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Pakistan
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 6, 2007
M WAHEED JADOON

NEW YORK USA

Pakistan is a federal republic with a population of approximately 168
million. The head of state is President Pervez Musharraf, who assumed
power after overthrowing the civilian government in 1999 and was
elected president in 2002. He affirmed his right to serve
concurrently
as chief of army staff in August 2002 through a series of
controversial amendments to the 1973 constitution called the Legal
Framework Order. The head of government is Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz, whom the National Assembly elected in 2004. Domestic and
international observers found the 2002 National Assembly elections
deeply flawed. The government was affected by internal conflicts in
Balochistan and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
While the civilian authorities generally maintained effective control
of the security forces, there were instances when local police acted
independently of government authority.


The government's human rights record remained poor. Major problems
included restrictions on citizens' right to change their government,
extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape. The country experienced an
increase in disappearances of provincial activists and political
opponents, especially in provinces experiencing internal turmoil and
insurgencies. Poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest, and lengthy
pretrial detention remained problems, as did a lack of judicial
independence. Harassment, intimidation, and arrests of journalists
increased during the year. The government limited freedoms of
association, religion, and movement, and imprisoned political
leaders.
Corruption was widespread in the government and police forces, and
the
government made little attempt to combat the problem. Domestic
violence and abuse against women, such as honor crimes and
discriminatory legislation that affected women and religious
minorities remained serious problems. Widespread trafficking in
persons and exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child labor were
ongoing problems. Child abuse, commercial sexual exploitation of
children, discrimination against persons with disabilities, and
worker
rights remained concerns.


The government's Anti Trafficking Unit (ATU) was fully functional and
reportedly resulted in increased arrests and prosecutions of human
traffickers. Cooperative efforts between the military, ATU, and
international organizations prevented human trafficking resulting
from
the social dislocation following the 2005 earthquake. Training
efforts
within the security forces greatly improved treatment of trafficking
victims.


RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS


Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:


a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life


Security forces extrajudicially killed individuals associated with
criminal and political groups in staged encounters and during abuse
in
custody. Through July, human rights observers reported at least 37
instances of encounter killings and 79 killings in police custody.


Police stated that many of these deaths occurred when suspects
attempted to escape, resisted arrest, or committed suicide; however,
family members and the press reported that many of these deaths were
staged.


There were no developments in the March 2005 death in custody case of
Samiullah Kalhoro, the vice chairman of the Jeay Sindh Muttahida
Mahaz.


There were no developments in the January 2005 death in police
custody
of Abu Bakar Panwhar. A case was charged against Officer Mohammad
Rafiq Siyal, Senior Inspector Khamiso Khan, assistant senior
inspector
Ghulam Shabbir Dasti, and Police Constable Mohammad Aslam after
protests by the Sindh People's Students Federation and the Pakistan
People's Party Parliamentarians.


On January 13, police arrested Habibur Rehman in a car theft case in
Chitral. According to Rehman's father, police tortured Rehman while
he
was in police custody. Rehman was subsequently taken to district
headquarters hospital, where he died on January 16. The doctor stated
Rehman was in shock and critical condition from being beaten. At
year's end, police had not taken any action.


On July 8, Muslim Town police in Lahore killed a 14 year-old boy
named
Salman and seriously injured his 15 year-old friend Asqhar. The
police
fired randomly at the boys and later alleged that Salman was killed
in
a police encounter, claiming that the boys were armed and shot at the
police. According to eyewitnesses, the boys were not armed. The
government began an official inquiry and registered a murder case
against constable Munammad Sarwar of the antiterror police. However,
authorities did not charge Malik Munir, the SHO who ordered the
shooting, or any other Muslim Town police officers responsible for
the
incident. SHO Malik Munir was transferred after a brief suspension,
while the constable remained in custody. Salman's family was
reportedly under pressure not to pursue the case against constable
Sarwar in return for a cash payment from his relatives.


There were no developments in the 2004 death-in-custody cases of
Nazakat Khan and Syed Qutbuddin Shah or the 2004 killing of Tabassum
Javed Kalyar.


The government frequently investigated police officials for
extrajudicial killings; however, failure to discipline and prosecute
consistently and lengthy trial delays contributed to a culture of
impunity.


Continued clashes between security forces and terrorists in the FATA
resulted in 289 deaths, including civilians, militants, and security
forces. According to media reports, more than 100 civilians were
killed, along with dozens of government security forces, in
Balochistan.


On March 1, militants associated with the Taliban movement seized
government buildings in Miranshah, North Waziristan. On March 3, the
government began a military operation to retake the buildings.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), thousands of residents fled
Miranshah to avoid the fighting. The government reported that 140
militants were killed in the fight.


In Balochistan, according to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
119
civilians and 57 members of the security forces died as a result of
the ongoing insurgency. The government claims approximately 125
Balochistan Liberation Army militants were killed.


According to Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Commission
of
Pakistan (HRCP), local people in Balochistan demanded a greater share
of the revenue generated by their province's natural resources. They
resented the slow pace of economic development and persons who
settled
there from other provinces. A number of Balochi groups sought more
rights for the province and campaigned peacefully, while others
resorted to violence.


On August 26, militant Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Bugti, 35 of
his followers, and 16 military officers and soldiers were killed in
an
explosion inside a cave in Balochistan. According to the media, Bugti
and his followers were killed when the Air Force bombed Bugti's
hideout. The media reported that 16 soldiers died in the ensuing
battle. The government stated the officers were trying to reach Bugti
to speak to him when an unexplained explosion caused the cave to
collapse.


There were reports of politically motivated killings perpetrated by
political factions.


There were numerous political killings reported in Karachi, where
political parties Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and Jamaat e Islami
(JI) accused each other of killing political rivals. According to MQM
sources, JI activists killed 18 MQM active members. JI accused MQM of
killing 11 JI activists. Human rights observers reported that the
total politically motivated death toll in Karachi was 31 (see section
3).


In June an Awami National Party activist, Gul Khair Khan, was killed
in Nowshera in a street shoot-out. The party blamed the religious
extremists of JI and Jamiat Ulema i Islami, Fazlur Rehman group. The
police maintained that the shooting happened because Gul Khair Khan
was involved in the lending of money. There was no further
information
at year's end.


During the year, HRW and AI expressed concern about reports and
documentary evidence that armed Taliban supporters in the tribal
areas
engaged in vigilantism and violent acts, including murder.


Attacks on houses of worship and religious gatherings linked to
sectarian, religious extremist, and terrorist groups resulted in the
deaths of 127 individuals during the year (see section 2.c.).
According to HRW, approximately 4,0004 persons, largely from the
Shi'a
branch of Islam, died as a result of sectarian hostility since 1980.
The Ahmadi community claims that 171 of their members have been
killed
since 1988 and that the government made little effort to bring those
responsible for these and other acts of sectarian violence to justice
or to provide protection for the targets or their families.


Religious extremist organizations killed and attempted to kill
government officials and Islamic religious figures from opposing
sects
(see section 2.c.). On February 9, a suicide bomber killed 29 people
and injured more than 50 in an attack on a religious procession in
the
town of Hangu in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). The
explosion
disrupted a congregation of Shia marking the Ashura festival and
sparked a riot. As a result of the explosion, the Army imposed a
curfew. Police arrested three members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned
Sunni-Deobandi militant organization.


On April 11, terrorists killed 59 persons and injured more than 100
in
a bombing at a Sunni (Brelvi Sect) birthday celebration of the
Prophet
Muhammad in Karachi. Media reports attributed this bombing to intra
Sunni violence targeted against the leadership of Sunni Tehrik. The
government made many arrests and constituted a judicial tribunal, but
its report was not released to the public at year's end.


On May 30, a suicide bombing on a Shia mosque in Karachi killed 11
persons, including two worshippers, a policeman, and the other
attacker. Police arrested Muhammad Tehsin, a member of the terrorist
organization Lashkar e Jhangvi. On September 28, an antiterrorism
court sentenced Tehsil to death.


On September 21, unidentified gunmen assassinated Syed Bashir Hussain
Bukhari, an 85-year-old Shia religious leader in the main bazaar of
Sargodha, Punjab. The assailants fled after the firing, and no one
claimed responsibility for the attack.


In June 2005 a Karachi antiterrorism court convicted Gul Hasan for
murder and sentenced him to death for the May 2005 bombing of a Shi'a
mosque that killed 45 persons.


There were no developments in any of the cases of attacks on houses
of
worship that occurred in 2004.


The government had not conducted investigations on the sectarian
violence from 2005, including the March 2005 bombing of the shrine of
Pir Syed Rakheel Shah, which killed 40 and wounded more than 100; the
May suicide bombing of the Bari Imam shrine, which killed 20 and
wounded more than 100; or the May suicide bombing of a Shi'a mosque
in
Karachi, which killed five and injured 30. No one was arrested for
these actions. The trial of members of the radical Islamist Jandullah
group implicated in attacks on foreigners and government officials in
2004 continued at year's end. There were no developments in the other
2004 cases of the killing of government officials and religious
figures, or terrorist attacks on foreign targets.


Foreign terrorists and their local tribal allies attacked and killed
military personnel, government officials, and progovernment tribal
chiefs in the FATA. There were some investigations but no arrests in
the 2005 killings of progovernment chiefs in Waziristan.


A report released by the HRCP in January noted with concern that
armed
Baloch fighters opposing the army's presence laid landmines, as a
result of which civilians were indiscriminately killed and maimed.


On January 16, three children were reportedly killed in Kahan by
aerial bombing, and on February 7, 13 persons were killed by a bomb
planted by armed fighters.


On November 8, a suicide bomber killed approximately 42 soldiers at
they exercised at an army training school in Dargai, NWFP. According
to media reports, the attack was allegedly carried out by Tanzim
Nifaz
Shariat Mohammadi, which has links to the Taliban.


