Impaled on the Horns of a Dilemma.
Immortalist
Page 311 Introduction to Logic Irving Copi 9th Ed
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130749214/
(1) Must Choose Between Two Alternatives, Both Bad or Unpleasant
(2) Premise, Conditional Propositions, Disjunctive Conclusion
(3) Dilemmatic Arguments Expressed in No Particular Order
(4) 3 Duel Horn Evasions; Going Through, Grasping, Counterdilemma
(5) To Escape Between the Horns
(6) To Grasp the Dilemma by the Horns
(7) Counterdilemma With Opposite Conclusion
(8) Celebrated Lawsuit Between Protagoras & Euathlus
(9) 31 Dilemmatic EXERCISES With *Some Answers
........................................................
(1) Must Choose Between Two Alternatives, Both Bad or Unpleasant
The dilemma, a common form of argument in ordinary language, is a legacy
from older times when logic and rhetoric were more closely connected than
they are today. From the strictly logical point of view, the dilemma is not
of special interest or importance. But rhetorically the dilemma is perhaps
the most powerful instrument of persuasion ever devised. It is a devastating
weapon in controversy.
We say somewhat loosely that a person is in a dilemma when the person must
choose between two alternatives, both of which are bad or unpleasant. More
picturesquely such a person is described as being "impaled on the horns of a
dilemma." Traditionally, a dilemma is an argument intended to put one's
opponent in just that kind of position. In debate, one uses a dilemma to
offer alternative positions to one's adversary, from which a choice must be
made, and then to prove that no matter which choice is made, the adversary
is committed to an unacceptable conclusion. Thus, in a debate on a proposed
protective tariff bill, an opponent of the measure may argue as follows:
(2) Premise, Conditional Propositions, Disjunctive Conclusion
If the proposed tariff produces scarcity, it will be injurious; and if it
does not produce scarcity, it will be useless. It will either produce
scarcity or else it won't. Therefore the proposed tariff will either be
injurious or useless.
Such an argument is designed to push the adversaries (in this case, the
sponsors of the bill) into a corner and there annihilate them. The second
premiss, which offers the alternatives, is a disjunction. The first premiss,
which asserts that both of the alternatives have certain undesirable
consequences, consists of two conditional propositions linked by a
conjunction, for example, "and," "but," or "though." The conclusion of a
dilemma may be another disjunction, offering alternatives, or it may be a
categorical proposition. In the former case, the dilemma is said to be
"complex," in the latter case, "simple." A dilemma need not have an
unpleasant conclusion. An example of one with a happy conclusion is provided
by the following simple dilemma:
If the blest in heaven have no desires, they will be perfectly content; so
they will be also if their desires are fully gratified; but either they will
have no desires, or have them fully gratified; therefore they will be
perfectly content.
(3) Dilemmatic Arguments Expressed in No Particular Order
The premisses of a dilemma need not be stated in any special order; the
disjunctive premiss, which offers the alternatives, may either precede or
follow the other. And the consequences of those alternatives may be stated
either in a conjunctive proposition or in separate propositions. A
dilemmatic argument is often stated enthymematically: Its conclusion is
generally so obvious that it scarcely needs to be spelled out. This
obviousness is illustrated in the following passage dealing with the
Emancipation Proclamation, which freed the slaves in the Confederacy. It
occurred in a letter from Abraham Lincoln to James C. Conkling, dated 26
August 1863:
But the proclamation, as law, either is valid, or is nor valid. If it is not
valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it cannot be retracted, any
more than the dead can be brought to life.
(4) 3 Duel Horn Evasions; Going Through, Grasping, Counterdilemma
Three ways of evading or refuting the conclusion of a dilemma have been
given special names, all relating to the fact that a dilemma has two (or
more) "horns." These three ways of defeating a dilemma are known as "going
(or escaping) between the horns," "taking (or grasping) it by the horns,"
and "rebutting it by means of a counterdilemma." Note that these are not
ways to prove the dilemma invalid; rather, they are ways in which one seeks
to avoid its conclusion without challenging the formal validity of the
argument.
(5) To Escape Between the Horns
One escapes between the horns of a dilemma by rejecting its disjunctive
premiss. This method is often the easiest way to evade the conclusion of a
dilemma, for unless one half of the disjunction is the explicit
contradictory of the other, the disjunction may very well be false. One
justification sometimes offered for giving grades to students is that
recognizing good work will stimulate the student to study harder. Students
may criticize this theory, using the following dilemma:
If students are fond of learning, they need no stimulus, and if they dislike
learning, no stimulus will be of any avail. But any student is either fond
of learning or dislikes it. Therefore a stimulus is either needless or of no
avail.
