The God Hypothesis

[Martin Harran]

There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that
few if any of those discussing it have actually read the book; not
least when one prime critic dismissed the book out of hand before it
was even published! Whether people like to agree or disagree with my
conclusions about the book, it is at least based on an actual reading
of it.

I was initially attracted to the book because it seemed to give
comprehensive coverage of the main arguments for ID; before dismissing
other people's views or opinions, I think it is vital to understand
exactly what those views or opinions are and you can only really get
that by going to the original source. I have made clear previously
that I have serious disagreements with many of the ideas promoted by
Intelligent Design, so I have read this book in a serious attempt to
better understand their latest thinking and arguments; just like I
read people like Richard Dawkins and Jerry Coyne who are totally
opposed to my religious beliefs.

I also felt that this book deserves special attention. One of the
criticisms that I and many others have made about ID is that the main
proponents have admitted that 'intelligent designer' is really a
synonym for God but they try to obfuscate that by claiming that the
intelligent designer is actually undefined and can be basically
whatever anyone wants it to be. In this book, Meyer pulls no punches,
he is openly making the case for God; and not just the case for any
God, he is arguing for the theistic God.

Another point is that Stephen Meyer is not by any manner or means some
sort of "idiot". He clearly knows his science and has put a lot of
research and thought into his ideas. That, of course, does not make
his ideas necessarily right and indeed, as I will explain below, I
think at least some of them do not stack up. Once someone has put that
level of work into their ideas, however, I think they do deserve
proper consideration and not just scornful dismissal.

In that context, it is important, I think, to point out that Meyer
does not reject any scientific findings which are based on solid
evidence; on the contrary, he not only accepts things like the Big
Bang and Evolution, he argues them as evidence for the existence of
God. His focus is on where direct scientific knowledge runs out and
explanations offered by science are largely conjecture, not backed by
any physical evidence. His arguments have been dismissed by some
people as "God of the Gaps" but it seems to me that there is a
vacuousness inherent in tritely dismissing religious arguments such as
those put forward by Meyer as "God of the Gaps" without any
significant identification of the specific reasons why the arguments
do not stand up. It has always seemed to me, that those who resort to
that triteness often do so because they don't have any substantive
rebuttal to put up against the arguments put forward. If there is a
genuine gap in our scientific knowledge and someone put forward a
reasoned explanation, then that can only be counteracted with
similarly reasoned rebuttal. "God of the Gaps" dismissal without
detailed and rational argument against the ideas put forward, is
itself little more than handwaving. The important point in that,
however, is that a person putting forward God (or any supernatural
explanation) has to offer *a reasoned explanation* and that is my
personal test of the success of Meyer's book.

I will not go into details of the gaps that Meyer identifies; they
have been argued out many times here and essentially are about [1]:

- The 'vast': the origins of the Universe, the Big Bang.

- The 'very small' - DNA and coding/intelligence

- The 'very old': the Cambrian explosion and development of so
many novel life-forms

I think he has mixed success here, For example, regarding the origins
of the Universe, he draws heavily on the anthropic principle and that
has essentially been argued to death. He does, however, identify what
I believe are some significant issues; for example, scientists
generally agree that what we recognise as natural forces only came
into existence with the Big Bang so whatever caused the Big Bang is
beyond natural forces - unless we say there was no cause, that the Big
Bang 'just happened', which would present its own problems for
science.

Identifying shortfalls in existing hypotheses and theories is one
thing, however, the real issue for me is how well Meyer makes the case
for his own beliefs.

Meyer claims that he is not making a 'God of the Gaps' argument. He
says instead that he is using an *Inference to the Best Metaphysical
Explanation* approach *which he claims is a common approach in areas
of science where there is insufficient evidence to take a deductive
approach. He quotes as an example, the claim by Richard Dawkins in
'River Out of Eden' that "The universe we observe has precisely the
properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no
purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference."
He claims that this approach is not unique to Dawkins, that others
such as Neil deGrasse Tyson and Sean Carroll have adopted a similar
approach, recognising that there are different worldviews but arguing
that naturalism provides the best explanation for what we see. Meyer
states that this is an acceptable approach but that the properties we
see are also those which we would see from the influence of a theistic
God and that he will show that the hypothesis of a theistic God is in
fact more plausible. The real question for me, then, is how successful
he is at doing that.