On January 7, months after militants killed the tribal elder of South
Waziristan, Malik Khandan Khan, unidentified assailants killed five
members of Khan's family in an attack on their vehicle in Wana.
Khan's
two sons, a nephew, and two grandchildren died on the spot. Because
the attack took place in FATA, there was no police investigation.


On May 19, suspected militants killed another senior progovernment
tribal chief of the Dawar tribe, Tooti Gul, in the Khaddi area of
Miranshah in North Waziristan.


On July 22, suspected tribal militants killed three top progovernment
tribal elders, six of their close relatives and one bystander in
three
separate incidents at different places in South Waziristan. In the
first incident, armed individuals killed chief of Ahmadzai Wazir
tribe
Malik Mirza Alam Khan, his two brothers, son and nephew when they
opened indiscriminate firing on their vehicle at Dazja Ghundai near
Wana. In the second incident, armed militants at Karama in Laddha
Teshil shot Malik Khandan Khan along with his son and a close
relative. Meanwhile, government agencies recovered the body of Malik
Taj Muhammad, who had been killed by unknown assailants.


Honor killings continued to be a problem, with women as the principal
victims. During the year local human rights organizations reported
between 1,337 and 1,511 cases. Most took place in Sindh. Many more
likely went unreported (see section 5).


b. Disappearance


There was an increase of politically motivated disappearances. Police
and security forces held prisoners incommunicado and refused to
provide information on their whereabouts, particularly in terrorism
and national security cases.


AI cited a report issued by HRCP in late January, which found "scores
of cases of arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, extrajudicial
killings, 'disappearances' and uses of excessive force by security
and
intelligence forces committed in Balochistan since early 2005." AI
cited a January statement by self-exiled Senator Sanaullah Baloch,
who
noted that at least 180 people died in bombings, 122 children were
killed by paramilitary troops, and hundreds of people were arrested
since the beginning of the campaign in early 2005.


According to the NGO Asia Human Rights Commission (AHRC), during the
year more than 600 people disappeared after being taken into custody,
including 200 persons from Sindh. AHRC reported that in Balochistan,
1,000 persons had been killed since military operations began in
2001.
According to a statement by the federal minister for internal
affairs,
more than 4,000 persons were arrested in Balochistan since the
beginning of 2005, although many were released shortly after their
arrests.


NGOs such as AI and AHRC reported that the government increasingly
used the war on terror as an excuse to arrest and detain political
opponents. They noted the judiciary's inaction in answering habeas
corpus orders filed by family members. According to AI, "The practice
of enforced disappearance, which was rare before 2001, has become
more
common in contexts besides the 'war on terror.' Over the past two
years, dozens of Baloch nationalists are believed to have been
subjected to enforced disappearance and there are recent reports that
leaders of Sindhi parties and members of the Shi'a minority have as
well."


Families of some missing Baloch and Sindh nationalists have
petitioned
the courts for redress, claiming that government agencies held their
relatives without due process. On November 10, the Supreme Court
ordered the Ministry of Interior to disclose the whereabouts of 41
illegal detainees. Since then, 25 have been released, according to
the
government, although human rights groups have only accounted for 18.


On September 29, AI released a report entitled "Human Rights Ignored
in the 'War on Terror'" that documented the government's abuses
against hundreds of its citizens and foreign nationals. AI reported
that as the practice of enforced disappearance spread, people were
arrested and held incommunicado in secret locations with their
detention officially denied. They were at risk of torture and
unlawful
transfer to third countries. The report noted that the "practice of
offering rewards running to thousands of dollars for unidentified
terror suspects facilitated illegal detention and enforced
disappearance."


During the year there was no update on the case of Arifa and Saba
Baloch, charged as potential suicide bombers in 2004.


According to AI, security forces detained two leaders of a Baloch
political party, the Jamhoori Watan, Abdul Rauf Sasoli, and Saeed
Brohi. On February 3, two plainclothes police officers picked up
Sasoli, and on March 10, they picked up Brohi. According to AI,
authorities denied holding the individuals. Family members feared
that
they were being held and were in danger of being tortured.


On February 24, a group of 16 men, presumed to be plainclothes police
officers, seized Dr. Safdar Sarki, an American citizen and a Sindhi
nationalist, in Karachi. According to AI, witnesses saw Sarki being
taken in a van, "blindfolded and bleeding." AI reported that police
ransacked Sarki's apartment and took his laptop computer and
passport.
Sarki was the secretary general of the Jeay Sindh, a Sindhi
nationalist political organization advocating for the rights of
Sindhi
citizens.


On April 4, Muneer Mengal, managing director of the first Baloch
satellite television channel, disappeared after he returned to
Karachi
from Bahrain. His sister, Aziza Mangal, reported that the government
did not accept her appeals and petitions to gain access to her
brother, who was reportedly being held by the Inter-Services
Intelligence. At the end of the year, his whereabouts remained
unknown.


On June 11, police arrested Naser Baloch, a Baloch student leader at
Karachi University. Security agencies detained Baloch and did not
bring any charges against him. On August 19, police released Baloch.


In early July, Bilal Bugti, the younger brother of Jamhoori Watan
Party Secretary General Agha Shahid Bugti, and Murtaza Bugti, the son
of Balochistan's first finance minister, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, were
allegedly kidnapped by intelligence agencies in Karachi.


On July 16, intelligence agencies arrested Samiullah Baloch and
Obaidullah Baloch, brothers of Senator Sanaullah Baloch Zehri (Baloch
National Party). Authorities released Obaidullah Baloch on July 19
and
Samiullah on December 10. Both brothers allegedly reported being
tortured while in custody.


In 2005 political opponents kidnapped Moto Meghwar and Gyan Chand
Meghwar, potential candidates for local office in Chachro, Tharparkar
District, reportedly to keep them from contesting the elections
against candidates of the chief minister of Sindh Province. They were
both released unharmed in January, and no charges were brought
against
their kidnappers.


On October 4, police from the Anti-Terrorism Force of the Punjab
police reportedly picked up Abid Raza Zaidi in Lahore, Punjab. The
victim disappeared soon after he gave testimony about his earlier
illegal arrest, prolonged 110 day detention and alleged constant
abuse
by the army and police officers. Prior to this arrest, Zaidi had
protested his treatment in custody at a conference jointly organized
by AI and HRCP. No habeus corpus application was filed on his behalf
and he was not produced before a court of law. At the end of the
year,
his whereabouts remained unknown.


On September 29, according to AI, Afghan national Abdur Rahim Muslim
Dost was arrested without a warrant in Peshawar. AI reported that
Dost
was allegedly arrested due to his criticism of government agencies
which had arrested, detained, and transferred him and his brother to
a
third country.


On December 3, during a protest in Karachi against the death of
Baloch
leader Akbar Bugti during a military operation, police arrested two
Balochi political party leaders, Ghulam Muhammad and Sher Mohammad
Baloch of the Jamhoori Watan Party. On December 6, family members
filed a habeas corpus petition on behalf of the two disappeared
politicians with the Sindh High Court. Sher Muhammad was later
released, but Ghulam's whereabouts remained unknown at year's end.


There were no developments in the December 2005 disappearance of 18
members of the Pakistan Petroleum Workers' Union from Balochistan who
had gone to Karachi for negotiations with their management or the
November 2005 disappearance of Dr. Hanned Shareef, a writer, medical
doctor, and member of the Balochistan Student Organization.


There was no new information available on a British national who
disappeared after being detained by security agencies at Lahore
University in January 2004.


c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment


The law prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment; however, security forces tortured and abused persons.
Under
provisions of the Anti Terrorist Act, coerced confessions are
admissible in special courts, although police did not use this
provision to obtain convictions. Security force personnel continued
to
severely abuse persons in custody throughout the country. Human
rights
organizations reported that methods included beating, burning with
cigarettes, whipping the soles of the feet, prolonged isolation,
electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, use of
electric shocks, and forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters.
Security force personnel reportedly raped women and children during
interrogations.


During the year, the NGO Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid
recorded 1,513 cases that they labeled torture. The NGO Asia Human
Rights Commission reported approximately 1,319 cases of torture
during
the year. In May the NGO reported over 1,250 cases being committed
during the previous 16 months, with most reported in Punjab and
Sindh.
Punjab had 743 cases, Sindh had 503, eight were reported in
Balochistan, 43 in NWFP, and 23 in Islamabad. Torture occasionally
resulted in death or serious injury (see section 1.a.).


On February 19, police arrested Arif Ali and Irfan Ali in Multan and
charged them with murdering a jeweler. Police reportedly tortured
both
detainees while they were in custody. Irfan Ali developed kidney
problems because of his abuse and was released in April. Arif was
released in May, after their family appealed to the family of the
dead
jeweler. Local political and social leaders also called on the police
to produce evidence against the accused. According to human rights
NGOs, Station House Officer (SHO) Sadaat Ali admitted there was no
proof that either Irfan or Arif had been involved in the murder. No
charges were brought against SHO Ali.


On July 11, three policemen in Adiala Jail allegedly tortured and
beat
Gul Waiz when Waiz threatened to complain about the bribes the police
forced his family to pay when they came to visit him. Waiz reported
severe beatings and the withholding of all food. On July 17, Waiz's
condition deteriorated, and he was moved to the jail hospital. After
his family hired a lawyer, jail Superintendent Nadeem Kokab Warraich
promised the Civil Court Rawalpindi that he would hold an independent
inquiry and take appropriate action against the culprits. One
constable, Muhammad Idrees, was suspended for the month of August. No
action was taken against the other police officers involved.


