Proof of fundamental reality?

[e...@disroot.org]

> What does Turing universality mean then for AI/Robot perception and consciousness, when we can mathematically prove that they can't
> access or know their fundamental reality?

Good morning Jason,

Is this a fact? That we can prove that software can never know their fundamental
reality? If so, could you please summarize the proof?

What I find interesting here is the thought that perhaps, assuming materialism,
and that humans are "software" running on hardware, the proof can be extended to
us humans never being about to know our fundamental reality?

Best regards,
Daniel

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Oct 8, 2025, 4:15 AM efc via The Important Questions <the-importa...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> What does Turing universality mean then for AI/Robot perception and consciousness, when we can mathematically prove that they can't
> access or know their fundamental reality?

Good morning Jason,

Is this a fact? That we can prove that software can never know their fundamental
reality?

It follows from the Church-Turing thesis. This thesis cannot be proven (only disproven), but it almost universally believed to be true for many reasons. It is also foundational to computer science as we know it.

See:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis

For more information about it and why it is accepted, and why it is so important to CS.

If so, could you please summarize the proof?

The thesis says that everything that is computable, can be computed by a Turing machine.

A corollary of this is that all Turing machines can emulate one another.

For example, a PC can simulate a Mac running Safari. And likewise a Mac can simulate a PC running Internet explorer.

When emulated in this way, Safari has no idea that it is running (ultimately) on a PC rather than on real Mac hardware. This is because perfect emulability requires the program unfold exactly as it would had it run on the original genuine hardware. There is no room for deviation and hence there's no room for that program "to tell" it's being emulated in virtual hardware (a virtual machine).

Turing emulability means, there is no hardware, no instruction set, for which a VM layer could not be implemented.

What I find interesting here is the thought that perhaps, assuming materialism,
and that humans are "software" running on hardware, the proof can be extended to
us humans never being about to know our fundamental reality?

Exactly, if one assumes functionalism/computationalism, which says that producing a particular conscious state is only a matter of performing the right computation, then the Church-Turing thesis is a way of proving Cartesian doubt is a real and fundamental limitation for all conscious beings.

For computationalism means you could always exist in a computer simulation of your environment, and The Church-Turing thesis says we can know nothing about the ultimate nature of the computer on which we run.

We can even extend this to further say we could not know anything about the physics of the universe in which that computer exists, (aside from the fact that the physics permits the construction of a Turing machine).

I don't know that any philosophers have seen or acknowledged this connection between Cartesian doubt and the Church-Turing thesis, but I think it is quite clear and readily provable.

Jason 

[Brent Allsop]

To me, you guys are missing the most important part of the way we "compute".

We compute on top of subjective qualities like redness and greenness via a subjective binding mechanism.

This mechanism is essentially  a detector of qualities, or as I believe qualities of physical reality.

If we were running on something that was qualitatively (physically) different, we would be able to detect that, since consciousness is a detector of physical qualities.

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[e...@disroot.org]

On Wed, 8 Oct 2025, Brent Allsop wrote:

>
> To me, you guys are missing the most important part of the way we "compute".
> We compute on top of subjective qualities like redness and greenness via a subjective binding mechanism.
> This mechanism is essentially  a detector of qualities, or as I believe qualities of physical reality.

Good evening Brent,

Could you please elaborate? I do not understand what you mean when you say
"computer on top of subjective qualities like redness ... via a subjective
binding mechanism."

It sounds to me like either a contradiction in terms (what is a subjective
computation?) or word soup.

> If we were running on something that was qualitatively (physically) different, we would be able to detect that, since
> consciousness is a detector of physical qualities.

I think what you must keep in mind is that our empirical reality and our
bodies, is the "hardware" while our minds is the software. As per the
thesis, we can therefore never know anything beyond our empirical reality,
since the software on the emulated windows machine, can never know that it
runs on an emulation, to use Jasons explanation.

The only thing I can come up with counter to this idea is that
Church-Turing is not proven, but it is not disproven, and seems to be
"working", and also... to continue our computer thought experiment... what
about "bugs" in the system? ;)

Yet another thought experiment is breaking out of the simulation with the
help from the outside.

