The Analogy -
Immortalist
or effects, when the things are otherwise entirely different. In
mathematics, an equation between ratios; as, Napier's analogies an
explaining of something by comparing it point by point with something else.
In biology, similarity in function between parts, dissimilar in origin and
structure: distinguished from homology. In logic, the inference that certain
admitted resemblances imply probable further similarity. In linguistics, the
process by which new or less familiar words, constructions, or
pronunciations conform with the pattern of older or more familiar (and often
unrelated) ones: as, energize is formed from energy by analogy with
apologize from apology.
Analogy is a sort of similarity. It is, we could say, similarity on a more
definite and more conceptual level. Yet we can express ourselves al little
more accurately. The essential difference between analogy and the other
kinds of similarity lies, it seems to me, in the intentions of the thinker.
Similar objects agree with each other in some aspect. If you intend to
reduce the aspect in which they agree to definite concepts, you regard those
similar objects as analogous. If you succeed in getting down to clear
concepts, you have clarified the analogy.
Analogical thought is dependent on high-level perception in a very direct
way. When people make analogies, they are perceiving some aspects of the
structures of two situations - the essences of those situation, in some
sense - as identical. These structures, of course, are a product of the
process of high-level perception . . .
Analogical thought further provides one of the clearest illustrations of the
flexible nature of our perceptual abilities. Making an analogy requires
highlighting various different aspects of a situation, and the aspects that
are highlighted are often not the most obvious features. The perception of a
situation can change radically, depending on the analogy we are making. . .
Furthermore, not only is analogy-making dependent on high-level perception,
but the reverse hods true as well: perception is often dependent on
analogy-making itself. The high-level perception of one situation in terms
of another is ubiquitous in human thought . . . In the large or the small,
such analogical perception - the grasping of one situation in terms of
another - is so common that we tend to forget that what is going on is, in
fact, analogy. Analogy and perception are tightly bound together.
It is useful to divide analogical thought into two basic components. First
there is the process of situation-perception, which involves taking the data
involved with a given situation, and filtering and organizing them in
various ways to provide an appropriate representation for a given context.
Second, there is the process of mapping. This involves taking the
representations of two situations and finding appropriate correspondences
between components of one representation with components of the other to
produce the match-up that we call analogy.
Our conceptual networks are intricately structured by analogical and
metaphorical mappings, which play a key role in the synchronic construction
of meaning and in its diachronic evolution. Parts of such mappings are so
entrenched in everyday thought and language that we do not consciously
notice them; other parts strike us as novel and creative. The term metaphor
is often applied to the latter, highlighting the literary and poetic aspects
of the phenomenon. But the general cognitive principles at work are the
same, and they play a key role in thought and language at all levels . . .
Analogical mapping is so commonplace that we take it for granted. But it is
one of the great mysteries of cognition. Given the richness of the domains
and their complexity, how are the "right" schemas consistently extracted,
elaborated, and applied to further mappings?
The aspects of analogy that are relevant for present purposes, they include:
domain mapping from a source onto a target;
extraction of an induced schema (of frame)
extension, fluidity, and reanalysis." (p102)
According to the standard lore, the two main modes of inference
corresponding to learning from experience are analogy and induction. Loosely
speaking, analogy (in the inferential sense) is the transfer of information
from one situation to another, similar one, and induction is the acquisition
of general principles from collections of individual experiences . . .
Introspection and anecdotal evidence suggest analogy as a common form of
reasoning in humans. Tasks involving recognition of structural similarity
between objects, an important component of analogical reasoning, figure
heavily in tests of human intelligence; an early study of such tests,
intellectual ability can be defined as the ability to reason by analogy from
awareness of relations between experienced characters. . . .
. . . What the definition amounts to is that analogical inference takes
place when further similarities between situations are inferred from known
similarities.
Miller
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:umrd0c...@corp.supernews.com...
Analogies can be used to illustrate ideas, but anaologies as a sort of proof
of some idea are fallable. It is the ease of making them that allows people
to use them, not the fact that they allow for any particular accurate
insight.
When people make analogies, they can only believe they are perceiving some
aspects of the structures of two situations. They suppose, further, that
they have the common essences of those situations simply because they have
constructed the analogy. In many case, this form of intellectual shorthand
obscures more than it illuminates.
Scott
Immortalist
"Miller" <chuml...@chartermi.net> wrote in message
news:umrqc8...@corp.supernews.com...
Then you have in mind human cognitive and cultural activities, some of which
are anological and others that are not anological?
> When people make analogies, they can only believe they are perceiving some
> aspects of the structures of two situations. They suppose, further, that
> they have the common essences of those situations simply because they have
> constructed the analogy. In many case, this form of intellectual
shorthand
> obscures more than it illuminates.
>
Would some methods of comparing events and objects be better than others
based upon more or less strict criteria for doing so?
> Scott
>
>
Immortalist
"Dare" <clyd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:akl3hq$9m40$1...@news3.infoave.net...