This argument is formally valid, but we can evade its conclusion by going
between the horns. The disjunctive premiss is false, for students have all
kinds of attitudes toward learning: Some may be fond of it, many dislike it,
and many are indifferent. For them, a stimulus may be both needed and of
some avail. Going between the horns does not prove the conclusion to be
false but shows merely that the argument does not provide adequate grounds
for accepting that conclusion.
(6) To Grasp the Dilemma by the Horns
Where the disjunctive premiss is unassailable, as when the alternatives
exhaust the possibilities, it is impossible to escape between the horns.
Another method of evading the conclusion must be sought. One such method is
to grasp the dilemma by the horns, which involves rejecting the premiss that
is a conjunction. To deny a conjunction, we need only deny one of its parts.
When we grasp the dilemma by the horns, we attempt to show that at least one
of the conditionals is false. Consider again the dilemma attacking the
protective tariff. The proponent of the tariff bill might grasp the dilemma
by the horns and argue that, even if the proposed tariff were to produce
scarcity, it would not be injurious. After all, a scarcity would stimulate
domestic production, thus giving the country increased employment and more
highly developed industry. Were any scarcity produced, the proponent might
argue, it would be only temporary, and far from being injurious, it would be
highly beneficial. Of course there may be more to be said, but the original
dilemma has been grasped firmly by the horns.
(7) Counterdilemma With Opposite Conclusion
Rebutting a dilemma by means of a counterdilemma is the most entertaining
and ingenious method of all, but it is seldom cogent, for reasons that will
appear presently. To rebut a given dilemma, one constructs another dilemma
whose conclusion is opposed to the conclusion of the original. Any
counterdilemma may be used in rebuttal, but ideally it should be built up
out of the same ingredients (categorical propositions) that the original
dilemma contained.
A classical example of this elegant kind of rebuttal concerns the following
legendary argument of an Athenian mother attempting to persuade her son not
to enter politics:
If you say what is just, men will hate you; and if you say what is unjust,
the gods will hate you; but you must either say the one or the other;
therefore you will be hated.
Her son rebutted the dilemma with the following one:
If I say what is just, the gods will love me; and if 1 say what is unjust,
men will love me. I must say either the one or the other. Therefore I shall
be loved!
In public discussion, where the dilemma is one of the strongest of the
weapons of controversy, a rebuttal like this, which derives an opposite
conclusion from almost the same premisses, marks great rhetorical skill. But
if we examine the dilemma and rebutting counterdilemma more closely, we see
that their conclusions are not as opposed as they might at first appear.
The conclusion of the first dilemma is that the son will be hated (by men or
by the gods), whereas that of the rebutting dilemma is that the son will be
loved (by the gods or by men). But these two conclusions are perfectly
compatible. The rebutting counterdilemma serves merely to establish a
conclusion different from that of the original. Both conclusions may very
well be true together, so no refutation has been accomplished. But in the
heat of controversy, analysis is unwelcome, and if such a rebuttal occurred
in a public debate, the average audience might overwhelmingly agree that the
rebuttal demolished the original argument.
That this sort of rebuttal does not refute the argument but only directs
attention to a different aspect of the same situation is perhaps more
clearly shown in the case of the following little dilemma, advanced by an
"optimist":
If I work, I earn money, and if I am idle, I enjoy myself. Either I work or
I am idle. Therefore either I earn money or I enjoy myself.
A "pessimist" might offer the following counrerdilemma:
If I work, I don't enjoy myself, and if I am idle, I don't earn money.
Either I work or I am idle. Therefore either I don't earn money or I don't
enjoy myself.
These conclusions represent merely different ways of viewing the same facts;
they do not constitute a disagreement over what the facts are.
