.com>
> ma...@peterR3M0VETH1Sduncanson.net "Peter Duncanson" wrote:
>
>> I had assumed that it was a colloquialism, similar to plans being
>> sketched out "on the back of an envelope" or "on a paper napkin in a
>> cafe". Sometimes this is literally true, sometimes not. It indicates
>> that the planning started immediately wherever the planner(s) happened
>> to be and was not delayed until the 'proper' facilities were
>> available.
>
>All the best engineering drawings have been done freehand on the table
>cloths at Joe's. Usually after empirical tests of optical
>transmission...
Quite right and proper.
It is essential to record one's thoughts on any suitable surface,
because the empirical tests of optical transmission have a strange
tendency to interfere with normal memory processes.
--
Peter D.
[Quote from original Guardian article follows:]
> >He asked me not to report what happened, but there are good reasons to
> >ignore him. Like you, perhaps, I rarely give the British Army much
> >thought. Now I feel warm towards the institution because of this
> >compassionate man. His show of feeling is an assurance that the death
> >of these animals will be humane. The RSPCA can relax.
> >
>
> All very touching. Perhaps the Brigadier is one good man but I want
> and demand independent RSPCA inspectors to attend and observe all of
> the killing operations.
> LNM
What's interesting is the effect seeing someone in uniform who's
obviously 'in charge' and reasonably competent has on the public. This
reporter certainly seems to have fallen for it. There's no doubt this
effect exists and is played on by the police and so on to good effect
- there was some discussion on this on radio4 on Sunday morning.
This reporter was clearly dazzled by the Brig. because he's never some
across someone before who impressed him in that way. The fact this
reporter had never come across someone in his organisation who could
'get things done' may say something about the Guardian newspaper, but
these people do exist, and probably in the civil service and in MAFF.
As I said in my post earlier, the army has useful skills and training,
but probably little clue as to what to do in this situation. Let's not
get into the habit of calling them in to solve all of life's problems
for goodness sake.
>In an earlier post, The Loch Ness Monster said.....
Yes, the dazzlement of the reporter come through quite strongly.
I must say that I was pleasantly surprised to discover that the Army
was doing anything of practical value. Cynically, I had rather
assumed that the primary mission of Army officers (under orders from
Supreme Commander Blair) was to stand in front of TV cameras looking
competent and "in charge" while MAFFites and others got on with the
real work.
The Brig. did not seem to exaggerate what he was doing, which was
organising and not policy making.
It is also worth remembering that today's senior army officers do
receive some training or guidance in speaking to the press, which is
presumably not the case for MAFF officials.
--
Peter D.
Thanks for posting that. I don't read the ST and would never have found it
otherwise.
as to the final question, why wasn't the army called in earlier, I think the
answer to that can be made in one word: Politics.
--
Austin Shackles. www.telinco.co.uk/anshackles my opinions are just that
"Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose"
Alphonse Karr (1808 - 1890) Les Guêpes, Jan 1849