> If we are mapping new information onto a pre-existing
> target won't the conclusions be kind of skewed or biased
> to fit onto the old target? I don't have the background to
> use the correct language, but do you see what I mean?
> Can we trust our interpretations and conclusions if they
> are based old models? I don't know how else we could
> process the new information, though!
>
Well said!
> It's interesting that it mentions intelligence...I have been
> wondering what intelligence is and how to discern and
> possibly "measure" it. Can intelligence be measured in a
> was independent of particular experience?
>
Thats a tough question bound to arouse emotions whichever way an answer is
expressed. How about two opposed reviews of a recent book about this
intelligence question?
Two Views of The Bell Curve:
(Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray 1994
The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life)
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||| View 1: Breaking the Last Taboo
Review by Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr.
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." With these
words Jefferson introduced one of America's most treasured documents, the
Declaration of Independence. Successive generations of Americans have not
only embraced Jefferson's noble sentiments, they have embellished them.
Equality of political rights and legal standing has been expanded into a
belief in literal equality; today, differences in outcome are taken as prima
facie evidence of unequal opportunity. In an egalitarian society such as
ours, the existence of significant and enduring individual or group
differences in intelligence is seen as a challenge to our highest ideals.
This challenge is taken up by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray in
The Bell Curve.
The Bell Curve has a simple but powerful thesis: There are substantial
individual and group differences in intelligence; these differences
profoundly influence the social structure and organization of work in modern
industrial societies, and they defy easy remediation. In the current
political milieu, this book's message is not merely controversial, it is
incendiary. As scholars such as Daniel Moynihan, Arthur Jensen, and E. O.
Wilson have learned, the mainstream media and much of the scientific
community have little tolerance for those who would question our most
cherished beliefs. Herrnstein and Murray have received similar treatment.
They have been cast as racists and elitists, and The Bell Curve has been
dismissed as pseudoscience, ironically by some commentators who broadly
proclaim that their critique has not benefited from a reading of the book.
The book's message cannot be dismissed so easily. Herrnstein and Murray have
written one of the most provocative social science books published in many
years. The issues raised are likely to be debated by academics and
policymakers for years to come.
The emergence of a cognitive elite
Commentators from across the political spectrum have documented the profound
social changes that all industrialized societies are undergoing at the end
of the 20th century--erosion of the middle class, loss of well-paying
manufacturing jobs, and an emerging information age in which individual
success will depend on brains not brawn. The Bell Curve tells a similar
story regarding the United States. It differs from other works by focusing
on intelligence, rather than education or social class as a causal variable.
The authors tell us that true educational opportunity as a function of
ability (measured by IQ tests) did not arrive in the United States until
about 1950. Until that date only about 55 percent of high school graduates
in the top IQ quartile went directly to college. From 1950 to 1960, this
number jumped to 72 percent, and in 1980 over 80 percent of graduates in the
highest ability quartile went to college. In addition, sorting by cognitive
ability continues as students move through college. It also occurs across
colleges, with the elite schools selecting the more intellectually talented
students. Finally, it continues across careers in the world of work. The
authors argue that intellectual stratification through occupations is driven
by powerful economic pressures. This argument is based on a number of
different and compelling lines of evidence. If Herrnstein and Murray are
correct, current social inequalities reflect, in large part, the achievement
of a meritocracy based on cognitive ability.
The notion of a meritocracy is not, in itself, an affront to American
sensibilities. Social scientists have carefully documented that social
mobility does occur from one generation to the next and that cognitive
ability is a major factor in determining whether an individual will achieve
greater or lesser social status than did his or her parents (Waller, 1971).
When each generation resorts in this way, the elements of fairness and
opportunity are preserved. If, however, as The Bell Curve asserts, the
heritability of IQ is quite high and there is a strong tendency for those
similar in ability to marry, there will be less regression toward the mean
in the cognitive ability of children of the intellectually talented and,
therefore, less intergenerational reassortment. Under these circumstances a
meritocracy begins to look like an aristocracy, a perception that is
strongly reinforced when the intellectual elite segregate themselves from
the rest of society by living in separate neighborhoods, sending their
children to private schools, and supporting social institutions that cater
to their own unique interests.
The authors do argue that general cognitive ability (i.e., "g") is a major
determiner of social status and that variance in general mental ability is
largely attributable to genetic factors--propositions that are certainly
endorsed by many experts in the field. The book explicitly disclaims,
however, that general mental ability is the only determinant of social
status, or that g is the sum total of an individual's social worth.
The role of social class of origin
The Bell Curve carefully documents in table after table, graph after graph
that cognitive ability has become a more important determinant of social
status than social class of origin. Although this may come as a surprise to
many, it is consistent with a large body of evidence. Research methodology
in the domain of individual differences has changed dramatically in the past
20 years. Many investigators in this domain now accept two major
methodological principles: that single studies based on small samples are
inherently uninformative and that correlations calculated from data gathered
within biological families are seriously confounded. Understanding both of
these principles is important when evaluating evidence often brought to bear
against The Bell Curve.