(8) Celebrated Lawsuit Between Protagoras & Euathlus
No discussion of dilemmas would be complete unless it mentioned the
celebrated lawsuit between Protagoras and Euathlus. Protagoras was a teacher
who lived in Greece during the fifth century B.C. He taught many subjects
but specialized in the art of pleading before juries. Euathlus wanted to
become a lawyer, but not being able to pay the required tuition, he made an
arrangement according to which Protagoras would teach him but not receive
payment until Euathlus won his first case. When Euathlus finished his course
of study, he delayed going into practice. Tired of waiting for his money,
Protagoras brought suit against his former pupil for the tuition money that
was owed. Unmindful of the adage that the lawyer who tries his own case has
a fool for a client, Euathlus decided to plead his own case in court. When
the trial began, Protagoras presented his side of the case in a crushing
dilemma:
If Euathlus loses this case, then he must pay me (by the judgment of the
court); if he wins this case, then he must pay me (by the terms of the
contract). He must either lose or win this case. Therefore Euathlus must pay
me.
The situation looked bad for Euathlus, but he had learned well the art of
rhetoric. He offered the court the following counterdilemma in rebuttal:
If I win this case, I shall nor have to pay Protagoras (by the judgment of
the court); if I lose this case, I shall not have to pay Protagoras (by the
terms of the contract, for then I shall not yet have won my first case). I
must either win or lose this case. Therefore I do not have to pay
Protagoras!
Had you been the judge, how would you have decided?
It is to be noted that the conclusion of Euathlus' rebutting dilemma is not
compatible with the conclusion of Protagoras' original dilemma. One
conclusion is the explicit denial of the other. But it is a rare case in
which a rebuttal stands in this relation to the dilemma against which it is
directed. When it does so, the premisses involved are themselves
inconsistent, and it is this implicit contradiction that the two dilemmas
serve to make explicit.
(9) 31 Dilemmatic EXERCISES With *Some Answers
Discuss the various arguments that might be offered to refute each of the
following.
Example: *1. If we interfere with the publication of false and harmful
doctrines, we shall be guilty of suppressing the liberties of others,
whereas if we do not interfere with the publication of such doctrines, we
run the risk of losing our own liberties. We must either interfere or not
interfere with the publication of false and harmful doctrines. Hence we must
either be guilty of suppressing the liberties of others or else run the risk
of losing our own liberties.
Solution:
Impossible to go between the horns. It would be plausible to grasp it by
either horn, arguing either (a) that liberties do not properly include the
right to publish false and harmful doctrines or (b) that we run no risk of
losing our own liberties if we vigorously oppose false and harmful doctrines
with true and helpful ones. And it could be plausibly rebutted (but not
refuted) by the use of its ingredients to prove that "we must either be
guiltless of suppressing the liberties of others or else run no risk of
losing our own liberties."
2. Circuit Courts are useful, or they are not useful. If useful, no State
should be denied them; if not useful, no State should have them. Let them be
provided for all, or abolished as to all. -ABRAHAM LINCOLN, annual message
to Congress, 3 December 1861
3. If you tell me what I already understand, you do not enlarge my
understanding, whereas if you tell me something that I do not understand,
then your remarks are unintelligible to me. Whatever you tell me must be
either something I already understand or something that I do not understand.
Hence whatever you say either does not enlarge my understanding or else is
unintelligible to me.
4. If what you say does not enlarge my understanding, then what you say is
without value to me, and if what you say is unintelligible to me, then it is
without value to me. Whatever you say either does not enlarge my
understanding or else is unintelligible to me. Therefore nothing you say is
of any value to me.
*5. If the conclusion of a deductive argument goes beyond the premisses,
then the argument is invalid, while if the conclusion of a deductive
argument does not go beyond the premisses, then the argument brings nothing
new to light. The conclusion of a deductive argument must either go beyond
the premisses or not go beyond them. Therefore either deductive arguments
are invalid or they bring nothing new to light.
SOLUTION: The key to refuting this dilemma lies in exposing the ambiguity of
the key phrase "going beyond," which could mean "going logically beyond to
what is not implied" or "going psychologically beyond to what is not
suggested." When this is done, it permits grasping it by one horn or the
other depending on which sense of "going beyond" is intended. A plausible
but nonrefuting rebuttal can be constructed here.
6. If a deductive argument is invalid, it is without value, whereas a
deductive argument that brings nothing new to light is also without value.
Either deductive arguments are invalid or they bring nothing new to light.
Therefore deductive arguments are without value.
7. If the general was loyal, he would have obeyed his orders, and if he was
intelligent, he would have understood them. The general either disobeyed his
orders or else he did not understand them. Therefore the general must have
been either disloyal or unintelligent.
