Pc Health Check Not Opening

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Flaviano Bada

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Aug 3, 2024, 6:05:25 PM8/3/24

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The documentation set for this product strives to use bias-free language. For the purposes of this documentation set, bias-free is defined as language that does not imply discrimination based on age, disability, gender, racial identity, ethnic identity, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and intersectionality. Exceptions may be present in the documentation due to language that is hardcoded in the user interfaces of the product software, language used based on RFP documentation, or language that is used by a referenced third-party product. Learn more about how Cisco is using Inclusive Language.

This vulnerability exists because the health check RPM opens TCP port 6379 by default upon activation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the Redis instance on the open port. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write to the Redis in-memory database, write arbitrary files to the container filesystem, and retrieve information about the Redis database. Given the configuration of the sandboxed container that the Redis instance runs in, a remote attacker would be unable to execute remote code or abuse the integrity of the Cisco IOS XR Software host system.

For information about which Cisco software releases were vulnerable at the time of publication, see the Fixed Software section of this advisory. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.

To determine if the device is in a vulnerable state, issue the run docker ps CLI command. If the output returns a docker container with the name NOSi, as shown in the following example, the device is considered vulnerable:

To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices, deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The iACL policy denies unauthorized Redis communications packets on TCP port 6379 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access before denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.

While these workarounds have been deployed and were proven successful in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such environment.

When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories page, to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.

At the time of publication, the release information in the following table(s) was accurate. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.

In May 2022, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of attempted exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild. Cisco strongly recommends that customers apply suitable workaround or upgrade to a fixed software release to remediate this vulnerability.

To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.

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Each load balancer node routes requests only to the healthy targets in the enabled Availability Zones for the load balancer. Each load balancer node checks the health of each target, using the health check settings for the target groups with which the target is registered. After your target is registered, it must pass one health check to be considered healthy. After each health check is completed, the load balancer node closes the connection that was established for the health check.

If a target group contains only unhealthy registered targets, the load balancer routes requests to all those targets, regardless of their health status. This means that if all targets fail health checks at the same time in all enabled Availability Zones, the load balancer fails open. The effect of the fail-open is to allow traffic to all targets in all enabled Availability Zones, regardless of their health status, based on the load balancing algorithm.

You configure health checks for the targets in a target group as described in the following table. The setting names used in the table are the names used in the API. The load balancer sends a health check request to each registered target every HealthCheckIntervalSeconds seconds, using the specified port, protocol, and health check path. Each health check request is independent and the result lasts for the entire interval. The time that it takes for the target to respond does not affect the interval for the next health check request. If the health checks exceed UnhealthyThresholdCount consecutive failures, the load balancer takes the target out of service. When the health checks exceed HealthyThresholdCount consecutive successes, the load balancer puts the target back in service.

Before the load balancer sends a health check request to a target, you must register it with a target group, specify its target group in a listener rule, and ensure that the Availability Zone of the target is enabled for the load balancer. Before a target can receive requests from the load balancer, it must pass the initial health checks. After a target passes the initial health checks, its status is Healthy.

The target is not registered with a target group, the target group is not used in a listener rule, the target is in an Availability Zone that is not enabled, or the target is in the stopped or terminated state.

If the status of a target is any value other than Healthy, the API returns a reason code and a description of the issue, and the console displays the same description. Reason codes that begin with Elb originate on the load balancer side and reason codes that begin with Target originate on the target side. For more information about possible causes for health check failures, see Troubleshooting.

Use CloudWatch alarms to trigger a Lambda function to send details about unhealthy targets. For step-by-step instructions, see the following blog post: Identifying unhealthy targets of your load balancer.

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