I think that Meyer actually does a very poor job of this. He goes into
a lot of detail, often excruciatingly [2], on what faults there are
with existing ideas but he makes the fundamental mistake of assuming
that if a number of solutions are offered and all but one can be
dismissed, then the "last man standing" must be accepted. It doesn't
work like that, for any hypothesis to be accepted, it must stand on
the strength of its own arguments and logic, not on the weakness of
alternative ideas. Also, the other ideas that Meyer examines may not
provide full answers but they at least provide part answers so Meyer's
alternative really needs to match at least the level of detailed
explanation that those alternatives do. He makes no real attempt to do
that, instead he relies on what seems to be the standard ID argument
that 'nothing else works so it *must* be an intelligent designer'
without any suggestion as to how or why that designer did the things
they did.

As mentioned earlier, Meyer at least gets away from the undefined,
'choose what you want' type of designer and comes out in favour of
God. This, however, creates an even bigger problem for me. On page
269, he defines theism, saying that it "affirms a personal,
intelligent, transcendent God." [3]

I have no issue with that definition as it is exactly the sort of God
that I believe in. Where I have a problem with Meyer's ideas is with
the word 'personal' which to me, in terms of theism, implies a God
with whom I can have an interactive relationship. Nowhere in his book
does Meyer explain the jump from a God fiddling about with the factors
in the anthropic principle or tweaking DNA to a God with whom we can
individually and collectively interact or a God that we can join with
in the afterlife.

Overall, I came away from the book very disappointed; as someone
already believing in the same God as he does, I should be an easy
target for Meyer but he fails to convince me of his particular
arguments. I earlier mentioned Dawkins and Coyne and I came away from
this book with the exact same feeling as I got from those authors
after reading their books arguing against God - "Is that really the
best he has to offer?"

Overall, if I was rating this book on Amazon, I would give it 2 stars
but that is a combination of 3 stars for effort and one star for
success.








=========================

[1] If anyone wants more detail without having to read the book, Meyer
covers the essential points in an interview with Peter Robinson of the
Hoover Institution:
Video:
https://www.hoover.org/research/stephen-meyer-intelligent-design-and-return-god-hypothesis
Transcript:
https://www.hoover.org/research/stephen-meyer-intelligent-design-and-return-god-hypothesis-1
[2] I found Meyer's writing laborious at times; he goes into levels of
detail that I thought unnecessary and he is overly repetitive about
that detail - I found my eyes glazing over at times and ended up
skipping pages. The book is 384 pages and I think it would be much
more readable if it was edited down to about 100 pages less.
[3] In the book, he uses Bayesian logic to argue that theism stands up
better than pantheism or deism).

[Abner]

Thanks for the substantive review! I found your thoughts interesting; I admit it didn't give me reason to read the book myself.

[John Harshman]

On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
> 'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
> Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that
> few if any of those discussing it have actually read the book; not
> least when one prime critic dismissed the book out of hand before it
> was even published! Whether people like to agree or disagree with my
> conclusions about the book, it is at least based on an actual reading
> of it.

I haven't read it either, though I have read other things Meyer wrote,
sufficient to form an opinion of his ideas. I have some comments and
questions.

> Another point is that Stephen Meyer is not by any manner or means some
> sort of "idiot". He clearly knows his science and has put a lot of
> research and thought into his ideas.

Based on *Darwin's Doubt* and various articles, this may not be true. If
he knows his science, he's deliberately lying about it. And it's
generally considered good practice not to explain by malice what can be
explained by stupidity.

> In that context, it is important, I think, to point out that Meyer
> does not reject any scientific findings which are based on solid
> evidence; on the contrary, he not only accepts things like the Big
> Bang and Evolution, he argues them as evidence for the existence of
> God.

Not sure that's true either. He has, for example, written an article
casting doubt on the evidence for common descent of humans and apes. And
his book on the Cambrian explosion tried to support the notion of a
phylogenetic lawn, in which each phylum (at least) is unrelated to any
other. Yet those findings are all based on solid evidence.

> His focus is on where direct scientific knowledge runs out and
> explanations offered by science are largely conjecture, not backed by
> any physical evidence.

Regarding biology, at least, you are wrong on this point.

[Martin Harran]

Elaboration on how I am wrong would be useful.

[Glenn]

ROFTLMAO!

