JUNE 26, 2011 UPDATE

[Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman Fleisher Law Firm]

June 26, 2011
An Electronic Newsletter of Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman
Fleisher P.A.
Charles (Chuck) Rubin, Editor/Author (except as otherwise noted) ©
2011

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CONTENTS:

1. ‘CHARITABLE LID’ DEFINED VALUE CLAUSE UPHELD
2. APPLICABLE FEDERAL RATES–JULY 2011
3. ‘BLAME THE TAX PREPARER’ DEFENSE SHOT DOWN
4. FLORIDA TAX LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS [FLORIDA] 2011
5. GOLFER RETIEF GOOSEN SCORES A BOGIE IN TAX COURT
6. DEBT FORGIVENESS IN AN INSOLVENT ESTATE [FLORIDA, BUT RELEVANT
ELSEWHERE]
7. INTEREST IN TRANSFER TAX REVISIONS BEGINS TO WARM
8. TAX RETURN PREPARER AND ADVISOR STANDARDS REVISED
9. PURCHASE AND SALE OF MARITAL TRUST ASSETS DID NOT TRIGGER ANY
TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES
10. MANAGEMENT ENTITIES
11. FIRM ANNOUNCEMENTS
12. ABOUT OUR FIRM


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1. ‘CHARITABLE LID’ DEFINED VALUE CLAUSE UPHELD

Federal transfer tax laws provide for various fixed exemptions and
credits, such as the unified credit amount, the annual exclusion gift
maximum amount, and the generation-skipping tax exemption. Taxpayers
seeking to make inter vivos transfers of difficult-to-value assets
that are at or under an exemption amount have a practical problem. To
make the transfer they need to transfer property (such as shares of a
closely-held business), but unless and until the IRS audits the
transfer, there can be a large swing in potential transfer tax value
between the estimate provided by the taxpayer’s appraiser, and what
the IRS may assert or believe. Attempts to make transfers based on a
formula such as “so many XYZ Corp. shares that are equal in value to
$x” are vigorously opposed by the IRS. They can also be impractical
because some number of shares would need to be transferred based on
the initial valuation, with a later adjustment and transfer of shares
one way or the other if the value is adjusted by the IRS. The IRS
generally challenges such formula gifts as being invalid “savings
clauses” under Procter, 142 F2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944). The precise scope
of Procter has never been fully delineated by the courts, with King in
the 1970’s, and Harwood and Ward in the 1980’s, helping somewhat to
define its parameters.

In 2003, the 5th Circuit in McCord, 461 F2d 614, rev’g. 120 T.C. 358
(2003), reversed the Tax Court and gave tax effect to a defined value
clause. Now, the Tax Court itself has ruled in a case that also gave
effect to such a clause. The planning in the instant case was
excellent – it included two elements presumably intended to defuse
anticipated IRS arguments, and they appear to have functioned as
designed.

The first such planning element was a the inclusion of small gift to a
charitable recipient (here, a donor advised community fund), based on
the donors’ valuation. The gift was structured that a fixed dollar
amount of stock was to be transferred to family trusts, with any
excess value passing to the charitable fund. This achieved two
benefits, and since the charitable gift was relatively small as
compared to the transfer to the trusts, it did not have a substantial
economic cost to the donors.

First, it allowed the donors to defend against the IRS’ argument that
a defined value clause was against public policy. That argument is
that the IRS is discouraged from challenging valuations in these
circumstances since it has no transfer tax “upside” to disputing
value - any increase in value would only create a deductible
charitable gift. The donors instead could, and did, argue that the
clause furthered a public policy of encouraging charitable gifts. This
charitable benefit was noted by the Tax Court.

Second, it avoided the problem of the possibility of shares being
returned to the donors, or additional shares being transferred from
the donor, based on changes in value. Instead, the donors were taken
out of the picture in regard to transfers that were needed by such
subject revaluations. Any adjustments in value resulted in the
adjustment in shares occurring between the trusts and the charitable
fund – the donors were not a participant. This distinguishes these
transfers from facts similar to Procter.

The other interesting element was that the transfers to the trusts
were a part sale/part gift transaction. Only the excess of the total
defined transfer to the trusts over the consideration paid by the
trusts constituted a gift. The IRS argued that the formula clauses
were invalid because they were not reached at arm’s length. An
important aspect of the court’s decision to nonetheless find an arm’s
length transaction was the sale element. Pursuant to the sale, the
trusts incurred economic and business risk – if the value of the stock
used in the initial computation turned out to be too low, more shares
would pass out of the trusts and go to the charitable fund.

