functions are assigned, not intrinsic
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Gordon Swobe
Feb 17, 2025, 5:17:13 PMFeb 17
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While walking along a mountain path, you notice a stone on the ground about the size of your hand. Flat with a sharp but irregular edge, it looks like a random chip off a near-by boulder.
The stone has no intrinsic function, but you notice its sharp edge and its handy size and can see that it can function as a knife.
The stone is not a knife, but you assign that knife function to the stone.
And so it is, I say, with all functions in the world. In the case of natural objects such as our stone, the functions are assigned by intelligent minds. In the case of man-made objects, the functions are both designed and assigned by intelligent minds.
No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.
The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain. He does not see that this only shifts the problem. As the philosopher David Hume showed, those objective causal structures are themselves assigned by intelligent minds. They are functions by another name.
-gts
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
The stone has no intrinsic function, but you notice its sharp edge and its handy size and can see that it can function as a knife.
The stone is not a knife, but you assign that knife function to the stone.
And so it is, I say, with all functions in the world. In the case of natural objects such as our stone, the functions are assigned by intelligent minds. In the case of man-made objects, the functions are both designed and assigned by intelligent minds.
No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.
The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain. He does not see that this only shifts the problem. As the philosopher David Hume showed, those objective causal structures are themselves assigned by intelligent minds. They are functions by another name.
-gts
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
Jason Resch
Feb 17, 2025, 10:13:10 PMFeb 17
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Functionalism is simply the belief that the mind is a process, rather than a particular material thing.
What people chose to do or not do with their ideas about functions has no relevance to whether or not the mind is a process.
Jason
-gts
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
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Gordon Swobe
Feb 17, 2025, 10:46:39 PMFeb 17
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On Mon, Feb 17, 2025 at 8:13 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2025, 5:17 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:While walking along a mountain path, you notice a stone on the ground about the size of your hand. Flat with a sharp but irregular edge, it looks like a random chip off a near-by boulder.
The stone has no intrinsic function, but you notice its sharp edge and its handy size and can see that it can function as a knife.
The stone is not a knife, but you assign that knife function to the stone.
And so it is, I say, with all functions in the world. In the case of natural objects such as our stone, the functions are assigned by intelligent minds. In the case of man-made objects, the functions are both designed and assigned by intelligent minds.
No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.
The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain. He does not see that this only shifts the problem. As the philosopher David Hume showed, those objective causal structures are themselves assigned by intelligent minds. They are functions by another name.Functionalism is simply the belief that the mind is a process, rather than a particular material thing.What people chose to do or not do with their ideas about functions has no relevance to whether or not the mind is a process.
I see. So then if we switch some words around a bit and speak of processes, then suddenly functionalism has nothing to do with functions.
-gts
Jason----
-gts
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
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Jason Resch
Feb 17, 2025, 11:23:12 PMFeb 17
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On Mon, Feb 17, 2025, 10:46 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Feb 17, 2025 at 8:13 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Feb 17, 2025, 5:17 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:While walking along a mountain path, you notice a stone on the ground about the size of your hand. Flat with a sharp but irregular edge, it looks like a random chip off a near-by boulder.
The stone has no intrinsic function, but you notice its sharp edge and its handy size and can see that it can function as a knife.
The stone is not a knife, but you assign that knife function to the stone.
And so it is, I say, with all functions in the world. In the case of natural objects such as our stone, the functions are assigned by intelligent minds. In the case of man-made objects, the functions are both designed and assigned by intelligent minds.
No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.
The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain. He does not see that this only shifts the problem. As the philosopher David Hume showed, those objective causal structures are themselves assigned by intelligent minds. They are functions by another name.Functionalism is simply the belief that the mind is a process, rather than a particular material thing.What people chose to do or not do with their ideas about functions has no relevance to whether or not the mind is a process.I see. So then if we switch some words around a bit and speak of processes, then suddenly functionalism has nothing to do with functions.
I think you were just using a different sense of the word "function" when you spoke of rocks as knives. You are using sense #1 (purpose) whereas functionalism (in philosophy of mind) uses sense #4d: (a procedure/calculation)
noun
1. the kind of action or activity proper to a person, thing, or institution; the purpose for which something is designed or exists; role.
2. any ceremonious public or social gathering or occasion.
3. a factor related to or dependent upon other factors:
Price is a function of supply and demand.