[erik simpson]

On Monday, July 25, 2022 at 8:55:10 AM UTC-7, martin...@gmail.com wrote:

https://www.amazon.com/Cambrian-Explosion-Construction-Animal-Biodiversity/dp/1936221039

Best current overview of the Cambrian-Ediacaran "explosion". Meyer's view seems to be cross between
Gould's "Wonderful Life" and Discovery Institute crap. Gould's book was written in the 1980's shortly after
the Burgess shale collections were "rediscovered". A great story, and Gould does the story very well, but
his viewpoint quickly became seriously dated. Erwin and Velentine's book dates from 2011, and much more
has been discovered since. Gould, Erwin and Valentine were/are prominent paleontologists and Meyer is
not. Nuff said.

[broger...@gmail.com]

To me, the problem with a God of the Gaps argument is that, even if true, it gets you nowhere near the sort of God that most people who make the argument including, Meyer, want. By which I mean an personal God, interested in what happens to humans, an ultimate source of morality, preferably a beneficient one. If you pick some phenomenon that science has not explained and you manage to convince yourself that science can never possibly explain it, all you are left with is attaching the label "God" to the unknown cause of whatever it is you want to have explained. It tells you nothing about "God" other than that "God" is whatever caused whatever thing you want an explanation for. Any more details about God you need to get from faith. But if you have the faith, then you don't need a God of the Gaps argument in the first place.

[John Harshman]

Meyer had access to most of the same data summarized by Erwin &
Valentine but chose to ignore or misinterpret most of it, more to the point.

[John Harshman]

Look above: relationships of humans and apes are not conjecture;
relationships among animal phyla are not conjecture.

[Mark Isaak]

On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:

> There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
> 'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
> Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that
> few if any of those discussing it have actually read the book; not
> least when one prime critic dismissed the book out of hand before it
> was even published! Whether people like to agree or disagree with my
> conclusions about the book, it is at least based on an actual reading
> of it.

I admit I have not read it. I have skipped it because I have read
articles by Stephen Meyers before and know him to be someone who
arranges evidence to fit his conclusions, rather than vice versa.

>
> [...] so I have read this book in a serious attempt to
> better understand [ID proponents'] latest thinking and arguments...

From what you have written, that thinking has not changed significantly
in the last 150 years at least.

> [...] In this book, Meyer pulls no punches,

> he is openly making the case for God; and not just the case for any
> God, he is arguing for the theistic God.

> [...]

> In that context, it is important, I think, to point out that Meyer
> does not reject any scientific findings which are based on solid
> evidence; on the contrary, he not only accepts things like the Big
> Bang and Evolution, he argues them as evidence for the existence of
> God. His focus is on where direct scientific knowledge runs out and
> explanations offered by science are largely conjecture, not backed by
> any physical evidence. His arguments have been dismissed by some
> people as "God of the Gaps" but it seems to me that there is a
> vacuousness inherent in tritely dismissing religious arguments such as
> those put forward by Meyer as "God of the Gaps" without any
> significant identification of the specific reasons why the arguments
> do not stand up. It has always seemed to me, that those who resort to
> that triteness often do so because they don't have any substantive
> rebuttal to put up against the arguments put forward.

I don't understand this criticism. The God of the gaps argument notes
that an absence of evidence for X is not and never can be evidence for a
very different and rather specific Y. After all, in the absence of
evidence, X is still a possibility. That is the whole of it. All of
the substance is right there.

> If there is a
> genuine gap in our scientific knowledge and someone put forward a
> reasoned explanation, then that can only be counteracted with
> similarly reasoned rebuttal. "God of the Gaps" dismissal without
> detailed and rational argument against the ideas put forward, is
> itself little more than handwaving. The important point in that, > however, is that a person putting forward God (or any supernatural
> explanation) has to offer *a reasoned explanation* and that is my
> personal test of the success of Meyer's book.

Okay, it seems we're in agreement. The God of the Gaps rebuttal is
simply a noting of the fact that no case for God has been made in the
first place. If we don't have evidence for the causes of X, Y, and Z,
the inference we are justified in drawing is that we *don't know* the
causes of X, Y, and Z. Too many people are so uncomfortable with "don't
know" that they will eschew logic to avoid it.