It is important to note that the subject case is appealable to the 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals – the same circuit as McCord. Thus, issues as
to applicability of this case to cases arising in other circuits still
remain. However, the case is still important because it was not a mere
repeat of McCord. The Tax Court considered, and was not persuaded by,
two arguments of the IRS that were not considered in McCord. Those two
arguments were the public policy and lack of arms-length dealings
discussed above. Further, the court also noted with approval the
application of a similar clause in regard to a disclaimer in Estate of
Christiansen, 586 F3d 1061 (8th Cir 2009), which should help bolster
support for the use of such clauses outside of the 5th Circuit.

Hendrix, TC Memo 2011-133

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2. APPLICABLE FEDERAL RATES–JULY 2011

To view a table and graph, visit http://goo.gl/rfutI.

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3. ‘BLAME THE TAX PREPARER’ DEFENSE SHOT DOWN

Taxpayers received a Form 1099-MISC reporting $3.4 million in income.
This income item never made it to the income tax return. The IRS noted
the missing item and assessed tax on it, and an accuracy-related
penalty under Code §6662(a) of $104,295. That Code section imposes a
20% penalty on substantial understatements of income tax.

The taxpayers had engaged a specialty firm to prepare their income tax
return. The return was over 115 pages long, and involved the
integration of 160-plus information returns.

Code §6664(c)(1) overrides the above accuracy-related penalty if the
taxpayer can show reasonable cause for the underpayment. In the
instant case, the taxpayers claimed reasonable reliance on their tax
preparer to show reasonable cause.

The Regulations allow reliance on “professional advice” to constitute
reasonable cause if such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer
acted in good faith. Nonetheless, the Tax Court did not permit the IRS
to use this reasonable cause exception.

The problem for the taxpayers was that “advice” is defined in the
Regulation. To constitute “advice,” the advisor must reflect the
adviser’s “analysis or conclusion.” No evidence was offered that the
advisor conducted any analysis or provided any substantive advice on
the item that was omitted. Instead, it just appeared to be a clerical
omission. Thus, reliance on “professional advice” was not allowed to
avoid the penalty.

The Regulations also note that an isolated computational or
transcriptional error is not inconsistent with reasonable cause. There
are cases that support the defense when an item is unintentionally
left off the return by a third party preparer. However, a number of
items conspired to disallow such a defense in this case, including a
taxpayer’s duty to conduct a reasonable review of the return to assure
all income items are reported. All of these were noted by the Tax
Court, so it is uncertain what the result would be if some of them
were absent:

a. It was assumed that the omission was a computational or
transcriptional error, but no evidence was submitted to support that.

b. The large dollar amount of the omitted item raises questions
whether the taxpayers conducted a reasonable review of the return.
This amount was both large in amount and in the percentage of income
omitted.

c. The omitted income item was specifically and intentionally
triggered by one of the taxpayers during the tax year.

d. The taxpayers could not remember how much time and effort they
put into reviewing the return.

e. One of the taxpayers had the knowledge and general sophistication
to have been able to notice the missing item.

Stephen G. Woodsum, et ux. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 29,
06/13/2011

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4. FLORIDA TAX LEGISLATION HIGHLIGHTS [FLORIDA] 2011

A. BACK TO SCHOOL SALES TAX HOLIDAY.

Continuing the annual tradition, Florida has enacted legislation that
there will be no sales tax collected during the period from August 12,
2011, through August 14, 2011, on the sale of clothing, footwear, and
certain accessories selling for $75 or less per item; or school
supplies having a sales price of $15 or less per item. These tax
exemptions do not apply to sales within a theme park or entertainment
complex, a public lodging establishment, or an airport.

B. ABILITY TO APPORTION FLORIDA INCOME TAX TO FLORIDA BASED SOLELY ON
SALES FACTOR INSTEAD OF NORMAL THREE-FACTOR APPORTIONMENT FORMULA.

A taxpayer doing business within and without Florida, who
demonstrates to the Office of Tourism, Trade, and Economic Development
that, within a 2-year period beginning on or after July 1, 2011, it
has made qualified capital expenditures of at least $250 million, may
apportion its adjusted federal income solely by the sales factor
beginning in the taxable year that the Office approves the
application, but not before a taxable year that begins on or after
January 1, 2013. Once approved, a taxpayer may elect to apportion its
adjusted federal income for any taxable year using the sales factor
method or the three-factor apportionment formula. This provision does
not apply to taxpayers that are financial organizations, banks,
savings associations, international banking facilities, or banking
organizations.


