Bridging the Explanatory Gap
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Jason Resch
Aug 6, 2025, 2:30:28 PMAug 6
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David Chalmers famously asked:
"Why is it the case that information processing is accompanied by subjective experience?"
I earlier shared the beginning of my answer to this on this list, with a section on "Where is Consciousness?" I have now added a section (starting on page 23) which addresses the question of "Why", i.e. "Why must consciousness appear at all?" in certain information processing:
Any comments, questions, critiques, are welcome.
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Aug 11, 2025, 11:26:55 AMAug 11
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You might to include a section about the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) for bridging the explanatory gap as discussed in my thread about the subject.
In my research, Grok named about six philosophers who employ this idea of phenomenal concepts. At least three of them including Frank Jackson argue that the explanatory gap is epistemic, not ontological. If they are correct, the mystery is solved.
-gts
--Jason
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Gordon Swobe
Aug 11, 2025, 12:12:58 PMAug 11
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The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is a philosophical approach primarily used by physicalists in the philosophy of mind to address anti-physicalist arguments, including the explanatory gap, the knowledge argument (e.g., Jackson’s Mary thought experiment), and the conceivability of philosophical zombies.
0
The explanatory gap, first articulated by Joseph Levine, refers to the apparent difficulty in explaining how or why objective physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective phenomenal experiences (qualia), such as the redness of red or the pain of a headache—even if we had a complete physical description of the brain.
5
PCS, a term coined by Daniel Stoljar, does not deny the existence of this gap but relocates it as an epistemic (knowledge-related) issue rather than an ontological (reality-related) one. 1 In other words, the strategy holds that the gap arises from the distinctive nature of phenomenal concepts—our first-person concepts for thinking about conscious experiences—rather than from any fundamental divide between physical processes and consciousness itself. 0 Proponents, often type-B materialists like Brian Loar, David Papineau, and others, argue that phenomenal properties are identical to physical properties, but our dualistic way of conceptualizing them creates the illusion of inexplicability. 9
Key Features of Phenomenal Concepts
Phenomenal concepts are characterized as psychologically special in ways that distinguish them from ordinary physical or functional concepts: 1
Recognitional or demonstrative: They often function like “this feeling” or “that sensation,” directly picking out experiences through introspection without relying on theoretical descriptions (e.g., unlike describing pain in terms of C-fiber firing). 7
Non-inferential and direct: We apply them based on having the experience itself, not through deduction from physical facts. 12
Quotational or encapsulating: Some accounts (e.g., Papineau’s) suggest they “quote” or incorporate the experience, making them opaque to physical explanations. 14
Because of these features, there is no a priori (necessary, knowable in advance) connection between physical concepts (e.g., neural activations) and phenomenal concepts (e.g., the felt quality of pain). This lack of entailment explains why we can conceive of zombies—creatures physically identical to us but lacking phenomenal experience—or why Mary, who knows all physical facts about color but has never seen red, seems to learn something new upon seeing it: she acquires a new phenomenal concept, not a new non-physical fact. 6
How PCS Addresses the Explanatory Gap
The strategy defuses the gap by arguing that it is predictable and non-threatening to physicalism: 1
If phenomenal concepts are isolated from physical ones in our cognitive architecture, then even a complete physical theory won’t “explain” consciousness in phenomenal terms, but this is a conceptual artifact, not evidence of dualism. 0
It parallels other cases of conceptual dualism without ontological dualism, like the concepts of “water” (everyday) versus “H₂O” (scientific): we once couldn’t a priori derive one from the other, but they refer to the same thing. 6
Critics like David Chalmers argue that PCS faces a dilemma (the “master argument”): either phenomenal concepts themselves can’t be physically explained, reopening the gap, or they don’t adequately account for our epistemic situation regarding consciousness. 4 Defenders counter that the strategy can be refined to avoid this, emphasizing that the specialness of phenomenal concepts is itself physically grounded. 11
Overall, PCS aims to preserve physicalism by showing that the explanatory gap reflects limitations in our conceptual framework, not a flaw in reality. 3
Jason Resch
Aug 11, 2025, 12:14:04 PMAug 11
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On Mon, Aug 11, 2025 at 11:26 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 12:30 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:David Chalmers famously asked:"Why is it the case that information processing is accompanied by subjective experience?"I earlier shared the beginning of my answer to this on this list, with a section on "Where is Consciousness?" I have now added a section (starting on page 23) which addresses the question of "Why", i.e. "Why must consciousness appear at all?" in certain information processing:Any comments, questions, critiques, are welcome.You might to include a section about the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) for bridging the explanatory gap as discussed in my thread about the subject.In my research, Grok named about six philosophers who employ this idea of phenomenal concepts. At least three of them including Frank Jackson argue that the explanatory gap is epistemic, not ontological. If they are correct, the mystery is solved.