4. Mathematics.
a) Also called correspondence, map, mapping, transformation. a relation between two sets in which one element of the second set is assigned to each element of the first set, as the expression y = x 2 ; operator.
b) Also called mul·ti·ple-val·ue func·tion [muhl, -t, uh, -p, uh, l-, val, -yoo , fuhngk, -sh, uh, n]. a relation between two sets in which two or more elements of the second set are assigned to each element of the first set, as y 2 = x 2 , which assigns to every x the two values y = + x and y = − x.
c) a set of ordered pairs in which none of the first elements of the pairs appears twice.
d) a relationship in which an input value of a variable has a specifically calculated output value: for example, if the function of x is x 2 , the output will always be the square of whatever the value of x is. : f, F
Jason
------
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
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Gordon Swobe
Feb 18, 2025, 2:15:03 PMFeb 18
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My point applies to all the connotations. These functions that you suppose to exist are not intrinsic to the objects. Like all linguistic and mathematical expressions, they are mental absractions of your own creation.
Per your preferred connotation:
“4. Mathematics.
Also called correspondence, MAP, MAPPING, transformation. a relation between two sets in which one element of the second set is ASSIGNED to each element of the first set, as the expression y = x 2 ; operator.”
Yes, and those are your mental MAPPINGS. Functions are ASSIGNED by minds.
-gts
--Jason------
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
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Jason Resch
Feb 18, 2025, 4:27:18 PMFeb 18
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You would agree, I think, that atoms are atoms whether humans believe in the idea of atoms or not, and whether they call a particular thing an atom or don't, atoms exist.
Why can this be done for atoms, but not processes? Fusion is a process occurring within the sun, whether or not we ascribe "fusionness" to the sun.
So why do you think this doesn't work for conscious processes?
Jason
---gts--Jason------
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
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Gordon Swobe
Feb 18, 2025, 6:22:45 PMFeb 18
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As I wrote in my OP, “this is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.”
By that I mean it is a problem for any functionalist claim to have an objective, naturalistic, deep explanation of how the mind works in reality.
Functionalism becomes valid only in the superficial instrumentalist sense, which is probably not the sense in which you hold it.
-gts
Gordon Swobe
Feb 18, 2025, 7:37:26 PMFeb 18
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You probably do not understand me here for the same reason you do not understand when I say that computation is observer-dependent. There is no computation in the absence of a computer operator. This has implications in the philosophy of mind.
Jason Resch
Feb 18, 2025, 7:55:59 PMFeb 18
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If you were the only conscious being in the universe would you cease to vlbe conscious because no one is there to observe you?
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Feb 19, 2025, 6:26:55 PMFeb 19
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This is not some silly riddle. It’s just a fact that some things are observer-dependent and some things are not. Mountains exist independent of an observer, as do computers considered as physical structures, but computations are relative to an observer who recognizes and understands the abstract relationships.
-gts
Jason Resch
Feb 19, 2025, 8:27:37 PMFeb 19
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If you think about my question, however, you will see the mind is a pattern that recognizes itself. It needs no external interpretation or interpreter.
So why do you think this some unique problem for functionalism but not for any other theory of consciousness?
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Feb 20, 2025, 12:25:13 AMFeb 20
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Theories that ground consciousness in intrinsic properties are immune from this criticism. Identity theory, for example. Brent’s theory is probably also immune (if I ever understand it).
Functionalism abstracts away from the substrate.
That is what gives it its supposed power (multiple realizibity, etc) but that abstraction is also its weakness.
-gts
Jason Resch
Feb 20, 2025, 7:12:25 AMFeb 20
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Functions can have instrinsic properties. E.g. Bubblesort has a runtime complexity of O(n^2), or the function that tests primarily of 17 finishes after X number of steps and returns true.
You could say the function behaves differently and enters different states when it tests a prime vs. a composite number.
It's then only one small step to say the function "detects a difference" between primes and composites and then only a smaller step further to say the function "knows a difference" -- which is to say the function has its own knowledge states, which need not be interpreted by anyone, they are intrinsic to the different processing paths and states reached by the function as it processes it's input.
If you want to see my case against intrinsicism see "Is Physicalism True" starting on page 119 of section 3.5 here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL
There are powerful arguments that explain why most philosophers of mind now accept or learn towards functionalism.
Jason
Jason Resch
Feb 20, 2025, 8:58:42 AMFeb 20
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To clarify: functionalism isn't a denial of intrinsic properties, it is only a denial of the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states.
