trenchboot-devel

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Heya!

This is the development mailing list for https://github.com/TrenchBoot - which purpose is to make dynamic attestation possible in Linux kernel on AMD, ARM, and Intel machines using a flexible framework.

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Sergii Dmytruk, Daniel Kiper8

Oct 8

[PATCH v4 0/6] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

Hey, On Sun, Oct 06, 2024 at 05:14:41PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Hi, > > These are

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[PATCH v4 0/6] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

Hey, On Sun, Oct 06, 2024 at 05:14:41PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Hi, > > These are

Oct 8

Sergii Dmytruk, … Daniel Kiper37

Oct 3

[PATCH v2 0/8] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

On Sun, Sep 22, 2024 at 08:17:53PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.

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[PATCH v2 0/8] i386: memory/MSR/CR code updates

On Sun, Sep 22, 2024 at 08:17:53PM +0300, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.

Oct 3

Ross Philipson, … Andy Lutomirski101

Sep 21

[PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On Sat, Sep 21, 2024 at 11:37 AM Daniel P. Smith <dps...@apertussolutions.com> wrote: >

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[PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

On Sat, Sep 21, 2024 at 11:37 AM Daniel P. Smith <dps...@apertussolutions.com> wrote: >

Sep 21

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com4

Sep 19

[PATCH 07/24] mmap: Add grub_mmap_get_lowest() and grub_mmap_get_highest()

On 9/19/24 3:23 PM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Sent 0-7 and part of 11 separately taking all the

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[PATCH 07/24] mmap: Add grub_mmap_get_lowest() and grub_mmap_get_highest()

On 9/19/24 3:23 PM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > Sent 0-7 and part of 11 separately taking all the

Sep 19

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

Sep 17

[PATCH 10/24] include/grub: Introduce Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT)

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 10/24] include/grub: Introduce Secure Launch Resource Table (SLRT)

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

Sep 17

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com3

Sep 17

[PATCH 11/24] i386/slaunch: Add basic platform support for secure launch

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 11/24] i386/slaunch: Add basic platform support for secure launch

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Ross Philipson <ross.ph...@oracle.com>

Sep 17

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

Sep 16

[PATCH 04/24] i386/memory: Rename PAGE_SHIFT to GRUB_PAGE_SHIFT

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 04/24] i386/memory: Rename PAGE_SHIFT to GRUB_PAGE_SHIFT

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

Sep 16

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

Sep 16

[PATCH 03/24] i386/msr: Extract and improve MSR support detection code

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 03/24] i386/msr: Extract and improve MSR support detection code

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

Sep 16

Sergii Dmytruk, ross.ph...@oracle.com2

Sep 16

[PATCH 02/24] i386/msr: Rename grub_msr_read() and grub_msr_write()

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

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[PATCH 02/24] i386/msr: Rename grub_msr_read() and grub_msr_write()

On 8/26/24 5:44 AM, Sergii Dmytruk wrote: > From: Daniel Kiper <daniel...@oracle.com>

Sep 16

Ross Philipson2

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig options for compiling in/out the

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[PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig options for compiling in/out the

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

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[PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch

This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The Secure Launch platform

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[PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The Secure Launch platform

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality

Expose a sysfs interface to allow user mode to set and query the default locality set for the TPM

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[PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality

Expose a sysfs interface to allow user mode to set and query the default locality set for the TPM

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses

Curently the locality is hard coded to 0 but for DRTM support, access is needed to localities 1

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[PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses

Curently the locality is hard coded to 0 but for DRTM support, access is needed to localities 1

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The function

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[PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The function

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> When tis_tis_core initializes,

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[PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> When tis_tis_core initializes,

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> Commit 933bfc5ad213 introduced

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[PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> Commit 933bfc5ad213 introduced

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted, then SEXIT must be called. Note that the

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[PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths

If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted, then SEXIT must be called. Note that the

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support

Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources

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[PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support

Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support

On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs the late launch.

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[PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support

On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs the late launch.

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch() routine during early kernel

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[PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch() routine during early kernel

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub

The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and later AMD SKINIT) to vector

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[PATCH v11 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub

The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and later AMD SKINIT) to vector

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section

The MLE (measured launch environment) header must be locatable by the boot loader and TXT must be

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[PATCH v11 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section

The MLE (measured launch environment) header must be locatable by the boot loader and TXT must be

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers

These values are needed by Secure Launch to locate particular CPUs during AP startup and to restore

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[PATCH v11 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers

These values are needed by Secure Launch to locate particular CPUs during AP startup and to restore

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 support for Secure Launch early measurements

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The SHA-256 algorithm is

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[PATCH v11 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 support for Secure Launch early measurements

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> The SHA-256 algorithm is

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main header file

Introduce the main Secure Launch header file used in the early SL stub and the early setup code.

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[PATCH v11 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main header file

Introduce the main Secure Launch header file used in the early SL stub and the early setup code.

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

Introduce the Secure Launch Resource Table which forms the formal interface between the pre and post

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[PATCH v11 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

Introduce the Secure Launch Resource Table which forms the formal interface between the pre and post

Sep 13

Sep 13

[PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> Introduce background, overview

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[PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dps...@apertussolutions.com> Introduce background, overview

Sep 13

Sergii Dmytruk3

Sep 13

[PATCH 00/24] i386: Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT secure launcher

Ping. Tip of the day: patches 01-07 and 18 are no-brainers. Initial submission with all the patches

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[PATCH 00/24] i386: Intel TXT and AMD SKINIT secure launcher

Ping. Tip of the day: patches 01-07 and 18 are no-brainers. Initial submission with all the patches

Sep 13

Ross Philipson, … Daniel P. Smith8

Aug 29

[PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset

On 8/28/24 13:45, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > (cc Stuart) > > On Thu, 21 Mar 2024 at 15:46,

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[PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset

On 8/28/24 13:45, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > (cc Stuart) > > On Thu, 21 Mar 2024 at 15:46,

Aug 29

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