Apart from those three, I think this sounds quite solid.

Best regards,
Daniel

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Oct 8, 2025, 1:19 PM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

To me, you guys are missing the most important part of the way we "compute".

We compute on top of subjective qualities like redness and greenness via a subjective binding mechanism.

This mechanism is essentially  a detector of qualities, or as I believe qualities of physical reality.

In your model of consciousness, the substrate is important, hence you assume functionalism is false. If functionalism/multiple realizability is false, then reproducing the function is not enough to reproduce the conscious state, and then the Church-Turing thesis would have no consequence for the Cartesian doubt.

The consequence of Cartesian doubt follows from the assumed truth of functionalism, together with the capacity of all Turing machines to emulate each other.

If we were running on something that was qualitatively (physically) different, we would be able to detect that, since consciousness is a detector of physical qualities.

In another respect, one might use the Church-Turing thesis to argue that such detection of low level physical qualities is impossible.

If you assume that all physical laws are computable, then a human body and brain can be simulated on a Turing machine and we can see how it behaves and what it says in different physical situations. So if we simulate the human body as it looks at a strawberry and hears the words "what do you see?" we can see how the simulation unfolds.

Now if the Church-Turing thesis is correct, it matters not what computer hardware the brain sim runs on. It could be gallium, or silicon, or argon vacuum tubes, or copper relay switches, but the sim unfolds the same way in all cases, and so if the brain sim says "I see a ripe red strawberry." In one simulation on one set of hardware, it will necessarily say the same thing in all the other sims, on all the other hardware.

So Turing emulability + computable physics, is itself a strong argument in support of multiple realizability, and against physical intrinsicism.

Jason 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAK7-onsRN0%3DK8o-YOuqYUHFF%3DRnccgXjeTY2ww%2B%2BMm4-M7ThAA%40mail.gmail.com.

[e...@disroot.org]

On Wed, 8 Oct 2025, Jason Resch wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 8, 2025, 4:15 AM efc via The Important Questions
> <the-importa...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> > What does Turing universality mean then for AI/Robot perception and
> > consciousness, when we can mathematically prove that they can't access
> > or know their fundamental reality?
>
> Good morning Jason,
>
> Is this a fact? That we can prove that software can never know their
> fundamental reality?
>
> It follows from the Church-Turing thesis. This thesis cannot be proven (only
> disproven), but it almost universally believed to be true for many reasons. It
> is also foundational to computer science as we know it.
>
> See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis
>
> For more information about it and why it is accepted, and why it is so
> important to CS.

Thank you for the information. What a shame it cannot be proven, that would
certainly settle some interesting questions!

Btw, do you know if there are any competitors? In the wikipedia article, it says
that one way of looking at it is as a definition mechanical computability. Are
there any others, that work equally well?

> If so, could you please summarize the proof?
>
> The thesis says that everything that is computable, can be computed by a
> Turing machine.

...

> For example, a PC can simulate a Mac running Safari. And likewise a Mac can
> simulate a PC running Internet explorer.
>
> When emulated in this way, Safari has no idea that it is running (ultimately)
> on a PC rather than on real Mac hardware. This is because perfect emulability
> requires the program unfold exactly as it would had it run on the original
> genuine hardware. There is no room for deviation and hence there's no room for
> that program "to tell" it's being emulated in virtual hardware (a virtual
> machine).
>
> Turing emulability means, there is no hardware, no instruction set, for which
> a VM layer could not be implemented.

Makes perfect sense to me. As I wrote to Brent, the only three exceptions I can
think of are:

* Bugs (to continue the computer analogy).
* It's not proven, maybe a disproof will be produced?
* Breaking out with help from the outside.

But neither of those seem particularly satisfying to me.

> What I find interesting here is the thought that perhaps, assuming
> materialism, and that humans are "software" running on hardware, the
> proof can be extended to us humans never being about to know our
> fundamental reality?
>
> Exactly, if one assumes functionalism/computationalism, which says that
> producing a particular conscious state is only a matter of performing the
> right computation, then the Church-Turing thesis is a way of proving Cartesian
> doubt is a real and fundamental limitation for all conscious beings.