There are of course still intrinsic properties that emerge from higher-level organizations.
Basically all this is just a question of on what level are the properties important:
1. Quantum fields
2. Subatomic particles
3. Atoms
4. Molecules
5. Biochemistry
6. Neurons
7. Neural networks
8. Psychological processes
We know, for example, that neural networks (like Turing machines) are universal in what they can compute/do. That is, they can realize any kind of behavior, function, or process. So if they are so flexible as to be able to do anything, of what relevance are properties existing at any of the layers below it? Those layers can in no way limit, restrict, or influence what the system can do, nor do they specify what the system is capable of.
Accordingly, layers that sit below the level of universality (e.g., below the level of neural networks in the brain, or below the general purpose computing hardware in a computer) can be ignored as irrelevant.
You can swap them out and maintain a universal system, still just as capable as it was before. So what importance can the properties of those layers (which can be swapped without compromising universality) have to the conscious states accessible to a mind?
Jason
Quentin Anciaux
Feb 20, 2025, 9:11:55 AMFeb 20
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Le jeu. 20 févr. 2025, 14:58, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> a écrit :
To clarify: functionalism isn't a denial of intrinsic properties, it is only a denial of the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states.There are of course still intrinsic properties that emerge from higher-level organizations.Basically all this is just a question of on what level are the properties important:1. Quantum fields2. Subatomic particles3. Atoms4. Molecules5. Biochemistry6. Neurons7. Neural networks8. Psychological processesWe know, for example, that neural networks (like Turing machines) are universal in what they can compute/do. That is, they can realize any kind of behavior, function, or process. So if they are so flexible as to be able to do anything, of what relevance are properties existing at any of the layers below it? Those layers can in no way limit, restrict, or influence what the system can do, nor do they specify what the system is capable of.Accordingly, layers that sit below the level of universality (e.g., below the level of neural networks in the brain, or below the general purpose computing hardware in a computer) can be ignored as irrelevant.You can swap them out and maintain a universal system, still just as capable as it was before. So what importance can the properties of those layers (which can be swapped without compromising universality) have to the conscious states accessible to a mind?Jason
That's what Bruno Marchal referred to as the substitution level in its Universal dovetailer argument. And by definition substitution at this level makes no changes.
Quentin
Jason Resch
Feb 20, 2025, 9:58:22 AMFeb 20
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On Thu, Feb 20, 2025, 9:11 AM Quentin Anciaux <allc...@gmail.com> wrote:
Le jeu. 20 févr. 2025, 14:58, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> a écrit :To clarify: functionalism isn't a denial of intrinsic properties, it is only a denial of the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states.There are of course still intrinsic properties that emerge from higher-level organizations.Basically all this is just a question of on what level are the properties important:1. Quantum fields2. Subatomic particles3. Atoms4. Molecules5. Biochemistry6. Neurons7. Neural networks8. Psychological processesWe know, for example, that neural networks (like Turing machines) are universal in what they can compute/do. That is, they can realize any kind of behavior, function, or process. So if they are so flexible as to be able to do anything, of what relevance are properties existing at any of the layers below it? Those layers can in no way limit, restrict, or influence what the system can do, nor do they specify what the system is capable of.Accordingly, layers that sit below the level of universality (e.g., below the level of neural networks in the brain, or below the general purpose computing hardware in a computer) can be ignored as irrelevant.You can swap them out and maintain a universal system, still just as capable as it was before. So what importance can the properties of those layers (which can be swapped without compromising universality) have to the conscious states accessible to a mind?JasonThat's what Bruno Marchal referred to as the substitution level in its Universal dovetailer argument. And by definition substitution at this level makes no changes.
But I should say, that at least in my view, the functional substitution level may exist above the level of computational universality.
For example, in some program you could imagine different functions that nevertheless are equivalent from the perspective of higher level processes operating at still higher levels, for example Quicksort or Mergesort, which are different algorithms that compute the same thing. So in this case, functional equivalence is preserved for layers higher than these low level algorithms, but these algorithms sit above the level of the universal computer.
Bruno was always adamant that the particular place at which functional substitution level exists (for realizing a particular conscious state) was unknowable. That is, we can't know exactly what computation is necessary to produce a conscious state.
E.g., is it enough to simulate the spiking neural network, or do we need to simulate the molecules, or subatomic particles, etc.?