> I will not go into details of the gaps that Meyer identifies; they
> have been argued out many times here and essentially are about [1]:
>
> - The 'vast': the origins of the Universe, the Big Bang.
>
> - The 'very small' - DNA and coding/intelligence
>
> - The 'very old': the Cambrian explosion and development of so
> many novel life-forms
>
> I think he has mixed success here, For example, regarding the origins
> of the Universe, he draws heavily on the anthropic principle and that
> has essentially been argued to death. He does, however, identify what
> I believe are some significant issues; for example, scientists
> generally agree that what we recognise as natural forces only came
> into existence with the Big Bang so whatever caused the Big Bang is
> beyond natural forces - unless we say there was no cause, that the Big
> Bang 'just happened', which would present its own problems for
> science.

The origin of the universe is the ultimate unsolved problem. One point
I bet Meyer leaves out is that even if a God of the gaps argument were
valid here, it would not help, because it leaves open the question of
where the god came from. (Multiverse explanations suggested by more
reputable scientists suffer the same problem.) I see only two general
sorts of resolution: a universe infinite in duration, or an origin
without causation.

Regarding DNA coding and the Cambrian explosion, I grant there are
plenty of unknowns, but I have never seen a hint of a need for
supernatural exceptions to the normal operation of the universe. Does
Meyer supply any such exceptions, or does he think the unknowns are
sufficient for his point?

> Identifying shortfalls in existing hypotheses and theories is one
> thing, however, the real issue for me is how well Meyer makes the case
> for his own beliefs.
>
> Meyer claims that he is not making a 'God of the Gaps' argument. He > says instead that he is using an *Inference to the Best Metaphysical

> Explanation* approach ...

See what I mean about his arranging arguments to fit his conclusions?

I've snipped the rest of your review, having no significant issues with
it. (Though I am a little curious what sort of violence Meyer does to
Bayes in his justification of a personal God.)

Another point you allude to (in parts I snipped) but that, I gather,
Meyer doesn't cover, is that his whole book is utterly pointless.
People don't need evidence in order to believe in God, especially not
evidence from the Cambrian or from esoteric microbiology.

I wonder if Meyer has read famous criticisms of medieval scholasticism
such as Erasmus' _In Praise of Folly_.

--
Mark Isaak eciton (at) curioustaxonomy (dot) net
"The presence of those seeking the truth is infinitely to be preferred
to the presence of those who think they've found it." - Terry Pratchett

[Glenn]

Then why? It appears to me that your atheism clouds your reasoning.

[Glenn]

Not conjecture at all, certainly not "largely", to John, who thinks that there is no incomplete information or evidence, but hard fact. Do you walk with a swagger like the other John, Wayne?

[Martin Harran]

On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:26:22 -0700, John Harshman

You really should find out what people have said before you claim that
they are wrong. In this book, Meyer says nothing about the
relationships of humans and apes being conjecture or relationships
among animal phyla being conjecture; the conjecture he talks about is
that around the evolution of consciousness and intelligence.

[jillery]

From Harran's OP:
****************************

I will not go into details of the gaps that Meyer identifies; they
have been argued out many times here and essentially are about [1]:

- The 'vast': the origins of the Universe, the Big Bang.

- The 'very small' - DNA and coding/intelligence

- The 'very old': the Cambrian explosion and development of so
many novel life-forms

*****************************

The first one has nothing to do with the evolution of consciousness
and intelligence, and the last one has much to do with the
relationships among animal phyla.

Perhaps Harran should recall what he wrote before he claims others are
wrong.

--
You're entitled to your own opinions.
You're not entitled to your own facts.

[John Harshman]

True. As I said, I haven't read the book. But I have read Meyer's
article in which he claims that the evidence for human relationships is
poor. He may not explicitly reject that finding in the book, but he did
elsewhere.

Now what about the relationships among phyla? If he discusses the
Cambrian explosion in the book, is it a substantially different claim
from that in *Darwin's Doubt*?

[Lawyer Daggett]

On Monday, July 25, 2022 at 8:40:10 AM UTC-4, martin...@gmail.com wrote:

> There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
> 'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
> Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that

...

> I think he has mixed success here, For example, regarding the origins
> of the Universe, he draws heavily on the anthropic principle and that
> has essentially been argued to death. He does, however, identify what
> I believe are some significant issues; for example, scientists
> generally agree that what we recognise as natural forces only came
> into existence with the Big Bang so whatever caused the Big Bang is
> beyond natural forces - unless we say there was no cause, that the Big
> Bang 'just happened', which would present its own problems for
> science.