I agree. The big "if" is functionalism/computationalism, but since you know I
like the "behavioral" proof, it does seem to me that with every step forward in
the AI-sciences, with every progress, we get closer and closer to being able to
assume that functionalism is true with a very high probability of belief.

> For computationalism means you could always exist in a computer simulation of
> your environment, and The Church-Turing thesis says we can know nothing about
> the ultimate nature of the computer on which we run.
>
> We can even extend this to further say we could not know anything about the
> physics of the universe in which that computer exists, (aside from the fact
> that the physics permits the construction of a Turing machine).

What is interesting here is to think about what it tells us about the limits of
science and empiricism, and what "weight" to give to extrapolations. "Know" vs
speculation vs belief etc. But perhaps we should not open this can of worms. ;)

> I don't know that any philosophers have seen or acknowledged this connection
> between Cartesian doubt and the Church-Turing thesis, but I think it is quite
> clear and readily provable.

Well, yes, the relations between functionalism, church-turing (_if_ proven) and
cartesian doubt seem to be fairly clear, except to the degree of nitpicking that
one is comfortable with when it comes to demanding absolute proof vs having
something that is not disproven.

Best regards,
Daniel

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Oct 8, 2025, 3:34 PM efc via The Important Questions <the-importa...@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On Wed, 8 Oct 2025, Jason Resch wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 8, 2025, 4:15 AM efc via The Important Questions
> <the-importa...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>       > What does Turing universality mean then for AI/Robot perception and
>       > consciousness, when we can mathematically prove that they can't access
>       > or know their fundamental reality?
>
>       Good morning Jason,
>
>       Is this a fact? That we can prove that software can never know their
>       fundamental reality?
>
> It follows from the Church-Turing thesis. This thesis cannot be proven (only
> disproven), but it almost universally believed to be true for many reasons. It
> is also foundational to computer science as we know it.
>
> See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis
>
> For more information about it and why it is accepted, and why it is so
> important to CS.

Thank you for the information. What a shame it cannot be proven, that would
certainly settle some interesting questions!

Btw, do you know if there are any competitors? In the wikipedia article, it says
that one way of looking at it is as a definition mechanical computability. Are
there any others, that work equally well?

There is no known more powerful model of computation beyond Turing computability. That is partly why it is believed so strongly. People have had a long time to look for and discover a more powerful model of computation, something that could compute something that Turing machines could not compute, and yet no such competitor has ever been found. Hence, why there is a lot of confidence that Turing computability is the most expensive form of computability there is.

>       If so, could you please summarize the proof?
>
> The thesis says that everything that is computable, can be computed by a
> Turing machine.
...
> For example, a PC can simulate a Mac running Safari. And likewise a Mac can
> simulate a PC running Internet explorer.
>
> When emulated in this way, Safari has no idea that it is running (ultimately)
> on a PC rather than on real Mac hardware. This is because perfect emulability
> requires the program unfold exactly as it would had it run on the original
> genuine hardware. There is no room for deviation and hence there's no room for
> that program "to tell" it's being emulated in virtual hardware (a virtual
> machine).
>
> Turing emulability means, there is no hardware, no instruction set, for which
> a VM layer could not be implemented.

Makes perfect sense to me. As I wrote to Brent, the only three exceptions I can
think of are:

* Bugs (to continue the computer analogy).

* It's not proven, maybe a disproof will be produced?

It's possible but note for this to be relevant to the argument, the conscious beings mind would have to perform a function (and one relevant to its state of consciousness) which no Turing machine can compute. In essence, the conscious being would itself have to be a kind which provides the disproof of Church-Turing universality.

* Breaking out with help from the outside.

But neither of those seem particularly satisfying to me.

Yes, while bugs, or help from outside, could clue you in to the fact that you're in a simulation, being on the outside you would still never know if you were still being deceived as to the true nature of what exists outside.

