Abhidhamma realism in Theravada
Namdrol
You questioned my assertion that there is a realist tradition in Theravada
Abhidhamma which asserts that things posses natures and characteristics.
Based on traditional sources, I think it is fair to say that indeed there
is.
You only need to look at the single most influential commentarial abhidhamma
treatise in Thervada history to find it-- the Abhidhammatthasangaha.
Now, again you must understand that I truly enjoy the study of
Abhidharma/dhamma for its own sake, and have found that it is the basis of
any kind of real understanding of BuddhaDharma, regardless of sect or
tradition.
I think Lee's views on Theravada have been colored by his enthusiasm for
Nagarjauna [an enthusiasm I share, of course].
Now then, beginning with the Sautrantika view, the notion of svabhava and
svalakshana, i.e. natures and intrinsic characteristics are refuted against
the specific notion of the Sarvastivadins that arising had a secondary
chacteristic of arising, and so on-- please consult the second chapter of
the Abhidharmakosha for more details on this debate.
Now then, On page 25 of Bhikku Bodhi's translation we find the
Abhidhammatthasanghatha asserting:
"The things contained in the Abhidhamma, spoken of therein, are altogether
fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality, conciousness, mental
factors, matter and nibbaana."
Bhiku Bodhi then comments "Ultimate realitiee, in contrast, are things that
exist by reason of their own intrinsic nature (sabhaava)".
Now then, Nagarjuna, as we know, refutes svabhavas of any kind-- and
certainly svabhavas as defined here by Bhikku Bodhi. Therefor, my assertion
that there is an active and living realist tradition within Theravaada which
is subject to madhyamika criticism is certainly borne out and justified.
Having said that, Bhikku Bodhi also points at the very famous Burmese Master
of the 19th century, Ledi Sayadaw, was critical of this text. So of course,
as I mentioned elsewhere, Theravada is hardly a monolithic school.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
"Namdrol" <malcolm.smith@.genuity.com> wrote in message
news:bWg37.10$Zv6.85@burlma1-snr2...
I never said it was. It was you who made the "monolithic" claim by stating,
without qualification, that the Theravada tradition had a substatialist take on the
dhammas. I cited you to two scholars who clearly and repeatedly reject such a
charge. So we now agree.
Namdrol
"Lee Dillion" <dill...@home.com> wrote in message
news:6_g37.336327$p33.6...@news1.sttls1.wa.home.com...
> I never said it was. It was you who made the "monolithic" claim by
stating,
> without qualification, that the Theravada tradition had a substatialist
take on the
> dhammas. I cited you to two scholars who clearly and repeatedly reject
such a
> charge. So we now agree.
But is it correct to state that Thervada Abhidhamma can be criticized within
the context of the four tenet system originating in India and preserved in
Tibet and China. Also-- if the two scholars in question are modern
Theravadins-- I question whether or not they were influenced by a reading of
Nagajruna.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
Well, lets back up a bit. I have been arguing a narrow point that your assertion that
the Theravada position on dhammas is substantialist is incorrect since, at the very
least, Nyanaponika and Karunadasa state otherwise. Whether they were influenced by
Nagarjuna or not, you now appear to concede my point that the two modern Theravada
scholars clearly reject your contention.
As for what the tradition understood in earlier times and whether that understanding
was monolithic are separate questions that I would be interested in learning more
about. So, putting aside your Tibetan commentaries on another tradition, what
passages in the Abhidhammatthasangaha lead you to conclude that the Theravada
understanding of dhammas was substantialist and that such understanding was
monolithic?
--
Lee Dillion
dill...@home.com
Namdrol
> Well, lets back up a bit. I have been arguing a narrow point that your
assertion that
> the Theravada position on dhammas is substantialist is incorrect since, at
the very
> least, Nyanaponika and Karunadasa state otherwise. Whether they were
influenced by
> Nagarjuna or not, you now appear to concede my point that the two modern
Theravada
> scholars clearly reject your contention.
>
> As for what the tradition understood in earlier times and whether that
understanding
> was monolithic are separate questions that I would be interested in
learning more
> about. So, putting aside your Tibetan commentaries on another tradition,
what
> passages in the Abhidhammatthasangaha lead you to conclude that the
Theravada
> understanding of dhammas was substantialist and that such understanding
was
> monolithic?
