Distributive Justice Rawls Pdf Download
Clotilde Wilks
Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of society. All liberal theories (in the sense specified below) may be seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary. More specifically, such theories may be interpreted as specifying that the outcome of individuals acting independently, without the intervention of any central authority, is just, provided that those who fare ill (for reasons that the theories deem to be arbitrary, for example, because they have fewer talents than others) receive compensation from those who fare well.
Four theories of justice are discussed: Rawlsian egalitarianism, or justice as fairness; Dworkinian egalitarianism, or equality of resources; Steiner-Vallentyne libertarianism, or common ownership; and Nozickian libertarianism, or entitlements. The following specification of the theories sets out, for each theory: its definition of justice; the personal characteristics that it considers to be arbitrary and therefore makes adjustments for; the nature of the institution under which this may be achieved; the justification of any inequalities which it accepts; and the extent to which it is consistent with liberty.
These principles are lexically ordered: the first principle has priority over the second; and in the second principle the first part has priority over the second part. For the specific question of distributive justice, as opposed to the wider question of political justice, it is the final stone in the edifice that is crucial: this is the famous difference principle.
Rawls sees the social contract as being neither historical nor hypothetical but a thought-experiment for exploring the implications of an assumption of moral equality as embodied in the original position. To give effect to this Rawls assumes that the parties to the contract are situated behind a veil of ignorance where they do not know anything about themselves or their situations, and accordingly are equal. The intention is that as the parties to the contract have no information about themselves they necessarily act impartially, and thus as justice as fairness requires. As no one knows his circumstances, no one can try to impose principles of justice that favour his particular condition.
The wellbeing of representatives is assessed by their allocation of what Rawls terms primary goods. There are two classes of primary goods. The first class comprises social primary goods, such as liberty (the subject matter of the first part of the second principle of justice) and wealth (the subject matter of the second part of that principle). The second class comprises natural primary goods, such as personal characteristics. Justice as fairness is concerned with the distribution of social primary goods; and of these the difference principle is concerned with those that are the subject matter of the second part of the second principle of justice, such as wealth.
Dworkin accepts that inequalities are acceptable if they result from voluntary choices, but not if they result from disadvantages that have not been chosen. However, initial equality of resources is not sufficient for justice. Even if everyone starts from the same position one person may fare better than another because of her good luck, or, alternatively, because of her lesser handicaps or greater talents.
Suppose that a distribution that is (uniquely) specified as just by some patterned principle of distributive justice is realized: this may be one in which everyone has an equal share of wealth, or where shares vary in any other patterned way. Now there is a basketball player, one Wilt Chamberlain, who is of average wealth but of superior ability. He enters into a contract with his employers under which he will receive 25 cents for each admission ticket sold to see him play. As he is so able a player a million people come to watch him. Accordingly, Mr Chamberlain earns a further $250,000. The question is, is this new distribution, in which Mr Chamberlain is much better off than in the original distribution, and also much better off than the average person, just? One answer must be that it is not, for the new distribution differs from the old, and by hypothesis the old distribution (and only that distribution) was just. On the other hand, the original distribution was just, and people moved from that to the new distribution entirely voluntarily. Mr Chamberlain and his employers voluntarily entered into the contract; all those who chose to buy a ticket to watch Mr Chamberlain play did so voluntarily; and no one else was affected. All holdings under the original distribution were, by hypothesis, just, and people have used them to their advantage: if people were not entitled to use their holdings to their advantage (subject to not harming others) it is not clear why the original distribution would have allocated them any holdings. If the original distribution was just and people voluntarily moved from it to the new distribution then the new distribution must be just.
Nozickian entitlements theory may have the fewest problems of consistency. But although they may be few they are not trivial, particularly those relating to justice in initial acquisition, and to the rectification of past injustice.
During the 1960s, he mainly concentrated on writing A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. This complex work attempted to develop standards or principles of social justice that could apply to real societies.
Rawls called his concept of social justice "Justice as Fairness." It consists of two principles. Since he first published A Theory of Justice, he changed the wording of these principles several times. He published his last version in 2001.
The most controversial element of his theory of social justice was his Difference Principle. He first defined it in a 1968 essay. "All differences in wealth and income, all social and economic inequalities," he wrote, "should work for the good of the least favored."
Under the Difference Principle, Rawls favored maximizing the improvement of the "least-advantaged" group in society. He would do this not only by providing "fair equality of opportunity," but also by such possible ways as a guaranteed minimum income or minimum wage (his preference). Rawls agreed that this Difference Principle gave his theory of social justice a liberal character.
Finally, Rawls ranked his principles of social justice in the order of their priority. The First Principle ("basic liberties") holds priority over the Second Principle. The first part of the Second Principle ("fair equality of opportunity") holds priority over the second part (Difference Principle). But he believed that both the First and Second Principles together are necessary for a just society.
Rawls was interested in political philosophy. Thus he focused on the basic institutions of society. Unless such institutions as the constitution, economy, and education system operated in a fair way for all, he argued, social justice would not exist in a society.
Rawls devised a hypothetical version of the social contract. Some have called it a "thought experiment" (Rawls called it the "Original Position"). This was not a real gathering with real people, bargaining over an agreement. Instead, it was an imaginary meeting held under strict conditions that permitted individuals to deliberate only by using their reason and logic. Their task was to evaluate principles of social justice and choose the best ones. Their decision would be binding on their society forever.
Rawls added a requirement to assure that the choice of social justice principles would truly be impartial. The persons in this mental exercise had to choose their justice principles under a "veil of ignorance." This meant that these individuals would know nothing about their particular positions in society. It was as if some force had plucked these people from a society and caused them to experience severe amnesia.
Rawls argued that only under a "veil of ignorance" could human beings reach a fair and impartial agreement (contract) as true equals not biased by their place in society. They would have to rely only on the human powers of reason to choose principles of social justice for their society.
Rawls set up his "thought experiment" with several given systems of social justice principles. The task of the imaginary group members under the "veil of ignorance" was to choose one system of principles for their own society.
Rawls was mainly interested to see what choice the group would make between his own Justice as Fairness concept and another called "Average Utility." This concept of justice called for maximizing the average wealth of the people.
Clearly, designing economic, political, and social institutions that favored the "most advantaged" members of the society would not be justice for all. On the other hand, the members of the experiment group would rationally agree that equal rights and liberties, opportunities, and self-respect for all would be just.
In the example above, the best choice under the "maximin" rule would be SOCIETY A, which has the highest minimum wage. Those earning the average wage and above are doing pretty well as well. SOCIETY B with its higher average wage benefits those in the middle and at the top income levels, but largely ignores those at the bottom. This is the flaw of the Average Utility social justice system, according to Rawls.
Similarly, Rawls believed the persons in his experiment would rationally choose principles of social justice that maximized benefits for the "least advantaged." The individuals under the "veil of ignorance" do not know what position they really occupy in their society. Any one of them might be Bill Gates or an unemployed high school dropout.
To be on the safe side, Rawls maintained, the rational-thinking members of the imaginary group would choose the principles of justice that most benefited those at the bottom. In this way, Rawls believed, he had demonstrated that his Justice as Fairness principles, skewed toward the "least advantaged," were the best for building or reforming institutions for a just society.
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