Beforethe creation and advent of Aadhaar, availing the benefits of government programs was very hard and taxing for the poor. It involved filing a lot of complicated paperwork, providing several proofs of residence and identification and also required people to take time off work to complete these requirements. Aadhaar has since then replaced most requirements for identification proof and is usually the only document required to avail a government scheme.[7]
The Aadhaar card is now linked with services such as driving license, school scholarships, cooking gas subsidies, passports, pensions and provident fund accounts.[8] The Aadhaar card is also being considered for provision of the services provided by Indian Railway System, especially the online reservation process.[9] The Developmental Cooperative Bank even launched its first Aadhaar based ATM in June 2016 and aims to utilize the biometric fingerprint as an additional security feature in customers accessing their money.[10]
One of the major criticisms of Aadhaar has been the numerous major security lapses that have been omnipresent in the workings of Aadhaar and which have as a result made the system prone to data leaks. UIDIA has had to regularly shut down fraudulent websites that keep popping up, disguising themselves as official websites, and phishing people for their personal information.[11] In 2018 around 200 official government websites accidentally made personal Aadhaar data public; the problem exacerbated to such a level, that one could access thousands of government databases with confidential information simply by Googling it.[12] The Indian Government had to resort to blocking around 5,000 officials because Aadhaar data was being accessed by unauthorized personnel working for the government.[13]
The Tribune also reported that its journalists were able to track down an anonymous group on WhatsApp that was selling Aadhaar card details for a meagre Rs 500 ($7.2 US). Once the payment was made, the journalists received the Login ID and Username to a portal where all the information under the Aadhaar number of that individual could be accessed easily.[14] Before this vulnerability in the system was fixed, the Tribune estimated that over 100,000 people had accessed sensitive Aadhaar information illegally.[15]
The Aadhaar project initially continued without any real legislative backing and was delayed in its full implementation due to political polarization and opposition from the minority parties. The first legal trouble started in 2012 when oil companies lobbied to have the UPA make it mandatory for beneficiaries of gas subsidies to link their bank accounts to Aadhaar. The case went to the Supreme Court (SC) of India, which struck down the mandatory provision in 2013 and declared that the lack of an Aadhaar card was not grounds to deprive anyone of any service.[20]
The main issue between the NDA and the critics of the Aadhaar system was one of privacy. Aadhaar suffers from a myriad of security issues and the system has repeatedly proven to be vulnerable to both internal leaks and external abuse of the data. The NDA had argued that the right to privacy was not a fundamental right but was proven wrong by the SC verdict in August 2017 which guaranteed the fundamental right to privacy under the Indian Constitution.[23]
The latest development came in 2018 when the SC upheld the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar project.[24] The SC allowed the mandatory linking of Aadhaar for filing tax returns and accessing welfare schemes but removed the requirement for bank accounts and SIM cards. It also struck down section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, which allowed corporations and individuals to ask for Aadhaar in exchange for goods and services.[25] The court also demanded that the Central Government pass a strong data protection law as soon as possible.[26] Although the limited power of the private sector and the requirement to pass a strong data protection law are crucial in guaranteeing the right to privacy, the overall judgement did not go far enough in limiting government abuse of the program and of the data collected under the program.
The government of India thus has access to the data of nearly of all its citizens. They can track activities of suspicious individuals through their Aadhaar number which will connect them to other services that they use. It is highly likely that the government will push for AI programs that will scan citizens activities and their patterns to automatically flag certain individuals as dangerous or suspicious. While this may help with crime and controlling terrorism, it has the potential to turn India into an oppressive surveillance state.
Aadhaar is a perfect example of a well-intentioned government scheme gone awry. It started as a novel idea to reduce bureaucracy and fraud but is now threatening the individual privacy of all its users and limiting the constitutional rights of Indian citizens.
Furthermore, its plethora of security issues has left the biometric data of billions of people vulnerable to external and internal abuse. Aadhaar has also given the government unjust powers to surveil its citizens and deny them their fundamental rights. The association and potential of Aadhaar contributing to state-controlled machine learning programs will also undermine democratic principles. The Modi led NDA is using Aadhaar as another creative way to expand the powers of the government, even if it means eroding the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution.
Historically, applications using biometrics have been initiated by authorities for military access control and criminal or civil identification under a tightly regulated legal and technical framework.
Today Automated Biometric Identification Systems (ABIS) can create and store biometric information that matches biometric templates for the face (using the so-called mugshot systems), finger, and iris.
Live face recognition - the ability to perform face identification in a crowd in real-time or post-event - is also gaining interest for public security - in cities, airports, borders, or other sensitives such as stadiums or places of worship.
The electronic passport (e-passport) is a familiar biometric travel document. The second generation of such documents, also known as biometric passports, includes two fingerprints stored and a passport photo.
That means over 1.2 billion travelers have a standardized digital portrait in a secure document. It's a windfall for automatic border control systems (aka e-gates) and self-service kiosks.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) declared that more than 43.7m individuals had been scanned at border crossings, outbound cruise ships, and elsewhere so far. This process helped stop 252 people from attempting to use another person's passport to cross the border. (V.B., 6 February 2020.)
In Gabon, for example, even before the program started, it was clear to everyone that authorities had to implement all resources to avoid the health coverage program becoming a center of attention for neighboring countries' citizens.
Hence beneficiaries are individually identified so that access to care can be reserved for them. The authorities decided that the insured parties' identification would be nominative in implementing a Gabonese individual health insurance number.
AFIS databases (Automated Fingerprint Identification System), often linked to a civil register database, ensure citizens' identity and uniqueness to the rest of the population in a reliable, fast, and automated way.
India's Aadhaar project is emblematic of biometric registration. It is the world's most extensive biometric identification system and the cornerstone of reliable identification and authentication in India.
The Aadhaar number is a 12-digit unique identity number issued to all Indian residents. This number is based on their biographic and biometric data (a photograph, ten fingerprints, and two iris scans).
The pandemic has accelerated online digital onboarding and bank account opening as many branches were temporarily closed. Businesses have been developing mobile user-friendly onboarding processes, including facial recognition as a critical feature for identity verification.
Retailers can leverage facial recognition to identify a premium customer or a former shoplifter as soon as they enter the store. If the system recognizes one, it alerts the store manager.
Biometric applications in North America's security and government sectors drive regional market trends. With the U.S. at the helm, the study claims North America will represent more than 30% of the overall biometrics industry share by 2024.
The technical challenges of automated recognition of individuals based on their biological and behavioral characteristics are inherent in transforming analog (facial image, fingerprint, voice pattern) to digital information (patterns, minutiae) that can then be processed, compared and matched with effective algorithms.
Therefore, biometric checks must be carried out on a trusted secure device, which means the alternatives are to have a centralized and supervised server, a trusted biometric device, or a personal security component.
Numerous national identity cards (Portugal, Ecuador, South Africa, Mongolia, Algeria, etc.) now incorporate digital security features based on the "Match-on-Card" fingerprint matching algorithm.
Unlike conventional biometric processes, the "Match-on-Card" algorithm allows fingerprints to be matched locally with a reference frame thanks to a microprocessor built into the biometric I.D. card without connecting to a central biometric database (1:1 matching).
They were launched in 2018 for the first time by the Bank of Cyprus and Thales for EMV cards (contactless and contact payment). They use fingerprint recognition instead of a PIN code to authenticate the cardholder.
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