The second passage of the first chapter and the thirty second passage of the
sixth chapter-- and generally most of the discussions about the nature of
paramattha dhammas that I have read.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
> what
> > passages in the Abhidhammatthasangaha lead you to conclude that the
> Theravada
> > understanding of dhammas was substantialist and that such understanding
> was
> > monolithic?
> The second passage of the first chapter and the thirty second passage of the
> sixth chapter-- and generally most of the discussions about the nature of
> paramattha dhammas that I have read.
Perhaps you could quote a few passages that illustrate your point?
Lee Dillion
Just to be clear, I am not arguing for a monolithic understanding of the dhammas in
the Theravada tradition rejecting a substantialist take since I am not remotely
qualified to speak authoritavely on behalf of a tradition that I do not belong to.
Rather, I am seeking clarification on what it does or does not teach. For example,
last year, in response to an interesting post by Tang, I wrote the following:
-------
I would be interested if anyone else has an opinion on this issue. I
think Tang makes a number of valid points regarding the Abhidhamma. For
example, the quote below from the introduction by Bhikkhu Bodhi to "A
Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" seems to make claims that
Nyanaponika was rejecting, and yet Bhikkhu Bodhi edited the most recent
reissue of Nyanaponika's "Abhidhamma Studies."
"This project starts from the premise that to attain the wisdom that
knows things "as they really are," a sharp wedge must be driven between
those types of entities that possess ontological ultimacy, that is, the
dhammas, and those types of entities that exist only as conceptual
constructs but are mistakenly grasped as ultimately real. Proceeding
from this distinction, the Abhidhamma posits a fixed number of dhammas
as the building blocks of actuality, most of which are drawn from the
Suttas. It then sets out to define all the doctrinal terms used in the
Suttas in ways that reveal their identity with the ontological ultimates
recognized by the system. On the basis of these definitions, it
exhaustively classifies the dhammas into a net of pre-determined
categories and modes of relatedness which highlight their place within
the system's structure. And since the system is held to be a true
reflection of actuality, this means that the classification pinpoints
the place of each dhamma within the overall structure of actuality."
---------
Perhaps someone trained in the tradition like Punnadhammo could help us out?
Namdrol
Sure, for example a foot note to Mahasi Sayadaw's commntary notes this:
"The Sub-commentary to the Brahmajala Sutta explains as follows: "Things in
their true nature (paramatthadhamma) have two characteristics or marks:
specific characteristics and general characteristics. The understanding of
the specific characteristics is knowledge by experience (paccakkha-ñana),
while the understanding of the general characteristics is knowledge by
inference (anumana-ñana)." The specific characteristic, for instance, of the
element of motion (vayo-dhatu) is its nature of supporting, its function of
moving; its general characteristics are impermanence, etc.
Again another footnote to a commentary by Webu Sayadaw:
" Paññatti denotes all ideas, notions, names, words. The paramattha dhamma,
the ultimate truths, are not (paññatti) as they really exist. Paramattha
dhamma are defined as being fourfold: consciousness, mental properties,
matter and Nibbana"
And Bhiku Bodhi's comment in his introduction to the aforementioned text:
"The Abhidhamma conception of consciousness further results in a new primary
scheme for classifying the ultimate constituents of existence, a scheme
which eventually, in the later Abhidhamma literature, takes precedence over
the schemes inherited from the Suttas such as the aggregates, sense bases,
and elements. In the Abhidhamma Pitaka the latter categories still loom
large, but the view of mind as consisting of momentary concurrences of
consciousness and its concomitants leads to a fourfold method of
classification more congenial to the system. This is the division of
actuality into the four ultimate realities (paramattha): consciousness,
mental factors, material phenomena, and Nibbana (citta, cetasika, rupa,
nibbana), the first three comprising conditioned reality and the last the
unconditioned element."
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
Yes, I think I see your error. You have perhaps made the mistake of understanding the
use of the word ultimate in an ontological sense rather than its intended analytical
sense. This is what Punnadhammo said to Tang (on 1999/09/30) when he made the same
charge as yours:
------
> Tang: Actually the five aggregates, just like all Buddhist classifications, are
> only convenient cuts of a fluid reality that is ultimately resistant to
> mind-ordained categories. They are ultimates only in the
> Abhidhamma-Abhidharma.