Bruno suggested that the indeterminacy at the quantum level was evidence that one was looking "below one's functional substitution level".
I am not sure what additional light my ideas about the universal computing substrate shed on the problem. It does suggest that the material makeup of the computer is irrelevant to realizing any particular mental state, but I am not sure it can tell us how detailed the computer simulation of the brain must be.
Is it enough to preserve all self-measured states of the brain (however we define that)? Surely there is at least a limit of Heisenberg uncertainty where the brain has only a finite capacity to measure itself, and I would think this sets a limit on how much a brain can be conscious of.
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Feb 27, 2025, 2:26:33 PMFeb 27
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On Thu, Feb 20, 2025 at 6:58 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
To clarify: functionalism isn't a denial of intrinsic properties, it is only a denial of the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states.There are of course still intrinsic properties that emerge from higher-level organizations.
It looks to me like you are only redefining "intrinsic properties" to suit your purposes. To deny the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states is simply to deny that consciousness is grounded in intrinsic properties as intrinsic is meant in the criticism you are attempting to answer.
The objection here is that functional descriptions are abstractions of the theorist. You, the theorist, assign those abstractions to physical processes, in this case to physical processes in the brain. They are not intrinsic to the processes.
-gts
Jason Resch
Feb 27, 2025, 3:10:03 PMFeb 27
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On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 2:26 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Feb 20, 2025 at 6:58 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:To clarify: functionalism isn't a denial of intrinsic properties, it is only a denial of the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states.There are of course still intrinsic properties that emerge from higher-level organizations.
It looks to me like you are only redefining "intrinsic properties" to suit your purposes.
Mind-Brain Identity is a theory of consciousness that says intrinsic physical/chemical properties are important and necessary for a conscious state.
Functionalism is a theory of consciousness that says higher level intrinsic properties (of e.g., information processing systems, computational states) are important and necessary for a conscious state.
At both levels, there are intrinsic properties of the object/thing in question. Functionalism denies the importance of intrinsic physicochemical properties for consciousness, but it doesn't deny the importance of intrinsic properties generally.
To deny the relevance of intrinsic physical/chemical properties to conscious states is simply to deny that consciousness is grounded in intrinsic properties as intrinsic is meant in the criticism you are attempting to answer.
The objection here is that functional descriptions are abstractions of the theorist. You, the theorist, assign those abstractions to physical processes, in this case to physical processes in the brain. They are not intrinsic to the processes.
Consider when Putnam defined conscious states as being "the functional state of the whole organism." Does this not imply there are important (and external-observer independent) intrinsic properties of such a functional state?
Jason
Terren Suydam
Feb 27, 2025, 5:44:21 PMFeb 27
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Hi Gordon,
My first post here, so hello :-)
I would push back on the idea that functional descriptions are abstractions assigned by a theorist. I'm going to offer a counter, but using the notion of function that I believe you started with, not the notion that Jason is using in the functionalist theory of mind.
You said:
No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.
Natural evolution is a counter to your claim. Evolution creates bodies with parts that have different functions, and independently of any theorist to assign an abstraction, those functions have an intrinsic value that contributes to the fitness of an individual with that part. The long beak on a hummingbird allows it to access the nectar contained deep within the center of a flower. My describing it as such is not what gave that long beak its intrinsic value... instead, we discover the function that is intrinsic to a particular body part.
The point stands for Jason's use of "function" as well - the function of a particular algorithm, to an external observer, is something to be discovered, based on what the algorithm actually does. In a computationalist theory of mind, the algorithms that might be posited as necessary to instantiate a mind are important in terms of the functions they implement, and have an intrinsic value independently of how we might describe them.
Terren
Jason Resch
Feb 27, 2025, 6:54:44 PMFeb 27
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On Thu, Feb 27, 2025, 5:44 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Gordon,My first post here, so hello :-)
Hi Terren, welcome to the list!
I would push back on the idea that functional descriptions are abstractions assigned by a theorist. I'm going to offer a counter, but using the notion of function that I believe you started with, not the notion that Jason is using in the functionalist theory of mind.You said:No functions exist outside of the minds that assign them. This is a problem for functionalists in the philosophy of mind if they want to say their philosophy is anything more than a useful fiction.Natural evolution is a counter to your claim. Evolution creates bodies with parts that have different functions, and independently of any theorist to assign an abstraction, those functions have an intrinsic value that contributes to the fitness of an individual with that part. The long beak on a hummingbird allows it to access the nectar contained deep within the center of a flower. My describing it as such is not what gave that long beak its intrinsic value... instead, we discover the function that is intrinsic to a particular body part.