I don't understand this phrase "problem for science". By that, I mean
that I can imagine about 3 distinctly different meanings to assign to
the phrase, and they all mean distinctly different things implying
different presumptions and projecting to different resolutions.

Much of this breaks down on what one means by science. Does that
mean the methodology, or some body of knowledge, or is it something
like methodological naturalism?

So is a problem for science a statement that it is the type of problem
that is a good candidate for study by the scientific method?

Or is a problem for science about some phenomena or collection of
phenomena that suggest the body of knowledge called science appears
to include some catastrophic errors or inconsistencies that makes one
doubt the fidelity of this body of knowledge?

Or is it a problem for science that suggests aspects of the methodology,
such as methodological naturalistic assumptions appear to be inadequate
for use in studying the problem?

I expect I'll have other comments about what one attempts to conclude
from the various "problems for science" that get identified but don't want
to go on and on at cross purposes so would prefer to know more clearly
what the apparent claim is. Referencing the part of your post I left in
above, it matters to how one addresses the other stuff behind "natural forces"
and what assumptions are buried in there.

[Öö Tiib]

On Tuesday, 26 July 2022 at 18:30:11 UTC+3, Lawyer Daggett wrote:
> On Monday, July 25, 2022 at 8:40:10 AM UTC-4, martin...@gmail.com wrote:
> > There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
> > 'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
> > Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that
> ...
> > I think he has mixed success here, For example, regarding the origins
> > of the Universe, he draws heavily on the anthropic principle and that
> > has essentially been argued to death. He does, however, identify what
> > I believe are some significant issues; for example, scientists
> > generally agree that what we recognise as natural forces only came
> > into existence with the Big Bang so whatever caused the Big Bang is
> > beyond natural forces - unless we say there was no cause, that the Big
> > Bang 'just happened', which would present its own problems for
> > science.
>
> I don't understand this phrase "problem for science". By that, I mean
> that I can imagine about 3 distinctly different meanings to assign to
> the phrase, and they all mean distinctly different things implying
> different presumptions and projecting to different resolutions.
>
> Much of this breaks down on what one means by science. Does that
> mean the methodology, or some body of knowledge, or is it something
> like methodological naturalism?

Science is our undertaking to build and to organize knowledge.

> So is a problem for science a statement that it is the type of problem
> that is a good candidate for study by the scientific method?
>
> Or is a problem for science about some phenomena or collection of
> phenomena that suggest the body of knowledge called science appears
> to include some catastrophic errors or inconsistencies that makes one
> doubt the fidelity of this body of knowledge?
>
> Or is it a problem for science that suggests aspects of the methodology,
> such as methodological naturalistic assumptions appear to be inadequate
> for use in studying the problem?

Seemed that problem was meant as issue/difficulty (not like mathematical
problem). Things that happen with causes outside of our reach to investigate
and or that "just happened" once without explanation are difficulties. How
to build and to organize knowledge about those damn bangs (if there can
be more than one).

> I expect I'll have other comments about what one attempts to conclude
> from the various "problems for science" that get identified but don't want
> to go on and on at cross purposes so would prefer to know more clearly
> what the apparent claim is. Referencing the part of your post I left in
> above, it matters to how one addresses the other stuff behind "natural forces"
> and what assumptions are buried in there.

It is still fun to fantasize about someone who is older than time, faster
than light and cooler than 0 Kelvins.

[Martin Harran]

On Tue, 26 Jul 2022 06:13:38 -0700, John Harshman

I've never read Darwin's Doubt but in this book, Meyers tackles
head-on what he regards as the most significant criticism of what he
did say about the Cambrian in that former book. Much of the technical
detail of what Meyer writes is well outside my sphere of understanding
and I have had to take a lot of it at face value though, to be fair,
he does cite extensively when he is reviewing counter-arguments. One
of the things I would love to see is a response from someone with a
similar range of knowledge on the other side of the fence explaining
the weaknesses in his analyses. I don't expect to see that happen so,
as a little taster, I am copying below a lengthy extract covering what
he has to say in response to Charles Marshall's criticism of his
previous book. I will be interested to see you and others critiquing
his arguments in that.

<quote>
The review of Darwin's Doubt that most directly challenged the main
thesis of the book was written by Berkeley paleontologist Charles
Marshall and published in Science. Marshall, a thoroughly mainstream
evolutionary biologist, has taken little interest in the kind of
antireligious polemics advanced by Richard Dawkins and other New
Atheists. At the same time, he acknowledges holding a materialistic
worldview and thinks that some contemporary form of evolutionary
theory can (or will ultimately) explain the major innovations in
biological form in the history of life. A leading expert on the
Cambrian era, Marshall has posited various explanations for the abrupt
appearance of new forms of life in that period.

