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Livestock guardian (LGD) and herding shepherd (HSD) dogs have distinct morphological and behavioural characteristics, long selected by farmers and breeders, to accomplish different tasks. This study aimed to find the genomic regions that best differentiate and characterise Italian LGD and HSD. Genomic data of 158 dogs of four LGD and five HSD breeds, obtained with the 170K canine SNPchip, were collected. The two groups were compared using FST and XP-EHH analyses, identifying regions containing 29 genes. Moreover, 16 islands of runs of homozygosity were found in LGD, and 15 in HSD; 4 of them were partially shared. Among the genes found that better differentiated HSD and LGD, several were associated with dog domestication and behavioural aspects; particularly, MSRB3 and LLPH were linked to herding behaviour in previous studies. Others, DYSK, MAP2K5, and RYR, were related to body size and muscle development. Prick ears prevailed in sampled HSD, and drop ears in LGD; this explains the identification of WIF1 and MSRB3 genes. Unexpectedly, a number of genes were also associated with eye development and functionality. These results shed further light on the differences that human selection introduced in dogs aimed at different duties, even in a limited geographic area such as Italy.
Guardianship is an institution designed to protect people deemed legally incapable of managing their own affairs. It entails the granting of a set of powers and duties to a guardian to provide for the needs of the legally incapacitated. Judicial guardianship is a regime established following a judgment or ruling of incapacitation pronounced by a court. Once the guardianship regime is established, the Giudice Tutelare appoints a guardian who represents the incapacitated person for all acts in civil life and administers his/her own assets.
Administratorship/trusteeeship is a form of assistance provided for by law in favour of partially incapable persons (incapacitated and emancipated minors). This regime is established ex officio following a judgment or ruling of incapacitation issued by a court. Unlike the guardian, the administrator/trustee has no legal representation for the person subject to this regime.
The so-called amministrazione di sostegno is a form of judicial protection provided for by law and designed to protect the interests of a person wholly or partially deprived of autonomy, with the least possible limitation of his/her capacity to act. A legal action for establishing the regime of amministrazione di sostegno may be lodged by the beneficiary, by his/her spouse, relatives within the fourth degree, in-laws within the second degree, cohabiting partner, guardian or administrator/trustee, by the Public Prosecutor or the people in charge of the social and health services involved in the care and assistance of the person in need. The legal action shall be filed with the Registry Office of the Giudice tutelare of the Court having territorial jurisdiction in relation to the residence or domicile of the beneficiary of the amministrazione di sostegno.
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Pierina D'Ambrosio is the mother of Marion Rose Garbini, a minor, and the former wife of Agostini Garbini. In 1920, Garbini and his wife Pierina entered into a separation agreement; Garbini then went to Italy, sending his brother Luigi over to collect his share of the property under said agreement, amounting to some $94,000, and leaving in California only two pieces of property valued at a little over $7,000. Garbini died in 1924, leaving a will of his entire estate to his brother Luigi. Mrs. D'Ambrosio later consulted respondents as to any interest which the minor might have in the estate of her father. Respondents filed a petition for letters of administration upon the father's estate in California, and no appearance being made by Luigi, the estate was in due time distributed to the minor, and Mrs. D'Ambrosio appointed her guardian. Respondents also advised Mrs. D'Ambrosio that there was a possibility of recovering for the minor all or at least a portion of the estate in Italy. Subsequently a complicated mass of litigation was carried on --a suit to compel an accounting by Luigi; a suit to set aside the will; a suit by Luigi to have the separation agreement declared null and void; and a suit by Luigi to compel Mrs. D'Ambrosio to account for her share of the property obtained under the separation agreement. All of this litigation took place in Italy, and was handled by lawyers there in connection with the lawyers here, respondents having suggested [28 Cal. App. 2d 717] to Mrs. D'Ambrosio an Italian lawyer here whose brother handled her end, and respondents themselves preparing a great deal of evidence and sending it to Italy, Mr. Andriano even going to Italy while he was in Europe and seeing the parties and lawyers there in an endeavor to effect a compromise. As a result of the litigation and compromises, the Italian courts awarded the minor an estate of 480,000 lire, of which 80,000 lire was ordered paid as attorneys' fees and legal expense "due the American attorneys" and the Italian attorneys. The value of the Italian estate the lower court found to be in excess of $20,000 American money. Under the decree of the Italian court the 400,000 lire awarded to the minor was invested in Italian bonds, the bonds to be deposited for safekeeping in two designated banks in Italy, to be delivered to the minor upon her arriving at the age of majority.