8. If he was disloyal, then his dismissal was justified, and if he was
unintelligent, then his dismissal was justified. He was either disloyal or
unintelligent. Therefore his dismissal was justified.
9. If the several nations keep the peace, the United Nations is unnecessary,
while if the several nations go to war, the United Nations will have been
unsuccessful in its purpose of preventing war. Now, either the several
nations keep the peace or they go to war. Hence the United Nations is
unnecessary or unsuccessful.
*10. If people are good, laws are not needed to prevent wrongdoing, whereas
if people are bad, laws will not succeed in preventing wrongdoing. People
are either good or bad. Therefore either laws are not needed to prevent
wrongdoing or laws will not succeed in preventing wrongdoing.
SOLUTION: It is very easy to go between the horns here, because people lie
on a continuum of virtue stretching from saints to sinners. It can plausibly
be grasped by the second horn, arguing that even very bad people may be
deterred from wrongdoing by strictly enforced laws. A plausible but
nonrefuting rebuttal can be constructed here out of the ingredients of the
given dilemma.
11. Archbishop Morton, Chancellor under Henry VII, was famous for his method
of extracting "contributions" to the king's purse. A person who lived
extravagantly was forced to make a large contribution, because it was
obvious that he could afford it. Someone who lived modestly was forced to
make a large contribution because it was clear that he must have saved a lor
of money on living expenses. Whichever way he turned he was said to be
"caught on Morton's fork." -DOROTHY HAYDKN, Winning Declarer Play
12. If any member of our party is guilty in that matter, you know it or you
do not know it. If you do know it, you are inexcusable for not designating
the man and proving the fact. If you do not know it, you are inexcusable for
asserting it, and especially for persisting in the assertion after you have
tried and failed to make the proof. -ABRAHAM LINCOLN, address at Cooper
Institute, New York City, 27 February 1860
13. There is a dilemma to which every opposition to successful iniquity
must, in the nature of things, be liable. If you lie still, you are
considered as an accomplice in the measures in which you silently acquiesce.
If you resist, you are accused of provoking irritable power to new excesses.
The conduct of a losing party never appears right. -EDMUND BURKE, A Letter
to a Member of the National Assembly
14. And we seem unable to clear ourselves from the old dilemma. If you
predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is not; and
if you predicate what is not different, you say nothing at all. -F. H.
BRADI.F.Y, Appearance and Reality
*15. All political action aims at either preservation or change. When
desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when
desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political
action is then guided by some thought of better and worse. LEO STRAUSS, What
Is Political Philosophy?
SOLUTION: Impossible to go between the horns. It is plausible to grasp it by
either horn, arguing that either (a) that when desiring to preserve we may
be motivated simply by inertia and seek to rest in the status quo even while
admitting that a change would not be worse and might even be better- but
just "not worth the trouble of changing" or (b) that when desiring to change
we may be motivated simply by boredom with the status quo and seek a change
even while admitting that a change might not be better and might even be
worse-but "let's have a little variety." These are psychological rather than
political or moral considerations, but the original dilemma appears to be
itself psychological. The usual rebutting counterdilemma could be used here:
when desiring to preserve, we do not wish to bring about something better;
when desiring to change, we do not wish to prevent a change to the worse. It
is a question, however, how plausible this is.
16. If a thing moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in that
where it is not; but it moves neither in the place where it is (for it
remains therein) nor in that where it is not (for it does not exist
therein); therefore nothing moves. -SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Against the Physicists
17. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city,
ever changing my place of exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite
sure that wherever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock to me; and
if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their request; and
if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their
sakes. -PLATO, Apology
18. If Socrates died, he died either when he was living or when he was dead.
But he did not die while living; for assuredly he was living, and as living
he had not died. Nor when he died, for then he would be twice dead.