Unlike many other reviewers, Marshall grappled directly with my main
arguments about the problem of the origin of biological information
and morphological novelty. Yet his review demonstrated-if
inadvertently-that evolutionary biologists have not solved that
problem and do not have a better explanation than intelligent design.

To rebut my claim that evolutionary mechanisms lack the creative power
to generate the information necessary to produce new forms of animal
life, Marshall did not defend the sufficiency of mutation and natural
selection (or any other materialistic evolutionary mechanism).
Instead, he disputed that significant amounts of new genetic
information would have been necessary to build new animals and their
distinctive body plans.

Marshall claimed that "rewiring" of what are called developmental gene
regulatory networks (dGRNs) could produce new animals from preexisting
genes. Developmental gene regulatory networks comprise networks of
genes and gene products (DNA-binding proteins and regulatory RNAs)
that control the timing and expression of genetic information during
animal development. The components in these networks transmit signals
(known as transcriptional regulators or transcription factors) that
influence the way individual cells develop and differentiate. For
example, exactly when a signaling molecule gets transmitted often
depends upon when a signal from another molecule is received, which in
turn affects the transmission of still others-all beautifully
coordinated to perform specific time-critical functions. These
networks of genes and gene products function much like integrated
circuits and ensure that the developing organism produces the right
proteins at the right times to service the right types of cells during
embryological development (Fig. 15.5).

This "rewiring" hypothesis formed the basis of Marshall's critique. As
he argued:

"[Meyer's] case . . . rests on the claim that the origin of new animal
body plans requires vast amounts of novel genetic information coupled
with the unsubstantiated assertion that this new genetic information
must include many new protein folds. In fact, our present
understanding of morphogenesis indicates that new phyla were not made
by new genes but largely emerged through the rewiring of the gene
regulatory networks (GRNs) of already existing genes.19"

Superficially, Marshall's proposal sounded plausible. Nevertheless, it
too presupposed significant and unexplained sources of biological
information.

Elastic Control Networks Required
---------------------------------------------
First, Marshall assumed that developmental gene regulatory networks
were more flexible and subject to "rewiring" in the past.20 Yet all
available observational evidence shows that dGRNs do not tolerate
changes or perturbations to their basic control systems. Even modest
mutation-induced changes to the genes in the core of the dGRN produce
either no change in developmental trajectory (due to a preprogrammed
redundancy) or catastrophic (most often lethal) effects within
developing animals. Disrupt the central control nodes and the
developing animal does not shift to a different viable, stably
heritable body plan. Rather, the system crashes, and the developing
animal usually dies or, if it survives, is severely malformed.21

The late Eric Davidson, of Caltech, a leading developmental biologist,
discovered this fact about dGRNs.22 In his investigations, he
discovered what these networks of genes do and what they never do;
what they never do is change significantly via undirected mutations.
Davidson explained why. He likened the integrated complexity of the
dGRNs to that of an integrated circuit on an electrical circuit board.
This integrated complexity makes dGRNs stubbornly resistant to
fundamental restructuring without breaking.23 Instead, the mutations
affecting the dGRNs that regulate body-plan development inevitably
lead to "catastrophic loss of the body part or loss of viability
altogether."24 Davidson emphasized that "there is always an observable
consequence if a dGRN subcircuit is interrupted. Since these
consequences are always catastrophically bad, flexibility is
minimal."25

Davidson's findings present another challenge to the adequacy of the
mechanism of random mutation and natural selection. Building new
animal body plans requires not just new genes and proteins, but new
dGRNs. But to build a new dGRN from a preexisting one requires
altering the preexisting dGRN-the very thing Davidson showed does not
occur without catastrophic consequence.26 Given this, how could a new
animal body plan-and the new dGRNs necessary to produce it-ever evolve
from a preexisting body plan and dGRN? Davidson himself made clear
that no one really knows.27 Although many evolutionary theorists have
speculated about early "labile" (highly flexible) dGRNs, no developing
animal that biologists have observed exhibits the kind of elasticity
that the evolution of new body plans requires. Davidson, when
discussing these hypothetical labile dGRNs, thus acknowledged that
evolutionary biologists are speculating "where no modern dGRN provides
a model."28

But there is a more fundamental and obvious problem. Marshall claimed
that building new forms of animal life does not require new sources of
genetic information. But his account of body-plan building
(morphogenesis) presupposes many unexplained sources of such
information. Indeed, he presupposes at least three. Let's examine each
in turn.