Results from a single modest study carry little more weight than does a
single anecdote, no matter how compelling the finding. Most social
scientists, but certainly not all, have adopted the methodology of
meta-analysis, a statistical tool that systematically combines the results
from many studies to provide a single reliable conclusion. In a similar
fashion, behavioral geneticists combine the results from numerous kinships
weighted by their sample sizes to provide the best estimate of the degree of
environmental and genetic influence on any particular trait. Any single
study is viewed as providing only weak evidence on its own.
The confound generated by data drawn from within biological families
provides numerous pitfalls when assessing this book's claims and reviewers'
counterclaims. Within a biological family, correlations (e.g., parental
socioeconomic status x child's IQ) are ambiguous because the cause of the
correlation could be the family environment or the parent's genes. Within
biological families, the correlation between parental socioeconomic status
(SES) and child's IQ, based on a meta-analysis of the literature, is .333
(White, 1982). However, in studies where genetic effects are held constant,
through twin or adoption designs, the correlation drops dramatically
(Bouchard, Lykken, McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990; Scarr & Weinberg, 1978).
Another striking exemplar of this phenomenon is the IQ correlation between
unrelated individuals reared together who share a common family environment
but lack a common genetic background. When the cognitive ability of these
"unrelated siblings" is measured in adulthood the correlation is zero
(McGue, Bouchard, Iacono, & Lykken, 1993). Thus the correlation between
parental SES and offspring IQ in biological families is due, in some
measure, to genetic endowment. Consequently, when examining the relationship
between IQ and a dependent variable, to "hold constant" the SES of
biological parents (on the grounds that SES is a competing "environmental
explanation") results in an underestimate of the true influence of IQ. As
early as 1970, Paul Meehl warned that "the commonest error in handling
nuisance variables of the `status' sort (e.g., income, education, locale,
marriage) is the error of suppressing statistically components of variance
that, being genetic, ought not be thus arbitrarily relegated to the
`spurious influence' category" (pp. 393-394). In this book, intended for lay
readers as well as academicians, the authors have purposefully provided
simple and straightforward analyses of SES and cognitive ability. They have,
in many instances, understated the role of cognitive ability by holding SES
constant. We can expect to see numerous reanalyses and the presentation of
many more complex models derived to support both sides of the debate. The
careful reader will remember Meehl's caution when examining the data and
drawing conclusions.
Cognitive classes and social behavior
Part II of The Bell Curve reviews the role of cognitive ability in areas of
social dysfunction. In this section, the data are more complicated,
conclusions more equivocal. In spite of claims to the contrary by some
reviewers, the book makes it clear that with regard to the issues discussed
in this section of the book (e.g., poverty, schooling, unemployment,
idleness and injury, family matters, welfare dependency, parenting, crime,
civility, and citizenship), IQ "almost always explains less than 20 percent
of the variance, . . . usually less than 10 percent and often less than 5
percent" (p. 117). These analyses deal only with non-Latino Whites and make
use of the National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience of Youth
(NLSY). This large nationally representative survey, begun in 1979,
incorporated the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT provides
an excellent measure of g, and the survey contains sufficiently detailed
information that questions regarding the influence of g on the outcomes
listed above can now be addressed systematically.
I discuss the results regarding poverty as an exemplar. First, it must be
noted that the decline in poverty from 1940 to 1970 is dramatic and linear,
dropping from over 50 percent to less than 15 percent. It has remained
nearly constant since 1970. This means that the rise in crime, drug abuse,
and many other discontents over the past 25 years cannot be ascribed to
poverty per se. It also means the analyses in The Bell Curve are being
carried out on a very different population than would have been used had the
analysis been carried out before 1970. Consequently, comparisons with
earlier research are problematical. The evidence strongly supports the
conclusion that high IQ is an important protective factor, and low IQ is an
important risk factor. Parental SES is not nearly as protective or nearly as
debilitating. IQ has an effect even when education is held constant. When
one looks at poverty among women with children, the situation is quite
different. For separated, divorced, or never married White mothers with very
low IQs, the probability of being in poverty is almost 70 percent. For the
same group of mothers with very high IQs, the risk of poverty is about 10
percent. For married mothers, however, the range is from under 20 percent to
near zero. IQ is influential, but marriage is clearly more important. Thus
poverty among children is strongly associated with the marital status of
their mothers. Holding IQ constant washes out any influence of parental SES
for both types of mothers but leaves a large marital effect. Similar
empirical demonstrations, with numerous twists and turns, are made regarding
the other dependent variables enumerated above.
The national context
Part III of The Bell Curve contains the most controversial chapter in the
book, "Ethnic Differences in Cognitive Ability." The data reviewed here are
neither new nor surprising and find strong support in the current
psychological literature (Humphreys, 1988). East Asians, living in Asia or
America, score above White Americans in tests of cognitive ability; the best
estimate of that difference is about three points with findings ranging from
no difference to a 10-point spread in test scores. The difference in
measured IQ between African Americans and Whites has remained at about 15 IQ
points for decades, although there is some indication of very modest
convergence due to fewer low scores in the African American population.