Thanks for making clear the two different senses of the word function that we were confusedly using in the same thread. I like your example of natural selection. I sometimes bring up the example of the 17-year cicada as evidence of the inherent truth and relations of numbers (e.g., in this case, primality) were consequential in nature long before human mathematicians ever (re)discovered, defined, or thought about those concepts.
Jason
Brent Allsop
Feb 27, 2025, 10:58:10 PMFeb 27
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Hi Terrren,
Yea, welcome. Great post, and I agree.
Gordon Swobe
Feb 28, 2025, 2:32:55 PMFeb 28
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On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 1:10 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Functionalism denies the importance of intrinsic physicochemical properties for consciousness, but it doesn't deny the importance of intrinsic properties generally.
It denies what I mean here by intrinsic properties. To deny the importance of physicochemical properties is to deny the importance of intrinsic properties. The functionalist does this willingly and even proudly as it is on this basis that he can theorize about multiple realizability. It is by denying the importance of intrinsic properties that he can speculate about such things as conscious computers.
Consider when Putnam defined conscious states as being "the functional state of the whole organism." Does this not imply there are important (and external-observer independent) intrinsic properties of such a functional state?
Like all functionalists, Putnam is a theorist/philosopher who wants his readers to assign that functionalist framework -- that functionalist way of seeing reality and the mind -- to objective reality.
"Dear reader," says Putnam to us between the lines. "I am a functionalist in the philosophy of mind. I want you to also adopt this way of seeing reality and the mind, and here are my reasons why I think you should follow me."
That is fine, but nobody ever cracked open a skull and found a "functional state." They are abstractions of the theorist.
-gts
Jason
-gtsJason-gtsJason-gtsJason-gtsJason
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
Jason Resch
Feb 28, 2025, 3:30:51 PMFeb 28
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On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 2:32 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 1:10 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:Functionalism denies the importance of intrinsic physicochemical properties for consciousness, but it doesn't deny the importance of intrinsic properties generally.
It denies what I mean here by intrinsic properties. To deny the importance of physicochemical properties is to deny the importance of intrinsic properties.
Why can't it deny the importance of intrinsic physicochemical properties, while keeping the importance of intrinsic functional properties?
The functionalist does this willingly and even proudly as it is on this basis that he can theorize about multiple realizability.
Denies the relevance of physicochemical properties, yes.
It is by denying the importance of intrinsic properties
Of intrinsic physicochemical properties. Not of properties generally. I think this is the important point of contention for us.
that he can speculate about such things as conscious computers.
Consider when Putnam defined conscious states as being "the functional state of the whole organism." Does this not imply there are important (and external-observer independent) intrinsic properties of such a functional state?
Like all functionalists, Putnam is a theorist/philosopher who wants his readers to assign that functionalist framework -- that functionalist way of seeing reality and the mind -- to objective reality.
"Dear reader," says Putnam to us between the lines. "I am a functionalist in the philosophy of mind. I want you to also adopt this way of seeing reality and the mind, and here are my reasons why I think you should follow me."
And there are powerful reasons for adopting the functionalist philosophy. See this section for the thought experiments that got us here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y75Fx_Vd4FeNXj6AOE0sS4CdssLpULQx/view?usp=sharing
Or the more concise tetralemma at the beginning of this section: https://drive.google.com/file/d/195RNlMKZd5ayWwTd45M48sfhonDEyRZQ/view?usp=sharing
The tetralemma is as follows. Either:
1. No computer program can emulate the human brain.
2. An emulation is possible, but it wouldn’t be conscious.
3. It would be conscious, but not in the same way. Or,
4. It would be conscious in exactly the same way.
1. No computer program can emulate the human brain.
2. An emulation is possible, but it wouldn’t be conscious.
3. It would be conscious, but not in the same way. Or,
4. It would be conscious in exactly the same way.
We reject #1 due to the computability of all known physical laws and the Church Turing Thesis.
We reject #2 because to believe otherwise, is to accept the logical consistency and possibility of philosophical zombies and fading qualia.
We reject #3 because to believe otherwise, is to accept dancing qualia, and an inverted spectrum during a hemispheric visual cortex replacement.