If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations, but in particular they are due to the fact that any subjective experience is from the vantage point of a particular conscious state (the one they happen to be in at that time. This state cannot be escaped. I will read more about Chalmer's definition and if it fits, I agree it would be a great thing to cite.
Jason
----Jason
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Gordon Swobe
Aug 11, 2025, 10:16:07 PMAug 11
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If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.
-gts
--, but in particular they are due to the fact that any subjective experience is from the vantage point of a particular conscious state (the one they happen to be in at that time. This state cannot be escaped. I will read more about Chalmer's definition and if it fits, I agree it would be a great thing to cite.Jason----Jason
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Jason Resch
Aug 12, 2025, 8:09:42 AMAug 12
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On Mon, Aug 11, 2025, 10:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.
I would agree we have two ways of understanding water (or other objects of experience).
But I disagree that the problem is illusory. While a proposition understanding of another's brain can predict everything it will do an say, that understanding won't reveal what it's like to be that brain. To know that, you must modify your own brain to be like that brain in question.
So in my view, this is a genuine and insurmountable problem.
Jason
--
--, but in particular they are due to the fact that any subjective experience is from the vantage point of a particular conscious state (the one they happen to be in at that time. This state cannot be escaped. I will read more about Chalmer's definition and if it fits, I agree it would be a great thing to cite.Jason----Jason
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Gordon Swobe
Aug 12, 2025, 10:49:15 AMAug 12
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On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 6:09 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Aug 11, 2025, 10:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.I would agree we have two ways of understanding water (or other objects of experience).But I disagree that the problem is illusory.
While a proposition understanding of another's brain can predict everything it will do an say, that understanding won't reveal what it's like to be that brain. To know that, you must modify your own brain to be like that brain in question.
Of course. Nobody is claiming magic telepathic powers to see through the eyes or read the mind of another person.
The phrase “what it’s like” (made famous by Nagel and that we use so often) is only an informal way of speaking about phenomenal concepts.
When Mary sees red for the first time, she does not acquire knowledge of a new physical fact. She already knows all the facts, so what does she acquire? On this view, she acquires a new phenomenal concept about an existing physical fact. She now has both propositional and phenomenal concepts about the red strawberry.
-gts
--So in my view, this is a genuine and insurmountable problem.Jason--
--, but in particular they are due to the fact that any subjective experience is from the vantage point of a particular conscious state (the one they happen to be in at that time. This state cannot be escaped. I will read more about Chalmer's definition and if it fits, I agree it would be a great thing to cite.Jason----Jason
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Jason Resch
Aug 12, 2025, 3:14:59 PMAug 12
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On Tue, Aug 12, 2025, 10:49 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 6:09 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Aug 11, 2025, 10:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.I would agree we have two ways of understanding water (or other objects of experience).But I disagree that the problem is illusory.While a proposition understanding of another's brain can predict everything it will do an say, that understanding won't reveal what it's like to be that brain. To know that, you must modify your own brain to be like that brain in question.Of course. Nobody is claiming magic telepathic powers to see through the eyes or read the mind of another person.The phrase “what it’s like” (made famous by Nagel and that we use so often) is only an informal way of speaking about phenomenal concepts.When Mary sees red for the first time, she does not acquire knowledge of a new physical fact. She already knows all the facts, so what does she acquire? On this view, she acquires a new phenomenal concept about an existing physical fact. She now has both propositional and phenomenal concepts about the red strawberry.
But why not simply use "experience" in place of "phenomenal concept"? I guess I am not seeing what this new terminology buys you.
Also I don't think red in any way reduces to physical facts. According to functionalism, a red experience could exist in an entirely different universe with an entirely different physics.
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Aug 12, 2025, 5:19:08 PMAug 12
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On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2025, 10:49 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 6:09 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Aug 11, 2025, 10:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.I would agree we have two ways of understanding water (or other objects of experience).But I disagree that the problem is illusory.While a proposition understanding of another's brain can predict everything it will do an say, that understanding won't reveal what it's like to be that brain. To know that, you must modify your own brain to be like that brain in question.Of course. Nobody is claiming magic telepathic powers to see through the eyes or read the mind of another person.The phrase “what it’s like” (made famous by Nagel and that we use so often) is only an informal way of speaking about phenomenal concepts.When Mary sees red for the first time, she does not acquire knowledge of a new physical fact. She already knows all the facts, so what does she acquire? On this view, she acquires a new phenomenal concept about an existing physical fact. She now has both propositional and phenomenal concepts about the red strawberry.But why not simply use "experience" in place of "phenomenal concept"? I guess I am not seeing what this new terminology buys you.