In October police arrested Muhammad Arshad, a young shopkeeper, for
"misbehaving" with a female customer at his small grocery store.
Police held Arshad at the Banni Police Station in Rawalpindi, where
they reportedly broke his leg while beating him after he verbally
abused the inquiring officer. Police maintained Arshad slipped in the
toilet and twisted his ankle. Arshad was taken to a hospital and
later
discharged. No inquiry against the perpetrators was held, and police
dropped the case against Arshad.


In June Shahnaz Fatima and Javeria Alam complained to the special
superintendent of police Islamabad that they were sexually assaulted
at a police station in Islamabad after the police illegally picked
them up. Police maintained that both were prostitutes and were
negotiating with some clients on the roadside. Fatima and Alam
escaped
but were later brought to the police station. After approximately two
weeks, the complainants withdrew their petition from the Office of
SSP, Islamabad. The SHO of the police station Idrees Rathore,
reportedly coerced the petitioners and also paid money to have them
withdraw the complaint against him and his staff.


In July policeman Liaqat Ali was arrested for allegedly raping a rape
victim who went to a police check point in Islamabad to report being
attacked. The accuser, Ms. Surriya, went to the check point along
with
her mother to complain about the incident. Ali requested the mother
to
wait at the check point while he pretended to take Surriya to the
police station for further investigation and medical checkup. Surriya
reported that Liaqat instead took her to a house and sexually
assaulted her. She filed a complaint in Islamabad civil courts and at
the Office of SSP Islamabad. The civil court ordered an inquiry into
the complaint, and Liaqat Ali was suspended from his job and
arrested.
Ali remained in prison at the end of the year.


In May 2005 police claimed to have resolved the April 2005 case
involving Shabbir Hussain, Zafar Abass and Muhammad Sadiq, in which
they claimed they were detained, beaten, and forced to drink urine
and
eat mud. According to press accounts, the police apologized but
denied
that they made them drink urine or eat mud. The matter was settled
informally when the accusers withdrew their charges through a
gathering of local notables.


In June 2005 the Multan Bench heard a case against eight police in
Vehari accused of sewing shut the lips of Mohammad Hussain, and
ordered that the victim receive medical treatment. While the case
against the eight progressed, there was severe social pressure on
Hussain to accept an apology and a cash settlement from the eight
policemen, according to press accounts.


The Hudood Ordinances provide Koranic punishments for violations of
Shari'a (Islamic law), including death by stoning and amputation.
Authorities did not use such punishments during the year, as they
required a high standard of evidence.


According to human rights organizations such as HRW and HRCP,
security
forces sometimes used excessive force in combating domestic
insurgencies in FATA and Balochistan, which resulted in civilian
deaths (see section 1.a.).


There were also incidents of societal violence against members of
religious minorities such as Christians, Ahmadis, and Shi'as (see
section 2.c).


Honor killings and mutilations, including cutting off of women's
noses
and stripping women naked to dishonor them, occurred during the year
(see section 5).


Prison and Detention Center Conditions


Prison conditions did not meet international standards and were
extremely poor, except for those cells of wealthy or influential
prisoners. Overcrowding was widespread. According to the Society for
Human Rights and Prisoners Aid (SHARP), there were 86,500 prisoners
occupying 87 jails originally built to hold a maximum of 36,075
persons. The number declined from the previous year because on July
1,
President Musharraf ordered the release of children and prisoners
charged with petty offenses. Others were released as part of the
religious festivals of Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Azha. During the year
the government began a prison expansion and improvement program.


Inadequate food in prisons led to chronic malnutrition for those
unable to supplement their diet with help from family or friends.
Access to medical care was a problem. Foreign prisoners often
remained
in prison long after their sentences were completed because there was
no one to pay for deportation to their home country.


Authorities routinely shackled prisoners, including juvenile
prisoners. The shackles were tight, heavy, and painful and reportedly
led to gangrene and amputation in several cases.


Police held female detainees and prisoners separately from male
detainees and prisoners. Child offenders were generally kept in the
same prisons as adults, albeit in separate barracks. According to a
BBC report, an independent NGO investigation found that 70 percent of
children who came into contact with the police were abused in some
way. Since the children were not separated from adult prisoners, they
were also subject to sexual abuse. The report noted that the majority
of the children were pre-trial prisoners, who were often acquitted
one
to three years later for lack of evidence. Police often did not
segregate detainees from convicted criminals. Mentally ill prisoners
usually lacked adequate care and were not segregated from the general
prison population (see section 5).


There were reports of prison riots, largely due to the poor living
conditions inside the prisons. According to an Islamabad based NGO,
inmates complained about their treatment by jail staff and the
"culture of bribery" that prevailed at various levels of jail
administration. Few resources were allocated to the maintenance of
prison facilities.


In June 2005 inmates at the Sargodha jail took two assistant
superintendents and four wardens hostage to protest mistreatment. In
the ensuing clash, nine inmates and one guard were injured. One of
the
inmates later died from injuries sustained during the riot. An
investigative committee found three main culprits, including jail
inspector Asghar Syed guilty of mistreating the prisoners. Syed was
suspended from service and two years of his service were taken from
his retirement plan. The report blamed Syed for the use of excessive
violence to quell the protest. The punishment of the other two
accused
was not known. The prison department gave the relatives of the
prisoner who died a compensation of $3,300 (Rs 200,000).


On April 3, three prisoners in Adiala jail in Rawalpindi went on a
hunger strike against jail officials for not granting visitation
rights to their relatives. When the police tried to force feed the
prisoners, a prison riot ensued. All 5,000 inmates of Adiala jail
subsequently went on a hunger strike and clashed with police,
injuring
three police officers and 11 prisoners. Provincial prison authorities
resolved the issue through negotiation between the prisoners and jail
administrators.


In 2005 authorities established special women's police stations with
all female staff in response to complaints of custodial abuse of
women, including rape. The government's National Commission on the
Status of Women claimed the stations did not function effectively in
large part due to a lack of resources. Court orders and regulations
prohibit male police from interacting with female suspects, but male
police often detained and interrogated women at regular stations.
According to women's rights NGOs, there were approximately 2,500
women
in jails nationwide at the end of the year, following the July 1
presidential order to release several thousand women and children who
were imprisoned for petty offenses.


Authorities subjected children in prison to the same harsh
conditions,
judicial delay, and mistreatment as the adult population. Local NGOs
estimated that approximately 2,317 children were in prison at the end
of the year. Child offenders could alternatively be sent to one of
two
residential reform schools in Karachi and Bahawalpur until they
reached the age of majority. Abuse and torture reportedly also
occurred at these facilities. Nutrition and education were
inadequate.
Family members were forced to pay bribes to visit children or bring
them food. Facility staff reportedly trafficked drugs to children
incarcerated in these institutions.


The Supreme Court continued the suspension of a December 2004 Lahore
High Court ruling that struck down the Juvenile Justice System
Ordinance as unconstitutional. The ordinance is a separate procedural
code for accused juveniles. It provides numerous protections for
juvenile offenders not found in the normal penal code.


Landlords in Sindh and Punjab, as well as tribes in rural areas,
operated illegal private jails. According to a BBC report, a
religious
seminary in Haripur, NWFP, headed by Maulana Ilyas Qadri was used as
a
private "jail" to treat drug addicts. In October police raided the
seminary and freed 112 persons, including seven British nationals.
Police reported that they were held in chains. Some bore signs of
torture and sexual abuse.


Persons held for political offenses, or on "national security"
grounds, were usually held in different conditions than the general
prison population and often in separate facilities.


The government permitted visits to prisoners and detainees by human
rights monitors, family members, and lawyers with some restrictions
(see section 1.d.). Visits by local human rights monitors occurred
during the year; however, the government denied the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to alleged terrorist
detainees.


d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention


The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
authorities did not always comply with the law.


Role of the Police and Security Apparatus


Police have primary internal security responsibilities. Under the
Police Order (Second Amendment) Ordinance promulgated on July 2005,
control of the police falls under elected local district chief
executives known as nazims. Paramilitary forces such as the Rangers,
the Frontier Constabulary, and the Islamabad Capital Territory Police
fall under the Ministry of the Interior. Provincial governments
control these forces when they assist in law and order operations.
During some religious holidays, the government deployed the regular
army in sensitive areas to help maintain public order.


Corruption within the police was rampant. Police charged fees to
register genuine complaints and accepted money for registering false
complaints. Bribes to avoid charges were commonplace. Persons paid
police to humiliate their opponents and avenge personal grievances.
Corruption was most prominent among police station SHOs, some of whom
reportedly operated arrest for ransom operations and established
unsanctioned stations to increase illicit revenue collection.


Police force effectiveness varied greatly by district, ranging from
reasonably good to completely ineffective. Some members of the police
force committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. Failure to
punish abuses, however, created a climate of impunity. Police and
prison officials frequently used the threat of abuse to extort money
from prisoners and their families. The inspector general, district
police officers, district nazims, provincial interior or chief
ministers, federal interior or prime minister, or the courts can
order
internal investigations into abuses and order administrative
sanctions. Executive branch and police officials can recommend and
the
courts can order criminal prosecution. However, these mechanisms were
rarely used. Police often failed to protect members of religious
minorities particularly Christians, Ahmadis, and Shi'as from societal
attacks (see sections 2.c. and 5).


The Punjab provincial government initiated regular training and
retraining of police at all levels, both in technical skills and
human
rights. In July 2005 President Musharraf reissued and amended the
2002
Police Order, which transfers oversight responsibility of police from
provinces to districts and establishes the district level chief
executive as principal supervisor. The order also calls for the
immediate establishment of local oversight bodies that have been
stalled since 2002. In Punjab and NWFP, public safety commissions
were
established and functioned. Similar commissions in Balochistan and
Sindh were not as well developed. The government argued that these
reforms would make police more responsive to the local community.
Opponents charged that they would politicize the police force.