Controlling for SES reduces but does not eliminate this difference, and of
course, controlling for SES in ethnic group contrasts may eliminate a valid
source of IQ variance. Moreover, ethnic differences on cognitive tests
cannot be attributed to test bias.
As described earlier, The Bell Curve asserts that differences in cognitive
ability between individuals are due in part to differences in their genetic
endowment. A great deal of research supports this conclusion (Bouchard,
1993; Pedersen, Plomin, Nesselroade, & McClearn, 1992). The question is,
What can we infer from these findings about the origins of ethnic group
differences? As any graduate student knows, the source of individual
differences in a trait cannot be taken as evidence for the source of group
differences in the same trait. A great deal of indirect evidence points to
both genetic and environmental contributions to ethnic group differences in
IQ. None of this evidence, however, is as firm as the evidence for genetic
influence on individual differences in IQ. Many experts in the field
(Snyderman & Rothman, 1988) agree with Herrnstein and Murray when they state
that "it seems highly likely to us that both genes and the environment have
something to do with racial differences. What might the mix be? We are
resolutely agnostic on the issue; as far as we can determine, the evidence
does not yet justify an estimate" (p. 311).
Science, ethics, and social policy
The Bell Curve closes with a review of the policy implications of their
findings. What is the role of the social scientist in the formulation of
social policy? I agree with Kendler (1993) that it is clearly within the
scientific realm to comment on the likely consequences of competing social
policies. Judging the value, as opposed to the costs, of such policies is,
however, a matter of political rather than scientific discourse. As Kendler
documents, many social scientists confuse these two functions. Herrnstein
and Murray have been vigorously chastised for discussing policy implications
on the basis of the work reviewed and the data analyzed in their book.
Similar assertions are, however, regularly made by many investigators in the
social sciences. For example, the implications of specific research projects
are regularly found in grant applications where they are used to justify the
request for funds. Seldom are the value judgments underlying these
implications explicitly stated, but they are easily inferred. Herrnstein and
Murray have, in my opinion, been much more "up front" about these matters
than many social scientists, and their discussions fall clearly within the
boundaries discussed by Kendler. They argue, for example, with regard to
affirmative action, "Our contribution (we hope) is to calibrate the policy
choices associated with affirmative action, to make costs and benefits
clearer than they usually are" (pp. 387-388).
In writing the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson was attempting to give
birth to a shared political goal--freedom, as expressed in the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Herrnstein and Murray also addr
ess this important theme. They make it clear that a meritocracy need not be
a Darwinian jungle and that a responsible society should make a place for
everyone. Their description of the ideal meritocracy will not be to
everyone's taste, but it is neither more foolish nor more naive than many
proposals that have been suggested in the past. Nevertheless, predicting the
future is an extremely hazardous enterprise. We have recently seen the
virtual collapse of a number of societies that were based on a totally
different conception of human nature than that underlying The Bell Curve.
Virtually no one predicted this dramatic outcome for one of history's
largest social experiments. Undoubtedly, Herrnstein and Murray's arguments
are wrong in some of the details, and they may be wrong about the larger
picture. Nevertheless, one of the goals of the intellectual enterprise is to
question received wisdom, to ask difficult questions, and to seek novel and
"better" solutions to both new and old problems. They have succeeded
admirably at this task.
This is a superbly written and exceedingly well-documented book. It raises
many troubling questions regarding the organization of our society. It
deserves the attention of every well-informed and thoughtful citizen.
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||| View 2: Soft Science With a Neoconservative Agenda
Review by Donald D. Dorfman
"Is there a danger that current welfare policies, unaided by eugenic
foresight, could lead to the genetic enslavement of a substantial segment of
our population? The possible consequences of our failure seriously to study
these questions may well be viewed by future generations as our society's
greatest injustice to Negro Americans" (Jensen, 1969, p. 95).
So said Arthur Jensen in 1969 in a Harvard Educational Review article on
race and general intelligence. General intelligence is often called IQ for
short. In the most controversial parts of The Bell Curve, a book written for
the general reader, Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray present much
the same theories and general concerns as did Jensen with regard to Black
cognitive intelligence, while extending the analysis to include Latinos.
They greatly expand on the evidence, present possible causal links between
IQ and socially undesirable behaviors, and at the end of the book suggest
implications for public policy. They are especially worried about a supposed
downward pressure on the distribution of IQ in the United States, which they
call dysgenic pressure. Dysgenic is a term borrowed from population biology.
As does Jensen, the authors believe that Blacks "are experiencing even more
severe dysgenic pressures than Whites" (p. 341). Part of the problem may be
differences in reproductive strategies among the races, according to J.
Philippe Rushton's theory discussed in the book (pp. 642-643). Herrnstein
and Murray mention Rushton's theory that Blacks have the largest genitals
and the highest frequency of sexual intercourse among the three major races
(p. 642). Consistent with customary academic standards of scholarly
objectivity and neutrality, Herrnstein and Murray reserve judgment on
whether Rushton is right or wrong: "We expect that time will tell whether it
[Rushton's theory] is right or wrong in fact" (p. 643).