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5. GOLFER RETIEF GOOSEN SCORES A BOGIE IN TAX COURT

Golfer Retief Goosen, a nondomiciliary UK resident, entered into
endorsement agreements with various corporate sponsors, and other
agreements to provide services for those sponsors. The IRS challenged
Goosen’s characterization of payments under those agreements, raising
issues of personal services income, royalty income, source of income,
and taxation under the U.S. – U.K. income tax treaty.

These issues arise often for athletes and international artists. Many
of the characterization issues are factual and difficult to apply. The
Tax Court ultimately disagreed with several of Goosen’s positions and
increased his U.S. income taxes.

Given the variety of arrangements that Goosen entered into, the Tax
Court’s discussion and conclusions should be helpful in assisting
other athletes and artists in both structuring their arrangements and
determining the proper U.S. income tax consequences. The following
provides a brief summary of the what and why of the various
arrangements. Taxpayers and advisors with these issues would be well
served to review the opinion and conclusions.

Item: Prize money from U.S. golf tournaments and appearance fees in
the U.S.

Character: Effectively connected income from a U.S. trade or
business.

Item: Off-course endorsement agreement payments (that is, the ability
of the sponsor to use Retief’s name and likeness in advertising and
product promotions).

Character: Royalty income, per Retief’s ownership interests in his
name and likeliness. As to royalty income relating to golf card and
video game sales, these were sourced in the U.S. based on the
percentage portion of U.S. sales of those items to worldwide sales.
Allocating by the relative amount of advertising conducted for such
items inside and outside the U.S. by the sponsors was rejected by the
court. Royalty payments attributable to on-course and other
endorsement agreements were treated as 50% U.S. source based only on a
general analysis of various markets of the sponsors.

Item: On-course endorsement fees and bonuses, relating in large part
to wear or use sponsor products while playing golf.

Character: Personal services income, which are sourced by where
the services are performed. However, some of the contracts combined
such on-course use of products with the ability of the sponsor to use
Retief’s name and likeness. Such contract payments were thus
considered to be partly personal services income and party income from
royalties, with the court being forced to make some type of guestimate
allocation between the two.

Item: U.S. source royalty income from endorsements – effectively
connected with a U.S trade or business?

Character: As to on-course endorsements, which were tied to and
required Retief to play in golf tournaments, Retief’s participation
was material to his receiving such income and is treated as income
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. As to off-course
endorsements, these were not dependent on tournament play or Retief’s
presence in the U.S. These were thus determined to be non-effectively
connected income, subject to 30% tax as FDAP income.

Item: Applicability of U.S.-U.K. tax treaty.

Character: The opinion noted that the treaty will apply to income
for a U.K. nondomiciliary resident only to the extent the income is
remitted to or received in the U.K. Retief’s endorsement income was
initially paid into Liechtenstein bank accounts of entities controlled
by Retief’s manager. Amounts were ultimately transferred to a U.K.
bank account, but often in the form of salary and other payments.
While the Tax Court acknowledged funds being paid to the U.K. bank
account, Retief could not provide enough proof that such payments
were endorsement income. Thus, Retief was denied the use of the
treaty, which might otherwise have provided reduced U.S. income
taxation on Retief’s U.S. source income.

Because the various contracts often mixed on-course use of sponsor
products, with ability to use name and likeness for advertising and
promotion, the court had a difficult time allocating such combined
items. Taxpayers seeking more certainty in this area should consider
allocating a fixed portion of the compensation to the various items
being paid for.

Retief Goosen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No. 27 (June 9, 2011)

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6. DEBT FORGIVENESS IN AN INSOLVENT ESTATE [FLORIDA, BUT RELEVANT
ELSEWHERE]

A recent Florida case addresses an interesting question not previously
decided in Florida. The facts are straightforward. A decedent’s son
and daughter-in-law owed the decedent money under a promissory note.
In the decedent’s last Will, he forgave the repayment of the note.
However, if the decedent’s estate does not collect on the note, it
will not have enough money to pay its administrative costs, debts and
expenses. Thus, the question raised is whether the loan forgiveness is
effective if the estate is rendered insolvent by it.

The probate court held the loan forgiveness was effective. On appeal,
the probate court was reversed and the loan forgiveness was not given
effect.