Appellant contends that the court had no jurisdiction to make the order appealed from; that there was no contract, and therefore the true nature of the proceedings is in quantum meruit and that the only person having power to petition the court for determination of attorneys' fees is the guardian herself; that the only estate in the jurisdiction of the court amounts to approximately $7,000, and the order turns over practically the entire estate to the attorneys, because the court has no jurisdiction of the estate in Italy; and that the Italian estate cannot be removed from Italy; furthermore that the petition for approval of a contract of attorneys' fees should have been filed prior to the performance of the work and immediately after entering into the contract, if any.
Respondents contend that the court had jurisdiction because there was estate of the minor within its jurisdiction; that the Italian estate will eventually come into the hands of the minor, and that although the petition could be made only by the guardian, the guardian's answer constitutes such petition, and that a contract within the purview of section 1509, Probate Code, existed.
Appellant also contends that the evidence does not support the making of the order; that there is no evidence of a contract; that the work performed by respondents in preparing the evidence and briefs for the Italian litigation was done on behalf of the guardian personally and not on behalf of the minor; that the 80,000 lire set aside for attorneys' fees [28 Cal. App. 2d 718] was to cover the fees of respondents, as shown by the Italian order; that respondents had received approximately $1900 which had not been accounted for.
Practically all of the findings of fact of the lower court are attacked by the appellant as not supported by the evidence. In all instances, however, the evidence either wholly supports the findings or there is a conflict in evidence, in which case, of course, the appellate court is bound to follow the lower court's determination of such conflict. The main question in the case is one of law and revolves around the question of the jurisdiction of the lower court to allow attorneys' fees in a guardianship proceeding where the petition is made by the attorneys, and not by the guardian, and the guardian files an answer of the type herein, and also where the services were completely rendered before any application was made to the court concerning the same. The evidence upon which the court based its finding that there was a contract entered into between respondents and the guardian is very brief and as follows: In 1926 Mrs. D'Ambrosio, the widow of Garbini, and the mother of the minor, consulted Mr. Tramutolo, one of the respondents, concerning both her rights and the rights of the minor in the property left in this country and Italy by the father. Mr. Tramutolo filed a petition to probate the California estate and then referred Mrs. D'Ambrosio to Mr. Andriano. There is no mention in Mr. Tramutolo's testimony of any agreement concerning a guardianship proceeding or payment from the minor's estate for services to be rendered the minor, although apparently it was taken for granted by both Mr. Tramutolo and Mrs. D'Ambrosio that he, with the assistance of Mr. Andriano, was to do whatever was necessary to recover whatever could be recovered for both mother and daughter. Later, other attorneys were employed to represent Mrs. D'Ambrosio personally. Mrs. D'Ambrosio saw Mr. Andriano and from then on the matter of the minor's interests was handled principally by Mr. Andriano, in consultation, however, with Mr. Tramutolo and by the Italian attorneys. At the first conference between Mr. Andriano and the mother of the minor, the former advised her that the child was entitled under the [28 Cal. App. 2d 719] Italian laws to one-half of the estate. From time to time Mr. Andriano conferred with Mrs. D'Ambrosio about the situation, including the question of hiring Mr. Giannini, a San Francisco attorney, and his brother, an attorney in Italy, to represent the mother and the matter of compensation for them was agreed upon. The entire litigation, both as to the mother and the daughter, was frequently discussed. The only evidence concerning the question of compensation to be paid either of the respondents for their services for the minor is Mr. Andriano's testimony that he told Mrs. D'Ambrosio that he could not make any agreement with her as to the fee, that the court would have to fix that. It is not clear from the transcript when this statement was made, but apparently it was not until the services had already been rendered. There can be no doubt that Mrs. D'Ambrosio authorized the respondents to proceed to recover for the minor whatever could be recovered. The actions of Mrs. D'Ambrosio and the attorneys clearly indicate, and justify the lower court in finding, that it was contemplated by her and them, that the services being rendered by them for the minor were to be compensated out of the minor's estate, whatever such estate which they might recover for the minor might turn out to be, even though there was no express arrangement to that effect. However, a guardianship proceeding was not commenced until 1930, by which time respondents had been working on the matter for four years. Both before and after the appointment of Mrs. D'Ambrosio as guardian she knew, of course, that the respondents, together with the Italian attorneys, were proceeding in the minor's behalf.
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