Alguém pode dizer-me, p.f., o que é possível fazer quando uma firewall
detecta um ataque a Netbios do nosso computador?
A quem podemos fazer queixa desse ataque?
Neste caso a queixa deve ser dirigida à Eunet?
Segue o tracert ao IP onde se originou o ataque
___________________________________
C:\>tracert 193.126.227.17
Tracing route to 193.126.227.17 over a maximum of 30 hops
1 20 ms 10 ms 20 ms 212.113.183.254
2 10 ms 20 ms 10 ms 212.113.164.10
3 10 ms 20 ms 20 ms lpc-br01-porta1.netcabo.net [212.113.161.33]
4 50 ms 20 ms 21 ms 212.55.128.181
5 10 ms 20 ms 10 ms lcatrt2.telepac.net [213.13.135.58]
6 10 ms 20 ms 20 ms falcao.telepac.net [213.13.135.162]
7 20 ms 20 ms 30 ms 194.65.8.118
8 70 ms 30 ms 30 ms Lsb-nr02.PT.EU.net [193.126.2.210]
9 20 ms 40 ms 30 ms Prto-nr01.PT.EU.net [193.126.2.66]
10 40 ms * 50 ms Penafiel1.PT.EU.net [193.126.2.138]
11 70 ms 80 ms 61 ms PSaramagos1.PT.EU.net [193.126.2.142]
12 110 ms 90 ms 100 ms 193.126.25.6
13 140 ms 101 ms 90 ms 193.126.227.17
Trace complete.
__________________________________
Na firewall tem esta informação
The firewall has blocked Internet access to your computer (NetBIOS Name)
from 193.126.227.17 (NetBIOS Name).
Time: 25-07-2000 12:37:04
_______________________________________
Agradeço ajuda
Obrigado desde já
Fernando
--
,---------------------. ,--------------------------------------.
| se...@decoy.ath.cx | | gpg key: decoy.ath.cx/~sena/sena.asc |
| decoy.ath.cx/~sena/ | | Decoy org: http://decoy.ath.cx/ |
`---------------------' `--------------------------------------'
>I heard Viajante <ple...@no.spam.pt> saying:
>>Alguém pode dizer-me, p.f., o que é possível fazer quando uma firewall
>>detecta um ataque a Netbios do nosso computador?
>>A quem podemos fazer queixa desse ataque?
>>
>*bufo!* ;)
Se eu fosse fazer queixa de todos os ataques que a firewll da minha
máquina apanha, não fazia mais nada que não fosse fazer essas mesmas
queixas.
Assim como não os faço, posso passar o resto do tempo a divertir-me a
fazer ataques às máquinas dos outros. :))
>Olá
>
>Alguém pode dizer-me, p.f., o que é possível fazer quando uma firewall
>detecta um ataque a Netbios do nosso computador?
>A quem podemos fazer queixa desse ataque?
A ninguém. Só em casos de abusos, ou acessos ilegais, e mesmo
assim....
http://www.policiajudiciaria.pt/
@970, Nbk
Vou mandar um pouco do manual do PGP só para terem umas ideias da
necessidade das codificações .
pag. 30 An Introduction to Cryptography ( segue no proximo )
Já sei que vou ter todos os possiveis e imaginários a tentarem ver o que
tenho já mostrei uma vez as tentativas dos invasores
Yuyaric
Pagina 30 An Introduction to Cryptography
Perhaps you think your email is legitimate enough that encryption is
unwarranted. If you really are a law-abiding citizen with nothing to hide,
then
why don't you always send your paper mail on postcards? Why not submit to
drug testing on demand? Why require a warrant for police searches of your
house? Are you trying to hide something? If you hide your mail inside
envelopes, does that mean you must be a subversive or a drug dealer, or
maybe a paranoid nut? Do law-abiding citizens have any need to encrypt their
email?
What if everyone believed that law-abiding citizens should use postcards for
their mail? If a nonconformist tried to assert his privacy by using an
envelope
for his mail, it would draw suspicion. Perhaps the authorities would open
his
mail to see what he's hiding. Fortunately, we don't live in that kind of
world,
because everyone protects most of their mail with envelopes. So no one draws
suspicion by asserting their privacy with an envelope. There's safety in
numbers. Analogously, it would be nice if everyone routinely used encryption
for all their email, innocent or not, so that no one drew suspicion by
asserting
their email privacy with encryption. Think of it as a form of solidarity.
Until now, if the government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary
citizens, they had to expend a certain amount of expense and labor to
intercept
and steam open and read paper mail. Or they had to listen to and possibly
transcribe spoken telephone conversation, at least before automatic voice
recognition technology became available. This kind of labor-intensive
monitoring was not practical on a large scale. It was only done in important
cases when it seemed worthwhile.
Senate Bill 266, a 1991 omnibus anticrime bill, had an unsettling measure
buried in it. If this non-binding resolution had become real law, it would
have
forced manufacturers of secure communications equipment to insert special
"trap doors" in their products, so that the government could read anyone's
encrypted messages. It reads, "It is the sense of Congress that providers of
electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic
communications service equipment shall ensure that communications systems
permit the government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and
other communications when appropriately authorized by law." It was this bill
that led me to publish PGP electronically for free that year, shortly before
the
measure was defeated after vigorous protest by civil libertarians and
industry
groups.
The 1994 Digital Telephony bill mandated that phone companies install
remote wiretapping ports into their central office digital switches,
creating a
new technology infrastructure for "point-and-click" wiretapping, so that
federal agents no longer have to go out and attach alligator clips to phone
lines. Now they will be able to sit in their headquarters in Washington and
listen in on your phone calls. Of course, the law still requires a court
order for
a wiretap. But while technology infrastructures can persist for generations,
Yuyaric