History in the Middle East has never unfolded in isolation. Every political shift, every coup, every foreign intervention has rippled across borders, reshaping identities and destinies. My own family lived through these turning points. My father, who managed Palestinian affairs in Iraq in 1948, witnessed firsthand how global powers and regional ambitions intertwined to produce consequences still felt today.
In 1948, Iraq was fragile and heavily constrained by British influence. Support for Palestinians was limited, and even basic employment was restricted to those with formal credentials. The state was weak, and its sovereignty was conditional.
By the 1950s, Arab Jews were stripped of their Iraqi citizenship and sent one‑way to Israel — a transformation that reshaped the demographic and political landscape. Meanwhile, Britain viewed Iraq’s growing regional influence with suspicion. When Kuwait sought to join the Arab Union, London intervened decisively, helping dismantle the Iraqi monarchy under the supervision of Henry Trevelyan.
Abd al‑Karim Qasim’s attempt to form the Palestine Liberation Army was short‑lived; he was toppled soon after. The Baath Party then rose to power, exploiting Washington’s miscalculations and seizing control of Iraq’s political machinery.
Saddam Hussein later made a strategic error by dismantling the Baath hierarchy and rejecting unity with Syria — a union that would have made him prime minister rather than president. Yet Saddam’s motivations were rooted in Arab nationalism, not personal ambition alone.
The fall of the Shah, supported by Western powers, ushered in a new ideological force. Khomeini redirected Shiism toward rejectionism and expansionism, and with American tolerance, Iran attempted to occupy Iraq. The result was the devastating eight‑year Iran–Iraq war.
In 1982, Israel struck Iraq’s nuclear facilities. Saddam vowed revenge, and by 1989 Iraq possessed one of the strongest militaries in the world. It is not far‑fetched to imagine that Iraq, at its peak, could have fundamentally altered the regional balance — a possibility underscored by Israel’s current struggle in Gaza.
Kuwait’s aggressive demands for war‑debt repayment, combined with its decision to flood the oil market, pushed Iraq to the brink. When an Iraqi delegation was insulted by Kuwait’s aging ruler, Saddam — shaped by a rural sense of honor — reacted with fury. The invasion of Kuwait followed.
The United States intervened in 1990, suffering significant losses before halting the war and negotiating at Safwan. Iraq was then subjected to the harshest sanctions in modern history — sanctions that crippled society and paved the way for Iraq’s eventual collapse.
Under the guidance of American strategists, Washington coordinated with Iran’s clerical establishment, paying senior clerics to declare resistance to the invasion “haram.” After 2003, the United States effectively handed Iraq to Iran — a fact openly acknowledged by Paul Bremer.
Iranian‑backed militias began assassinating Iraqi pilots who had bombed Iran during the war. Mossad‑linked groups joined in, particularly in northern Iraq. Twelve thousand scientists were killed. Former military officers were massacred, especially in Mosul. One and a half million Iraqis died, and more than ten million were displaced.
During Saddam’s era, Palestinians joined the Baath Party in large numbers because Iraq championed their cause. Iran interpreted this as betrayal. After 2003, Palestinians became targets — one community among millions who suffered at the hands of both Washington and Tehran.