Naomi Gayle Rivkis and realism
Christopher Stone
made and would like to address them.
I proceed from two statements which Naomi made: first, "I am a realist [in
international relations]," and secondly, "[claims] in international
politics are never decided on the basis of justice." Naomi, if you do not
agree that these were your premises, please correct me (or retract your
premises, as the case may be!) :)
Naomi seems to be accusing me of forcing her to defend "realpolitik,"
which she distinguishes from realism -- remembering, of course, that she
endorsed the latter. In forcing her to defend realpolitik, she claims
that I am locking her into certain doctrinnaire assumptions which she does
not endorse.
I also proceed on the assumption that realism is in fact a highly codified
theory of international relations. IMHO if Naomi does not endorse much of
this theory, she should not have explicitly endorsed realism by name.
First off, I would ask Naomi to distinguish between realpolitik and
realism. I have always argued from the assumption that they are one and
the same. I used the word "realpolitik" in several of my posts, but I
could just as easily used the word "realism." In fact, when discussing
"realpolitik," I talked about Hans Morgenthau, who explictly uses the term
"realism" and is considered the intellectual pioneer of realist thought.
I therefore do not believe I am locking her into any assumptions which do
not naturally accompany that doctrine of realism.
Naomi's instistence that questions of justice never enter into
international relations is the sine qua non of realism. It defines
realist thinking. There are certain implications to realist thinking
which I think Naomi would be hard pressed to deny: the anarchic nature of
the international system, for one. Again, correct me if you disagree. :)
Naomi told us that outcomes in international politics were decided on
terms of "power" -- again, I believe that this is a direct quote and that
it coincides perfectly with realist thought. However, she later provided
a counterexample to her own thinking: she said that American policy
towards Israel was determined, in part, by domestic interest groups such
as AIPAC. Preumably when domestic interest groups determine a political
outcome, such as America's stance towards Israel, raw power does not
necessarily determine that outcome. An example of domestic groups in
Israel determining Israeli stances towards Arab states might be the Gush
Emunim, who presumably exerted influence upon the Likud -- as one of the
Likud's natural constituencies -- to take a hard line vis-a-vis the Arab
states. Again, this hard-line outcome was not necessarily due to power
alone, or due to a rational calculation of Israeli national interests by
Shamir, but due to domestic political bargaining and compromise.
We therefore see that Naomi rejects at least one key element of power
politics and realism, realpolitik, or whatever you want to call this
worldview. And it would seem, to me anyway, to be difficult to
simultaneously say that international politics is determined only by power
calculations and that it can also be determined by domestic political
factors. That is not to say that outcomes in international politics are
not *sometimes* determined by power politics, but rather that they are not
*always* decided by power politics.
To reapt, I don't think Naomi can have it both ways. She could claim that
outcomes are *sometimes* determined by national interest calculations, but
not was not her original claim -- her original claim was that outcomes
"are" not determined by questions of justice, but rather by power. She
did not add any qualifier or modifier to this statement.
Naomi further claims that she can endorse *some* realist claims, but that
she need not endorse *all* realist claims. She is correct on this point,
although her original post certainly indicated she was a hard-core realist
(prior to her rejection of moderation, that is!). However, I would say
that there are a couple of assumptions that one must accept if one is a
realist -- and one such assumption is the determination of political
outcomes not based on domestic political factors, but on the basis of one
state's power vis-a-vis another state.
There are a few axioms which Naomi cannot reject and still remain a realist.
And she did claim to be a realist.
Let me give an example: I once had a friend who claimed he was a Marxist, but
he hastened to add that he did not accept the theory of surplus labor, nor
of historical determininsm, nor that "good things come from the
proletariat." It seems to me that he left little ground on which he could
claim to be a Marxist -- he "Guamed" himself, so to speak. There were a
few tenets of Marxism which one could not abandon and still remain a
Marxist -- doctrines such as surplus labor and historical determinism were
the sine qua non of Marxism.
Likewise, there are certain doctrines which one must endorse to be a
realist. That's not to recognize that there is a distinction between hard
core and soft core realists, but that there are some doctrines which one
cannot abandon if one is to remain a realist. Among the concepts which
are the sine qua non of realism: the state is the main unit in
international relations; domestic factors don't significantly enter into
the equations which determine outcomes; national interests are paramount.
Perhaps Naomi does not endorse all these concepts. However, if that is
the case, she should not have called herself a realist and explictly
identifies national interest politics as her starting point. And if she
does not truly endorse realism, we must call into question her insistence
that justice never enters into the equation in international politics.
