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Implementations of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol must handle avariety of protocol versions and extensions, authenticationmodes and key exchange methods, where each combination may prescribea different message sequence between the client and the server.We address the problem of designing a robust compositestate machine that can correctly multiplex between thesedifferent protocol modes.
We systematically tested popular open-source TLS implementations forstate machine bugs and discover several new critical security vulnerabilitiesthat have lain hidden in these libraries for years.We call these collection of vulnerabilities SMACK: State Machine Attacks on TLS.
This page presents exploits and disclosure information related to theseattacks. For a technical overview of the TLS state machine and ourprotocol fuzzing methodology, please refer to our upcoming research paperat IEEE Security & Privacy 2015 and the following materials:
- Slides from IEEE S&P 2015
- Conference version of the paper
- Source code for the flexTLS tool
- OpenSSL state monitor codeverified with Frama-C
- Proof of transcript injectivity verified in F*
All the attacks on this page assume a network adversary (i.e. aman-in-the-middle)to tamper with TLS handshake messages.The typical scenario to mount such attacks is by tampering with theDomain Name System (DNS), for example via DNS rebinding or domain name seizure.
Fig. 1: TLS State machine in JSSEDifferent cipher suites in TLS use different message sequences.For instance, in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman cipher suites (including ECDHE),server authentication relies on the Server Key Exchange message,whereas this message is completely skipped in the RSA key exchange.As another example, in non-ephemeral (non forward-secret) variants of Diffie-Hellman ciphersuites, clients use the DH keys embedded in server certificates instead offreshly generated keys provided in the Server Key Exchange.
We find that several TLS implementations incorrectly allow some messagesto be skipped even though they are required for the selected cipher suite.The explanation for these attacks is very simple: libraries attempt to reuseas much code as possible between the different cipher suites. However, theconsequences of these vulnerabilities can be severe.
For instance, Fig. 1 shows the TLS state machine implemented in JSSE(the Java implementation of TLS shipped with the JDK). Black arrows representthe state machine according to the protocol specification. Green arrowsrepresent incorrect transitions in the server state machine; red arrowsrepresent incorrect transitions in the client state machine.
This figure shows that JSSE clients allow the peer to skip allmessages related to key exchange and authentication. In particular,a network attacker can send the certificate of any arbitrary website,and skip the rest of the protocol messages. A vulnerable JSSE clientis then willing to accept the certificate and start exchangingunencrypted application data. In other words, the JSSE implementationof TLS has been providing virtually no security guarantee (noauthentication, no integrity, no confidentiality) for the past severalyears.
Our attacks show that a malicious server can simply skip TLS altogether:it can pretend to be any server and exchange plaintext data with the client.Still Java clients are used routinely to access sensitive HTTPS APIssuch as Google,Paypal, andAmazon Web Servicesthrough popular Java SDKs.
- JSSE (CVE-2014-6593): vulnerable to server impersonation. The January 2015 critical update for Java 1.5, 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8 prevents the attack.
- CyaSSL: vulnerable to client and server impersonation. Version 3.3.0 prevents the attack.
- OpenSSL (CVE-2015-0205): vulnerable to client impersonation if server accepts static Diffie-Hellman certificates. OpenSSL 1.0.1k prevents the attack.
- Mono: default TLS library vulnerable to client impersonation. Version 3.12.1 prevents the attack.
- axTLS: vulnerable to client impersonation. Version 1.5.2 prevents the attack.
- Other disclosure pending
You are vulnerable if you use client software that uses one of the above TLS librariesto connect to HTTPS (or IMAPS/SMTPS) servers over an insecure network (such as public Wi-Fi).If your client uses, for example, the latest version of OpenSSL, you are probably not affected by this attack.
We provide an online server to test your client for the specific SKIP-TLS attack against JSSE.Point your HTTPS client to :6443 - in Java e.g. (new URL(" :6443")).openConnection().If the connection doesn't trigger an exception, you are vulnerable (please note, you mayget an exception if our test server is down).
Fig. 2: FREAK exploit on Safari Among the various state machine problems we found, one is particularly interesting becauseit leads to a server impersonation exploits against several mainstream browsers (including Safariand OpenSSL-based browsers on Android).
This attack targets a class of deliberately weak export cipher suites.As the name implies, this class of algorithms wereintroduced under the pressure of US governments agencies to ensure that they would be able to decrypt all foreign encryptedcommunication, while stronger algorithms were banned from export (asthey were classified as weapons of war).
Support for these weak algorithms has remained in many implementationssuch as OpenSSL, even though they are typically disabled by default;however, we discovered that several implementations incorrectly allowthe message sequence of export ciphersuites to be used even if a non-exportciphersuite was negotiated.
Thus, if a server is willing to negotiate an export ciphersuite, a man-in-the-middlemay trick a browser (which normally doesn't allow it) to use a weak exportkey. By design, export RSA moduli must be less than 512 bits long; hence, theycan be factored in less than 12 hours for $100 on Amazon EC2.
Ironically, many US government agencies (including the NSA and FBI), as well as anumber of popular websites (IBM, or Symantec)enable export ciphersuites on their server - by factoring ther 512-bit RSA modulus,an attacker can impersonate them to vulnerable clients.
Other than websites, HTTPS servers that enable export ciphersuites include those that hostpopular third-party JavaScript, such as the Facebook JavaScript SDK(loaded in most sites that use Facebook's Like or Login button).By impersonating such vulnerable script servers, an attacker caninject arbitrary JavaScript into any number of innocent third-partywebsites to steal user data (such as passwords) entered on these sites.We demo how an attacker can perform widespread XSS attacks after factoringthe 512-bit RSA modulus for connect.facebook.net (the site that serves Facebook's JavaScript SDK).
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