Therefore Socrates did not die. -SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Against the Physicists
19. Inevitably, the use of the placebo involved built-in contradictions. A
good patient-doctor relationship is essential to the process, but what
happens to that relationship when one of the partners conceals important
information from the other? If the doctor tells the truth, he destroys the
base on which the placebo rests. If he doesn't tell the truth, he
jeopardizes a relationship built on trust. -NORMAN COUSINS, Anatomy of an
Illness
*20. The "paradox of analysis," which postulates the dilemma that an
analysis is either a mere synonym and hence trivial, or more than a synonym
and hence false, has its equivalent in Linguistic Philosophy: a neologism
can either be accounted for in existing terms, in which case it is
redundant, or it cannot, in which case it has not "been given
sense." -ERNEST GF.LLNER, Words and Things
SOLUTION: Of the first dilemma one must admit that as it is formulated here
that one cannot go between the horns, at least if "more than a synonym" is
understood as "other than a synonym." But grasping the first horn is easy,
especially along Fregean lines, which distinguish sense from reference. And
grasping the second horn is also possible, with one plausible move turning
on equivocations that need untangling, another turning on the legitimate aim
of improving the terms (or concepts) being analyzed. The usual nonrefuting
rebuttal can be constructed out of the original dilemma's ingredients. Of
the second dilemma, one can go between the horns by remarking on the fact
that directions for the proper use of a new term need not take the form of,
or be reducible to, an explicit definition of it. This suggests a plausible
way of grasping the first horn. The usual nonrefuting rebuttal can be
constructed out of the original dilemma's ingredients.
21. In discussing Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, an
enormously successful, best-selling book whose message is that "Our culture
is going downhill. Thought has been vanquished," along with several other
widely selling books with much the same message, all of which received much
critical acclaim, the reviewer wrote: ". . . if the books really are good,
then the public, far from being boorish and uncultivated, knows how to
appreciate quality- and the books' central argument is false. On the other
hand, if the argument is true, and the public can appreciate only books
aimed at its own low level and the mass media can glorify nothing but
marketability, then these books do not embody the high culture they extol,
and are therefore not good." -TZVETAN TODOROV, "The Philosopher and the
Everyday," The New Republic, 14 and 21 September 1987, p. 34
22. The dilemma of permissible novelty is interesting . . .we may put it
thus: for an interpretation to be valuable, it must do more than merely
duplicate the ideas of the thinker being interpreted. Yet if it is to be
just, it cannot deviate significantly from the original
formulation. --GEORGE KIMBALL PLOLHMAN, Foreword to Prege's Logical Theory
by Robert Sternfeld
23. The decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nixon (1974) handed down
the first day of the Judiciary Committee's final debate was critical, if the
President defied the order, he would be impeached. If he obeyed the order,
it was increasingly apparent, he would be impeached on the
evidence. -VICTORIA SHUCK, "Watergate," The Key Reporter, vol. 41, Winter
1975-1976
24. Kamisar . . . seeks to impale the advocates of euthanasia on an old
dilemma. Either the victim is not yet suffering pain, in which case his
consent is merely an uninformed and anticipatory one-and he cannot bind
himself by contract to be killed in the future-or he is crazed by pain and
stupefied by drugs, in which case he is not of sound mind. -CLANVILLL
WILLIAMS, "'Mercykilling' Legislation-A Rejoinder," Minnesota Law Review,
vol. 43, 1958
*25. If we are to have peace, we must not encourage the competitive spirit,
whereas if we are to make progress, we must encourage the competitive
spirit. We must either encourage or not encourage the competitive spirit.
Therefore we shall either have no peace or make no progress.
SOLUTION: Impossible to go between the horns. But either horn may plausibly
be grasped. The claim the having peace requires that the competitive spirit
not be encouraged may be contested; that spirit, it could be argued, results
in the productivity that alone can yield the contentment that peace
requires. Or the claim that progress requires the encouragement of the
competitive spirit may be contested; cooperation in place of competition may
produce progress of a more lasting and more satisfying kind.
26. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form,
which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal
government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the
people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by
that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the
other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its
schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who
will be supported by the people, -JAMES MADISON, The Federalist Papers, no.
46
27. Does the gentleman from Coles know that there is a statute standing in
full force, making it highly penal, for an individual to loan money at a
higher rate of interest than twelve per cent? If he does not he is too
ignorant to be placed at the head of the committee which his resolution
proposes; and if he does, his neglect to mention it shows him to be too
uncandid to merit the respect or confidence of any one. -ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
speech in the Illinois legislature, 11 January 1837
28. ... a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that
which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if
not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to
enquire. -PLATO, Meno
29. Dissidents confined to asylums are caught up in an insoluble dilemma.
"If you recant, they say, it proves that he was crazy. If you refuse to
recant, and protest, they say that it proves he is still crazy." -LEWIS H.