Consider what happens if we replace the visual cortex with non-biological neurons made of some other physical or chemical material. The non-functionalists would posit that this would necessarily mess up the consciousness, creating someone who is blind in one half of the visual field, or who sees colors in a different way in one half of the visual field. But now think one step deeper, how does this person react to such a change?
There are only three possibilities:
1. The qualia change, and that change can be expressed
2. The qualia change, but that change cannot be expressed
3. The qualia do not change
1. The qualia change, and that change can be expressed
2. The qualia change, but that change cannot be expressed
3. The qualia do not change
We know no change can be expressed, because it is a functional duplicate. It also seems extremely bizarre for there to be a huge change to someone's qualia and experience, which they don't seem to notice, don't report on, don't express shock or dysfunction with, and so on. If you reject "a change unexpressed" then we are left with full preservation of qualia.
"It would seem, then, that the only proper
intrinsicist version of the story would have to be ‘A
Change Unexpressed’. In this I am supposed to be
speaking, thinking and behaving as though my
vision on the right side were fine even though it is
intrinsicist version of the story would have to be ‘A
Change Unexpressed’. In this I am supposed to be
speaking, thinking and behaving as though my
vision on the right side were fine even though it is
actually all screwy on account of the replacement.
But if my vision were so messed up, it would be
impossible for me to carry on just as I would if I saw
everything as usual on both sides of my field of
vision. I'd be bumping into things on the right and
pleading for help from the doctors. No. The only
coherent way for all the speech, behaviour and
thought of normal vision to have been preserved
with the replacement would be for all the
experience on which these were based to have been
preserved as well. So functioning preserves the
phenomenal and functionalism is right."
— Arnold Zuboff in "Thoughts about a Solution to the Mind-
Body Problem" (2008)
But if my vision were so messed up, it would be
impossible for me to carry on just as I would if I saw
everything as usual on both sides of my field of
vision. I'd be bumping into things on the right and
pleading for help from the doctors. No. The only
coherent way for all the speech, behaviour and
thought of normal vision to have been preserved
with the replacement would be for all the
experience on which these were based to have been
preserved as well. So functioning preserves the
phenomenal and functionalism is right."
— Arnold Zuboff in "Thoughts about a Solution to the Mind-
Body Problem" (2008)
This leaves us with only one option, a functional substitution must be conscious in exactly the same way.
"While both total absence and total inversion of
qualia without functional implications seem
possible, such a possibility would require that qualia
depended on non-functional properties—those that
could be absent or systematically inverted while the
functional properties stayed the same.
qualia without functional implications seem
possible, such a possibility would require that qualia
depended on non-functional properties—those that
could be absent or systematically inverted while the
functional properties stayed the same.
And this in turn would require that there be
possible also partial absences and partial inversions,
systematic or haphazard, of such properties (and
therein of qualia) without functional implications,
which is clearly absurd. The only way of avoiding
that clear absurdity is to accept functionalism as the
full account of not just the presence but also the
character of qualia."
possible also partial absences and partial inversions,
systematic or haphazard, of such properties (and
therein of qualia) without functional implications,
which is clearly absurd. The only way of avoiding
that clear absurdity is to accept functionalism as the
full account of not just the presence but also the
character of qualia."
— Arnold Zuboff in "Shoemaker's Odd Mistake" (2011)
"It is therefore extremely implausible that absent
qualia and inverted qualia are possible. It follows
that we have good reason to believe that the
principle of organizational invariance is true, and
that functional organization fully determines
conscious experience."
qualia and inverted qualia are possible. It follows
that we have good reason to believe that the
principle of organizational invariance is true, and
that functional organization fully determines
conscious experience."
-- David Chalmersin "The Conscious Mind" (1996)
You say functionalism, for some reason, uniquely requires an outside observer, where no other theories of consciousness have this requirement, but I find this unconvincing. The mind is its own interpreter. And moreover, functional states have intrinsic properties, including those we would associate most closely with consciousness, such as knowledge states, counterfactuals, changes in processing, etc. And some even have states which are unknowable by third-person observers, such as this paper argues: https://archive.is/rDP33
That is fine, but nobody ever cracked open a skull and found a "functional state." They are abstractions of the theorist.
According to functionalism, the mind is also a process, not a thing, which further contributes to the reasons "conscious" can't be found, seen, or held.