In addition to supposed downward pressures on the distribution of
intelligence in this country produced by high fertility rates in Blacks,
Herrnstein and Murray believe that Latinos are also experiencing more severe
dysgenic pressures than Whites (p. 341) and that Latino immigration is
putting downward pressure on the distribution of American national
intelligence. So should we be worrying about dysgenic pressure on our
national cognitive intelligence? They conclude, "Putting the pieces
together--higher fertility and a faster generational cycle among the less
intelligent and an immigrant population that is probably somewhat below the
native-born average--the case is strong that something worth worrying about
is happening to the cognitive capital of the country" (p. 364).
The authors present a large number of research analyses that they performed
themselves, in which they pit parental socioeconomic status (SES) against IQ
on a variety of economic and social behaviors. They conclude that the major
cause of economic and social behaviors is IQ, not SES. The authors' research
analyses are based on data collected in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY). None of their research analyses on the relation between IQ,
SES, and social behaviors has ever been published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals. The Bell Curve is written for the general reader and
does not assume that the reader has had a course in statistics. The authors
have even included an appendix for those readers who are sure they can not
learn statistics, titled "Statistics for People Who Are Sure They Can't
Learn Statistics" (Appendix 1, pp. 553-567). Scientists first publish their
research in peer-reviewed scientific journals, not in books written for the
general reader who may not have the technical background needed to detect
flaws in data and misinterpretations of data analyses. It is inappropriate
for a scientist to do otherwise.
Herrnstein and Murray's research analyses--never published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals--investigate the relation of IQ and SES to marriage, to
divorce, to illegitimacy, to welfare dependency, and to parenting. They
conclude that IQ is the primary problem, not SES: "People with low cognitive
ability tend to be worse parents" (p. 232). The authors believe that low
birth weight and high infant mortality are indications of poor parenting and
are probably caused by "prenatal negligence" (p. 233) on the part of mothers
with low cognitive ability rather than inadequate prenatal medical care on
the part of society. They also present unpublished research analyses on the
relation between crime and low cognitive intelligence, and between civility
and high cognitive intelligence. "A smarter population is more likely to be,
and more capable of being made into, a civil citizenry" (p. 266), according
to the authors.
In the final part of The Bell Curve, titled "Living Together," Herrnstein
and Murray propose a solution to the supposed dysgenic downward pressures on
our national intelligence caused by the large number of children born to
"low-IQ women," and to the recent large-scale Latino immigrations to the
United States. They argue that America's current fertility policy
"subsidizes births among poor women, who are disproportionately at the low
end of the intelligence distribution" (p. 548). They seem to urge eugenic
foresight to counteract dysgenic pressure: "We urge generally that these
policies, represented by the extensive network of cash and services for
low-income women who have babies, be ended" (p. 548). With regard to the
supposed dysgenic effects of Latino immigration on national intelligence,
their central thought about immigration "is that present policy assumes an
indifference to the individual characteristics of immigrants that no society
can indefinitely maintain without danger" (p. 549). "But," they conclude,
"we believe that the main purpose of immigration law should be to serve
America's interests" (p. 549). For those members of groups who will not be
excluded from the American dream by eugenic foresight or new immigration
laws, Herrnstein and Murray propose "that group differences in cognitive
ability, so desperately denied for so long, can best be handled--can only be
handled--by a return to individualism" (p. 550).
Who are the authors of The Bell Curve? Are they right? The first author,
Richard Herrnstein, was a professor of psychology at Harvard University for
36 years. He died a very short time ago. One would presume that The Bell
Curve represents Herrnstein's final summing up of a lifetime of objective
scholarly research published in peer-reviewed scientific journals on the
genetic basis of IQ. Regrettably, the media seem to be totally unaware of
the fact that the deceased Harvard professor never published any scientific
research on the genetic basis of IQ and its relation to race, poverty, or
social class in peer-reviewed scientific journals in his entire 36-year
academic career. Richard Herrnstein's actual area of expertise is the
experimental analysis of decision making in pigeons and rats, and he never
studied the genetic basis of any behavior in those laboratory animals. The
first presentation of his theory on the genetic basis of IQ, social class,
and poverty appeared in a magazine article titled "I.Q." published in the
September 1971 issue of the Atlantic Monthly magazine. As we all know,
scientists publish their data and theories in peer-reviewed scientific
journals or in peer-reviewed technical books, not in popular magazines or in
nontechnical books written for the general reader.
In 1973, Herrnstein published a nontechnical Atlantic Monthly Press book
titled I.Q. in the Meritocracy that expanded on his theory of the genetic
basis of IQ and poverty. Herrnstein had never collected data on IQ, so the
book drew on the work of others, especially the "data" of Sir Cyril Burt.