GANN, "Psychiatry: Helpful Servant or Cruel Master?" The Intercollegiate
Review, Spring-Summer 1982, p. 109
*30. We tell clients to try to go through the entire first interview without
even mentioning money. If you ask for a salary that is too high, the
employer concludes that he can't afford you. If you ask for one that is too
low, you're essentially saying, "I'm not competent enough to handle the job
that you're offering." -JAMES CHALLENGER, "What to Do-and Not to Do- When
Job Hunting," U.S. News 6- World Report, 6 August 1984, pp. 63-66
SOLUTION: It is easy to go between the horns here. On the continuum of
possible salaries, there is surely a range (though it might be narrow) of
salaries that are neither too high nor too low. And either horn may be
grasped, though with different degrees of plausibility. If "too high" a
salary is asked for, employers may see that the job or the applicant is
worth more than they first thought. And if "too low" a salary is asked for,
the applicant may also express a willingness to work at that low salary with
a conviction that the employer is likely soon to recognize that a higher
salary is deserved.
31. "Pascal's wager," justifiably famous in the history of religion and also
of betting, had nothing to do with making sacrifices for a good cause.
Pascal was arguing that agnostics-people unsure of God's existence-are best
off betting that He does exist. If He does but you end up living as an
unbeliever, then you could be condemned to spend eternity in the flames of
Hell. If, on the other hand, He doesn't exist but you live as a believer,
you suffer no corresponding penalty for being in error. Obviously, then,
bettors on God start out with a big edge. -DANIEL SELICMAN, "Keeping Up,"
Fortune, 7 January 1985, p. 104
.................................................
Can anyone use the current situation to construct some Dilemmatic Arguments?
Qexugir
dilemma, but some of the stuff you posted rounded out my knowledge.
Qexugir
Immortalist
"Qexugir" <ust...@sympatico.ca> wrote in message
news:3E8BECD1...@sympatico.ca...
> Thank you. That was quite instructive. I already knew the logical form
of a
> dilemma, but some of the stuff you posted rounded out my knowledge.
>
> Qexugir
>
We could squeak through by slipping through the middle of the horns, or even
going around either side.
One may throw sand in the bull's eyes.
We could attempt to sing the bull to sleep.
We could simply refuse to enter the arena.
We could quickly slice the jugular vein and hope we dive to the right side.
So if we are such a free people why does determinism seem such a predominant
factor here?
Qexugir
Immortalist wrote:
> "Qexugir" <ust...@sympatico.ca> wrote in message
> news:3E8BECD1...@sympatico.ca...
> > Thank you. That was quite instructive. I already knew the logical form
> of a
> > dilemma, but some of the stuff you posted rounded out my knowledge.
> >
> > Qexugir
> >
>
> We could squeak through by slipping through the middle of the horns, or even
> going around either side.
>
> One may throw sand in the bull's eyes.
>
> We could attempt to sing the bull to sleep.
>
> We could simply refuse to enter the arena.
>
> We could quickly slice the jugular vein and hope we dive to the right side.
>
> So if we are such a free people why does determinism seem such a predominant
> factor here?
Here my knowledge not of philosophy and logic but of basic literary theory comes
into play. The term "horns of a dilemma" is a metaphor. It is based on the
fact that a dilemma has two major premisses, "If A then B" and "If C then B",
which are its horns; and which are joined by the minor premiss "Either A or C
but not both or neither", which is the head of the bull - or goat, or Ibex - and
joins them at the root. It's a potentially powerful but conceptually weak
metaphor. What you appear to be doing it is turning it into an analogy, and as
an analogy, the thing completely falls apart - which is quite common with
metaphors that are turned into analogies. Literally speaking, what does it mean
to throw sand into the bull's eyes? I believe that it's meaningless when
applied to the reality of a dilemma as opposed to the image of the bull. The
metaphor should be left as a metaphor and not expanded beyond its natural
limits, IMO.
Qexugir
Immortalist
It is an compilation of stuff I could find on the internet before I got a
text scanner from this old book where it is a look at or disection of the
dilemma from it's Greek origins. Hard to get in context with this book.
http://www.aoe.vt.edu/~ciochett/lit/part3.html
...he accepted the premise that Quality was objective, he was impaled on one
horn of the dilemma. If he accepted the other premise that Quality was
subjective, he was impaled on the other horn. Either Quality is objective or
subjective, therefore he was impaled no matter how he answered.
He noticed that from a number of faculty members he was receiving some
good-natured smiles.