Not even there, except in the later commentories. I mentioned one before in
this forum a fascinating article by Y. Karunadasa "The Dhamma Theory as the
ABhidhamma Theory of Reality." His point is that the ultimate dhammas are
only ultimate in the sense that they cannot be further analyzed. They are
not real in any ontological sense. They only take what reality they have at
second-hand, as it were, through relations with other dhammas. Everything
whatsoever, in this view, is defined in terms of the relations of other
things.
A very brief quote:
"Analysis shows that the world of experience is resolveable into a
plurality of factors; synthesis shows these factors are not discrete
entities existing in themselves but inter-connected and inter-dependent
nodes in a complex web of relationships. It is only for the purposes of
definition and discussion that things are artificially dissected. In
actuality the world given to experience is a vast network of tightly woven
relationships."
--------
In an even earlier exchange with DT, Punnadhammo stated as follows:
------------
I've just been reading a fascinating little book, "Beyond the Metaphysics
of Commonsense" which is a collection of papers delivered at a conference
in Sri Lanka which brought together Buddhist scholars and physicists to
discuss and debate the question "what is real?"
One of the papers dealt with the answer to this given by Abhidhamma, and
throws a new perspective on the question. The author (Y. Karunadasa)
maintains that it was only a late scholastic development which gave a
substantive reality to the ultimate dhammas. (That is, in the four
categories of consciousness, mental-formations, matter and nibbana)
In the earliest texts, he argues, it is clear that these are only ultimate
in an analytic or pedagogical sense in that one cannot break them down into
anything more basic. In the ontological sense the only reality they have is
relational.
What this means is that nothing at all exists except relations. Everything
is ultimately dependent on everything else, and can only be said to exist
as a product of that relationship. Seeing individual things is only an
abstraction.
Other papers use the analogy of Indra's Net from Hua Yen Buddhism to bring
out the same point.
The great thing about this view is that it transcends both the naive
realism of the materialists and the naive monism of the eternalists.
----------
--
Lee Dillion
dill...@home.com
Namdrol
>
> Yes, I think I see your error. You have perhaps made the mistake of
understanding the
> use of the word ultimate in an ontological sense rather than its intended
analytical
> sense. This is what Punnadhammo said to Tang (on 1999/09/30) when he made
the same
> charge as yours:
I do not beleive it to be an error-- Bhikku Bodhi states iin his comment:
"Ultimate realities are characterized not only from an ontological angle as
ultimate existents...."
"Although ultimate realities exist as the concrete essences of things..."
<snip>
> What this means is that nothing at all exists except relations. Everything
> is ultimately dependent on everything else, and can only be said to exist
> as a product of that relationship. Seeing individual things is only an
Naagarjuna rejects even this-- claiming that things exist only as
conventions-- even the "relationships" are merely conventions. This forceful
refutation is contained in Nagarjuna sustained refutation of the four causes
andisx conditions asserted by the Saravastivadins.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
If the short quote from Bhikku Bodhi stands for the proposition that the dhammas are
ontological ultimates - which implies to me that they are unconditioned - then the
criticism by you and Nagarjuna would be well founded. On the other hand, such an
interpretation seems like such a simple and fundamental error given the pali canon, I
cannot help but believe I am missing something.
Namdrol
>
> If the short quote from Bhikku Bodhi stands for the proposition that the
dhammas are
> ontological ultimates - which implies to me that they are unconditioned -
then the
> criticism by you and Nagarjuna would be well founded. On the other hand,
such an
> interpretation seems like such a simple and fundamental error given the
pali canon, I
> cannot help but believe I am missing something.
Here is another quote from an earlier introduction to the same text, written
by U Rewata Dhamma and Bhikku Bodhi:
"In contrast to the Suttas, the Abhidhamma Pitaka is intended to divulge as
starkly and directly as possible the totalistic system that underlies the
Suttanta expositions and upon which the individual discourses draw. The
Abhidhamma takes no account of the personal inclinations and cognitive
capacities of the listeners; it makes no concessions to particular pragmatic
requirements. It reveals the architectonics of actuality in an abstract,
formalistic manner utterly devoid of literary embellishments and pedagogical
expedients. Thus the Abhidhamma method is described as the
nippariyaya-dhammadesana, the literal or unembellished discourse on the
Dhamma.