This makes sense. Florida law, as does the probate law of most states,
gives a priority in payment to administrative costs, debts of the
decedent, and expenses. Heirs of the probate estate are entitled to
receive gifts and bequests only to the extent there are assets
remaining after the payment of such items. One policy of such a system
is to encourage the probate of insolvent estates to wind-up the
affairs of the decedent, even though there may not be assets for the
heirs. If costs and expenses of administration could not be paid from
available assets first, it would be difficult to find persons willing
to undertake such administration. Another policy served is that a
decedent’s creditors should be paid before his heirs.

Thus, if a probate estate has $100,000 in cash which is left to the
decedent’s son, but has $100,000 of administrative costs, debts and
expenses, the son would get nothing. What if the estate did not have
$100,000 in cash, but instead has $100,000 due to it from the son
under a promissory note which is forgiven in the Will? If the
forgiveness is effective, the son is effectively $100,000 richer as if
he received $100,000 from his father’s estate, and the estate has no
money to pay its costs, debts and expenses. That is, if the promissory
note forgiveness is given effect, the son receives the benefit of the
write off and thus gets more than if he was entitled only to a
$100,000 cash gift, and essentially jumps ahead of the creditors in
receiving payment. This was rejected by the appellate court – it
noted:

“[t]he ruling by the lower court elevates the gift of forgiveness
of an obligation to a superior status over the rights of legitimate
creditors of the decedent, contrary to the priorities established in
the Probate Code.”

The appeals court distinguished these facts from those in Estate of
Whitley, 508 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In that case, loan
forgiveness was effectuated by the provisions of the promissory note
itself, thus keeping the note out of the probate estate and giving
effect to the write-off. This is important in context of the judicial
recognition of the effectiveness of the cancellation provisions of
self-cancelling installment notes, and provides an avenue for a
decedent to be able to assure loan forgiveness at death in all events.

The appeals court rejected arguments that the forgiveness mechanism
was the equivalent of forms of ownership that allow for the transfer
of assets at death outside of the probate estate. Again, this appears
to be a correct analysis since it is the Will that effectuates the
loan forgiveness.

The appellate court also noted that while this was a case of first
impression in Florida, its decision is in accord with all other
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.

Bernadette Lauritsen, as Personal Representative v. Brian Wallace, 5th
DCA, April 1, 2011

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7. INTEREST IN TRANSFER TAX REVISIONS BEGINS TO WARM

The last time there was a threat to return to pre-2001 transfer tax
rules and levels, Congress sat on its hands for over 9 years. It
waited until the last minute at the end of 2010 to avoid such a
return, but the new legislation that was passed expires after 2012. If
Congress does not act, in 2013 the unified credit will return to $1
million and the maximum transfer tax rates will rebound to 55% (from a
$5 million unified credit and a 35% maximum rate, for 2011 and 2012).

According to a recent New York Post article, there is interest in
Congress to act now to deal with 2013 and beyond. While there is still
Republican interest for total repeal, there does some to be a fair
amount of cross-party agreement to extend the $5 million unified
credit amount, but perhaps bump up the maximum rates to 45%. The hope
is that Congress will take up the matter if and when it gets past the
current debt-ceiling matters.

Early action to deal with the post-2012 situation would be welcome by
planners and taxpayers alike. I don’t think there are too many out
there that would like a replay of the last-minute planning and
forecasting that arose from Congress’ last minute activities in 2010.
As to whether Congress could actually get something done this year?
Your guess is as good as mine.

Senate Eyes Compromise on Estate Tax, June 5, 2011

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8. TAX RETURN PREPARER AND ADVISOR STANDARDS REVISED

The IRS recently issued new rules that tinker with the ethical
standards for tax return preparers, and persons advising taxpayers in
regard to positions taken on a return.

These provisions reside in §10.34 of the Circular 230 regulations that
govern ethical standards and discipline for tax practitioners before
the IRS. The provisions are separate and apart from similar (and
overlapping) rules under Code §6694 which relate to penalties that may
be imposed on return preparers under the Internal Revenue Code.

Essentially, there are 3 courses of conduct that may get a preparer in
trouble under the new Circular 230 rules. The same items apply to
persons signing a return or claim for refund and persons advising
taxpayers on adopting a return position:

a. If the position lacks a reasonable basis;

b. If it is an unreasonable position under Code §6694(a)(2)
(relating to the Code penalties on tax preparers); or

c. If the position is a willful attempt to understate liability or
is a reckless or intentional disregard of rules and regulations.

