Cfa Level 2 Concepts
Cherish Asleson
A term is defined as a human-readable phrase that names or describes a concept. A term is one of the properties of a description. Other properties of a description link the term to an identified concept and indicate the type of description, e.g. Fully Specified Name, Preferred Term, Synonym.
Concepts are linked to their more general parent concepts directly above them in a hierarchy. More general meanings, are usually at the top of the hierarchy. Descending levels of the hierarchy contain more specific or specialized meanings.
The concept file includes a special concept referred to as the root concept. It is the single concept that is at the top of the SNOMED CT concept hierarchy. All other concepts are descended from this root concept via at least one series of relationships of the Relationship type 116680003 Is a (attribute) , i.e. all other concepts are regarded as subclasses of this concept. The root concept code is 138875005 SNOMED CT Concept (SNOMED RT+CTV3) . All other SNOMED CT concepts are subtypes of the root concept. Unlike other SNOMED CT concepts, the root concept is not a subtype of any other concept.
Concepts that are directly related to the root concept by a single relationship of the Relationship type 116680003 Is a (attribute) are referred to as top-level concepts. All other concepts are descended from at least one top-level concept via at least one series of relationships of the Relationship type 116680003 Is a (attribute) , i.e. all other concepts represent subclasses of the meaning of at least one top-level concept.
A concept that is directly related to the root metadata concept, 900000000000441003 SNOMED CT Model Component (metadata) by a single relationship of the relationship type IS_A. All metadata concepts are descended from at least one top-level metadata concept via at least one series of relationships with Relationship type IS_A. Metadata codes represent structural information about the terminology itself. The top-level metadata concepts represent broad groups of metadata.
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There was one concept in the book that resonated with me; the opponent-process theory. The basic idea of what goes up must come down. The book explains the concept in general scientific terms, but not everyone is willing to pick up a book with 'neuroscience' in the title.
I feel a knowledge of the opponent-process theory could change how we talk about drug addiction. So, I wanted to make this high-level, scientific concept a little more accessible - and share my creative process with anyone interested.
There are certain elements of any communication you'll need to find before crafting your story. When writing technical stories, I use the Data Story Canvas. The canvas helps me to uncover the informational elements of my message.
But the brain learns with repeated drug exposure. The BRAIN RESPONSE gets faster, bigger, and longer-lasting. For the same amount of alcohol, the DRUG EFFECT is no longer felt. The BRAIN RESPONSE overrides it. It takes a larger amount of alcohol to feel the DRUG EFFECT. This is a sign of drug tolerance. With use over time, the BRAIN RESPONSE becomes powerful. It can trigger negative feelings. So, using the drug can make someone feel stable. Alcohol is now used to counter the feelings it made the brain create.
Compelling and memorable venues make people feel comfortable while also providing that element of surprise. Getting the right team, interior and food & beverages are all essential ingredients. We conceive, create and construct truly atmospheric venues.
In such a time-short yet health conscious world, people need healthy, high quality alternatives without having to spend hours on shopping and preparing. We support retail chains to change their business models and meet these new demands..
Providing offices, hospitals and schools with high-quality and affordable food is not easy, especially when time is pressing. We develop flexible and customized concepts and assortments for caterers/clients so that they can offer food to the same high standards as any hospitality venues.
Sizable events invariably mean high peaks and volumes, together with a large number of international and non-international visitors. The result? A need for smart operational processes and resource and logistics planning.
Some member states have used this opportunity to call into question important measures to strengthen safeguards that have been in place since the early 1990s. Most disconcerting have been challenges to IAEA authority under comprehensive safeguards agreements to verify the nondiversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a state with such an agreement.
The IAEA board and General Conference will have another opportunity to address this issue when they convene again this month to discuss the state-level concept. The purpose of this article is to assist the parties involved in those deliberations in understanding the legal basis for IAEA authority to verify the correctness and completeness of state declarations under comprehensive safeguards agreements and, in doing so, to call attention to the possible unintended consequences of those deliberations if the recent challenges to that authority are allowed to prevail.
The second part consisted of measures that the secretariat proposed be implemented on the basis of a new legal instrument. These measures were eventually transformed into the Model Additional Protocol, which the board approved in May 1997.[3]
In 2010 the Department of Safeguards presented the results of its long-term strategic plan for 2012-2023,[6] in which it stated that, in its efforts to focus its activities and resources where they mattered most in terms of achieving safeguards objectives, it would further develop the state-level concept and extend its application to all states.
There were no serious challenges to the implementation of that concept until 2012 when, for reasons that were not entirely apparent, Russia actively challenged the state-level concept.[7] Although some of its concerns were shared by other states, the challenges were particularly surprising because, as a nuclear-weapon state, Russia does not have a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force and because it had previously supported all of the early efforts to strengthen safeguards.
Among the issues raised by these states during the 2012 General Conference were the prospect that application of the state-level concept could result in the IAEA making political and subjective judgments about states; the need for further definition of specific elements of the concept, such as what constituted safeguards-relevant information and safeguards objectives; and the authority of the secretariat to implement the concept without approval of the board or General Conference. Clearly, further clarifications and information by the secretariat were necessary for states to fully understand the state-level concept.
Debates on the state-level concept provided an opportunity for states to express genuine concerns. Unfortunately, they also provided a platform for some states to call into question the most fundamental principle in the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreements: that the right and obligation of the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of state declarations derives from the agreements themselves.
Well before Programme 93+2 was initiated or the Model Additional Protocol even contemplated, the board made a number of decisions confirming that the IAEA had not just the right but the obligation to verify that all nuclear material required to be safeguarded under a comprehensive safeguards agreement was under safeguards and that, in fulfilling that obligation, the agency had the right to use all relevant information available to it about the state concerned. These decisions addressed a range of countries and issues.
Yet, the IAEA could look for indications of undeclared activities. In the case of Iraq, having sought such indications and not found any, the agency could conclude with a high degree of confidence that Iraq had not resumed its nuclear weapons program. As it turned out, the IAEA was right.
IAEA safeguards are not based on confidence; they are designed to create confidence. The degree of confidence created is directly dependent on the scope and reliability of the verification process. The real issue at stake here is not the state-level concept, but the risk of dramatic damage to effective safeguards implementation. There is a further risk that the damage could creep into the NPT review process.
Others can speculate on the underlying motivations of the vocal critics of the state-level concept. The more pressing concern is that the debate on the state-level concept might have unintentionally provided a vehicle for a rearguard attack on the hard-won progress made 20 years ago in strengthening safeguards. If so, this would be a dramatic and unfortunate example of the law of unintended consequences.
The biggest challenges to effective safeguards and their further evolution are not technical. They are a lack of knowledge about the history of safeguards and a misrepresentation of the history that capitalizes on that lack of knowledge. It is possible to correct the former and to limit the impact of the latter through education and communication by raising the level of knowledge about safeguards and the history of their evolution. It is incumbent on all parties to understand what has already been achieved in strengthening safeguards so that it is not necessary to reinvent those achievements.
One of the questions asked specifically about my colleague Dick Allington, since he has published articles and chapters saying that teaching kids with challenging text is a dumb idea. And, a couple of others queries referred to the advertising copy from Teachers College Press (TCP) about their programs. Both Dick and TCP threw the R-word (research) around quite a bit, but neither actually managed to marshal research support for their claims, which means that the instructional level, after 71 years, still remains unsubstantiated.
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