This difference in technique between the two methods also influences their
respective terminologies. In the Suttas the Buddha regularly makes use of
conventional language (voharavacana) and accepts conventional truth
(sammutisacca), truth expressed in terms of entities that do not possess
ontological ultimacy but can still be legitimately referred to them. Thus in
the Suttas the Buddha speaks of "I" and "you," of "man" and "woman," of
living beings, persons, and even self as though they were concrete
realities. The Abhidhamma method of exposition, however, rigorously
restricts itself to terms that are valid from the standpoint of ultimate
truth (paramatthasacca): dhammas, their characteristics, their functions,
and their relations. Thus in the Abhidhamma all such conceptual entities
provisionally accepted in the Suttas for purposes of meaningful
communication are resolved into their ontological ultimates, into bare
mental and material phenomena that are impermanent, conditioned, and
dependently arisen, empty of any abiding self or substance."
While I was poking around I found an interesting passage on access to
insight:
"The Citta which has been trained, which is freed from defilements and which
is pure must still depend on the aggregates while they are alive. But the
duty and work of one whose Citta is pure will only be for the good of the
world. This pure Citta is called "Arahant" or Arahat." The person who is an
Arahant has a Citta which is entirely pure in all respects. His Citta is
completely free from anything which will cause it to be born again and it
will encounter happiness which is entirely satisfying while there is still
life. When he dies, it has absolute bliss and it has no Dukkha, nor any
involvement with the mundane, relative world (Sammuti).
Thus there is a saying of the Buddha which states "Nibbanam Paramam Suññam"
which means "Nibbana is entirely empty" -- of all Dukkha. But it does not
mean that when one has attained Nibbana there is nothing left, as the world
understands "emptiness" to mean. But one also does not "exist" in the way
that the world exists. In other words, the happiness of Nibbana is happiness
specific to Nibbana without -- any of the mundane conventions (and the pure
Citta still "is"). If the Citta still wears the form of the aggregates when
the defilements have been completely eradicated, it means that it has
attained to freedom."
--Bhikkhu Ñanasampanno Maha Thera
punnadhammo
<malcolm.smith@.genuity.com> wrote:
> Having said that, Bhikku Bodhi also points at the very famous Burmese Master
> of the 19th century, Ledi Sayadaw, was critical of this text. So of course,
> as I mentioned elsewhere, Theravada is hardly a monolithic school.
True enough. Here is another view, from the scholar Peter Harvey
The Vibhajjavada (Theravada) distinguished between the existence of
present dhammas and past or future ones, and largely resisted the
tendency to reify dhammas, retaining the older, more experiential
understanding of their nature. They insisted on the uniqueness of
Nibbana as the sole unconditioned dhamma...As unconditioned, Nibbana
can have no temporal or spatial relationship with anything, even by
negation: no place or time can be nearer to or further from it. It is
not separate from the conditioned world, but is as it were, always
available to be experienced. As it is also the stopping of conditioned
dhammas, this seems to imply that, ultimately they are not real. The
notion of "own-nature" does occur in the Theravada as well as
Sarvastivada tradition, but in a different sense than there.
Buddhaghosa, the fifth century AD commentator, explains dhammas thus:
"They are dhammas because they uphold their own-nature. They are
dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld
according to their own-nature." (Atthasalani 39) Here "own-nature"
would appear to mean a characteristic nature, which is not something
inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arises due to
the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurences
of that dhamma. This is of significance because it makes the Mahayana
critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant
to the Theravada.
Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism, 1990. p. 87
Lee Dillion
I have read this intro before. But as I noted previously, I am not attempting to
argue that the Theravada had a monolithic understanding of the dhammas, simply that
two respected commentators within the tradition reject your substantialist charge.
I suggest that you read Karunadasa's small book on Dhamma Theory. It is only 40
pages long, it does an excellent job of discussing the complex history of the
dhamma theory in Theravada, and states that "the Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka did not
succumb to this error of conceiving of the dhammas as ultimate unities or discrete
entities. In the Pali tradition it is only for the sake of definition and
description that each dhamma is postulated as if it were a separate entity: but in
reality it is by no means a solitary phenomenon having an existence of its own."
p.8
If you prefer to think that Karunadasa is misrepresenting the tradition and is
really just stating a modern position in response to the critique of Nagarjuna, you
are free to do so.
