The Present Spencer Johnson Pdf Free 29
Felicia Lehoullier
For years as the young boy grew, he searched high and low, trying in vain to find the Precious Present. Finally, as a grown man, he stopped to recall the things the happy old man had told him so many years ago. At that moment, he realized the Precious Present was just that: the present. Not the past, not the future, but the Precious Present.
When he thought about what the old man had said, the boy thought he understood. He knew about presents. Like the bicycle he got for his birthday and the gifts he found under the tree on Christmas morning. But as the boy thought more about it, he knew. The joy of toys never lasts forever.
In an instant the man was happy. He realized that he was in the Precious Present. He raised both hands triumphantly into the cool, fresh air. He was joyous--for one moment. But then, just as quickly as he had discovered it, he let the joy of the present moment evaporate. He slowly lowered his hands, touched his forehead, and frowned. The man was unhappy--again.
"Why," he asked himself, "didn't I see the obvious long ago? Why have I missed so many precious moments?" "Why has it taken me so long to live in the present?" As the man remembered his fruitless travels around the world in his search for the Precious Present, he knew how much happiness he had lost.
When he became aware of his unhappiness and of his being in the past, he returned to the present moment. And he was happy. But then the man began to worry about the future. "Will I," he asked, "be able to know the joy of living in the Precious Present tomorrow?" Then he saw he was living in the future and laughed--at himself.
It was so simple. And now he saw it. The present nourished him. But the man knew it was not going to be easy. Learning to be in the present was a process he was going to have to do over and over, again and again, until it became a part of him. Now he knew why he had enjoyed being with the old man.
The old man was totally present when he was with the younger man. The old man was not thinking about something else or wishing that he was somewhere else. He was fully present. And it felt good to be with such a person. The younger man smiled at himself, the way the old man used to smile. He knew. "I can choose to be happy now, or I can try to be happy when. . . or if. . . ."
He listened again to his thoughts. "The present is what it is. It is valuable. Even I do not know why. It is already just the way it is supposed to be. When I see the present, accept the present, and experience the present, I am well, and I am happy. Pain is simply the difference between what is and what I want it to be.
Then all of a sudden, the little girl jumped up and squealed with delight! As the girl ran off to play, the old man smiled. For he heard what she had said: "Wow!" she exclaimed. "I hope someday someone gives me the Precious Present!" To a large degree, the measure of our peace of
mind is determined by how much we are able
to live in the present moment. Irrespective of
what happened yesterday or last year, and
what may or may not happen tomorrow, the
present moment is where you are--always!
Richard Carlson
Irene Fonseca, Kavčić-Moura university professor of mathematics at Carnegie Mellon University, will present the 59th William J. Spencer Lecture titled "Phase Transitions in Heterogeneous Media: Equilibria and Geometric Flows" as part of the Mathematics Department Women Lecture Series in celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Association for Women in Mathematics. The lecture will take place from 2:30-3:20 p.m. Thursday, April 22, via YouTube Live.
A group of scientists, experts, and representatives from New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and West Virginia convened for a mid-Atlantic Regional One Health Consortium Conference at Rutgers University last Friday.
In her presentation, Stroud gave a high-level overview of the history of the One Health movement. She spoke about the work that is being done on an international level in terms of the One Health movement, meetings, and summits, and applauded New Jersey for its efforts in establishing a One Health Task Force.
And Doug Riley ended the day of presentations by encouraging participants to think about ways they can take the first step to bridge connections with one another and continue the work of the One Health initiative.
The action is one for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff by reason of the alleged negligence of defendant city in maintaining a public sidewalk in a dangerous and defective condition. W. J. MacIntyre and F. W. Curl were joined as defendants in their alleged capacity as "officers of said city". Plaintiff did not present her claim for damages to defendant city within ninety days after the accident, as required by chapter 1167, Statutes 1931, page 2475, although she did present a claim some five months after the accident. The demurrer of the defendant city was sustained upon the ground that presentation of a claim within the prescribed time was a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action.