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Feb 28, 2025, 3:33:29 PMFeb 28
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:44 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Gordon,My first post here, so hello :-)
Welcome, Terren!
Natural evolution is a counter to your claim. Evolution creates bodies with parts that have different functions, and independently of any theorist to assign an abstraction, those functions have an intrinsic value that contributes to the fitness of an individual with that part. The long beak on a hummingbird allows it to access the nectar contained deep within the center of a flower. My describing it as such is not what gave that long beak its intrinsic value... instead, we discover the function that is intrinsic to a particular body part.
This is how I expected the discussion to go and why I included the last paragraph in my first post.
I wrote: The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain.
You argue, understandably, that we do not assign but rather discover the "intrinsic function" of the hummingbird's beak. You write of the beak's "intrinsic value" in allowing the bird to access nectar.
I am saying that 1) yes, we discover the beak and its activity but then 2) we assign any possible function or value to the beak and its activity.
It so happens that we assign value to life, including to the lives of hummingbirds, and we can see that the beak has value to us in so much as it supports the bird's life, and so we assign it that function.
-gts
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 2:26 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
-gtsJason-gtsJason-gtsJason-gtsJason
This is a problem in the functionalist philosophy of mind as it suggests
Terren Suydam
Feb 28, 2025, 5:10:30 PMFeb 28
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 3:33 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:44 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:Hi Gordon,My first post here, so hello :-)Welcome, Terren!Natural evolution is a counter to your claim. Evolution creates bodies with parts that have different functions, and independently of any theorist to assign an abstraction, those functions have an intrinsic value that contributes to the fitness of an individual with that part. The long beak on a hummingbird allows it to access the nectar contained deep within the center of a flower. My describing it as such is not what gave that long beak its intrinsic value... instead, we discover the function that is intrinsic to a particular body part.
This is how I expected the discussion to go and why I included the last paragraph in my first post.
I wrote: The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain.
You argue, understandably, that we do not assign but rather discover the "intrinsic function" of the hummingbird's beak. You write of the beak's "intrinsic value" in allowing the bird to access nectar.
I am saying that 1) yes, we discover the beak and its activity but then 2) we assign any possible function or value to the beak and its activity.
It so happens that we assign value to life, including to the lives of hummingbirds, and we can see that the beak has value to us in so much as it supports the bird's life, and so we assign it that function.
-gts
I'm saying that beyond whatever magic the observer bestows on the hummingbird's beak by way of describing its function, the hummingbird nonetheless uses its beak to survive. And independent of any value I might put on that hummingbird's life, that hummingbird lives or dies based on having a beak that allows it to get nourishment from its environment.
In light of that, the only way I can make sense of your claim that functional properties are not intrinsic, is to say something like "The function of a hummingbird's beak is not intrinsic, but assigned by Evolution," because hummingbirds without functional beaks die. We can imagine all sorts of undiscovered species in undiscovered environments that have functional adaptations that allow them to survive. Those functional adaptations have value in a way that is not assigned by us, but assigned by Evolution in the sense that if something doesn't exist, it has no intrinsic anything.
At the end of the day, if some object has a property (e.g. a beak of a certain shape), and that property were to be removed from that object (beak gets shortened), and the removal of that property would cause the object to no longer exist (hummingbird starves and dies), then I would call that an intrinsic property.
Terren
Jason Resch
Mar 1, 2025, 8:28:20 AMMar 1
to The Important Questions
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025, 2:32 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 1:10 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:Functionalism denies the importance of intrinsic physicochemical properties for consciousness, but it doesn't deny the importance of intrinsic properties generally.
It denies what I mean here by intrinsic properties. To deny the importance of physicochemical properties is to deny the importance of intrinsic properties. The functionalist does this willingly and even proudly as it is on this basis that he can theorize about multiple realizability. It is by denying the importance of intrinsic properties that he can speculate about such things as conscious computers.
Here is another angle to consider. The intrincist believes that chemical properties unique to molecules may be important to conscious states. But note that all chemicals, all molecules, are simply higher-level aggregations of quarks and electrons.
But if one can admit and accept that molecules have distinct and unique intrinsicist properties that go beyond the intrinsic properties of quarks and electrons, then this is a tacit admission that higher level aggregates can yield new and distinct intrinsic properties, properties that were not present in the individual parts.