Furthermore, what you are led to believe about the greater reality outside, could also itself be part of a simulation which neither you nor your helper on the outside, know anything about:  think nested VMs, with a jailbreak attack allowing an escape only one layer out.

>       What I find interesting here is the thought that perhaps, assuming
>       materialism, and that humans are "software" running on hardware, the
>       proof can be extended to us humans never being about to know our
>       fundamental reality?
>
> Exactly, if one assumes functionalism/computationalism, which says that
> producing a particular conscious state is only a matter of performing the
> right computation, then the Church-Turing thesis is a way of proving Cartesian
> doubt is a real and fundamental limitation for all conscious beings.

I agree. The big "if" is functionalism/computationalism, but since you know I
like the "behavioral" proof, it does seem to me that with every step forward in
the AI-sciences, with every progress, we get closer and closer to being able to
assume that functionalism is true with a very high probability of belief.

Yes, and it is the leading theory in philosophy of mind. Although, I would say, functionalism being shown false, would be a surprise in philosophy of mond, but Church-Turing being false would be earth shattering in computer science.

> For computationalism means you could always exist in a computer simulation of
> your environment, and The Church-Turing thesis says we can know nothing about
> the ultimate nature of the computer on which we run.
>
> We can even extend this to further say we could not know anything about the
> physics of the universe in which that computer exists, (aside from the fact
> that the physics permits the construction of a Turing machine).

What is interesting here is to think about what it tells us about the limits of
science and empiricism, and what "weight" to give to extrapolations. "Know" vs
speculation vs belief etc. But perhaps we should not open this can of worms. ;)

;-)

> I don't know that any philosophers have seen or acknowledged this connection
> between Cartesian doubt and the Church-Turing thesis, but I think it is quite
> clear and readily provable.

Well, yes, the relations between functionalism, church-turing (_if_ proven) and
cartesian doubt seem to be fairly clear, except to the degree of nitpicking that
one is comfortable with when it comes to demanding absolute proof vs having
something that is not disproven.

Yes. I would frame it on similar terms as the consistency of set theory on which current mathematics is based. That too, is not provable. But it is strongly believed, and to an extent much stronger than say, any speculative theory in philosophy tends to be.

I think a nice philosophy paper could be published on this idea.

Jason 

Best regards,
Daniel


> Jason 
>
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>
>

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[Brent Allsop]

Hi Daniel,

We have a series of videos that hopefully will help.

https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/introduction

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[Brent Allsop]

Hi Jason,

There are two different types of 'multiple realizability': specific and arbitrary.

Arbitrary realizability is the way you can get a digital 1 from anything like "gallium, or silicon, or argon" or redness or greenness as long as you have an interpretation mechanism or dictionary to get the one from whatever physics is representing that 1.

There is also specific multiple realizability in that multiple things have the same color quality.   With specific realizability, you cann't get redness from greens.

You can't get a quality from nothing.  As I always say, give an example of how you could get or detect a quality from nothing, and I will accept your type of "functionalism" as legitimate.  You never do this because it is impossible.

Let me ask you a question, do you agree that consciousness is a detector of qualities?  If someone is representing a 1 with redness, and someone else is representing a 1 with greeness, they are not like each other, right?, even though the 1 can be multiply realized by both redness and greenness?

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CA%2BBCJUj8tcNEm385DvU-CjbDkpNMok2g1Cr%3DVFCWD-E%2BSqXw4A%40mail.gmail.com.

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Oct 9, 2025, 9:32 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

There are two different types of 'multiple realizability': specific and arbitrary.

Arbitrary realizability is the way you can get a digital 1 from anything like "gallium, or silicon, or argon" or redness or greenness as long as you have an interpretation mechanism or dictionary to get the one from whatever physics is representing that 1.

There is also specific multiple realizability in that multiple things have the same color quality.   With specific realizability, you cann't get redness from greens.

But you believe both reds and greens are fundamentally made from the same stuff: quarks and electrons.

Depending on how quarks and electrons are arranged you can either get glutamate or glycine, or any number of other molecules.