According to Leslie Hearnshaw (1979), Burt's biographer and distinguished
historian of British psychology, Burt had probably invented much of his
highly cited data on the genetic basis of IQ. While doing research on Burt's
data for an article that I later published in Science (1978), I discovered
that Herrnstein had in fact laundered Burt's own descriptions of Burt's
widely publicized and highly cited study "Intelligence and Social Mobility"
(Burt, 1961). Burt had described his own study "merely as a pilot inquiry"
(p. 9) and his data as "crude and limited" (p. 9). Burt had not even
reported the number of subjects he had tested in his crude and limited
study. In describing Burt's study, however, Herrnstein (1973) failed to tell
the reader about the deficiencies that Burt, himself, had mentioned. In
addition, Herrnstein (1973) said Burt's sample size was "1,000" (p. 203),
later revising that figure to "40,000" in response to criticism. In reply to
a critical letter by Jerry Hirsch (1975), Herrnstein (1975) revised his 1973
figure: "It is true that Burt's sample was 40,000, not 1,000 as I said" (p.
436), while failing to acknowledge that Burt had never reported the number
of subjects he had tested. Leon Kamin (1974) appears to have been the only
psychologist to notice and publicly report that Burt had failed to give the
sample size of his celebrated 1961 study of IQ and social mobility.
Presumably, Herrnstein and other psychologists who had publicized the
results of that study had never noticed that Burt had not reported the
sample size of his famous study.
The second author of The Bell Curve, Charles Murray, has a doctorate in
political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is
currently a Bradley Fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative research group in Washington, DC. Murray often publishes his
research and theories in The Public Interest (e.g., Murray, 1994), a
neoconservative magazine edited by Irving Kristol, also a fellow of the
American Enterprise Institute and sometimes considered the founding father
of neoconservatism (Atlas, 1995). In an article recently published in The
Public Interest, Murray listed the first priority of his political agenda:
"And so I want to end welfare" (1994, p. 18). Inasmuch as the media
sometimes refer to The Bell Curve as Murray's book, perhaps the book
represents Murray's summing up of a body of objective scholarly research
that he had published in scientific journals on the genetic basis of IQ and
poverty. But like his coauthor Richard Herrnstein, Murray has never
conducted or published any research in scientific journals on the genetic
basis of IQ and poverty in his entire career.
The Bell Curve is not a scientific work. It was not written by experts, and
it has a specific political agenda. Still, it is possible that the major
scientific premises of the book may be correct. If two monkeys were put
before a typewriter, it is theoretically possible for those two monkeys to
produce a Shakespearean sonnet. Perhaps Herrnstein and Murray produced a
valid scientific work. I will now evaluate the major premises of The Bell
Curve.
The rewriting of history: The Burt affair
In 1972, Leon Kamin exposed the empirical unsoundness of the most important
evidence in support of the IQ hereditarian position, Sir Cyril Burt's data
(Hearnshaw, 1979). He later published his results in a book attacking Burt's
data as well as the secondary sources who publicized those data (Kamin,
1974). In 1979, Leslie Hearnshaw (1979) published a biography of Burt in
which he concluded on the basis of personal diaries and other material that
it was highly likely that Burt had fabricated some of his most celebrated
data. Hearnshaw, distinguished historian of British psychology, delivered
the memorial address at Burt's Memorial Service and was later asked by
Marion Burt, Burt's sister, to write a full-length biography of Burt. The
result was the well-known Cyril Burt: Psychologist (1979). In their
discussion of the Burt affair, Herrnstein and Murray suggest that some of
Burt's "leading critics were aware that their accusations were inaccurate"
(p. 12), suggesting a possible conspiracy against Burt. There is, however,
no mention whatsoever of Hearnshaw's book in their half-page synopsis of the
Burt affair, and Hearnshaw's book does not appear anywhere in their 57-page
bibliography of references. This misrepresentation of the Burt affair by
omission of important historical facts is not uniquely associated with The
Bell Curve. In 1982, Richard Herrnstein published an article in The Atlantic
Monthly in which he attacked the media for misrepresenting the evidence in
the IQ controversy (Herrnstein, 1982). In that magazine article, the Harvard
professor wrote "that most psychometricians had stopped trusting Burt's data
years before, partly because of inconsistencies first noted in a 1974
article by Arthur Jensen" (p. 70), while omitting any mention of Leo Kamin,
the psychologist who in reality first noted inconsistencies in Burt's data.
Does the distribution of IQs follow a bell curve?
The distribution of IQ test scores cannot be expected to follow a bell curve
unless it is constructed by the tester to do so (Dorfman, 1978). The shape
of the distribution of IQ test scores will depend on the average difficulty
of the test items as well as their intercorrelations. The high item
intercorrelations in IQ tests imply that the IQ distribution can take a
variety of shapes. The central limit theorem does not apply to random
variables with positive intercorrelations (Lamperti, 1966). Frederic Lord
(1952), one of the fathers of modern test theory and former president of the
Psychometric Society, gave results on this question: "The results given are
sufficient to show that the distribution of test scores cannot in general be
expected to be normal, or even approximately normal. The question naturally
arises as to what possible shapes the frequency distribution fs, as given in
(76) [Lord's Equation (76)], may assume. The answer is that this function
may assume any shape whatsoever, provided the item intercorrelations are
sufficiently high" (Lord, 1952, pp. 32-33). The symbol fs refers to the
distribution of test scores.
