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trenchboot-devel

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Heya!

This is the development mailing list for https://github.com/TrenchBoot - which purpose is to make dynamic attestation possible in Linux kernel on AMD, ARM, and Intel machines using a flexible framework.

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Ross Philipson19

12/19/24

[PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

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[PATCH v12 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

12/19/24

12/19/24

[PATCH v12 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file

Introduce the main Secure Launch header file used in the early SL stub and the early setup code.

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[PATCH v12 04/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file

Introduce the main Secure Launch header file used in the early SL stub and the early setup code.

12/19/24

Sergii Dmytruk8

12/18/24

[RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for AMD SKINIT (GRUB)

From: Michał Żygowski <michal....@3mdeb.com> Signed-off-by: Michał Żygowski <michal.

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[RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for AMD SKINIT (GRUB)

From: Michał Żygowski <michal....@3mdeb.com> Signed-off-by: Michał Żygowski <michal.

12/18/24

Ross Philipson, … Daniel P. Smith115

12/13/24

[PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On 12/12/24 17:30, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 11:56 AM Daniel P. Smith >

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[PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On 12/12/24 17:30, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 11:56 AM Daniel P. Smith >

12/13/24

Sergii Dmytruk20

12/12/24

[PATCH v3 00/19] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for Intel TXT (GRUB)

From: Michał Żygowski <michal....@3mdeb.com> The code makes sure the order of policy

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[PATCH v3 00/19] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for Intel TXT (GRUB)

From: Michał Żygowski <michal....@3mdeb.com> The code makes sure the order of policy

12/12/24

Sergii Dmytruk10

12/12/24

[RFC PATCH 0/9] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for AMD SKINIT (Linux)

From: Jagannathan Raman <jag....@oracle.com> GRUB and AMD-SL would have executed the SKINIT

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[RFC PATCH 0/9] x86: Trenchboot Secure Launch DRTM for AMD SKINIT (Linux)

From: Jagannathan Raman <jag....@oracle.com> GRUB and AMD-SL would have executed the SKINIT

12/12/24

Daniel P. Smith, … James Bottomley9

11/4/24

Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] Alternative TPM patches for Trenchboot

On 11/4/24 15:36, James Bottomley wrote: > On Mon, 2024-11-04 at 11:34 -0500, Daniel P. Smith

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Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] Alternative TPM patches for Trenchboot

On 11/4/24 15:36, James Bottomley wrote: > On Mon, 2024-11-04 at 11:34 -0500, Daniel P. Smith

11/4/24

Ross Philipson, Jarkko Sakkinen3

11/2/24

[PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

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[PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

11/2/24

Ross Philipson, … Jarkko Sakkinen13

11/2/24

[PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses

On Sat Nov 2, 2024 at 3:39 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > int tpm_chip_set_locality(struct

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[PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses

On Sat Nov 2, 2024 at 3:39 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > int tpm_chip_set_locality(struct

11/2/24

Ross Philipson, Jarkko Sakkinen3

11/2/24

[PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

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[PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

11/2/24

Sergii Dmytruk11

11/1/24

[PATCH v2 00/19] i386: Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT secure launcher

From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.

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[PATCH v2 00/19] i386: Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT secure launcher

From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.

11/1/24

Ross Philipson, … Jarkko Sakkinen17

11/1/24

[PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On Sat Nov 2, 2024 at 12:04 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 23:19, Jarkko

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[PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On Sat Nov 2, 2024 at 12:04 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 23:19, Jarkko

11/1/24

Ross Philipson, … Jarkko Sakkinen5

11/1/24

[PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality

On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 11:50 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 12:06 PM EET,

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[PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality

On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 11:50 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 12:06 PM EET,

11/1/24

ross.ph...@oracle.com

11/1/24

AMD DRTM work released to the TrenchBoot project

All, This week AMD released its first version of the DRTM specification publicly. This version can be

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AMD DRTM work released to the TrenchBoot project

All, This week AMD released its first version of the DRTM specification publicly. This version can be

11/1/24

Ross Philipson, Elliott, Robert (Servers)2

11/1/24

[PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

> diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > b/Documentation/security/

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[PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

> diff --git a/Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst > b/Documentation/security/

11/1/24

Ross Philipson, Jarkko Sakkinen2

11/1/24

[PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

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[PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow

On Fri Sep 13, 2024 at 11:05 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: > From: "Daniel P. Smith"

11/1/24

Sergii Dmytruk, Daniel Kiper8

10/8/24

[PATCH v4 0/6] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

Hey, On Sun, Oct 06, 2024 at 05:14:41PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Hi, > > These are

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[PATCH v4 0/6] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

Hey, On Sun, Oct 06, 2024 at 05:14:41PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Hi, > > These are

10/8/24

Sergii Dmytruk, … Daniel Kiper37

10/3/24

[PATCH v2 0/8] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

On Sun, Sep 22, 2024 at 08:17:53PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.

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[PATCH v2 0/8] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

On Sun, Sep 22, 2024 at 08:17:53PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.

10/3/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com4

9/19/24

[PATCH 07/24] mmap: Add grub_mmap_get_lowest() and grub_mmap_get_highest()

On 9/19/24 3:23 PM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Sent 0-7 and part of 11 separately taking all the

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[PATCH 07/24] mmap: Add grub_mmap_get_lowest() and grub_mmap_get_highest()

On 9/19/24 3:23 PM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Sent 0-7 and part of 11 separately taking all the

9/19/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

9/17/24

[PATCH 10/24] include/grub: Introduce Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT)

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 10/24] include/grub: Introduce Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT)

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

9/17/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com3

9/17/24

[PATCH 11/24] i386/slaunch: Add basic platform support for secure launch

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 11/24] i386/slaunch: Add basic platform support for secure launch

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

9/17/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

9/16/24

[PATCH 04/24] i386/memory: Rename PAGE_SHIFT to GRUB_PAGE_SHIFT

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 04/24] i386/memory: Rename PAGE_SHIFT to GRUB_PAGE_SHIFT

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

9/16/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

9/16/24

[PATCH 03/24] i386/msr: Extract and improve MSR support detection code

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 03/24] i386/msr: Extract and improve MSR support detection code

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

9/16/24

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

9/16/24

[PATCH 02/24] i386/msr: Rename grub_msr_read() and grub_msr_write()

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 02/24] i386/msr: Rename grub_msr_read() and grub_msr_write()

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

9/16/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

unread,

[PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

9/13/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The Secure Launch platform

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[PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The Secure Launch platform

9/13/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted, then SEXIT must be called. Note that the

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[PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted, then SEXIT must be called. Note that the

9/13/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support

Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources

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[PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support

Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources

9/13/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support

On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs the late launch.

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[PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support

On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs the late launch.

9/13/24

9/13/24

[PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch() routine during early kernel

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[PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch() routine during early kernel

9/13/24

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