PC Guard For Win32 V5.rar

1 view
Skip to first unread message

Vaniria Setser

unread,
Jun 29, 2024, 6:10:46 AM6/29/24
to torctiwahi

If you want to install this agent on a machine with an EDR in place, please keep in mind that most EDRs perform actions to detect malware or other types of threats. Those actions generate events that our agent collects. This may result in raising false positive alerts from our detection rules of effort levels 3 and 4. Customers need to fine-tune these rules to reduce the occurrence of false positives.

It is also possible to restrict the allowed matching characters by specifying a range between brackets.For example, the pattern /var/log/nginx/*[a-z].log will match /var/log/nginx/access.log but not /var/log/nginx/access.2023-02-14.log.This kind of pattern is particularly useful when log rotation is enabled.

The agent sends the host logs through the Internet. The agent saves logs locally on disk in a non-customizable 100 MB memory space if the Internet connection is lost. Once the logs exceed the buffer size, the older logs are replaced by newer ones. When the Internet connection is restored, the older logs are sent to Sekoia.io first.

Sysmon is a Microsoft tool downloadable from microsoft.com.A common installation instruction and configuration file is available on Florian Roth's GitHub. This configuration is an updated (and maintained) version of the SwiftOnSecurity's configuration, which can also be used.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Sekoia.io Endpoint Agent. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

This method detects malicious services mentioned in APT29 report by FireEye. The legitimate path for the Google update service is C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe so the service names and executable locations used by APT29 are specific enough to be detected in log files.

Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. This technique leverages the COM object (CoCreateInstance), which loads the DLL "C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll", to get an authentication token. Monitoring the load of this DLL can detect an attacker abusing this technique. More details on this technique are available in the article in the source section. The prerequisite is to log for Loaded DLLs, it can be done using the Sysmon Event ID 7 (DLL image loaded by process).

This method uses uncommon error codes on failed logons to determine suspicious activity and tampering with accounts that have been disabled or somehow restricted. Depending on the network environment some failed logons Status can be added to the list.

Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.

Detects potential persistence installation from an already compromised administrator domain account. The attacker will create a TGT and abuse a service account with the constrained delegation and update it with the krbtgt service. The detection relies on the Event ID 4738.

Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to regular user or machine account, this technics is often used to give ResetPassword or WriteMembers or DCSync permission(s) for persistency on a domain.

Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. It requires a configuration step where the legit service account should be added to the exclusion list.

Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects

Detects access to $ADMIN share. The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure. Also be very cautious to previously check if this is not commonly used by your administrators as to remotely manage your computers.

Detects remote login through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by Administrator user depending on internal pattern. Check before activation the identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character ("Admin*") to adapt and add some filtering.

Detects AutoIt3 execution from an unusual/suspicious folder. Legitimate folders are "Program Files" and "AppData\Local". AutoIt3.exe is a legitimate process used to execute AutoIt program files, which are used by legitimate software, custom scripts, but also malware. Finding AutoIt3 execution from unusual/suspicious folder can help detect malware activities, such as DarkGate execution. The detection rule can be tailored to your environment and your use of AutoIt3 by filtering out folder's execution of legitimate applications or scripts.

The rule detects when the Backup Catalog has been deleted. It means the administrators will not be able to access any backups that were created earlier to perform recoveries. This is often being done using the wbadmin.exe tool.

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.

Detects suspicious image loads and file creations from the spoolsv process which could be a sign of an attacker trying to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527. A remote code execution vulnerability exists when the Windows Print Spooler service improperly performs privileged file operations. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. This works as well as a Local Privilege escalation vulnerability. To fully work the rule requires to log for Loaded DLLs and File Creations, which can be done respectively using the Sysmon's event IDs 7 and 11.

When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

Detects a possible process injection through CreateRemoteThread() which is spotted by EventID 8 from Sysmon and several EDRs. This rule has a list of process commonly being injected by the attackers that should be updated regularly.

Detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, often used to deploy ransomware at scale. This rule is based on the EventID 5145 which is specific to Windows Servers. The advanced audit policy setting Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share must be configured for Success/Failure.

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This process should not create a child process or it is very rare.

The csrss.exe process (csrss stands for Client / Server Runtime Subsystem) is a generic Windows process used to manage windows and Windows graphics. This rule analyse if the parent of this process is a legitimate one or not.

This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded. This would indicate a succesful attack against DHCP service allowing to disrupt the service or alter the integrity of the responses.

Detects a method to load DLL via LSASS process using an undocumented Registry key. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events. This can be done with Sysmon events 12, 13 and 14 and monitor SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services.

Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.

Detects when an authenticated user who is not allowed to log on remotely attempts to connect to this computer through Remote Desktop. This event can be generated by attackers when searching for available windows servers in the network. This rule detects only users from external network.

Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.

Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stopped write events. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events for this specific registry key is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).

Detects registry keys being changed to disable Windows Defender Credential Guard. The rule requires to log Registry Keys modifications or creations, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12,13 and 14.

b1e95dc632
Reply all
Reply to author
Forward
0 new messages