Steal Car Games

[Kody Baril]

A6-0 run with a drop-step layup from Pickett and a steal and dunk from Bile pushed the lead back up to 67-57, and every time Creighton got within true striking distance, Georgetown answered with a defensive stop and basket on the other end.

If you do copy code examples, please remember to provide attribution. Depending on when code was last edited on Stack Overflow, it is licensed under a version of the Creative Commons license, the most recent being CC BY-SA 4.0, which requires attribution.

Copying code from Stack Overflow is a form of code cloning; that is, duplicating code from within a project or between projects and reusing it. Depending on who you ask, as little as 5-10% or as much as much as 7-23% of code is cloned from somewhere else. Whether these clones are good or bad is up for debate.

Even Stack Overflow answers themselves are not immune to code cloning. An independent researcher found several instances where Stack Overflow answers had code copied from other places. One Java snippet found its way into over 40 answers.

So yes, steal code. Take it, understand it, and implement it in your own projects. Make it yours. You can be more efficient, improve your projects, and maybe even improve your resume (aka your ctrl+C ctrl+V). But if you copy without fully understanding your newly acquired code and what it does, you risk making your code worse.

And even when immune cells, especially certain killer T cells, make it into a tumor, they face a hostile environment. This can include molecules that can disable T cells, low oxygen, and a lack of nutrients for energy. The end result is often a dysfunctional state known as T-cell exhaustion.

But in 2006, researchers looking at cells grown in lab dishes put a more sinister face on mitochondrial transfer. When placed in a stressful, low-oxygen environment, certain cells tended to lose their mitochondria over time. But when subsequently mingled with other, healthy cells, they appeared to steal mitochondria from those cells to survive. How exactly this theft happened remained poorly understood.

Then in 2021, researchers saw this phenomenon happening in real time, with cancer cells. They observed those cancer cells literally sucking the mitochondria out of nearby immune cells in lab dishes with a straw-like structure called a nanotube.

Next, they expanded their analysis to include tumor samples taken from people with other cancers, including lung, pancreatic, colorectal, and breast cancers. Again, they identified a subset of mitochondrial receiver cells in many tumors that displayed the hallmark gene expression pattern of mitochondrial theft.

In most cancer types, tumor samples had much higher mitochondrial receiver scores than samples taken from adjacent normal tissues, they found. Samples with higher mitochondrial receiver scores also showed signs of more aggressive cell division.

Although the 17-gene signature accurately identified mitochondrial receiver cells, many of these cells also had other notable genetic changes. Some of these changes are related to the behaviors needed to steal mitochondria and could be potentially shut down with drugs, he explained.

The team also wants to study the T-cell side of the equation: whether some T cells may be more susceptible to having their mitochondria snatched than others, and if so, why; where in the tumor this process occurs; and how it might be potentially prevented.

It is also important to better understand why this phenomenon happens, explained Dr. Salnikow. It may be a survival response to low-oxygen environments, or it could be a direct defense against the immune system by tumor cells, he said.

Zscaler ThreatLabz recently discovered a new stealing campaign dubbed as the "Steal-It" campaign. In this campaign, the threat actors steal and exfiltrate NTLMv2 hashes using customized versions of Nishang's Start-CaptureServer PowerShell script, executing various system commands, and exfiltrating the retrieved data via Mockbin APIs.

Through an in-depth analysis of the malicious payloads, our team observed a geofencing strategy employed by the campaign, with specific focus on targeting regions including Australia, Poland, and Belgium. These operations use customized PowerShell scripts, designed to pilfer crucial NTLM hashes before transmitting it to the Mockbin platform. The initial phase of the campaign involves the deployment of LNK files concealed in zip archives, while ensuring persistence within the system through strategic utilization of the StartUp folder. Additionally, the gathered system information and NTMLv2 hashes are exfiltrated using Mockbin APIs.

- Exfiltration Tactics: We discovered that the threat actor steals and exfiltrates NTLM hashes using customized scripts from the Nishang framework and system information by executing system commands. Once captured, the data is exfiltrated via mock APIs.