So there is a level at which you believe organization of (the same fundamental low.level stuff) is what determines whether you get redness or greenness as an emergent high level property of the quark-electron organization.

You can't get a quality from nothing.

Right there is something there that explains it, but as you show with your own beliefs, that quality can emerge from things which themselves, do not possess those qualities (only the potential to be arranged to provide such properties).

  As I always say, give an example of how you could get or detect a quality from nothing, and I will accept your type of "functionalism" as legitimate.  You never do this because it is impossible.

Not from nothing, but from a substrate, appropriately arranged and organized.

Let me ask you a question, do you agree that consciousness is a detector of qualities? 

I wouldn't say consciousness is a detector of qualities. Instead I would say a conscious state results from discrimination, relation, and comparison.

If someone is representing a 1 with redness, and someone else is representing a 1 with greeness, they are not like each other, right?, even though the 1 can be multiply realized by both redness and greenness?

If a process is able to make finer distinctions then it is able to tell the two are not identical in all respects.

Jason 

To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/the-important-questions/CAK7-onuVLLuOwViSYQjpi5927uoE2GhsM8jvetQAbC5iB7OHng%40mail.gmail.com.

[e...@disroot.org]

> Btw, do you know if there are any competitors? In the wikipedia article, it says
> that one way of looking at it is as a definition mechanical computability. Are
> there any others, that work equally well?
>
> There is no known more powerful model of computation beyond Turing
> computability. That is partly why it is believed so strongly. People have had
> a long time to look for and discover a more powerful model of computation,
> something that could compute something that Turing machines could not compute,
> and yet no such competitor has ever been found. Hence, why there is a lot of
> confidence that Turing computability is the most expensive form of
> computability there is.

Thank you. Makes perfect sense.

> > Turing emulability means, there is no hardware, no instruction set, for which
> > a VM layer could not be implemented.
>
> Makes perfect sense to me. As I wrote to Brent, the only three exceptions I can
> think of are:
>
> * Bugs (to continue the computer analogy).
>
> * It's not proven, maybe a disproof will be produced?
>
> It's possible but note for this to be relevant to the argument, the conscious
> beings mind would have to perform a function (and one relevant to its state of
> consciousness) which no Turing machine can compute. In essence, the conscious
> being would itself have to be a kind which provides the disproof of
> Church-Turing universality.

Maybe our belief in Church-Turing is what keeps us from doing it? Maybe this is
what intense spiritual phenomena is? A temporary letting go of Church-Turing
mind prison?! ;)

> * Breaking out with help from the outside.
>
> But neither of those seem particularly satisfying to me.
>
> Yes, while bugs, or help from outside, could clue you in to the fact that
> you're in a simulation, being on the outside you would still never know if you
> were still being deceived as to the true nature of what exists outside.

True, because the outside could also be a simulation, so the same challenges
would most likely occur there as well.

> Furthermore, what you are led to believe about the greater reality outside,
> could also itself be part of a simulation which neither you nor your helper on
> the outside, know anything about:  think nested VMs, with a jailbreak attack
> allowing an escape only one layer out.

Agreed!

> > Exactly, if one assumes functionalism/computationalism, which says that
> > producing a particular conscious state is only a matter of performing the
> > right computation, then the Church-Turing thesis is a way of proving Cartesian
> > doubt is a real and fundamental limitation for all conscious beings.
>
> I agree. The big "if" is functionalism/computationalism, but since you know I
> like the "behavioral" proof, it does seem to me that with every step forward in
> the AI-sciences, with every progress, we get closer and closer to being able to
> assume that functionalism is true with a very high probability of belief.
>
> Yes, and it is the leading theory in philosophy of mind. Although, I would
> say, functionalism being shown false, would be a surprise in philosophy of
> mond, but Church-Turing being false would be earth shattering in computer
> science.

I think that is the charm with philosophy of mind. There is actually a chance of
science, given enough time, clearing up some (or all) of the confusion!