This is the central claim of emergentism. If you accept this (that chemicals have intrinsic properties not present in quarks) then we should also accept that living beings have properties not found in molecules (like being alive), and brains have properties not found in neurons (like emotions and personality).
Might consciousness be a higher level emergent state?
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Mar 15, 2025, 5:40:50 PMMar 15
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 3:10 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 3:33 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:44 PM Terren Suydam <terren...@gmail.com> wrote:Hi Gordon,My first post here, so hello :-)Welcome, Terren!Natural evolution is a counter to your claim. Evolution creates bodies with parts that have different functions, and independently of any theorist to assign an abstraction, those functions have an intrinsic value that contributes to the fitness of an individual with that part. The long beak on a hummingbird allows it to access the nectar contained deep within the center of a flower. My describing it as such is not what gave that long beak its intrinsic value... instead, we discover the function that is intrinsic to a particular body part.
This is how I expected the discussion to go and why I included the last paragraph in my first post.
I wrote: The functionalist might respond that even while it is true that functions are assigned by minds, some of those functions are valid in so much they point to objective causal structures in the world and in the brain.
You argue, understandably, that we do not assign but rather discover the "intrinsic function" of the hummingbird's beak. You write of the beak's "intrinsic value" in allowing the bird to access nectar.
I am saying that 1) yes, we discover the beak and its activity but then 2) we assign any possible function or value to the beak and its activity.
It so happens that we assign value to life, including to the lives of hummingbirds, and we can see that the beak has value to us in so much as it supports the bird's life, and so we assign it that function.
-gtsI'm saying that beyond whatever magic the observer bestows on the hummingbird's beak by way of describing its function, the hummingbird nonetheless uses its beak to survive. And independent of any value I might put on that hummingbird's life, that hummingbird lives or dies based on having a beak that allows it to get nourishment from its environment.
Yes, the beak facilitates the bird's survival, as it allows it to get nourishment from its environment, but these are only other ways of saying that the beak supports the bird's life. We assign value to the bird's life, and so we assign that function to the beak. We likewise assign functions to whatever the bird consumes, calling it "nourishment," because it supports the life of the bird that we recognize and value.
In light of that, the only way I can make sense of your claim that functional properties are not intrinsic, is to say something like "The function of a hummingbird's beak is not intrinsic, but assigned by Evolution," because hummingbirds without functional beaks die.
We can say that Evolution assigns the function, but here we are anthropomorphizing. Perhaps that is why you capitalize the word.
In itself, evolution is a blind process with no purpose.
We can imagine all sorts of undiscovered species in undiscovered environments that have functional adaptations that allow them to survive. Those functional adaptations have value in a way that is not assigned by us, but assigned by Evolution in the sense that if something doesn't exist, it has no intrinsic anything.At the end of the day, if some object has a property (e.g. a beak of a certain shape), and that property were to be removed from that object (beak gets shortened), and the removal of that property would cause the object to no longer exist (hummingbird starves and dies), then I would call that an intrinsic property.
That's right; you would call that an "intrinsic" property. You make that assignment.
-gts
Terren Suydam
Mar 19, 2025, 11:06:10 PMMar 19
to the-importa...@googlegroups.com
On Sat, Mar 15, 2025 at 5:40 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
I'm saying that beyond whatever magic the observer bestows on the hummingbird's beak by way of describing its function, the hummingbird nonetheless uses its beak to survive. And independent of any value I might put on that hummingbird's life, that hummingbird lives or dies based on having a beak that allows it to get nourishment from its environment.
Yes, the beak facilitates the bird's survival, as it allows it to get nourishment from its environment, but these are only other ways of saying that the beak supports the bird's life. We assign value to the bird's life, and so we assign that function to the beak. We likewise assign functions to whatever the bird consumes, calling it "nourishment," because it supports the life of the bird that we recognize and value.
But the bird would have no value at all otherwise, because it wouldn't exist.
In light of that, the only way I can make sense of your claim that functional properties are not intrinsic, is to say something like "The function of a hummingbird's beak is not intrinsic, but assigned by Evolution," because hummingbirds without functional beaks die.
We can say that Evolution assigns the function, but here we are anthropomorphizing. Perhaps that is why you capitalize the word.
No, see my point above. It's not about the value I myself put on life. It's about the function and the thing going together, about the fact that in a particular environment, if it weren't for the function it wouldn't be a thing.
In itself, evolution is a blind process with no purpose.
yes
Terren
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