Does cognitive ability consist of a single general factor?
The book uses factor analysis to infer the existence of a single
hypothetical general factor of cognitive intelligence that is presumed to
account for most of cognitive performance. One of the problems with factor
analysis as a tool for determining the underlying structure of a system is
that neither the factors nor the loadings are uniquely defined if you have
more than one factor (Lawley & Maxwell, 1963), and it is difficult to
determine if you have only one factor. In experimental cognitive psychology,
factor analysis is virtually never used as a tool to determine the
underlying cognitive structure. It is a tool for correlational cognitive
psychology, not experimental cognitive psychology. I inspected the subject
index of some well-known texts in experimental cognitive psychology and
found that the term factor analysis never appears in the subject index
(e.g., see Anderson, 1985; Matlin, 1994; Reed, 1982). Why not? Kendall and
Stuart (1966) may provide the answer: "Application of the same technique
[factor analysis] to physical systems very often results in weighted sums of
variables to which no clear interpretation can be given" (p. 310). In short,
"The main difficulty, as a rule, is to know what the results mean" (p. 310),
Kendall and Stuart point out.
Can you measure the heritability of IQ?
The most direct way of estimating heritability is from data on monozygotic
twins reared apart (MZA) and separated in early infancy (Bouchard, Lykken,
McGue, Segal, & Tellegen, 1990). This MZA design allows for the estimation
of heritability if the following major assumptions are met: (a) environments
are a random sample from the population of environments, (b) genotypes are a
random sample from the population of genotypes, (c) there is no
genotype-environment correlation, and (d) there is no genotype-environment
interaction. If the pairs of MZAs differ in age, then these assumptions will
not be met. If these assumptions are met, then the intraclass correlation
between IQ scores of MZA twin pairs directly measures heritability. Sir
Cyril Burt's (1966) study of 53 MZAs appears to have met the first three
assumptions. Unfortunately, Burt's data appear to have been invented
(Hearnshaw, 1979). Bouchard et al.'s (Minnesota) survey of MZAs provides the
next best data set. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, the detailed
case-study records of the Minnesota MZAs have never been released and have
therefore not been subjected to public scrutiny to determine the degree to
which assumptions have been met and the degree to which the MZAs told the
truth to the Minnesota group. Finally, if there is genotype-environment
interaction--then the fourth assumption is not met--and heritability is
undefined. But this is the most controversial assumption underlying the MZA
design. Herrnstein and Murray present no convincing evidence to justify the
fourth assumption.
Does high within-group heritability of IQ imply between-group heritability
of IQ?
The authors have made a fundamental error well-known by professional
geneticists. It is sometimes called "Jensen's error." Jensen made that error
in his famous 1969 Harvard Educational Review article. The critical
importance of that error was first clearly illuminated by Roger Milkman, a
professor of biology at the University of Iowa and a world authority on
population genetics and evolutionary biology. The article, "A Simple
Exposition of Jensen's Error," was published in the Journal of Educational
Statistics in 1978 (Milkman, 1978). Melvin Novick was editor of that journal
when Milkman's article was published. Novick, professor of statistics and
education at the University of Iowa at the time, later became president of
the Psychometric Society. What is Jensen's error? It is that within-race
heritability has no implications for between-race heritability. The Bell
Curve is therefore flawed with regard to inferring between-race heritability
in IQ from within-race heritability in IQ.
Does IQ or SES cause socially undesirable behaviors?
Herrnstein and Murray use logistic regression to determine which is more
important--IQ or SES--in determining socially undesirable behaviors.
Logistic regression is a form of regression in which the dependent variable
is binary. In all of their analyses, they assume a simple additive model in
which the logit (a transform of the sample proportion) is assumed to equal
B0 + B1IQ + B2SES + B3 age + random residual [numbers after Bs should read
as subscripts]. They assume no IQ-SES interaction. They use the standardized
beta weights to determine the relative importance of IQ and SES in
determining the probability of various undesirable or desirable behaviors.
Unfortunately, IQ and SES are highly intercorrelated (collinearity).
There are two major problems with Herrnstein and Murray's attempts to
determine whether IQ or SES is more important. First, there is the
collinearity problem. Weisberg (1985) describes the collinearity problem in
linear regression: "When the predictors are related to each other,
regression modeling can be very confusing. Estimated effects can change
magnitude or even sign depending on the other predictors in the model" (p.
196). Next, there is the problem of deciding that the predictor with the
largest standardized beta weight is the most important. Weisberg describes
why this approach is faulty: "Unfortunately, this logic is faulty because
the scaling depends on the range of values for the variables in the data"
(p. 186). Perhaps these are the reasons why Herrnstein and Murray never
published their logistic analyses in peer-reviewed journals.
Were Herrnstein and Murray as lucky as the proverbial monkeys at a
typewriter? That depends on your point of view.