- Explicit Images as Lures: The Fansly Whoami Exfil and Exfil Sysinfo OnlyFans infection chain variations use explicit images of models to entice victims to execute the initial payload.

The infection chain begins with a ZIP archive bundled with a malicious LNK (shortcut) file, the LNK file is commissioned to download and execute another PowerShell script from mockbin[.]org and webhook[.]site as seen in the screenshot below.

Mockbin enables you to create custom endpoints for testing, mocking, and monitoring HTTP requests and responses across different libraries, sockets, and APIs. When the GET request is made to the Mockbin URL with a captured base64-encoded NTMLv2 hash, the request is logged on the server side and can be tracked by threat actors.

Upon execution, the malicious LNK file runs a command that opens the Microsoft Edge browser with a base64 encoded argument. This argument is a JavaScript one liner redirecting to the [.]mocky[.]io/v3/ URL using location.href. This is depicted in the screenshot below.

Since the working directory of the previous LNK file is set to the Startup folder path, the LNK file is copied into the Startup folder. Because of this, the m8.lnk file will be executed every time the system is restarted, allowing persistence on the system.

When executed, the downloaded LNK file m8.lnk downloads a CMD file from run[.]mocky[.]io and copies it to the Startup folder as m8.cmd, following the same method as the previous LNK file. These actions are depicted in the screenshot below.

The CMD file m8.cmd is executed on a system reboot, and is the final script commissioned to gather and exfiltrate the system information. Once executed, it first runs the following three system commands and stores the output in the ProgramData directory.

Towards the end of the script, clean up takes place where the command output files are deleted and the command outputs of executed commands: ipconfig, systeminfo, tasklist are exfiltrated to Mockbin URL.

This infection chain begins with a ZIP archive bundled with a malicious LNK (shortcut) file. The LNK file opens the [.]mocky[.]io/v3/ URL in a browser, which consists of an HTML page with malicious Javascript. This HTML page is different from the page described in the "Systeminfo stealing infection chain" section. In this case, the JavaScript performs the following actions:

If all of the conditions above are satisfied, the JavaScript downloads a ZIP file named fansly.zip by decoding a large base64 blob. The ZIP file includes three explicit JPEG images of Ukrainian and Russian Fansly models to lure users into downloading a malicious batch file, called fansly.com_online.bat, bundled inside the same ZIP archive.

In our analysis of this infection chain, we observed a ZIP archive bundled with a LNK file that uses geofencing techniques to target users in Belgium and unknowingly downloading multiple stages of a PowerShell script that executes system commands to collect basic information for nefarious purposes. Interestingly, we saw a similar infection reported by CERT-UA which was attributed to APT28.

For this infection chain, the initial vector is a malicious LNK file bundled inside a ZIP archive (e.g. command_powershell.zip). The malicious LNK file opens the run[.]mocky[.]io URL using Microsoft Edge. This downloads a c1 file into the Downloads folder, which is then moved into the Startup folder as c1.bat, maintaining persistence on the machine. Whenever the system is restarted, c1.bat is executed.

Once opened, the run[.]mocky[.]io URL executes a JavaScript code which downloads a batch script from a base64-encoded blob. The batch script is downloaded to the Downloads folder, where it is then renamed to c1.bat and moved into the Startup folder.

If both the conditions above are satisfied, a b4.css script is downloaded into the Downloads folder by decoding a base64 blob. The script is then moved into the Startup folder and renamed to b4.cmd. This helps threat actors maintain persistence like in the other infection chains.

The final set of PowerShell commands in this script are commissioned to execute the commands tasklist and systeminfo on the system, and then use WebClient.UploadString() to exfiltrate the command output to the mockbin[.]org URL using a POST request as shown below.

The meticulousness and technical process demonstrated by the Steal-It campaign emphasizes the importance of robust cybersecurity measures. In addition to staying on top of these threats, Zscaler's ThreatLabz team continuously monitors for new threats and shares its findings with the wider community.

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