Good question. Had you asked me a few weeks ago about Mary (you probably have at some time in the past) I would have replied like a good property dualist that Mary learns new non-physical facts. I was giving my “experiential knowledge” special status, as if it were a primitive and completely different from my intellectual, propositional knowledge.
I now see how it is true (or at least could be true) that my phenomenal concepts have the same conceptual status as my propositional concepts. We do not know of our experience except as our concepts of it.
This is to say that qualia are not spooky non-physical facts in the world in need of an explanation. They are our phenomenal concepts about physical facts in the world.
Also I don't think red in any way reduces to physical facts. According to functionalism, a red experience could exist in an entirely different universe with an entirely different physics.
A question on my mind is about whether it is even possible for a functionalist to reject the later Jackson’s pro-physicalist argument. Chalmers doesn’t totally buy it, but this only helps explain why he is a property dualist.
-gts
Gordon Swobe
Aug 13, 2025, 12:33:02 PMAug 13
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On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
Also I don't think red in any way reduces to physical facts.
If you mean that Mary cannot see the color of red from knowing all the scientific facts then I agree. Jackson never recanted this aspect of his Knowledge Argument.
According to functionalism, a red experience could exist in an entirely different universe with an entirely different physics.
The Mary thought experiment should work in any universe with any kind of physics and any kind of conscious experience. It makes no difference that some other physics might result in the same experience.
Mary will feel surprised about quale X when she first experiences it, but does this mean she learned some new non-physical about the world? Does quale X have some different ontology such that dualism is true?”
“No,” says the later Jackson. “She is only seeing the physics in a different way, via a different mode of presentation.”
-gts
Jason-gts
,
Jason Resch
Aug 13, 2025, 2:31:57 PMAug 13
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 12:33 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:Also I don't think red in any way reduces to physical facts.If you mean that Mary cannot see the color of red from knowing all the scientific facts then I agree. Jackson never recanted this aspect of his Knowledge Argument.
I agree with that, but that wasn't quite my point, but I think you see it below:
According to functionalism, a red experience could exist in an entirely different universe with an entirely different physics.The Mary thought experiment should work in any universe with any kind of physics and any kind of conscious experience. It makes no difference that some other physics might result in the same experience.
I see that conclusion as a rejection of physicalism (at least insofar as establishing the correct philosophy of mind), at least, a rejection of any reductionist form of physicalism.
Mary will feel surprised about quale X when she first experiences it, but does this mean she learned some new non-physical about the world? Does quale X have some different ontology such that dualism is true?”“No,” says the later Jackson. “She is only seeing the physics in a different way, via a different mode of presentation.”
I would rather reverse the whole picture. She is never seeing the physical universe from an objective, perfect, God's eye view. She is only ever experiencing her conscious experiences. Her conceptual understanding of the physical universe is itself a particular kind of quale and conscious experience (a more conceptual kind). But thoughts too, as you've said before, (like thinking of Vienna) are themselves particular kinds of qualia.
Jason
,
--
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Jason Resch
Aug 13, 2025, 2:40:36 PMAug 13
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On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 5:19 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tue, Aug 12, 2025, 10:49 AM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 6:09 AM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:On Mon, Aug 11, 2025, 10:16 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:If it boils down to what can be known (epistemic) vs. what exists (ontologic) then I agree the gap is due to knowledge limitations...
Yes that is what the words mean, but it's not about limitations. The gap, on this account, is a sort of illusion. We feel like a gap exists between the subjective and the objective because we format our concepts in two ways: propositionally and phenomenologically. We have a propositional concept of water as H2O and we have phenomenal concepts of water (it feels wet, cold when frozen, etc, etc).