Namdrol
Well, what I am is struck by is the fact that as far as I can determine,
prior to the twentieth century, with remarkable consistency, the views
attributed to Theravaadins in Indian texts such as MMK, etc., are in
remarkable consonance with whaty Anuradha, Buddhaghosa, etc., report.
I do not think that Karunadasa is "misrepresenting" his tradition, rather, I
think that like everything, there is always room for dissenting opinions
even with a tradition.
Namdrol
Namdrol
"punnadhammo" <arcc@STOPSPAM_baynet.net> wrote in message
news:120720012119215518%arcc@STOPSPAM_baynet.net...
> Buddhaghosa, the fifth century AD commentator, explains dhammas thus:
> "They are dhammas because they uphold their own-nature. They are
> dhammas because they are upheld by conditions or they are upheld
> according to their own-nature." (Atthasalani 39) Here "own-nature"
> would appear to mean a characteristic nature, which is not something
> inherent in a dhamma as a separate ultimate reality, but arises due to
> the supporting conditions both of other dhammas and previous occurences
> of that dhamma. This is of significance because it makes the Mahayana
> critique of the Sarvastivadin's notion of own-nature largely irrelevant
> to the Theravada.
If you read Naagaarjuna, he clearly refutes this notion in the MMK chapter
15. So I must disagree with Peter Harvey-- Theravaadins remina suceptible to
precisely the criticisms that Vasubandhu leveled against the Sarvastivaada
notion of svalakshana, and the criticisms that Naagaarjuna levels against
both svabhava and conditionality in MMK.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
I doubt we will progress much beyond this stalemate. But once again, I suggest you
read Karunadasa. I think you will find his discussion of the dhamma theory
interesting, if only because of its careful and precise analysis of terminology
that is easily misunderstood. In particular, his discussion of terms like
saccikattha and paramattha (real and ultimate) when applied to the dhammas is worth
the price of admission.
His study presents his position not a s a minority view within a substantialist
tradition but as the majority view easily understood by outsiders without the
training in the tradition.
Lee Dillion
And if you read Karunadasa, you would find the Theravada response on pages 12-19.
Namdrol
I'll remember to look for the text the next time i am at a bookstore with a
decent Theravaadin collection.
In the meantime, can you summerize his points?
Namdrol
>
>
Lee Dillion
> > And if you read Karunadasa, you would find the Theravada response on pages
> 12-19.
>
> I'll remember to look for the text the next time i am at a bookstore with a
> decent Theravaadin collection.
>
> In the meantime, can you summerize his points?
In essence (oops), he states that the use of the word sabhava is repeatedly
qualified in the tradition by the fact that a "dhamma is not that which bears its
own nature, but that which is born by its own conditions" a subtle point that
"attributes a passive role to the dhammas and downgrades it from the subject of a
substantial bearer to an object." He writes that "what is radical about this new
definition [as distinguished from other schools' use of the word to denote an
active, agency role for the dhammas] is that it reverses the whole process which
otherwise might culminate in the conception of dhammas as substances or bearers of
their own nature."
He does a similar treatment with "salakkhana", each time clearly distinguishing the
intent and understanding of the word from its use by the Sarvastivadins, the school
that you wrongfully equate (in Karunadasa's take) to the Theravada.
Namdrol
> In essence (oops), he states that the use of the word sabhava is
repeatedly
> qualified in the tradition by the fact that a "dhamma is not that which
bears its
> own nature, but that which is born by its own conditions" a subtle point
that
Yes, this notion is what Naagaarjuna calls "other natured" [parabhaava],
which is itself a species of svabhaava.
> "attributes a passive role to the dhammas and downgrades it from the
subject of a
> substantial bearer to an object." He writes that "what is radical about
this new
> definition [as distinguished from other schools' use of the word to denote
an
> active, agency role for the dhammas] is that it reverses the whole process
which
> otherwise might culminate in the conception of dhammas as substances or
bearers of
> their own nature."
>
> He does a similar treatment with "salakkhana", each time clearly
distinguishing the
> intent and understanding of the word from its use by the Sarvastivadins,
the school
> that you wrongfully equate (in Karunadasa's take) to the Theravada.