Arrest and Detention


A First Information Report (FIR) is the legal basis for all arrests.
Police may issue FIRs provided complainants offer reasonable proof
that a crime was committed. A FIR allows police to detain a named
suspect for 24 hours, after which only a magistrate can order
detention for an additional 14 days, and then only if police show
such
detention is material to the investigation. In practice the
authorities did not fully observe these limits on detention. FIRs
frequently were issued without supporting evidence as part of
harassment or intimidation or not issued when adequate evidence was
provided unless the complainant could pay a bribe. Police routinely
did not seek magistrate approval for investigative detention and
often
held detainees without charge until a court challenged them.
Incommunicado detention occurred (see section 1.c.). When requested,
magistrates usually approved investigative detention without
reference
to its necessity. In cases of insufficient evidence, police and
magistrates colluded to continue detention beyond the 14 day period
provided in the law through the issuance of new FIRs.


The police sometimes detained individuals arbitrarily without charge
or on false charges to extort payment for their release.


Some women continued to be detained arbitrarily and were sexually
abused (see sections 1.c. and 5). Police also detained relatives of
wanted criminals to compel suspects to surrender (see section 1.f.).
Courts appointed attorneys for indigents only in capital cases. In
some cases persons had to pay bribes to see a prisoner. Foreign
diplomats could meet with prisoners when they appeared in court and
could meet with citizens of their countries in prison visits,
although
not in all cases. Despite repeated requests to ascertain the
whereabouts of "disappeared" foreign citizen Safdar Sarki, diplomats
were denied both information about his whereabouts and access (see
section 1.b.). Local human rights activists reported few restrictions
to their access to prisons.


The district coordinating officer may order preventive detention for
up to 90 days; however, human rights monitors reported instances in
which prisoners were held in preventive detention for up to six
months. Human rights organizations charged that a number of
individuals alleged to be affiliated with terrorist organizations
were
held in preventive detention indefinitely. A magistrate may permit
continued detention for up to 14 days if necessary to complete the
investigation. In corruption cases, the National Accountability Board
(NAB) may hold suspects indefinitely provided that judicial
concurrence is granted every 15 days (see section 1.e.).


The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30
days of their arrest. Under both the Hudood and standard criminal
codes, there are bailable and non bailable offenses. Bail pending
trial is required for bailable offenses and permitted at a court's
discretion for non bailable offenses with sentences of less than 10
years. In practice judges denied bail at the request of police, the
community, or on payment of bribes. In many cases trials did not
start
until six months after the filing of charges, and in some cases
individuals remained in pretrial detention for periods longer than
the
maximum sentence for the crime for which they were charged. Human
rights NGOs estimated that 50 to 52 percent of the prison population
was awaiting trial.


As in previous years, the government used preventive detention, mass
arrests, and excessive force to quell or prevent protests, political
rallies, or civil unrest (see section 2.b.).


Several dozen Mohajir Quami Movement Haqiqi (MQM H) activists,
arrested between 1999 and 2003, remained in custody at year's end,
some without charge for violent acts against members of other parties
as well as expressing views critical of the government. MQM H claims
that their enemy, the MQM, is behind these delays.


On December 1, President Musharraf signed the Women's Protection
Bill,
which reversed the most negative aspects of the Hudood Ordinances.
Although, according to human rights monitors, 80 percent of the
female
prison population was awaiting trial on adultery-related offenses
under the Hudood Ordinances, few if any of those women had been
released at the end of the year, despite the new law. Most of these
cases were filed without supporting evidence, trials often took
years,
and bail was routinely denied. The Hudood Ordinances were used by
family members to control their children for making their own choices
in marriage, abusive husbands, or neighbors to settle personal
scores.
According to the NGO Asian American Network Against Abuse, research
in
the country's prisons showed that many of women imprisoned under zina
(adultery or fornication) laws were single or widowed women living
alone, young brides who make their in-laws angry for not bringing
enough dowry, or elderly women whose husbands did not want to be
married to them anymore. There were also several cases of pimps who
filed zina charges against women who were trafficked and refused to
work.


Special rules apply to cases brought by the NAB or before
antiterrorist courts. Suspects in NAB cases may be detained for 15
days without charge (renewable with judicial concurrence) and, prior
to being charged, are not allowed access to counsel. Despite
government claims that NAB cases were pursued independently of an
individual's political affiliation, opposition politicians were more
likely to be prosecuted (see section 1.d.). The NAB prosecuted no
serving members of the military or judiciary.


Accountability courts may not grant bail; the NAB chairman has sole
power to decide if and when to release detainees. Antiterrorist
courts
do not grant bail if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused is guilty. Security forces may without reference to the
courts restrict the activities of terrorist suspects, seize their
assets, and detain them for up to a year without charges.


In June 2005 the government assigned a security detail to Mukhtiar
Mai
(Mukhtaran Bibi), at her request. Mai was concerned for her safety
following the court-ordered release of five men convicted in her 2002
gang rape ordered by a village council because of an alleged
infraction committed by her brother. Human rights groups claimed that
when the government learned Mai wished to travel abroad to speak
publicly of her experience, the protection detail controlled her
movements and communication, such that she was under virtual house
arrest. The Supreme Court later intervened and suspended the
acquittals of the five men as well as the eight who were acquitted in
the original 2002 trial. All remained in custody.


On July 22, Sarhad police arbitrarily arrested Naveed Ahmed, a local
reporter for the Daily Koshish, a Sindhi language newspaper, while
Ahmed was recovering from gunshot wounds in the hospital. According
to
AHRC, Ahmed was falsely implicated in a kidnapping case. AHRC reports
that Ahmed was a vocal and prominent journalist in the district, who
reported on police atrocities and on cases of financial corruption by
local authorities.


e. Denial of Fair Public Trial


The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice
the judiciary remained subject to executive branch influence at all
levels. In nonpolitical cases, the high courts and Supreme Court were
generally considered credible. Lower courts remained corrupt,
inefficient, and subject to pressure from prominent religious and
political figures. The politicized nature of judicial promotions
enhanced the government's control over the court system. Unfilled
judgeships and inefficient court procedures resulted in severe
backlogs at both trial and appellate levels. According to the AHRC,
more than 15,000 cases were pending before the Supreme Court.
Ordinary
cases take a minimum of five to six years, while cases on appeal can
take as long as 20 to 25 years.


There were several court systems with overlapping and sometimes
competing jurisdictions: criminal, civil and personal status,
terrorism, commercial, family, military, and Shariat.
Feudal landlords in Sindh and Punjab and tribal leaders in Pashtun
and
Baloch areas continued to hold jirgas (local councils), at times in
defiance of the established legal system. Such jirgas, particularly
prevalent in rural areas, settled feuds and imposed tribal penalties
on perceived wrongdoers that could include fines, imprisonment, or
even the death sentence. In Pashtun areas, such jirgas were held
under
the outlines of the Pashtun Tribal Code. Under this code, a man, his
family, and his tribe are obligated to take revenge for wrongs real
or
perceived to redeem their honor. Frequently these disputes arose over
women and land and often resulted in violence. In the tribal areas,
the settling of many family feuds, particularly over murder cases,
involved giving daughters of the accused in marriage to the bereaved
(see section 5).


Many tribal jirgas instituted harsh punishments such as the death
penalty or watta-satta (exchange of brides between clans or tribes)
marriages (see section 5).


The Supreme Court had a history of annulling the rulings and validity
of the military courts trying civilians. A civilian prime minister,
Nawaz Sharif, established military courts in 1998 to dispense "quick
justice." The human rights and the lawyers' community appealed to the
Supreme Court to invalidate military courts on the grounds that they
operated outside the rule of law. A 1999 Supreme Court decision
invalidating military courts was not implemented. The Supreme Court
continued to attempt to nullify military court decisions involving
civilians. However, this was often difficult since judges were under
an oath required by the 1999 Provisional Constitutional Order, which
forbids court review of actions taken by the chief executive
(President Musharraf's title at the time) or his designees.


Trial Procedures


The civil, criminal, and family court systems provide for an open
trial, the presumption of innocence, cross examination by an
attorney,
and appeal of sentences. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited
number of judges, heavy backlog of cases, lengthy court procedures,
and political pressures, cases routinely took years, and defendants
had to make frequent court appearances. Cases start over when an
attorney changes.


The Anti Terrorist Act allows the government to use special
streamlined courts to try violent crimes, terrorist activities, acts
or speech designed to foment religious hatred, and crimes against the
state. Cases brought before these courts are to be decided within
seven working days, but judges are free to extend the period as
required. Under normal procedures, the high court and the Supreme
Court hear appeals from these courts. Human rights activists
criticized this expedited parallel system, charging it was more
vulnerable to political manipulation.


Special accountability courts try corruption cases (see section
1.d.),
including defaults on government loans by wealthy debtors brought by
the NAB. The NAB has not targeted genuine business failures or small
defaulters. Accountability courts are expected to try cases within 30
days. In accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt.


Despite government claims that NAB cases pursued independently of an
individual's political affiliation, opposition politicians were more
likely to be prosecuted (see section 1.d.). The NAB prosecuted no
serving members of the military or judiciary, which rely on courts
marshal and Supreme Judicial Council venues, respectively.