Phædrus, however, because of his training in logic, was aware that every
dilemma affords not two but three classic refutations, and he also knew of a
few that weren't so classic, so he smiled back. He could take the left horn
and refute the idea that objectivity implied scientific detectability. Or,
he could take the right horn, and refute the idea that subjectivity implies
``anything you like.'' Or he could go between the horns and deny that
subjectivity and objectivity are the only choices. You may be sure he tested
out all three.
In addition to these three classical logical refutations there are some
illogical, ``rhetorical'' ones. Phædrus, being a rhetorician, had these
available too.
One may throw sand in the bull's eyes. He had already done this with his
statement that lack of knowledge of what Quality is constitutes
incompetence. It's an old rule of logic that the competence of a speaker has
no relevance to the truth of what he says, and so talk of incompetence was
pure sand. The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that
doesn't make it dark out. Socrates, that ancient enemy of rhetorical
argument, would have sent Phædrus flying for this one, saying, ``Yes, I
accept your premise that I'm incompetent on the matter of Quality. Now
please show an incompetent old man what Quality is. Otherwise, how am I to
improve?'' Phædrus would have been allowed to stew around for a few minutes,
and then been flattened with questions that proved he didn't know what
Quality was either and was, by his own standards, incompetent.
One may attempt to sing the bull to sleep. Phædrus could have told his
questioners that the answer to this dilemma was beyond his humble powers of
solution, but the fact that he couldn't find an answer was no logical proof
that an answer couldn't be found. Wouldn't they, with their broader
experience, try to help him find this answer? But it was way too late for
lullabies like that. They could simply have replied, ``No, we're way too
square. And until you do come up with an answer, stick to the syllabus so
that we don't have to flunk out your mixed-up students when we get them next
quarter.''
A third rhetorical alternative to the dilemma, and the best one in my
opinion, was to refuse to enter the arena. Phædrus could simply have said,
``The attempt to classify Quality as subjective or objective is an attempt
to define it. I have already said it is undefinable ,'' and left it at that.
I believe DeWeese actually counseled him to do this at the time.
Why he chose to disregard this advice and chose to respond to this dilemma
logically and dialectically rather than take the easy escape of mysticism, I
don't know. But I can guess. I think first of all that he felt the whole
Church of Reason was irreversibly in the arena of logic, that when one put
oneself outside logical disputation, one put oneself outside any academic
consideration whatsoever. Philosophical mysticism, the idea that truth is
indefinable and can be apprehended only by nonrational means, has been with
us since the beginning of history. It's the basis of Zen practice. But it's
not an academic subject. The academy, the Church of Reason, is concerned
exclusively with those things that can be defined, and if one wants to be a
mystic, his place is in a monastery, not a University. Universities are
places where things should be spelled out.
I think a second reason for his decision to enter the arena was an egoistic
one. He knew himself to be a pretty sharp logician and dialectician, took
pride in this and looked upon this present dilemma as a challenge to his
skill. I think now that trace of egotism may have been the beginning of all
his troubles.
I see a deer move about two hundred yards ahead and above us through the
pines. I try to point it out to Chris, but by the time he looks it's gone.
The first horn of Phædrus' dilemma was, If Quality exists in the object, why
can't scientific instruments detect it?
This horn was the mean one. From the start he saw how deadly it was. If he
was going to presume to be some super-scientist who could see in objects
Quality that no scientist could detect, he was just proving himself to be a
nut or a fool or both. In today's world, ideas that are incompatible with
scientific knowledge don't get off the ground.
He remembered Locke's statement that no object, scientific or otherwise, is
knowable except in terms of its qualities. This irrefutable truth seemed to
suggest that the reason scientists cannot detect Quality in objects is
because Quality is all they detect. The ``object'' is an intellectual
construct deduced from the qualities. This answer, if valid, certainly
smashed the first horn of the dilemma, and for a while excited him greatly.
But it turned out to be false. The Quality that he and the students had been
seeing in the classroom was completely different from the qualities of color
or heat or hardness observed in the laboratory. Those physical properties
were all measurable with instruments. His Quality...``excellence,''
``worth,'' ``goodness''...was not a physical property and was not
measurable. He had been thrown off by an ambiguity in the term quality.He
wondered why that ambiguity should exist, made a mental note to do some
digging into the historic roots of the word quality, then put it aside. The
horn of the dilemma was still there.