References
http://www.apa.org/journals/bell.html
> Thanks,
> Dare
>
>
Immortalist
> >
> > "Dare" <clyd...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> > news:akl3hq$9m40$1...@news3.infoave.net...
> >
> > > wondering what intelligence is and how to discern and
> > > possibly "measure" it. Can intelligence be measured in a
> > > was independent of particular experience?
> > >
> >
> > Thats a tough question bound to arouse emotions whichever way an answer
is
> > expressed. How about two opposed reviews of a recent book about this
> > intelligence question?
> >
> > Two Views of The Bell Curve:
> >
> > (Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray 1994
> > The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life)
> >
> > xXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxX
> >
> > ||| View 1: Breaking the Last Taboo
> > Review by Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr.
> >
> > xXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxXxX
> >
> > ||| View 2: Soft Science With a Neoconservative Agenda
> > Review by Donald D. Dorfman
> >
> >
> > http://www.apa.org/journals/bell.html
> >
>
> Interesting commentary...fraught with emotional landmines! :-)
>
> I've always thought a good(albeit impossible to implement)
> intelligence test would be to take the test subject and hurl
> him "splat" into a new universe where the laws were different
> than in his home universe and he had no pre-determined
> reference points...then observe how well he survived and
> thrived in the new environment.
> (I guess it's kind of like being born...except that we have
> a pre-designed universe-friendly brain structure and other
> "experienced" folks to guide and teach us....)
>
Actually that is kind of what happened with the IQ controversy. They were
judging other cultures by a few cultures. When the other cultures were splat
into this one they were deemed not intelligent and this turned out wrong.
> Thanks,
> Dare
>
>
>
Y-c...@webtv.net
> Our conceptual networks are intricately
> structured by analogical and
> metaphorical mappings, which play a
> key role in the synchronic construction
> of meaning and in its diachronic
> evolution.
>Parts of such mappings are so
> entrenched in everyday thought and
> language that we do not consciously
> notice them; other parts strike us as
> novel and creative. The term metaphor
> is often applied to the latter, highlighting
> the literary and poetic aspects of the
> phenomenon. But the general cognitive
> principles at work are the same, and
> they play a key role in thought and
> language at all levels . . .
This raises the old question of the possibility of cognition without
language.
It is a which comes first," chicken or egg" type question.
If language,metaphor and analogy are the structural framework for
thought, then there would be no inchoate concepts.
However, we all know that this is not true,as the most common of human
experience is being totally unable to communicate a concept or idea
unless and until a new methodology is developed to express it.
The strangest cognitive experience is to be thinking of something that
you have no framework to express, even to yourself.
Metaphor, analogy and language all fail to provide even a rudimentary
map to communicate such concepts.
Mathematics as it has evolved has served to provide the "mapping" for
those concepts which could not be expressed by analogy or metaphor or
anything else, but which surely existed before the mathematical language
to describe them was developed.
From cave art to poetry to music,humanity has developed many "languages"
that provide "mapping" to illustrate and communicate ideas,however, the
ideas and concepts existed before the translation devices were
available.
One of the most evident sign of this phenomenon is the compulsion of
artists, composers, poets and writers to create their works.
In their metaphorical efforts are seen the struggle to bring these
undecipherable concepts into some analogous recognizable patterned form.
elevator
transmitting a complete description of an object.
Because it can be difficult to formulate original vocabularies and phrasings
to describe each new object, it is often convienent to use another well
understood object, and the vocabulary associated with it, as a reference.
By adding to or removing properties from the familiar object held in the
mind, one seeks to construct a picture of the new item in the same way one
might add to or remove bits of clay from a clump of clay that only vaugely
resembles a bust of Socrates. (In this case, one might say to himself,
"this is the rough shape of the head of a man, now I must add some here and
remove some here to make it look more exactly like Socrates).
This can and has been quite sucessfull under diverse circumstances, but the
process of filtering that which does not belong to the new object is one
frought with practical dangers. First off, the two objects will be forever
linked in a real way be the act of association. If, for instance, a
person's grasp of a difficult concept initially relied upon an act of
association with a much more simple concept, it is likely that a recalling
of the simple concept, (even if this happens unconsciously), will be the
route by which the more complex one is reached from that point on. This
causes two immediate problems: that any properties belonging to the simple
concept will be inappropriatly carried over to the understanding of the more
complex one; and that a potentially fallacious belief will develop that one
concept is a special case of the other.
Just as important a limitation is the inherent unreliabilty of shared
understanding. While this does not apply to the act of "place-holding" an
understanding in one's own mind via analogy while a better grasp of an
object's properties might be developed, it does apply to the act of
transmitting an understanding of that obejct to others via a reference point
familar to all parties involved. When an analogy is built upon a supposedly
shared understanding of a reference object, the potential for
misunderstanding is great. In fact, the risk of a potential
misunderstanding of the new object grows in proportion to the amount one
relies upon a common understanding of the reference object. This is to say:
the more you rely on the analogy as a descriptive tool, the more likely it
is that a misunderstanding of the reference object will render your
description meaningless.
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