Perhaps justice is a minor factor that influences international relations
only rarely -- this might be construed as the stance of a soft
core realist. It did not seem to me that Naomi endorsed this stance, and
if she did, she ought to tell us why the Palestine dispute should not be
one of the infrequent cases when justice does enter into the equation --
after all, there are religious overtones to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, which would suggest to a soft-core realist that the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be one of those few cases where justice
is important.
Again, hard core realists would reject justice as altogether irrelevant,
but Naomi does not seem to want to embrace hard core realism.
And one final point: I think Naomi ought to tell us why she views the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a transnational conflict, rather than a
communal conflict within the borders within one state. Presumably, if it
is but a communal conflict, realist claims about the nature of
internationa politics do not apply.
In sum, I believe that if Naomi agrees with the original quotes and
premises of her writings which I cited, I believe there is sufficient
ground to conclude that she is being inconsistent.
--
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Naomi Gayle Rivkis
>Unfortunately, I lost Naomi's post, but I remember most of the points she
>made and would like to address them.
Well, you misunderstood a few in the first place, which seems to be where
the trouble comes in; I'll concentrate on those, since the rest of what
you say is irrelevant, springing from bad premises.
>Naomi seems to be accusing me of forcing her to defend "realpolitik,"
>which she distinguishes from realism -- remembering, of course, that she
>endorsed the latter. In forcing her to defend realpolitik, she claims
>that I am locking her into certain doctrinnaire assumptions which she does
>not endorse.
>
>I also proceed on the assumption that realism is in fact a highly codified
>theory of international relations. IMHO if Naomi does not endorse much of
>this theory, she should not have explicitly endorsed realism by name.
>First off, I would ask Naomi to distinguish between realpolitik and
>realism. I have always argued from the assumption that they are one and
>the same.
Here's the heart of the confusion (I'll give you the benefit of the doubt
and assume that it's confusion rather than dishonesty). I don't see any
wrong whatsoever in using "realism" in its standard dictionary definition
rather than as a title for "a highly codified theory of international
relations". In fact, when I made a distinction between realpolitik and
realistic analysis, I was deliberately trying to head you *away* from
this particular mistake, using a common, everyday word that in normal
conversation both political and nonpolitical means simply a belief in
looking at the world as it's handed to you rather than as you'd like it
to be. I recognize that realpolitik is a highly codified theory, that's
what I don't like about it. I've never yet met *any* highly codified
theory I accepted in its entirety. So I tried to distinguish by using
a word that did *not* necessarily apply to a highly codified, complex
set of interlocking (and not always logically dependent) concepts. You
are now taking a word whose primary meaning is general and insisting that
because it is very rarely but occasionally used to mean a set of specifics
which already -- as you point out -- has another name, I may not use it
in its most basic definition. I think this is a semantic game you have
no business playing.
For future reference, then, the definition of realism as I've heard it
used in everyday circumstances ranging from this sort of political dis-
cussion to questions of a child's bedtime: realism is the premise that
it's more likely to get you what you want if you look at the physical
facts of the situation and at what your opponent wants from you than you
are by building moral castles in the air, as the latter rarely convince
anyone who was already in opposition to you.
>Naomi told us that outcomes in international politics were decided on
>terms of "power" -- again, I believe that this is a direct quote and that
>it coincides perfectly with realist thought. However, she later provided
>a counterexample to her own thinking: she said that American policy
>towards Israel was determined, in part, by domestic interest groups such
>as AIPAC. Preumably when domestic interest groups determine a political
>outcome, such as America's stance towards Israel, raw power does not
>necessarily determine that outcome.
Nonsense. That's just power being exerted on the deciding individuals
directly rather than power exerted on the nation they represent. Pres-
suring individuals is often more effective but less reliable than pres-
suring nations: it takes less force to influence an individual, since
they're smaller in the scope of their interests and easier to affect,
but individuals are quirkier and liable to turn martyr on you if not
carefully handled.
You are now going to insist that it is not a part of realist doctrine
to accept that power games can be played on the individual level so as
to affect the international level. I repeat, I do not accept any such
doctrine, and mean the word 'realist' strictly in its conversational,
not-necessarily-political sense.
>And it would seem, to me anyway, to be difficult to
>simultaneously say that international politics is determined only by power
>calculations and that it can also be determined by domestic political
>factors.