> What is interesting here is to think about what it tells us about the limits of
> science and empiricism, and what "weight" to give to extrapolations. "Know" vs
> speculation vs belief etc. But perhaps we should not open this can of worms. ;)
>
> ;-)

;)

> > I don't know that any philosophers have seen or acknowledged this connection
> > between Cartesian doubt and the Church-Turing thesis, but I think it is quite
> > clear and readily provable.
>
> Well, yes, the relations between functionalism, church-turing (_if_ proven) and
> cartesian doubt seem to be fairly clear, except to the degree of nitpicking that
> one is comfortable with when it comes to demanding absolute proof vs having
> something that is not disproven.
>
> Yes. I would frame it on similar terms as the consistency of set theory on
> which current mathematics is based. That too, is not provable. But it is
> strongly believed, and to an extent much stronger than say, any speculative
> theory in philosophy tends to be.
>
> I think a nice philosophy paper could be published on this idea.

Are you thinking about accepting the challenge? I'll happily try and help you
poke holes in it to strengthen your arguments!

Best regards,
Daniel

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Jason,

On Thu, Oct 9, 2025 at 11:01 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Thu, Oct 9, 2025, 9:32 AM Brent Allsop <brent....@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi Jason,

There are two different types of 'multiple realizability': specific and arbitrary.

Arbitrary realizability is the way you can get a digital 1 from anything like "gallium, or silicon, or argon" or redness or greenness as long as you have an interpretation mechanism or dictionary to get the one from whatever physics is representing that 1.

There is also specific multiple realizability in that multiple things have the same color quality.   With specific realizability, you cann't get redness from greens.

But you believe both reds and greens are fundamentally made from the same stuff: quarks and electrons.

Depending on how quarks and electrons are arranged you can either get glutamate or glycine, or any number of other molecules.

So there is a level at which you believe organization of (the same fundamental low.level stuff) is what determines whether you get redness or greenness as an emergent high level property of the quark-electron organization.

You can't get a quality from nothing.

Right there is something there that explains it, but as you show with your own beliefs, that quality can emerge from things which themselves, do not possess those qualities (only the potential to be arranged to provide such properties).

  As I always say, give an example of how you could get or detect a quality from nothing, and I will accept your type of "functionalism" as legitimate.  You never do this because it is impossible.

Not from nothing, but from a substrate, appropriately arranged and organized.

OK, this is a powerful argument and a workable example I can accept.  But there are still some required qualifications.

It must be the specific set of quarks and electrons arranged in a specific glutamate pattern.

It is a physical fact that that particular set, arranged as glutamate, has a redness quality.

There is no way to get redness from a set of 1s and 0s (which use transducing mechanisms to achieve the substrate independence of those 1s and 0s) [at least this is my falsifiable prediction.]

In other words, while we may be in some kind of simulation (that is what consciousness is after all) the qualities themselves are a physical fact of some basement level physical reality.

 

Let me ask you a question, do you agree that consciousness is a detector of qualities? 

I wouldn't say consciousness is a detector of qualities. Instead I would say a conscious state results from discrimination, relation, and comparison.

Now we are just defining terminology.

Since R can distinguish anything A, B, and C can distinguish, you define it to be "conscious".  I do not.

R is clearly not like anything.  Its  distinguishability of knowledge is just made of abstract 1s and 0s which require transducing mechanisms from something physically distinguishable, like redness and greenness.

And this begs the question, how do you detect physical qualities?  You can't detect what they are like through cause and effect based senses.  How do you bridge the explanatory gap of consciousness?  In the functionalist world there are 'hard problems' and 'explanatory gaps', in a grounded physically real world there are no such problems.  The only problem is what has which quality, and functionalists keep taking their eye off this simple ball.

 

If someone is representing a 1 with redness, and someone else is representing a 1 with greeness, they are not like each other, right?, even though the 1 can be multiply realized by both redness and greenness?

If a process is able to make finer distinctions then it is able to tell the two are not identical in all respects.

No, these are both just single binary states.  You either have redness and greenness or you have 1 and 0.  Nothing else.

One is like something (doesn't need a dictionary), the other is specifically designed to be substrate independent via a dictionary or transducing mechanism.