On December 1, President Musharraf signed into law the Women's
Protection Act, which rolled back the most negative sections of the
Hudood Ordinances, particularly those sections that had dealt with
sexual relations. The zina clause had made it difficult for rape
victims to seek justice and put them at rise of prosecution for
fornication. Sections of the Hudood Ordinances that remain in effect,
such as those prohibiting gambling, alcohol, and some property
offenses, are tried by ordinary criminal courts. The ordinances set
strict standards of evidence, which discriminate between men and
women
and Muslims and non Muslims, for cases in which Koranic punishments
are to be applied (see sections 1.c. and 5). For Hudood cases
involving the lesser secular penalties, different weight is given to
male and female testimony in matters involving financial and
contractual obligations. The Hudood ordinances do not apply to non-
Muslims, although non-Muslims can be implicated in cases that involve
wrong-doing by Muslims.


Laws prohibiting blasphemy continued to be used against Christians,
Ahmadis, and members of other religious groups including Muslims.
Lower courts often did not require adequate evidence in blasphemy
cases, which led to some accused and convicted persons spending years
in jail before higher courts eventually overturned their convictions
or ordered them freed.
The Federal Shariat Court is the court of first appeal in all Hudood
cases that result in a sentence of more than two years. The Supreme
Court, however, determined that in cases where a provincial high
court
decides to hear an appeal in a Hudood case, even in error, the
Federal
Shariat Court lacks authority to review the provincial high court's
decision. The Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court is the final court
of
appeal for federal shariat court cases. A 2005 ruling allows the full
Supreme Court to bypass the Shari'a bench and assume jurisdiction in
such appellate cases in its own right.


The Federal Shariat Court may overturn legislation that it judges to
be inconsistent with Islamic tenants, but such cases are appealed to
the Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court and may ultimately be heard by
the full Supreme Court.


In September the Supreme Court heard a case of a 13 year-old rape
victim who gave birth after she was raped while captive of a
government official. On September 28, the Chief Justice remarked that
efforts to charge the girl with fornication demonstrated that the
police were a "highly negligent department," unaware of their
fundamental duties without the court's assistance.


The law allows for the victim or his/her family to pardon criminal
defendants in exchange for monetary restitution (diyat) or physical
restitution (qisas). While diyat was invoked, particularly in NWFP
and
in honor cases in Sindh, qisas have never been used.


The FATA have a separate legal system, the Frontier Crimes
Regulation,
which recognizes the doctrine of collective responsibility.
Authorities are empowered to detain fellow members of a fugitive's
tribe or to blockade a fugitive's village, pending his surrender or
punishment by his own tribe. Tribal leaders are responsible for
justice in the FATA. They conduct hearings according to Islamic law
and tribal custom. The accused have no right to legal representation,
bail, or appeal. The usual penalties consisted of fines. Federal
civil
servants assigned to tribal agencies oversee proceedings and may
impose prison terms of up to 14 years.


Political Prisoners and Detainees


Some political groups claimed their members were marked for arrest
based on their political affiliation (see sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In
2001 police arrested Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, a former speaker of the
National Assembly and an accountability court in Rawalpindi charged
Gilani with misusing his position. On October 5, Gilani was released
on bail. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML N) leader Javed Hashmi
remained in jail, sentenced to 27 years on sedition charges in 2004
after reading in the cafeteria of the National Assembly a letter
critical of the military. His appeal was ongoing at year's end.


According to Baloch nationalist political leaders and human rights
organizations, there were more than 500 Baloch nationalist political
prisoners who had been detained by military intelligence and security
forces since the military operation began in the province in December
2004. The exact number of the prisoners was not available. The
government denied imprisoning people because of their political
beliefs, but it was commonly and widely believed that there were
hundreds of Sindhi and Baloch nationalist leaders and activists
imprisoned without any formal charges.


Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies


Persons may petition high courts to seek redress for human rights
violations, and courts often take such actions. Persons may seek
redress against government officials, including on grounds of denial
of human rights, in civil courts. However, observers reported that
civil courts seldom or never issued official judgments in such cases,
and that most cases were settled outside of court. While there were
no
official procedures for administrative redress, informal reparations
were common.


f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence


The law requires court issued search warrants for property but not
persons. Police routinely ignored this requirement and at times stole
items during searches. Police were seldom punished for illegal entry.
In cases being pursued under the Anti Terrorist Act, security forces
were allowed to search and seize property related to the case without
a warrant.


The government maintained several domestic intelligence services that
monitored politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, the
media and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Despite a Supreme
Court order, credible reports indicated that the authorities
routinely
used wiretaps and intercepted and opened mail without the requisite
court approval.


In accordance with the Anti Terrorist Act, the government banned the
activities of and membership in several religious extremist and
terrorist groups. However, some of the groups that the government
banned changed their names and remained active. Examples included:
Lashkar e Taiba (new name: Jamatud Dawa), Jaish e Muhammad (new name:
Tehrikul Furqan & Al Rehmat Trust), Tehrik e Ja'afria Pakistan (new
name: Tehrik e Islami Pakistan), Sipah e Sihaba Pakistan (new name:
Millat e Islamia Pakistan).


While the government generally did not interfere with the right to
marry, local officials on occasion assisted influential families to
prevent marriages that the families opposed. The government also
failed to prosecute vigorously cases in which families punished
members (generally women) for marrying or seeking a divorce against
the wishes of other family members. Upon conversion to Islam, women's
marriages performed under the rites of their previous religion were
considered dissolved, while the marriages of men who converted
remained intact (see section 2.c.).


In some cases, authorities detained relatives to force a family
member
who was the recipient of an arrest warrant to surrender (see section
1.d.). NGOs alleged that intelligence personnel often harassed family
members of Baloch nationalists (see section 1.b.).


Human rights NGOs expressed concern with the Frontier Crimes
Regulation (FCR) Act, noting that it applied the concept of
collective
punishment. According to HRW, the FCR empowered authorities to detain
members of fugitives' tribes, demolish their homes, confiscate or
destroy their property, or lay siege to a fugitive's village pending
his surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local
tradition.


AI reported that under the FCR, people suspected of committing
criminal offenses did not have legal representation at a formally
constituted tribal jirga or council which submits its recommendations
regarding convictions or acquittals to a Political Agent. There is no
possibility of appealing against conviction or punishment under the
FCR, as the judiciary's appellate powers do not extend to the FATA.


Reports of religious extremists forming parallel administrations,
including justice administrations, in FATA increased during the year.
For example, on March 26, AI reported that Hayatullah Gul in Tiarza,
South Waziristan, was shot by the father of taxi driver who Gul
allegedly killed two weeks earlier. The decision to sanction the
shooting was made by a council of persons described in the media as
"local Taliban." Gul had no legal counsel to assist him and no
possibility to challenge the conviction and punishment. Gul was not
brought before a proper jirga, and his case was not decided by the
Political Agent for South Waziristan.


Section 2: Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:


a. Freedom of Speech and Press


The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens
generally were free to discuss public issues; however, some
journalists were harshly intimidated and others practiced self
censorship. Newspapers and periodicals had to be given permission by
the Kashmir Council and Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in order to
publish within the territory. According to HRW's recently released
report on Azad Kashmir, these bodies were unlikely to grant
permission
to publications sympathetic to an independent Kashmiri cause.


There were numerous English and Urdu daily and weekly newspapers and
magazines. All were independent. The Ministry of Information
controlled and managed the country's primary wire service, the
Associated Press of Pakistan, which is the official carrier of
government and international news to the local media. The military
has
its own press wing, as well as two sections to "monitor" the press.
The few small privately owned wire services practiced self
censorship.
Foreign magazines and newspapers were available, and many maintained
in country correspondents who operated freely.


The government directly owned and controlled Pakistan Television and
Radio Pakistan, the only non fee national electronic broadcasters.
Both reflected government views in news coverage. Private cable and
satellite channels GEO, ARY, Indus, and Khyber all broadcast domestic
news coverage and were critical of the government. Cable and
satellite
television with numerous international news stations was generally
affordable. Private radio stations existed in major cities, but their
licenses prohibited news programming. Some channels evaded this
restriction through talk shows, although they were careful to avoid
most domestic political discussions. International radio broadcasts,
including from the BBC and the Voice of America, were available.


Newspapers were free to criticize the government, and most did so.
Condemnation of government policies and harsh criticism of political
leaders and military operations were common. Media outlets practiced
self-censorship for fear of government agents engaging in retribution
against papers and journalists critical of certain governmental
policies.


There was an increase in government arrests, harassment, and
intimidation of journalists during the year. According to the NGO
AHRC, the government banned three FM radio stations and two
television
channels, although service was restored after protests from civil
society.


According to Internews, an NGO that monitors the state of the media
in
the country, there were 127 attacks against the media and journalists
during the year. By the end of the year, at least five journalists
had
been killed; nine abducted (of which seven were later released
without
charges being filed against their abductors); 191 attacked, beaten,
tortured, or shot at; 45 arrested; four jailed; and 13 threatened. In
addition 15 publications, 3 television channels, and 23 Web sites
were
temporarily banned; three newspaper presses were raided; one FM
station was sealed. Seventeen journalists and media organizations
were
going through court cases; 30 were prevented from covering official
functions; and 11 newspapers or magazines were denied state-sponsored
advertising from public funds for being critical of government
policies. Internews believed that many cases were not reported
because
journalists in small cities and towns functioned at the mercy of
local
authorities and were reluctant to complain of intimidation, even if
they knew where to register their problems.


In December 2005 unknown assailants kidnapped journalist Hayatullah
Khan from North Waziristan. According to the Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ), on June 16, Hayatullah was found dead, handcuffed,
and shot in the head from behind. Khan's family accused intelligence
agencies of the crime. According to the CPJ, Khan reported on a
December 2005 explosion in the town of Haisori in North Waziristan
that the government claimed killed a senior Al-Qaeda commander.
Colleagues suspected that authorities detained Khan after he
contradicted a government report that the senior leader died when
munitions exploded inside a house. Khan quoted local tribesmen as
saying the house was hit by a missile fired from an aircraft.