Note that it is possible that the position have a reasonable basis,
with a violation still occurring. This is because under Code §6694(a)
(2), a reasonable basis will not protect a practitioner against
penalties for certain tax shelter and listed transaction standards,
nor for positions that lack “substantial authority” if required
disclosure rules are not complied with.

However, the preamble to the new rules does provide that a violation
of Code §6694(a)(2) is not a per se or automatic violation of Circular
230. An independent determination as to whether the practitioner
engaged in willful, reckless or grossly incompetent conduct will be
made before such a violation is found.

T.D. 9527, IRS Final Regs. Governing Practice Before the Internal
Revenue Service ( May 31, 2011)

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9. PURCHASE AND SALE OF MARITAL TRUST ASSETS DID NOT TRIGGER ANY
TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES

Trust and estate litigation often involves issues regarding a QTIP
marital trust for which a deduction was taken under Code §2057(b)(7)
for estate tax purposes. This comes up often, since such litigation
often arises between a surviving spouse who is beneficiary of the QTIP
trust, and children of the decedent who are remaindermen and may not
be children of the surviving spouse.

Care must be undertaken in dealing with such trusts and their assets
in crafting settlements of such disputes. Transfers of interests in
such trusts, terminations of such trusts, and other transactions can
trigger gift tax consequences, including under Code §2519 (creating a
gift tax upon disposition by a surviving spouse of all or part of such
spouse’s mandatory income interest in the QTIP).

Not all settlement transactions give rise to adverse transfer tax
consequences. In a recent private letter ruling, a QTIP trust
purchased ownership interests in entities owned by the children/
remaindermen and trusts for their benefit. The children/remaindermen
also purchased interests in other entities that were owned by the QTIP
trust. The taxpayers sought confirmation that such transfers did not
trigger Code §2519 or other gift tax consequences.

Since there was no effective or deemed disposition of the spouse’s
income interest in the QTIP trust, the IRS confirmed that Code §2519
was not triggered. Further, no other taxable gift was deemed to occur.

Central to the ruling was that the prices for the various purchases
were determined by independent third party appraisals – thus, there
were no underpayments or overpayments for the assets. If the
remaindermen had been able to purchase QTIP trust assets at a
discounted value, or if the QTIP trust overpayed for the assets it
bought, this might otherwise have been construed as a disposition of
the spouse’s income interest under Code §2519. Underpayments or
overpayments for the assets may have also given rise to other gift tax
consequences, although if undertaken in context of litigation
settlement it probably could still be argued that other consideration
was exchanged for the assets (such as releases of rights under the
purported claims) as to avoid a gift element.

Private Letter Ruling 201119003, 05/13/2011

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10. MANAGEMENT ENTITIES

Taxpayers who own various business entities often establish a
management entity to provide management services to the entities and/
or to act as a common paymaster and employer of all the various
entities. The operating businesses will pay a fee to the management
entity for the services provided, which fee will usually include an
element for reimbursement of the hard costs of the management entity
such as for employee wages and withholding taxes.

A recent Tax Court case challenged the deductions claimed by the
operating entity for its payments to the management entity. The case
addressed a number of the tax issues involved in these arrangements,
and provides many “lessons” in structuring them. Some of the key
lessons are described below.

1. WHEN WILL THE IRS ATTACK? The IRS will generally be interested in
attacking these arrangements only when it perceives taxes are being
deferred or avoided. Oftentimes, there are no deferral or avoidance
circumstances. For instances, if the operating entities and the
management entity are commonly owned, and are pass-through entities
such as LLC’s, partnerships or S corporations, the deduction on the
operations side is offset by the income on the management entity side.
Even with C corporations, if both the operations side and the
management side are profitable, then there is little chance of tax
avoidance. In the instant case, the operating entity and the
management entity were both S corporations. However, the management
entity was owned by an ESOP. Thus, there was not common ownership on
both sides. Further, the ESOP allowed for deferral or avoidance of tax
on the management fees earned by the management entity, while the
payor operating entity received an operating deduction. Thus, the IRS
was very interested in challenging the management fees.

2. WILL THE MANAGEMENT ENTITY BE DISREGARDED AS A SHAM ENTITY? Relying
on Moline Props., Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 [30 AFTR 1291]
(1943), in the instant case the IRS argued that the management entity
should be disregarded for Federal income tax purposes because it
lacked a legitimate business purpose and economic substance and was
formed for the sole purpose of obtaining tax benefits. Such an attack
can be successfully defended if the taxpayer can show the management
entity was formed for a valid business purpose or if it actually
engaged in business activity. Some business purposes that often exist
in these circumstances (and that should be of assistance in defending
a Moline-type attack) include:

a. Centralization of employee management;

b. Provision of management and other actual services;

c. Creditor protection (including products liability protection) by
placing management in an entity without significant business assets
and separating business activities in multiple entities;

d. Establishment of incentive and retirement plans for employees; and

e. Business efficiencies via centralization of services and
activities.