[1] The liability of the city is founded upon Statutes 1923, page 675, Deering's General Laws, Act 5619. That act contained no requirement for the presentation of damage claims to a municipality or other corporate body or any representative thereof. Such presentation was first required by the act of 1931 above referred to. It is the contention of appellant that the latter act is void because when it was adopted it effected an amendment of the act of 1923 and the former act was not reenacted and published in full in accordance with the provisions of article IV, section 24, of the Constitution, which require that an act revised or section amended must be reenacted and published in full as amended. This procedure was not followed by the legislature, nor was it necessary that it should have been followed, in adopting the 1931 act. The latter act did not purport to amend the 1923 act, nor did it, strictly speaking, amend it. The 1923 act created a liability of municipalities and certain other governmental agencies in cases of negligence. That liability was not to any extent changed by the 1931 act. The former act remained in full effect. The latter act covers new matters, such as the presentation of claims for damages, certain duties of attorneys for municipalities and other agencies in actions for damages against officers, and it makes permissive the insurance of officers against liability arising out of negligence. Thus the law on the subject was made broader by new and independent legislation, but without destroying or impairing any substantive right or liability created by the former act. [2] It has been held frequently that legislation which adds to or supplements or interprets an existing law or makes such law applicable to new situations without otherwise changing [12 Cal. App. 2d 393] its operation is neither a revision nor an amendment of the existing law within the meaning of the constitutional provision. In the early case of Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266 [22 P. 176], it was held that the Constitution "applies clearly to acts which are in terms revisory or amendatory of some former act; it does not apply to an independent act". Neither does it apply to cases in which the former act remains in full effect. (Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136 [44 P. 915, 45 P. 1057]; Gadd v. McGuire, 69 Cal. App. 347 [231 P. 754].) It does not apply to the addition of new code sections, even though the effect thereof be to amend by implication existing code sections. (Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. 476 [74 P. 28, 98 Am.St.Rep. 73]; In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202 [131 P. 352]; People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333 [202 P. 51]; Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58 [8 PaCal.2d 467].) The act of 1931, in so far as it requires the presentation of claims within ninety days after the happening of an accident, merely prescribes rules of procedure for the enforcement of claims arising under the 1923 act, no such rules having been prescribed by that act. In this respect and as to all other matters to which it relates, the act of 1931 was original legislation; it did not revise or amend the existing law, although it did supplement it. It was therefore legally adopted.
[3] The statute is mandatory and plaintiff's failure to present her claim within the time provided by law, unless excused by the facts alleged in the complaint, precludes any recovery against the City of Glendale or any officers or employees thereof for negligence. (Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal. App. 2d 267 [49 PaCal.2d 320]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal. App. 73 [35 PaCal.2d 185]; Farmers etc. Bank v. City of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 655 [91 P. 795]; Coen v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. App. 752 [234 P. 426]; Continental Insurance Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 585 [268 P. 920]; Phillips v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal. App. 78 [35 PaCal.2d 187].)
[4] As an excuse for the failure to present her claim to the city on time, the complaint alleged: "That plaintiff, by reason of her injuries, was incapacitated and sick and sore in mind and body for a period of three months and unable to ascertain the true state of the law and the nature of her rights, and unable to file a claim against said city." The allegation of incapacity and inability to file a claim presents a question [12 Cal. App. 2d 394] which has not been directly decided in this state and one as to which the authorities elsewhere are in irreconcilable conflict. In one line of cases it is held that the requirements of statutes, charter provisions or ordinances for the giving of notice of injuries or for the presentation of claims for damages need not be strictly met, and that substantial compliance only is demanded. In so holding, the courts have supplied conditions not expressed or attempted to be expressed in the laws. This is held justified by assuming that it could not have been the intention in enacting the legislation to bar the claims of those who might be unable to present them on time by reason of physical or mental incapacity, and this assumption again is held justified under the maxim that the law does not require impossibilities. The contrary, and we think the more satisfactory, rule is that the giving of notice or the filing of claims within the limited period allowed therefor is purely a matter for legislative control, and that where a law makes compliance mandatory and no exceptions are provided in the law itself, the courts may provide none under the guise of interpretation or construction. (Haynes v. City of Seattle, 83 Wash. 51 [145 P. 73]; People v. City of Valparaiso, 178 Ind. 673 [100 N.E. 70]; Schmidt v. City of Fremont, 70 Neb. 577 [97 N.W. 830]; Ellis v. City of Kearney, 80 Neb. 51 [113 N.W. 803]; McCollum v. City of South Omaha, 84 Neb. 413 [121 N.W. 438]; Touhey v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, [93 N.E. 540, 32 L.R.A. (N. S.) 350]; Huntington v. City of Calais, 105 Me. 144 [73 Atl. 829]; Daniels v. City of Racine, 98 Wis. 649 [74 N.W. 553]; Hay v. City of Baraboo, 127 Wis. 1 [105 N.W. 654, 115 Am.St.Rep. 977, 3 L.R.A. (N. S.) 84]; Crocker v. City of Hartford, 66 Conn. 387 [34 Atl. 98]; City of Ft. Worth v. Shero, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 487 [41 S.W. 704]; Trost v. City of Casselton, 8 N. D. 534 [79 N.W. 1071]; Gribben v. City of Franklin, 175 Ind. 500 [94 N.E. 757]; Collins v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash. 153 [116 P. 663, 35 L.R.A. (N. S.) 840]; Benson v. City of Hoquiam, 67 Wash. 90 [121 P. 58].)
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