According to CPJ, on January 14, authorities in Bajaur Agency, FATA,
briefly detained two journalists who were reporting on an incident in
Damadola village, where missiles were fired into three houses. Both
security forces and militants allegedly warned Daily Times bureau
chief Iqbal Khattak and BBC World Service correspondent Haroon Rashid
against reporting in the area. According to CPJ, few journalists
remained in Waziristan, FATA, after attacks and threats from security
forces and militants forced many to flee.


According to the CPJ, intelligence agencies illegally detained GEO
television correspondent Mukesh Rupeta and cameraman Sanjay Kumar on
March 6. In June, the government filed criminal cases against Rupeta
and Kumar and accused them of filming a government air force base in
violation of the Official Secrets Act. According to international
news
reports and human rights organizations, Rupeta was tortured while in
custody. On June 22, family members reported that the two men were
kept blindfolded and that Rupeta and Kumar were released.


On May 30, Munir Ahmed Sangi, a cameraman for the Sindhi-langauge
Kaswish Television Network, was killed while covering a gunfight
between members of the Unar and Abro tribes in Larkana. According to
the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, Sangi may have been
deliberately killed by the Unar tribe since he had been reporting on
their tribal council.


On June 6, men associated with a provincial minister, Sohrab Sarki
and
a member of the National Assembly from the Pakistan's People's Party
party, Bijarani, beat and ransacked the office of a journalist named
Sarmad who worked for a Sindhi television station. Sarmad had
reported
on the outcome of a jirga decision related to a 12-year-old murder
case. The jirga, which included the local feudal landlords and
district mayor, had ordered the murderers to hand over five girls not
exceeding the age of 10 to the members of the deceased family as
compensation.


On July 2, police arrested Mehruddin Mari, a reporter for the Sindhi
language newspaper the Daily Kawish who had reported on human rights
abuses at a police roadblock near Golarchi, in southern Sindh. Other
reporters witnessed the police picking up Mari. At the end of the
year, Mari remained missing.


On August 23, authorities in NWFP, under orders from the Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), closed radio station
FM
103 for airing the concerns of earthquake victims who had not
received
relief or rehabilitation assistance. The officials at FM 103 strongly
criticized the government for banning their transmission and filed an
appeal in the district court of Mansehra. Prior to the closure, the
Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Authority had warned FM 103 to
"mend its ways."


On September 3, police and intelligence agencies arrested Rafiq Ajis,
editor of the daily Chamag in Turbat, Balochistan, and Abdul Sattar
Khan from Chiniot, Punjab. On September 20, Saeed Sarbazi from
Karachi, Sindh, was arrested. On September 23, intelligence agencies
released Sarbazi and confirmed that he had been detained by
intelligence agencies without charge. According to the CPJ, Sarbazi
told reporters that he was dragged by unknown kidnappers who covered
his face with his shirt. Sarbazi alleged being interrogated about his
personal and professional life, including his connection with the
Baloch Liberation Army. Sarbazi had written recently of disputes over
access to political unrest in Balochistan.


On September 13, private guards of Federal Minister for Labor and
Manpower Ghulam Sarwar Khan severely beat a senior journalist, C.R.
Shamsi, inside the Parliament premises. Shamsi had asked the
minister,
who later apologized to other media personnel for the incident, about
a legal case pending against him. No one was arrested for the
incident.


On September 15, two masked gunmen killed journalist Maqbool Hussain
Siyal in Dera Ismail Khan. Siyal worked for the Pakistani Online News
Network and was on his way to interview a leader of the PPP. The CPJ
was investigating whether Siyal's death was related to his work as a
journalist. By the end of the year, police had not made any arrests.


On September 16, police beat and seized the equipment of two
journalists, Wadood Mushtaq from ARY and Zahid Malik from ATV along
with cameraman Nazir Awan from ARY at a religious congregation in
Minar e Pakistan in Lahore. They had filmed police demanding bribes
from participants in the rally. The journalists also filmed the
police
impounding buses under false pretenses. All three were treated for
multiple fractures. By the end of the year, the police officer
involved, Mukhtar Shan, had not been charged.


On September 17, Shakeel Anjum, a senior correspondent for the News,
was included in a FIR involving a triple murder case in Islamabad. He
had written a series of articles highlighting problems in the police,
and the SHO of the Shehzad Town police included his name in the FIR.
On October 16, the police cleared him. The CPJ alleged that the FIR
was punishment for Mari's criticism of the police.


On September 17, officials in Punjab directed cable operators in the
province to stop airing the ARY Digital television network after ARY
repeatedly broadcast the beating of the three journalists at Minar e
Pakistan. The government allowed the network to resume broadcasting a
week later. A similar incident took place on September 26 after
officials in Punjab forced cable operators in Taxila, Wah Cantonment
to stop broadcasting ARY on September 26 and 27.


On November 8, PEMRA allegedly verbally instructed cable operators
throughout the country not to transmit a Bangkok-based television
network, Sindh Television. According to AHRC, the Sindhi channel had
gained popularity for highlighting government mismanagement. In late
October the channel had broadcast a satirical show about high-level
government officials, including the president and prime minister.


On November 20, unknown individuals in plainclothes illegally
detained
Dilawar Khan Wazir, a BBC correspondent and reporter for the Daily
Dawn. The kidnappers released Wazir after detaining and beating him
for approximately 30 hours. During his interrogation, Wazir's captors
allegedly questioned him about his reporting in South Waziristan.
Observers and human rights groups believed security services were
responsible for Wazir's kidnapping and torture.


On December 19, a British reporter working for the New York Times in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, Carlotta Gall, was assaulted by military
intelligence officers for covering a story in Quetta. The officers
searched Gall's room and took her equipment. Gall's photographer was
detained and released a few hours later.


The Anti Terrorist Act prohibits the possession or distribution of
material designed to foment sectarian hatred or material obtained
from
banned organizations. As part of the government's crackdown on
extremists, President Musharraf ordered police to take action against
radical publications. There were no reported cases of such crackdowns
during the year.


Court rulings mandate the death sentence for anyone blaspheming
against the "prophets." The law provides for life imprisonment for
desecrating the Koran and up to 10 years in prison for insulting
another's religious beliefs with the intent to outrage religious
feelings (see section 2.c.). This law was used only against those who
allegedly insulted the Prophet Muhammad. Groups such as the Khateme
Nabuwwat Movement, which considered anyone who questioned the
finality
of Prophet Muhammad to be a heretic, were known to insult Ahmadi
beliefs; however, the law was not used against them. Foreign books
must pass government censors before being reprinted. Books and
magazines may be imported freely but are subject to censorship for
objectionable sexual or religious content.


Obscene literature, a category broadly defined by the government, was
subject to seizure. Television stations broadcast dramas and
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption,
social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female
inequality.


Internet Freedom


While there were no reports that the government limited public access
to the Internet, it attempted to control some extremist and Baloch
separatist Web sites based in the country. Telecom authorities
claimed
that Internet access had risen by 750 percent in five years (10.5
million total subscribers during the year, compared with 1.2 million
in 2001), and service existed in nearly all of the country's urban
areas.


On April 23, according to the AHRC, the government shut down four Web
sites that focus on the area of Balochistan. The government said the
sites had spread misinformation. Supporters of the sites believed
that
sites were shut down because the news offered on these sites detailed
military operations in Balochistan.


Academic Freedom and Cultural Events


The government generally did not restrict academic freedom; however,
the atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student
organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to
limit
academic freedom. On some university campuses, well armed groups of
students, most commonly associated with the All Pakistan Mutahidda
Students Organization (affiliated with the MQM) and the Islami Jamiat
Talaba (IJT)(affiliated with the JI), clashed with and intimidated
other students, instructors, and administrators over issues such as
language, syllabus content, examination policies, grades, doctrines,
and dress. These groups frequently facilitated cheating on
examinations, interfered with the hiring of staff, influenced those
admitted to the universities, and sometimes also influenced the use
of
funds of the institutions. Such influence generally was achieved
through a combination of protest rallies, control of the campus
media,
and threats of mass violence. In response, university authorities
banned political activity on many campuses, but with limited effect.


The religious party coalition (MMA) government in NWFP banned the use
of music in public transportation. Daewoo Bus Service, a major line,
shuts down its in-bus movies and music when it crossed the Attock
river into NWFP. MMA also directed that billboards not feature women.


The Ministry of Culture operated the Central Film Censor Board, which
previewed all foreign and domestic films before exhibit in the
country.


There were no incidents of government crackdowns on art exhibitions
or
other musical/cultural activities.


b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association


The law provides for freedom "to assemble peacefully and without arms
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest
of public order," and freedom of association, and the government
generally observed these rights, but with some restrictions.


Freedom of Assembly


While the law provided for this right, in practice, the government
placed selective restrictions on the right to assemble and sometimes
refused permits for processions in urban areas. Ahmadis have been
prohibited from holding any conferences or gatherings since 1984 (see
section 2.c.).


The HRCP expressed concern that the government had permitted a rally
on April 8 of the banned terrorist organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan, during which the participants preached violence against
non-
believers and sold videos depicting violent acts.


Police often used preventive detention and excessive force against
demonstrators.


On February 2, police detained leaders of the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front, including Amanullah Khan. Police detained Khan
after
he attended a peaceful demonstration in Rawalpindi against the
construction of the Basha Dam in the Gilgit region of the Northern
Areas. According to AI, Khan was not permitted to receive visitors,
and his health deteriorated during his one-week detention.


On April 15, police baton charged and used tear gas to disperse a
rally of journalists and human rights activists in Choa Saidan Shah,
Chakwal, Punjab, when they demanded compensation for the owners of
two
shops that caught fire during the government's anti encroachment
drive. Police also registered two criminal cases against Chaudhary
Farzand Ali, president, and Malik Wazir Muhammad, secretary general,
of a journalists' union, citing their disruption of the public order.
Police also injured local human rights activist Chaudhary Nematullah.