No I accept that there are differences between Sarvastivada presentations of
intrinsic characteristics and the treatement of intrinsic characterisitcs in
the Theravada. What I am asserting is that when you begin to claim that
things have "intrinsic characteristics" at all-- you run into trouble. This
is why I still maintain that Theravada abhidhammikas are exposed to
criticism from Madhyamika.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
>
> "Lee Dillion" <dill...@home.com> wrote in message
> news:o4C37.341512$p33.6...@news1.sttls1.wa.home.com...
>
> > In essence (oops), he states that the use of the word sabhava is
> repeatedly
> > qualified in the tradition by the fact that a "dhamma is not that which
> bears its
> > own nature, but that which is born by its own conditions" a subtle point
> that
>
> Yes, this notion is what Naagaarjuna calls "other natured" [parabhaava],
> which is itself a species of svabhaava.
Incorrect, as the "other nature" theory is also expressly rejected by Karunadasa on p
15-16. I can keep in typing responses from his book to your misunderstandings, but I
would prefer you read the book then we could discuss it more.
The other option is we capture a live theravadin monk (using the promise of food,
perhaps) and torture him with my Western Secular Buddhist babble until he gives up the
secrets of the Abhidhamma.
In the meantime, my defense of the theravada is to this 6', slightly overweight, white
guy trying to play center for the Lakers. I can stand here and take shots, but it
won't be pretty.
>
> > "attributes a passive role to the dhammas and downgrades it from the
> subject of a
> > substantial bearer to an object." He writes that "what is radical about
> this new
> > definition [as distinguished from other schools' use of the word to denote
> an
> > active, agency role for the dhammas] is that it reverses the whole process
> which
> > otherwise might culminate in the conception of dhammas as substances or
> bearers of
> > their own nature."
> >
> > He does a similar treatment with "salakkhana", each time clearly
> distinguishing the
> > intent and understanding of the word from its use by the Sarvastivadins,
> the school
> > that you wrongfully equate (in Karunadasa's take) to the Theravada.
>
> No I accept that there are differences between Sarvastivada presentations of
> intrinsic characteristics and the treatement of intrinsic characterisitcs in
> the Theravada. What I am asserting is that when you begin to claim that
> things have "intrinsic characteristics" at all-- you run into trouble. This
> is why I still maintain that Theravada abhidhammikas are exposed to
> criticism from Madhyamika.
I read Karunadasa to expressly reject the idea that the dhammas are possessors of
anything, intrinsically or otherwise - that being the import of shifting the dhamma
from a subject to an object. He writes:
"Another common definition of dhamma is that which bears its own characteristic,
salakkhana. Since salakkhana is used in the same sense as sabhava, this definition
carries more or less the same implications. That each dhamma has its own
characteristic is illustrated with reference to its colour, which is one of the
secondary material elements. Although color is divisible as blue, yellow, etc., the
characteristic peculiar to all varieties of colour is their visibility. Hence it is
also called individual characteristic. As in the case of dhamma and sabhava, so in
the case of dhamma and salakkhana too, their duality is only a convenient assumption
made for the purpose of definition. For it is a case of attributing duality to that
which has no duality. And since it is only an attribution it is based on
interpretation and not on actuality. Hence the definition of earth element as 'that
which has" the characteristic of solidity is said to be invalid from an ultimate point
of view"
--
Lee Dillion
dill...@home.com
Namdrol
>
> "Another common definition of dhamma is that which bears its own
characteristic,
> salakkhana. Since salakkhana is used in the same sense as sabhava, this
definition
> carries more or less the same implications. That each dhamma has its own
> characteristic is illustrated with reference to its colour, which is one
of the
> secondary material elements. Although color is divisible as blue, yellow,
etc., the
> characteristic peculiar to all varieties of colour is their visibility.
Hence it is
> also called individual characteristic. As in the case of dhamma and
sabhava, so in
> the case of dhamma and salakkhana too, their duality is only a convenient
assumption
> made for the purpose of definition. For it is a case of attributing
duality to that
> which has no duality. And since it is only an attribution it is based on
> interpretation and not on actuality. Hence the definition of earth
element as 'that
> which has" the characteristic of solidity is said to be invalid from an
ultimate point
> of view"
All he is doing in this passage is saying that things do not possess
characterisitics, they are there own characteristics; so for example, heat
would not be a characteristic of fire, it would be fire. I do not see,
however, how he avoids attributing substantial existence to things. So,
what, for Karunadas, is ultimately true?