In the instant case, while the taxpayer had difficulty factually
proving a valid business purpose for the arrangement, it did conduct
enough actual business activities to avoid a sham finding. In
particular, the Tax Court noted that the management entity provided
personnel services, maintained an investment and bank account, paid
employees by check, adopted a retirement plan, followed corporate
formalities and filed income and employment tax returns.

3. WILL MANAGEMENT FEES BE DEDUCTIBLE? Code §162 requires that
expenses be ordinary and necessary in carrying on a trade or business
to be deductible. Presumably, if the management entities provide
employees to the operating entities, fees paid for such employees will
be ordinary and necessary and deductible – this is what occurred in
the subject case and was approved by the Tax Court. However, in the
subject case, the IRS successfully challenged the management fees paid
for other services. To enhance the deduction for such services, the
following items are helpful:

a. Have an agreement to establish what services will be performed and
what will be paid for them; and

b. Make sure the services are in fact performed by the management
entity, and be able to specifically prove what was done (this was a
problem in the subject case).

Overcharging or undercharging for fees can be problematic, either
under Code §162 requirements of a “reasonable” amount, or Code §482
which requires amounts paid between commonly controlled entities to
meet arms-length standards.

4. LOANS. If loans exist between the entities, adequate interest
should be charged – if not, the IRS will typically be able to impute
interest under Code §§482 and/or 7872. Code §7872 was applied in the
subject case. All loans should be documented and treated as such on
the books and records – failure to do so could result in deemed
distributions and dividends.

On the positive side, the Tax Court had no problem with the concept of
a management entity or centralized employer – so long as the parties
toe the line on the above issues.

Weekend Warriors Trailers, Inc. v. Comm., TC Memo 2011-105

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11. FIRM ANNOUNCEMENTS

For those readers that have issues involving trusts and foreign
accounts, we suggest they review Chuck Rubin’s latest article (co-
authored with his daughter, Jenna Rubin) entitled Final Regulations
Expand on FBAR Reporting which is being published in the July 2011
edition of Estate Planning Journal (WG&L). To our knowledge, it is the
only summary out there that brings together in one analysis the
various disparate factual circumstances that may trigger an FBAR
filing requirement for a trust or persons connected with trusts
(including grantors, beneficiaries, and trustees). We hope to have a
copy of the article up at the firm’s website in a few days
(www.floridatax.com).

Our attorneys are available for speaking engagements at Bar,
accountant, and other professional organization meetings and seminars
(schedules permitting). Feel free to contact us with any requests.

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12. ABOUT OUR FIRM

Our firm seeks to protect and enhance the individual, family and
business wealth of our clients in the following principal practice
areas: Planning to Minimize Taxes (U.S. & International) • Probate &
Trust Litigation • Estate Planning, Charitable, Marital & Succession
Planning • Business Structuring & Transactions • Trusts & Estates
Administration • Tax Controversies • Creditor Protection.

Please visit our website at http://www.floridatax.com for information
about the firm, our attorneys, articles from recent monthly
newsletters, interesting articles and tax guides, and federal and
Florida tax rates and information. The firm and its attorneys have
been recognized in numerous peer rating guides, such as U.S. News &
World Report law firm rankings, Best Lawyers, Martindale-Hubbell,
Chambers, Who's Who in American Law, Florida Trend's Legal Elite,
Superlawyers, and South Florida Legal Guide Top Lawyers.

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DAILY TAX AND BUSINESS UPDATES AVAILABLE. View prior articles, updates
that we didn't have room for in this newsletter, or read the above
postings when they are first published, by visiting http://www.rubinontax.blogspot.com.

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The Usual Disclaimer: This newsletter summarizes for informational
purposes only information of interest to the clients and friends of
Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman Fleisher P.A. The information is
condensed from, and a general summary of, legislation, court
decisions, administrative rulings and other information, and should
not be construed as legal advice or opinion, and is not a substitute
for the advice of counsel.

Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin Forman Fleisher P.A.

Boca Corporate Center
2101 Corporate Blvd., Suite 107
Boca Raton, Florida 33431
561.998.7847
www.floridatax.com