On August 22, approximately 2,000 teachers of the Sindh Employees
Alliance protested in front of the Karachi Press Club against the
government's ban on teachers' unions. According to the AHRC, police
used teargas and batons to disperse the demonstration. Police
arrested
45 teachers and injured six.


On October 12, to protest General Musharraf's coup against Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML N) Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999, the
PML N demonstrated in Karachi, Lahore and other cities. In Lahore,
police charged the crowd with batons when they did not disperse.
According to the Dawn and other newspapers, police injured 11
demonstrators and arrested others under section 16 of the Maintenance
of Public Order law.


On November 27, according to AHRC more than 400 human rights and
political activists were arrested in Balochistan to prevent them from
participating in peaceful protests in advance of President
Musharraf's
visit to the province. Virtually all were released after the visit.


Unlike in previous years, the authorities did not restrict the
domestic movements of leaders of religious political parties.


Freedom of Association


The law provides for the right of association subject to restriction
by government ordinance and law. NGOs were required to register with
the government under the 1960 Cooperative Societies and Companies
Ordinance. No prominent NGO reported problems with the government
over
registrations during the year. Some continued to operate without
registering and were not prosecuted.


According to HRW's recently released report on freedom of expression
and civil liberties in Azad Kashmir, individuals and political
parties
who did not support Kashmir's accession to the country were barred
from participating in the political process, thus excluding
individuals who supported Kashmir's independence. HRW noted that
individuals who did not support Kashmir's accession to the country
were subject to abuse by the intelligence agencies and the military.


c. Freedom of Religion


The constitution states that adequate provisions shall be made for
minorities to profess and practice their religions freely; however,
the government limited freedom of religion in practice. Islam is the
state religion, and the constitution requires that laws be consistent
with Islam. All citizens were subject to certain provisions of
Shari'a, including extensions such as the blasphemy laws. Reprisals
and threats of reprisals against suspected converts from Islam
occurred. Members of religious minorities were subject to violence
and
harassment, and police at times refused to prevent such actions or
charge persons who committed them, leading to an atmosphere of
impunity. The constitution stipulates that the president and the
prime
minister must be Muslim. The prime minister, federal ministers, and
ministers of state, as well as elected members of the Senate and
National Assembly (including non Muslims), must take an oath to
"strive to preserve the Islamic ideology," which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan (see section 3).


Religious groups must be approved and registered; there were no
reports that the government refused to register any group.


The law declares the Ahmadi community, which considers itself a
Muslim
sect, to be a non Muslim minority. The law prohibits Ahmadis, who
claimed approximately two million adherents, from engaging in any
Muslim practices, including using Muslim greetings, referring to
their
places of worship as mosques, reciting Islamic prayers, and
participating in the Hajj or Ramadan fast. Ahmadis were prohibited
from proselytizing, holding gatherings, or distributing literature.
Government forms, including passport applications and voter
registration documents, require anyone wishing to be listed as a
Muslim to denounce the founder of the Ahmadi faith. In 2005 the
government reinstated the religion column for machine readable
passports (see section 2.d.). Ahmadis were frequently discriminated
against in government hiring and in admission to government schools
and faced prosecution under the blasphemy laws.


On June 24, a mob attacked Ahmadi residents in Jhando Sahi near
Sialkot district, Punjab, after allegations of the desecration of the
Koran. The rumors alleged that Ahmadi men were seen burning pages of
the Koran in public. The police arrested the accused Ahmadis, but a
mob gathered and started burning houses, shops, and vehicles of
Ahmadis. There were reports that prior to the incident, Muslim
clerics
had encouraged mobs to attack Ahmadis by calling out to Muslims on
the
loud-speakers of their mosques that non Muslims should not be allowed
to live among Muslims. Reports indicated that two Ahmadis were
injured, and about 100 Ahmadi villagers fled their homes where they
had lived for 60 years.


On September 10, the government of Punjab banned the century old
Ahmadi newspaper the Daily Al Fazal and raided its office in Chenab
Nagar, Chiniot District, Punjab. Police arrested printer Sultan Dogar
and journalist Abdul Sattar Khan and lodged cases under ("anti-
Ahmadi"
provisions) 298B and 298C of the Penal Code, Maintenance of Public
Order, and the Anti Terrorism Act against them. Police confiscated
all
the publications and sealed their offices. While police released Khan
on September 23, Dogar remained in custody at year's end. According
to
Deputy Superintendent of Police Saeed Tatla, the raid was part of the
government's campaign to confiscate religious "hate literature." In
the FIR, the police accused the newspaper of preaching Qadiyani
("Ahmadian") beliefs and describing Ahamdis as Muslims, which is
illegal. Qadiyani is a derogatory word for Ahmadis.


Complaints under the blasphemy laws, which prohibit derogatory
statements or action against Islam, the Koran, or the prophets, were
used in business or personal disputes to harass religious minorities
or other Muslims. Most complaints were filed within the majority
Sunni
Muslim community. Most blasphemy cases were ultimately dismissed at
the appellate level; however, the accused often remained in jail for
years awaiting the court's decision. Trial courts were reluctant to
release on bail or acquit blasphemy defendants for fear of violence
from religious extremist groups. In January 2005 President Musharraf
signed a bill into law revising the complaint process and requiring
senior police officials to review such cases in an effort to
eliminate
spurious charges. However, according to human rights and religious
freedom groups, this was not effective because senior police officers
did not have the resources to review these cases. During the year the
courts convicted one person and acquitted three under the blasphemy
laws; 73 cases were ongoing.


On January 26, Parvez Aslam Choudhry, a prominent human rights lawyer
and chairman of the NGO Legal Aid for Destitute and Settlement, was
attacked and beaten by extremists who tried to intimidate him because
of his work defending blasphemy cases. Prior to the incident,
Choudhry
had been threatened outside of court and received death threats
because of his work.


On March 3, according to the NGO Center for Legal Aid and Settlement,
police lodged a blasphemy case against Naseem Bibi for failing to
show
respect to a picture of the Kaaba in Mecca. According to Naseem Bibi,
the Muslims in her neighborhood tried to seize her land by force. In
the dispute that ensued between Naseem and the local residents, the
Muslims vandalized a crucifix from Naseem's home, to which Naseem
responded by vandalizing a picture of the Kaaba. On November 27,
Naseem was released.


On August 31, after police refused to register a theft case against
Shahid Masih and Mohammad Ghaffar in Faisalabad, police lodged a
false
case against them under the blasphemy law for allegedly burning the
Koran. Local residents attacked Masih and Ghaffar's homes, and their
families were forced to flee. According to AHRC, while in police
custody, both men were tortured.


On November 10, the Lahore High Court overturned the conviction
Ranjha
Masih, a Christian, of blasphemy. Masih had been arrested in 1998 and
sentenced to life in prison in 2003. While some witnesses claimed to
have seen Masih throw stones at a commercial sign that included a
verse from the Koran, the Lahore High Court found the witnesses'
testimony not credible. Prior to his acquittal, Masih spent almost 8
1/2
years in jail, where he reportedly was beaten and mistreated.


There were no restrictions on Christian or Hindu places of worship.
District Nazims had to authorize the construction after they assessed
whether a new church or temple was required.


According to HRCP, on November 25, unknown persons burnt down an
Ismaili place of worship in Chitral district. HRCP reported that no
arrests had been made.


On February 19, a mob attacked St. Mary's Church, St. Xavier's
Church,
and St. Mary's School at Sukkar, Sindh, after Irfan, a convert to
Islam, allegedly tried to accuse his Christian father-in-law, Saleem,
of burning a copy of the Koran.


According to AHRC, during the year, four churches, five Ahmadi
mosques, and two Hindu temples were burnt, attacked, or destroyed in
different parts of the country, with most occurring in the Punjab.
Religious extremists killed ten Christians and four Ahmadis who were
accused of blasphemy. AHRC reported that 49 Ahmadis and 110
Christians
faced trials or were in prison on charges for desecrating the Koran.
According to AHRC, there were 35 reported cases of forcible
conversion
of religious minorities.


The All Pakistan Minority Alliance reported that approximately 25
Hindu girls were allegedly forced to convert to Islam in Sindh.


NGOs such as AHRC reported that during the year, several Hindu girls
had been raped inside a Hindu compound in Karachi. In April police
refused to register a FIR against Javed Qasai for allegedly
kidnapping
and raping a Hindu girl. According to the AHRC, police forced the
girl's family to settle the matter with Qasai and did not arrest him.


All religious groups experienced bureaucratic delays and requests for
bribes when attempting to build houses of worship or obtain land. The
government prevented Ahmadis from building houses of worship.


Islamiyyat (Islamic studies) was compulsory for all Muslim students
in
state run schools. Students of other faiths were exempt from such
classes; however, in practice teachers induced many non Muslim
students to complete Islamic studies.


The Hindu community faced harassment and demands for bribes from
security forces.


Societal Abuses and Discrimination


Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'a extremists continued
during
the year and attacks on mosques and religious gatherings resulted in
127 deaths (see sections 1.a. and 5). Shi'as, Christians, and Ahmadis
were the targets of religious violence (see section 1.a.).


Police arrested five suspects in connection with the October 2005
attack in Mongh, District Mandi Bahauddin that killed eight and
wounded 14 Ahmadis.


There were no developments in the March 2005 case where five gunmen
fired at Christians leaving Easter services at a church in Lahore or
in the April kidnapping and murder case of Pastor Shamoon Babar or
his
driver.