He turned his attention to the other horn of the dilemma, which showed more
promise of refutation. He thought, So Quality is whatever you like? It
angered him. The great artists of history...Raphael, Beethoven,
Michelangelo...they were all just putting out what people liked. They had no
goal other than to titillate the senses in a big way. Was that it? It was
angering, and what was most angering about it was that he couldn't see any
immediate way to cut it up logically. So he studied the statement carefully,
in the same reflective way he always studied things before attacking them.
........................
Now this part was combined but I can't find the link for the added parts
now.
HORNS OF A DILEMMA -- "A dilemma, in logic, is a form of argument in which a
participant finds himself in the embarrassing predicament of having to make
a choice of either of two premises, both of which are obnoxious; it is a
trap set by an astute person to catch an unwary one, like answering yes or
no to the question, ''Have you stopped beating your wife?''Because one may
be caught and impaled upon either of the alternatives, each of them has been
called a 'horn.' Medieval scholars, writing in Latin, used the expression,
argumentum cornutum, horned argument. Nicolas Udall, in his translations of
the adages collected (in Latin) by Erasmus explains the saying the language
of 1548: 'Thys forked questyon; which the sophisters call a horned question,
because that to whether of both partyes a bodye shall make a direct
aunsweere, he shall renne on the sharpe poyncte of the horne.'" From "A Hog
on Ice" by Charles Earle Funk.
Here is the old file with the clipped earlier versions:
Are we impaled upon the horns of a dilemma?
It looks like we are in the embarrassing predicament of having to make a
choice of either of two premises, both of which are obnoxious; it is a trap
set by an astute historical predicamente that has caught us unwary to the
money, politics, oil, and cultural history.
In a perverse way it is like the simple fallacy of the complex question,
'Have you stopped beating your wife?' where either way you answer you've
been had.
Because one may be caught and impaled upon either of the alternatives, each
of them has been called a 'horn.' Medieval scholars, writing in Latin, used
the expression, argumentum cornutum, horned argument. Nicolas Udall, in his
translations of the adages collected (in Latin) by Erasmus explains the
saying the language of 1548: 'Thys forked questyon; which the sophisters
call a horned question, because that to whether of both partyes a bodye
shall make a direct aunsweere, he shall renne on the sharpe poyncte of the
horne.'" From "A Hog on Ice" by Charles Earle Funk.
It is like we are at the front end of an angry and charging bull. Every
dilemma affords not two but three classic refutations, but there are a few
that aren't so classic.
Shall we just let the Bull impale us, perhaps take the jab from just one
horn? Or shall we grasp one horn, dodge to that side and yank down, driving
it into the ground? How about grabbing both horns and thrusting them down
and jumping to the side of the flying body?
Qexugir
crossposting as spam. Hence also my lack of reply to your post.
Qexugir
Not so quick
this post is informative and I intend to try to digest it
when time allows, but... didn't impaled used to mean to
have a stake driven up the lower end of one's digestive
system? If so it would be hard to get both horns up one's
butt.
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
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Immortalist
"Not so quick" <goodidea...@lvcm.com> wrote in message
news:m2Jja.1840$ss.460@fed1read04...
> I'm sorry to be so crude and irreverent because I think
> this post is informative and I intend to try to digest it
> when time allows, but... didn't impaled used to mean to
> have a stake driven up the lower end of one's digestive
> system? If so it would be hard to get both horns up one's
> butt.
>
pale 2 n.
1 pointed piece of wood for fencing etc.; stake. 2 boundary.
Idiom: beyond the *pale* outside the *bounds* of acceptable
behaviour.[[Latin palus]]
impale v.
(-ling) transfix or pierce with a sharp stake etc.
....
turn the body sides ways and two prongs will be an boundry or pointed whole?
Or to be impaled could be a bull putting one point up arse, pulling out
quickly, imale ares with other, pull out, stomp feet and snort dust.
I don't know but this is my first take so I will look into it!
Not so quick
think that my mistake would be amusing. It was
to me but a lot of things I think are amusing,
only to me. :-)
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:v90v778...@corp.supernews.com...
Immortalist
> You are probably right. I wonder what made me
> think that my mistake would be amusing. It was
> to me but a lot of things I think are amusing,
> only to me. :-)
>
Well it made me step back, the notion of two horns simualtainiously impaling
that arse. It was funny.
Not so quick
when nobody else does. Hope everything is going
well.
:-)
"Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
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