Sql Server Password Change

[Imelda Matchett]

Ifyou already know the current administrator password, log into your Windows Server, and simply change the password. The steps on how to do so differ depending on the version of Windows you are running.

The commands mentioned above may vary based on the path of your Windows install. In our example, it is on the C drive. In case your install is located on another disk partition, modify the command accordingly.

Changing the Administrator password on a Windows server is a critical security measure. Regularly updating and strengthening this password helps protect data and prevent unauthorized access. Best practices include using complex, unique passwords and implementing multi-factor authentication for added security. Proactive password management is essential for server security and data protection.

You may perform a factory reset, but be aware that this action erases all data. Use recovery options during startup or a recovery disk. Proceed with caution as this process is irreversible and results in data loss.

Has anyone come up with a way to allow remote users to change their own passwords in VisualSVN server? We have it running in 'stand-alone' (non-ActiveDirectory) mode and the only down side that I've found to this excellent product is that users can't set or change their passwords.

It's something I can live with, but the security implications of passwords that never change are well known. I'm sure it must be possible to add the functionality, but I'm not the least bit talented in any of the technologies used by VisualSVN - so just wondering if anyone has done it?

I've decided to have a bash at implementing this myself. First obstacle, with which I'd appreciate some help, is the password encryption. I've found that VisualSVN has a password file, called htpasswd which has a list of users in the following format:

You can't reset user's password via web interface however WMI (Windows ManagementInstrumentation) provider of VisualSVN Server allows you to reset a password. I.e. you can access VisualSVN Server via WMI so you can write a script on various programming languages to manage the server and automate maintenance tasks.

Unfortunately VisualSVN Server WMI provider is not documented however you can look though MOF file which describes available classes, methods and properties. You can also check WMI Administrative Tools, this toolkit is very helpful when you want to explore WMI infrastructure.

Please note that this script is a sample and you may need to adjust the command to work in your environment. E.g. you may need to pass '-credential' parameter to authenticate successfully. Make sure that user account under which you authenticate has administrator privileges or at least is a member of VisualSVN Server Admins local group.

We have an installation of ArcGIS Enterprise Workgroup 10.6.1: GIS Server, Portal, DataStore. After some time, we would like to change GIS Server siteadmin password: we need to give a admin control to another company and old password is used widely.

You should be able to change the primary site administrator account with no issues, even if the site is federated. Make sure that you change it from ArcGIS Server Manager and not by editing the config files.

In ArcGIS Server Manager, navigate to Security > Settings > Primary Site Administrator Account, then click on the edit pencil. It will allow you to change the username and password of the primary site administrator account.

A connection was successfully established with the server, but then an error occurred during the login process. (provider: Shared Memory Provider, error: 0 - No process is on the other end of the pipe.) (Microsoft SQL Server, Error: 233)

I've never heard of such a thing, no. Unless you've found some kind of very obscure bug, I can almost 100% guarantee that something is being done on that system. Either the people there are doing it, some automated process is doing it, or some third party software is doing it. Something is making that happen. The 'sa' password doesn't spontaneously change, ever. Accounts don't appear on the system with zero outside agency, ever. I would strongly suggest putting extended events sessions on the server to see what you can capture in terms of queries, connections, etc., to understand where this is coming from.

It sounds to me that the application is using the "sa" login. If so, that needs to be fixed immediately and then the "sa" account needs to be given a two GUID password (each half stored on paper in seal envelopes in two different safes) and then it must be disabled.

Also, any application that is using ANY login the has "sysadmin" or "control server" privs should be reworked immediately to not have such a high level of privs. My personal feeling is that all apps should have only PUBLIC privs and the privs to execute stored procedures. That, notwithstanding (it makes Developers whine a lot), no public facing app should have more than Read, Write, and Execute privs. You're just asking for a hack attack otherwise.

Speaking of that, it sounds like that might be the actual problem... you may be under attack either externally or internally. I'd recommend treating the situation that way and with great cause for concern until you can prove otherwise.

Hello community, I am looking for some advice. I currently have several workflows on our Alteryx server that publish TDE's to our Tableau server using the Publish to Tableau Server tool. Every quarter, I am required to update my password for the Tableau server, and I end up spending a good 2-3 hours going through all my workflows on the Alteryx server and updating my password for every Publish to Tableau Server tool. Does anyone know if there is one centralized place where I could change the password once and all my workflows become updated? Any thoughts on a better way for me to do this?

If you are able to get an exception to the password change, perhaps the creation of a generic Tableau account, independent of your own, that is allowed to publish? This ensures that you, personally, are still held to the password change requirement and the generic account acts more like a "Service." Use this generic account on all of your Publish to Tableau Server tools instead of your own.

Updating this - there's a new option called Data Connection Manager (DCM) that does exactly this in versions 2021.4 and later! Here's some information about it.

It essentially allows you to store your credentials in one location and then utilize the associated credential in the tool - so when it comes time to change your password, you only have to do it in one location! Here's a list of DCM supported connectors and tools (note this link is for 22.3, so you may need to change the version to see what is supported on 2021.4+)

I'm not even sure if I asked that right. Anytime someone mentions changing the root password, they mention changing /etc/passwd, or just using the passwd command, but I've never heard of having to change it in an authorized_keys file as well. Where might I find that, and how can I safely delete an entry or change this for root without causing havoc? Thanks!

Yes. You'll need to delete the user's public SSH key to completely remove access. If you're simply trying to remove one user's access to root it's a little tricky. Hopefully you've been using separate private keys, because otherwise you'll have to recreate the file and redistribute the public keys to the authorized users.

To remove the entry, you need to edit the authorized_keys file. If this is your root user on a Linux box, chances are the the file can be found at /root/.ssh/authorized_keys. You'll need to remove the line that contains the public key of the user that you're removing. Unfortunately, there's no easy way to know what line this is without a copy of that user's public key.

Yes; it's considered bad practice to allow people to ssh in as "root" for just this reason. Your boxes should probably have root's ssh disabled, and use something like "sudo" to provide access controls over who can do what as root, that way you won't need to give out the root password or anything equivalent.

If someone has had root, it's very difficult, perhaps impossible, to be sure they can't get it back, unless you reinstall and restore from a backup taken before they had access. Things to watch out for: firstly an old trick: any extra users in /etc/passwd with UID 0. For example:

You should check for any extra processes running as root, that might offer up a root shell to a particular remote or local user; that process' executable need not exist on disk anymore, or need not be what it was when the process was started.

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