In October 2005 gunmen opened fire at an Ahmadi worship service in
Mong, Mandi Bahauddin, Punjab, killing eight and injuring 14. On May
11, police arrested four persons linked to the terrorist organization
Lashkar e Jhangvi in Toba Tek Sing, Punjab. Police charged Malik
Abrar
and Amjad Shah for planning and executing the attack. The state filed
a case against them under the Anti Terrorism Act. According to the
Ahmadi community, judges feared for their lives if they accepted such
cases.


Following the attack by an angry mob in Sangla Hills, Punjab, in
November 2005, high level provincial officials visited the site to
express solidarity with the Christian community. The provincial
government provided funds to reconstruct the destroyed buildings, and
church services resumed in December 2005. At year's end, no charges
had been brought against the mob that destroyed the buildings or its
leaders.


Ahmadi leaders charged that militant Sunni mullahs and their
followers
sometimes staged marches through the streets of Rabwah, a
predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center in central Punjab.
Backed by crowds of between 100 and 200 persons, the mullahs
reportedly denounced Ahmadis and their founder, creating a situation
that sometimes led to violence. The Ahmadis claimed that police
generally were present during these marches but did not intervene to
prevent violence.


On February 20, a mob attacked St. Mary's Catholic Church in Sukkur
after rumors that the Christian speakers at a Sunday gathering spoke
against Islam and its Prophet. Police arrested seven people including
a local religious leader. All of them were released on bail.


On August 7, three Christians were hospitalized with serious wounds
in
Mominpura Thaiki village near Sharaqpur, Punjab. The injuries
occurred
during a dispute over land sharing between the Christian community
and
Muslims living in the village. Police took action and Yaqub Maher, a
Muslim landowner, was accused and arrested for plotting the attack on
the Christian community.


The Ahmadi, Christian, Hindu, and Shi'a Muslim communities reported
significant discrimination in employment and access to education,
including at government institutions.


Although there were few Jewish citizens in the country, anti Semitic
sentiments appeared to be widespread, and the press commonly
published
anti Semitic press articles.


For a more detailed discussion, see the 2006 International Religious
Freedom Report.


d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration,
and Repatriation


The law provides for these rights; however, the government limited
them in practice. The government required that foreigners have
special
permission to enter certain restricted areas, including parts of the
FATA and Balochistan.


The law prohibits travel to Israel. Despite this, Pakistani
journalists reported on the Israel Lebanon conflict from inside
Israel
in July. Government employees and students must obtain "no objection"
certificates before traveling abroad, although this requirement
rarely
was enforced against students. Persons on the publicly available Exit
Control List (ECL) were prohibited from foreign travel. There were
approximately 3,740 names on the ECL. While the ECL was intended to
prevent those with pending criminal cases from traveling abroad, no
judicial action was required to add a name to the ECL, and it was
sometimes used to harass human rights activists or leaders of
opposition and nationalist parties. Those on the list had the right
to
appeal for removal to the Secretary of Interior and the advocate
general of the senior judiciary.


Mukhtar Mai was temporarily placed on the ECL, which barred her from
leaving Pakistan. In June 2005 the government confiscated her
passport
after she received a visa to attend an event abroad. Her passport was
returned in August 2005.


The law prohibits forced exile; however, former prime minister Nawaz
Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, remained in exile abroad, in
accordance with his 2000 agreement with the government. In late 2005
the government granted Nawaz Sharif and his immediate family new
passports, allowing them to travel outside Saudi Arabia. Neither
Shabaz nor Nawaz were permitted to enter Pakistan. Shabaz was denied
entry when he arrived in country by plane in 2004. Former prime
minister Benazir Bhutto remained in self imposed exile. A number of
corruption and contempt of court charges against her remained
pending.


Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)


According to press reports there were approximately 1.5 million
displaced Kashmiris, from Indian held Kashmir, in the country. The
law
entitles Kashmiris to the same rights as citizens. According to UN
Children's Fund, up to 80,000 Baloch civilians were displaced as the
result of clashes between government forces and Baloch nationalists.
These were including among the more than 200,000 persons who,
according to AHRC, migrated to different places of the country from
areas affected by military operations. According to newspaper
reports,
many of the displaced lived in terrible conditions with no safe
drinking water and no medical help.


Protection of Refugees


The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status
in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; however, the government has a system
to protect refugees. In practice, the government provided protection
against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution. The government did not grant refugee status or
asylum.


Since 1979 the government has provided temporary protection to
millions of refugees from neighboring Afghanistan. According to the
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approximately 2.4 million
Afghan refugees remained in country. The government continued to work
closely with the UNHCR to provide support to this population. As of
October 13, the last day of UNHCR-assisted repatriations, the
government cooperated with UNHCR in the voluntary repatriation of
133,338 Afghan refugees. There were also 9,681 spontaneous refugee
returns known to UNHCR.


The Afghan refugee camps that the government scheduled for closure
during the year remained open. A registration of those Afghan
refugees
counted in the 2005 census in the country began on October 15 and was
scheduled to be completed by the end of the year, but was extended.
The registration, conducted jointly by country's National Database
and
Registration Authority and UNHCR, issues a proof of registration
card,
valid for three years, and identifies the holder as an Afghan
resident.


Police in some cases demanded bribes from Afghan refugees. There were
credible reports that members of the intelligence services harassed
refugees during their search for al Qa'ida. Some female refugees who
accepted jobs with NGOs reported harassment from Taliban sympathizers
in their own community. Refugees faced societal discrimination and
abuse from local communities, which resented economic competition,
and
blamed refugees for high crime rates. Single women, female headed
households, and children working on the streets were particularly
vulnerable to abuse, including trafficking.


Approximately 300,000 Biharis, Urdu speaking non Bengali Muslims in
Bangladesh without citizenship rights since 1971, continued to
campaign for resettlement in the country.


Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government


The law provides citizens with the right to change their government;
however, this right was restricted in practice. In October 1999,
General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected government of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif in a military coup and was elected president in
2002 in deeply flawed elections. Since then, President Musharraf has
controlled the government and dominated the PML-Q federal coalition
government.


Elections and Political Participation


Domestic and international observers found the 2002 national assembly
elections, the most recent national elections, and the August 2005
local elections deeply flawed. HRW's 2006 report on Azad Kashmir
noted
that the July Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections were flawed
and "greeted with widespread charges of poll rigging by opposition
political parties and independent analysts." HRW reported that 60
pro-
independence candidates who belonged to the Jammu Kashmir Liberation
Front, the All Parties Nationalist Alliance, and smaller political
parties were barred from participating in the state elections.


The Supreme Court sanctioned General Musharraf's 1999 coup; however,
it directed Musharraf to restore elected government within three
years. In 2002 President Musharraf held a nationwide referendum on a
five year extension of his presidency and claimed to have received a
97.5 percent vote in favor of the extension. Independent observers
found evidence of widespread fraud and coerced voting. The Supreme
Court ruled that the referendum was constitutional; however, the
court
allowed the results to be revisited by an elected parliament. In 2003
the National Assembly affirmed Musharraf as president for a five-year
term. Musharraf reportedly promised some members of parliament to
remove his uniform in 2004 but did not do so.


In 2002 elections were held for the national and provincial
assemblies. Musharraf's Legal Framework Order (LFO) created a number
of new candidate eligibility prerequisites. International and
domestic
observers found the elections greatly flawed, identifying serious
problems in the election framework and tampering of results in
certain
districts. After a number of floor crossings, which the opposition
claims were induced, the PML formed a governing coalition in concert
with the MQM, smaller parties, and dissident groups from opposition
parties. The February 2003 indirect Senate elections resulted in a
majority for the governing coalition. In December 2003, despite
opposition protests, the Parliament incorporated a large part of the
LFO into the 1973 constitution as its 17th Amendment. The amendment
affirmed Musharraf's presidency until 2007 and his right to serve
concurrently as chief of army staff until the end of 2004. The
amendment allowed the president to dissolve parliament but required
him to obtain the consent of the Supreme Court within 30 days.
Opposition parties said the amended constitution legitimized the
powerful role of the military in politics and transfers significant
powers from the prime ministership to the previously ceremonial
presidency. In October 2004 the National Assembly, over objections
from the opposition parties, approved a bill extending Musharraf's
exemption to hold two offices through 2007.


The National Assembly and the cabinet functioned normally during the
year. In August 2004 the National Assembly elected the PML candidate,
former finance minister Shaukat Aziz, prime minister, although all
opposition parties boycotted the vote because their candidate, PML N
leader Javed Hashmi, was not allowed to appear at the assembly,
having
been convicted of sedition. Opposition parties criticized Aziz's
election, claiming his two by election victories to the assembly were
fraudulent. Domestic and international observers found irregularities
but concluded the elections were generally free, fair, and credible.


President Musharraf continued to back reforms proposed by the
National
Reconstruction Bureau to empower local governments. In August 2005
the
country held direct local elections to choose members and executives
for the lowest tier of local government, the union council.
International observers found serious flaws in the contests in Sindh
and Punjab provinces, principally during the August 25 round.
Intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters, use of state
resources to influence the election, vote buying, and voting
irregularities that appeared to benefit government endorsed
candidates
occurred and likely had an impact on the results of the August 18
contest in Karachi as well as the August 25 contests in Sindh and
Punjab.


In October 2005 indirect elections for executives of reserved
minority
and women's seats on the tehsil (county) and district councils
occurred. International observers found that all political parties
engaged in attempted intimidation, coercion, and vote buying during
these contests. According to press reports, in Upper Dir and
Battagram
districts, NWFP, local community and religious leaders prevented
women
from voting or holding official office. In response, the adviser to
the prime minister on women's affairs visited Upper Dir to mobilize
women to stand in elections.


The government permitted all existing political parties to ...