These concepts are about the same physical fact (water), preserving physicalism. We just know about water in more than one way.I would agree we have two ways of understanding water (or other objects of experience).But I disagree that the problem is illusory.While a proposition understanding of another's brain can predict everything it will do an say, that understanding won't reveal what it's like to be that brain. To know that, you must modify your own brain to be like that brain in question.Of course. Nobody is claiming magic telepathic powers to see through the eyes or read the mind of another person.The phrase “what it’s like” (made famous by Nagel and that we use so often) is only an informal way of speaking about phenomenal concepts.When Mary sees red for the first time, she does not acquire knowledge of a new physical fact. She already knows all the facts, so what does she acquire? On this view, she acquires a new phenomenal concept about an existing physical fact. She now has both propositional and phenomenal concepts about the red strawberry.But why not simply use "experience" in place of "phenomenal concept"? I guess I am not seeing what this new terminology buys you.Good question. Had you asked me a few weeks ago about Mary (you probably have at some time in the past) I would have replied like a good property dualist that Mary learns new non-physical facts. I was giving my “experiential knowledge” special status, as if it were a primitive and completely different from my intellectual, propositional knowledge.I now see how it is true (or at least could be true) that my phenomenal concepts have the same conceptual status as my propositional concepts. We do not know of our experience except as our concepts of it.
I would say, on the other hand, that we don't know concepts except as our experiences of thinking about them.
This is to say that qualia are not spooky non-physical facts in the world in need of an explanation. They are our phenomenal concepts about physical facts in the world.Also I don't think red in any way reduces to physical facts. According to functionalism, a red experience could exist in an entirely different universe with an entirely different physics.A question on my mind is about whether it is even possible for a functionalist to reject the later Jackson’s pro-physicalist argument. Chalmers doesn’t totally buy it, but this only helps explain why he is a property dualist.
I'm not well enough acquainted with Jackson's position to say whether or not a functionalist would accept or reject it.
For what it's worth, my own understanding of conscious can be seen as a sort of combination between three mutually consistent views, of non-reductionist physicalism, functionalism, and neutral monism.
For further details see: https://drive.google.com/file/d/11-fcvG1TiuHcS9bDCN05UQJyYY6Dl0LY/view?usp=sharing (in particular pages 76-77) on which I conclude:
"We have arrived at a final picture in our understanding of consciousness.
The correct theory of consciousness appears to exist in theintersection of mechanism, physicalism, and neutralmonism. Mechanism is true, because computation is whatdetermines states of consciousness. Physicalism is true,because minds are beholden to laws governing the worldsthat contain them. Neutral Monism is true, because bothmind and matter emerge from a more fundamental,mathematical or computational reality."
Jason
Gordon Swobe
Aug 13, 2025, 3:17:07 PMAug 13
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 12:31 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 12:33 PM Gordon Swobe <gordon...@gmail.com> wrote:On Tue, Aug 12, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
The Mary thought experiment should work in any universe with any kind of physics and any kind of conscious experience. It makes no difference that some other physics might result in the same experience.I see that conclusion as a rejection of physicalism (at least insofar as establishing the correct philosophy of mind), at least, a rejection of any reductionist form of physicalism.
How does it reject physicalism? This was your opening to say “Ah, so then Jackson’s defense of physicalism is not an affront to functionalism.”
As I wrote in my previous, I am wondering how any functionalist can reject the later Jackson’s pro-physicalist argument. You have yourself in the past cited Jackson’s reversal on his own knowledge argument in defense of functionalism.
Mary will feel surprised about quale X when she first experiences it, but does this mean she learned some new non-physical about the world? Does quale X have some different ontology such that dualism is true?”“No,” says the later Jackson. “She is only seeing the physics in a different way, via a different mode of presentation.”I would rather reverse the whole picture. She is never seeing the physical universe from an objective, perfect, God's eye view.
Nobody is claiming a God’s eye view. You are adding that to the picture.
It is, however, my contention (along with pretty much everyone on earth!) that our conscious experiences tell us something about the world.
She is only ever experiencing her conscious experiences. Her conceptual understanding of the physical universe is itself a particular kind of quale and conscious experience (a more conceptual kind). But thoughts too, as you've said before, (like thinking of Vienna) are themselves particular kinds of qualia.
Sure, thoughts (propositional concepts) are also a kind of quale. This should make phenomenal concepts even easier to understand.
Our understanding of the world involves both propositional and phenomenal concepts.
Reality, what a concept!
-gts
--Jason--
,
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Gordon Swobe
Aug 13, 2025, 3:57:56 PMAug 13
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On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 12:40 PM Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com> wrote:
I'm not well enough acquainted with Jackson's position to say whether or not a functionalist would accept or reject it.
Don’t let the term “phenomenal concepts” be an obstacle to your understanding. As you pointed out, Jackson did not coin the term. Think of it as another term for qualia. I prefer it here because it makes clear that qualia are concepts.
We look at the physical world with our intellects and form propositional concepts about it. We also look at the physical world with our senses and form phenomenal concepts about it. It’s the same physical world in both cases.
-gts
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