Re: Alert over “IRGN” cells in Iraq — GDN, Page One, 20/06/2026
John Churchilly
Re: Alert over “IRGN” cells in Iraq — GDN, Page One, 20/06/2026
The front‑page report on the discovery of “IRGN” cells inside Iraq reveals, once again, the depth of Iranian penetration into the country’s security and political landscape. According to the article, these cells maintain direct operational links to IRGN command in Iran and were responsible for attacks on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE between April 20 and May 17. Their bases, located in the desert regions near Basra and Samawa, underscore how entrenched these networks have become.
It is deeply troubling that an Arab country has reached a point where its territory is used to threaten fellow Arab states. This situation did not emerge suddenly; it is the culmination of a long chain of political, military, and demographic developments that reshaped Iraq after 2003.
US–Iran Coordination Before and After the 2003 Invasion
Prior to the US‑led invasion of Iraq, Washington and Tehran engaged in discreet, pragmatic cooperation. Sharing a common adversary in Saddam Hussein, both sides used back‑channel diplomacy and intelligence exchanges to shape the coming conflict and secure their regional interests.
Key areas of cooperation included:
Geneva Back‑Channel Talks: Senior American and Iranian diplomats — including Mohammad Javad Zarif — reached an understanding that Iran would not target US aircraft even if they entered Iranian airspace during the invasion.
Intelligence Sharing and Post‑Invasion Planning: Iran provided intelligence to the US and facilitated the entry of Iranian‑trained militias and IRGC operatives into southern Iraq. These groups played a major role in shaping the post‑Saddam order, particularly in Basra.
Precedent in Afghanistan: This cooperation built on earlier coordination during the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, where Iran assisted in identifying Taliban targets and supported the Northern Alliance.
These details were documented in The New York Times on March 6, 2016, in an article by Michael Gordon discussing Zalmay Khalilzad’s book, which revealed that US–Iran talks continued even after Baghdad fell in April 2003.
Iran’s Expanding Grip on Iraq
A later New York Times report, published on July 15, 2017, described the author’s observations in Baghdad: Iranian goods filling markets, Iranian media dominating television, Iranian construction materials shaping the skyline, and Iranian‑sourced drugs entering through porous borders. Beyond commerce, Iranian‑backed militias were building a strategic corridor linking Iran to Syria and Lebanon.
The article concluded bluntly that in the struggle for influence over Iraq, “Iran won, and the United States lost.”
Demographic Engineering
Iran’s influence has not been limited to politics and security. Demographic shifts accelerated after 2003. Iraq’s population, which should have reached roughly 25 million by 2020 based on historical growth rates, instead surged to 38 million. This dramatic increase reflects large‑scale naturalization of individuals of Persian origin, fundamentally altering Iraq’s demographic composition.
A Return to the Present Moment
Seen against this backdrop, the revelations in the recent GDN report are not surprising. The presence of IRGN‑linked cells operating from Iraqi territory — and launching attacks on neighboring Arab states — is a direct consequence of the long, well‑documented process through which Iran consolidated its power inside Iraq.
Conclusion (Smoothed and Strengthened)
The GDN article does more than expose a security threat; it highlights the culmination of two decades of political, military, and demographic transformation that allowed Iran to embed itself deeply within Iraq’s institutions and territory. When viewed alongside the documented history of US–Iran coordination before and after 2003, and the extensive reporting by international media on Iran’s growing dominance, the emergence of IRGN cells is not an isolated incident but part of a broader, long‑term trajectory.