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
> All he is doing in this passage is saying that things do not possess
> characterisitics, they are there own characteristics; so for example, heat
> would not be a characteristic of fire, it would be fire. I do not see,
> however, how he avoids attributing substantial existence to things.
I am missing something in your reasoning. If you could, please break down your steps
showing how you to reach the conclusion that he cannot avoid attributing substantial
existence to things.
> So,
> what, for Karunadas, is ultimately true?
I suppose anicca, dukkha, and anatta, but he provides a more technical discussion on
pages 27-40. I am struggling to comprehend his approach fully, so I hesitate to
paraphrase. I can only report that he repeatedly denies your charge of
substantialism. Whether he is successful in his denial is something you should find
of interest.
I suspect that our debate could get highly technical, and I do not have the skills to
take it much deeper. Reminds me of the debates that Dreyfus describes in his book
Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. I have
read and reread this book, each time picking up something I missed previously. And
while I can follow large portions of the debates, I have difficulty putting them into
my own words in a way that is not misleading. This is a long way of saying once again
that you should read Karunadasa directly and not rely on my potentially misleading
interpretations. I think the book cost all of $4US and is available from most online
bookstores.
--
Lee Dillion
dill...@home.com
Namdrol
>
> "Namdrol" <malcolm.smith@.genuity.com> wrote in message
> news:HwE37.97$Zv6.1489@burlma1-snr2...
>
> > All he is doing in this passage is saying that things do not possess
> > characterisitics, they are there own characteristics; so for example,
heat
> > would not be a characteristic of fire, it would be fire. I do not see,
> > however, how he avoids attributing substantial existence to things.
>
> I am missing something in your reasoning. If you could, please break down
your steps
> showing how you to reach the conclusion that he cannot avoid attributing
substantial
> existence to things.
In other words, by asserting that characteristics are in themselves the
things they are characterizing, you do not avoid realism; you avoid infinite
regress, which is the fault for which the Sarvastivadins are taken to task
by the Sautrantikas. Secondly, merely by asserting that dharmas are
dependent on other dharmas and upon their own series [which itself opens up
a whole other can of worms which I will describe below], one still has to
accept the consequence that either the supporting dharma is real, or the
derived dharma is real.
For example, when Bhiku Bodhi discusses this, he asserts that dependent upon
earth, etc., we see moutains-- this moutain is not real in an ultimate
sense, because it is derived from the earth element; the earth element is
real in an ultimate sense and needs to be so in order to account for
reality.
In the case of ultimate things, it seems that Karunadas is asserting that an
instance of earth depends on another instance of earth, as well as the other
three elements; but in this instance, in order for this earth to be anything
other than a mere convention, and hence unreal, it must by definition exist
in the ultimate sense. Therefor, I do not see how Karunadas escapes the
charge of substantialism.
Moreover, if it is the case that this present instance of earth depends on a
previous instance of earth, how is possible that a cause does not exist at
the time of its effect? How is it possible that the something
[conventionally existent] is produced from something [conventionally]
non-existent?, such as a cause that does not exist at the time of its
produced effect?
And so on.
Namdrol
Lee Dillion
> > I am missing something in your reasoning. If you could, please break down
> your steps
> > showing how you to reach the conclusion that he cannot avoid attributing
> substantial
> > existence to things.
> In other words, by asserting that characteristics are in themselves the
> things they are characterizing, you do not avoid realism; you avoid infinite
> regress, which is the fault for which the Sarvastivadins are taken to task
> by the Sautrantikas. Secondly, merely by asserting that dharmas are
> dependent on other dharmas and upon their own series [which itself opens up
> a whole other can of worms which I will describe below], one still has to
> accept the consequence that either the supporting dharma is real, or the
> derived dharma is real.
This does not follow. You are correct only if you make the questionable demand
that you have a foundational metaphysics, a requirement debated across the
philosophical spectrum.
Further, as Karunadasa notes:
"It is not empirically possible to identify an absolute original cause of the
"dhammic" process. Such a metaphysical conception is not in accord with Buddhism's
empirical doctrine of causality, the purpose of which is not to explain how the
world began but to describe the uninterrupted continuity of the samsaric process
whose absolute beginning is not conceivable. In this regard it must be remembered
that as a system of philosophy the Abhidhamma is descriptive and not speculative."
--
-----------------
Lee Dillion
dill...@home.com