Corruption and the Limits of Electoral Accountability

[Everton Zanella Alvarenga]

Interesting new paper looking at electoral accountability in 74 countries

Corruption and Accountability: “Throwing the Bums Out” Does Not Work.

By Crisp, Potter, Olivella and Mishler (November 2012)

Abstract

Many theories of democracy stress the concept of accountability.
Voters reward or punish elected o cials by extending or ending their
political careers. Seeking the long-term reward of reelection,
officials avoid the short-term benefits of corruption that would put
them at risk of early electoral defeat. This good behavior, in turn,
leads to voter loyalty and reelection. Previous studies of electoral
volatility and political corruption, however, have not tested this
reciprocal relationship with an appropriate empirical model. In this
paper, we employ a bivariate normal model to assess the effects of
malfeasance on voter loyalty and, conversely, of voter defection on
subsequent malfeasance. We test these relationships on data drawn from
249 elections across 74 countries. Our results show that malfeasance
does indeed provoke voter defection, but that electoral volatility is
not followed by lower levels of perceived corruption. We discuss the
importance of these novel results for the emerging literature on
clarity of responsibility.

http://democracyspot.net/2012/12/19/corruption-and-the-limits-of-electoral-accountability/

http://crisp.wustl.edu/Brians_Site/Projects_files/Corruption.pdf