Power -- economic, political, rhetorical, personal or physical -- can
be exerted at the domestic level as easily as at the international. It
is ludicrous to say that there's a contradiction between domestic poli-
tics and the use of power; any basic political science textbook will
tell you that the *definition* of politics is the manipulation of power.
>To repeat, I don't think Naomi can have it both ways. She could claim that
>outcomes are *sometimes* determined by national interest calculations, but
>not was not her original claim -- her original claim was that outcomes
>"are" not determined by questions of justice, but rather by power. She
>did not add any qualifier or modifier to this statement.
Why are you equating "not decided by justice, but rather by the manip-
ulation of power and by trade" with "not decided at the domestic level
but only at the international"? This makes no sense. Don't tell me that
the reason is that this is what the devotees of realpolitik say about it;
I've told you, this has absolutely no influence on me.
>There are a few axioms which Naomi cannot reject and still remain a realist.
>And she did claim to be a realist.
You once again make the mistake of assuming that I meant the term as a
technical reference to a precise political doctrine, rather than as a
functional English word with a perfectly good nondoctrinal meaning. To
say that someone is liberal with their money is not branding them a mem-
ber of a political party; likewise, to say I take a realistic approach
to problemsolving of all sorts, political and nonpolitical, does not make
me an adherent of a detailed political doctrine.
>Perhaps Naomi does not endorse all these concepts. However, if that is
>the case, she should not have called herself a realist and explictly
>identifies national interest politics as her starting point.
Perhaps you should take a look at a dictionary instead of a political
philosophy textbook.
>And if she
>does not truly endorse realism, we must call into question her insistence
>that justice never enters into the equation in international politics.
>Perhaps justice is a minor factor that influences international relations
>only rarely -- this might be construed as the stance of a soft
>core realist. It did not seem to me that Naomi endorsed this stance, and
>if she did, she ought to tell us why the Palestine dispute should not be
>one of the infrequent cases when justice does enter into the equation --
>after all, there are religious overtones to the Palestinian-Israeli
>conflict, which would suggest to a soft-core realist that the
>Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be one of those few cases where justice
>is important.
I did overstate my case with the "never" -- what I should have said is
that trying to get what one wants by using moral persuasion is usually
much less effective than by bargaining for what the other side wants *or*
than by forcing a concession from the other side; and is hence not the
way you really want to start attacking the problem if your objective is
to get what you're looking for. Because individuals are occasionally swayed,
especially in cases where there's an absence of strong pressure of other
sorts on them, by moral factors, and because individuals make decisions
on behalf of their nations and *sometimes* are able to get away with it
in defiance of the national interest (depends on what the subject is, how
politically active the population is, and how far the leader has stepped
over the line -- I should also note that I mean "national interest" as
"what the population of his country wants", not "what would be best for
it"), there are some cases where moral suasion has had some effect on
international relations. It isn't the way to bet, for the most part; and
it's almost *never* effective if it's the only thing you try. Gandhi was
unlikely to have done so well had he not also had people rioting in the
streets to help him out. The Jews used moral claims to some effect in
the original creation of the State of Israel -- but I doubt it would
have worked without both the underground armies and the willingness to
bargain on the detail which led to partition.
My point isn't fundamentally that moral persuasiveness never works, it's
that if it doesn't work, then it pretty definitely doesn't. Being morally
right is largely irrelevant if you can't convince anyone of the fact or
if they don't care because they're more concerned with their own prior-
ities. When, as will usually happen, your protestation of a moral claim
is met with a yawn and the statement, "Come back when you're willing to
give me something for it," you have a decision to make: do you take the
hiogh ground and not get what you want, or do you do what they've sugges-
ted and trade for what you want, therefore possibly giving up something
you shouldn't have had to, but getting what you were looking for in the
first place? Either way is fine, depending on what your priorities are,
but people who take the first route, refuse to trade, and continue saying
they should be given what they want as a matter of right, are best off
realizing that they are very unlikely to get it. If this is all right
with them, I've got nothing against it, but that's the choice they make.
>And one final point: I think Naomi ought to tell us why she views the
>Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a transnational conflict, rather than a
>communal conflict within the borders within one state.
Because the Palestinians do. In this case, I take someone's word for
whether or not they are a nation, because it's easier than arguing. If
Israel says that it's a nation and the Palestinians say that they're a
nation, I will consider a conflict between them one between two nations.
-Naomi
--
"They want us dead. We want to be alive. Compromise between these two
positions is not exactly easy."
-Golda Meir