The Genetic Information in dGRNs
---------------------------------------------
Marshall presupposed unexplained genetic information, first, by
invoking preexistent developmental gene regulatory networks. The many
genes that code for signaling proteins and RNAs in developmental gene
regulatory networks contain a vast amount of genetic information-the
origin of which Marshall does not explain.

In his scientific papers and in his discussion of how "rewiring" gene
regulatory networks could generate new body plans, Marshall clearly
recognizes that preexisting genes would be necessary to produce new
animals. He emphasizes that Hox genes, in particular, must have played
a significant causal role in producing the origin of the first animals
during the Cambrian explosion.29 Hox genes are information-rich
regulatory genes that coordinate the expression of other genes and
thus play important roles in many dGRNs. Nevertheless, he does not
explain the origin of these or any other information-rich genes in
dGRNs. Thus, his proposal begs the question as to the origin of at
least one additional, significant, and necessary source of genetic
information.

A "Genetic Toolkit" for Anatomical Novelties
-----------------------------------------------------------
When Marshall wrote that new animals "emerged through the rewiring of
the gene regulatory networks (GRNs) of already existing genes," he did
not specify whether he meant already existing genes in genetic
regulatory networks or other preexisting genes such as those necessary
for building the specific anatomical structures that characterize the
Cambrian animals (the expression of which dGRNs regulate). Yet when
writing elsewhere, Marshall has emphasized that building new animal
body plans would require many other preexisting genes, indeed, a
preexisting, preadapted "genetic toolkit" for building specific
anatomical parts and structures.30

In a 2006 paper, "Explaining the Cambrian 'Explosion' of Animals,"
Marshall noted: "Animals cannot evolve if the genes for making them
are not yet in place. So clearly, developmental/genetic innovation
must have played a central role in the [Cambrian] radiation."31
Indeed, Marshall emphasized, in addition to Hox genes, the need for
"gene novelties" for building the anatomical structures and other
novel features of the various animals that arose in the Cambrian
period.32

Of course, he's right about this. Building new animals would have
required a whole range of different proteins to build and service
specific forms of animal life. Different forms of complex animal life
exhibit unique cell types, and typically each cell type depends upon
other specialized or dedicated proteins-which in turn require genetic
information.33 New forms of animal life would have needed various
specialized proteins: for facilitating adhesion, for regulating
development, for building specialized tissues or structural parts of
specialized organs, for producing eggs and sperm, and many other
distinctive functions and structures. These proteins must have arisen
sometime in the history of life, but Marshall does not explain how the
information for building them originated.

Rewiring Networks and Informational Inputs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Finally, "rewiring" genetic circuitry as Marshall envisions it would
itself require new information. To see why, consider what would be
needed to rewire the circuitry of the 1950s vintage electric guitar
shown in Figure 15.6. Notice that the material components of the three
different designs of the circuitry in the figure are the same in all
three guitars, though the musical tones produced by the rewired
guitars will differ perceptibly in accord with the designer's intent.
Rewiring requires the deliberate selection of a specific configuration
of parts out of a much larger range of possible options. Thus, it
requires an infusion of specified information to transform the
original system into new and different arrangements of parts. Notice
too that such an informational input will be required whether the
individual parts of the circuit remain largely the same or whether new
parts must be introduced.

In a similar but greater way, given the complexity of an animal
compared to a guitar, rewiring the circuitry of a gene regulatory
network would also require new inputs of information. It would require
multiple coordinated changes in the sequences of bases within the
individual genes and/or changes to the arrangement or timing of
expression of whole genes within the developmental gene regulatory
network. Such reconfiguring would entail fixing certain material
states and excluding a vast ensemble of others. Thus, it would
constitute a substantial infusion of new functional information into
the dGRN.34 Thus, even if it were possible to rewire genetic
regulatory networks without destroying a developing animal, Marshall's
"rewiring" proposal itself presupposes, but does not explain, the need
for an additional source of information.

Note, finally, the inescapably teleological (or purposeful) language
of Marshall's "rewiring" proposal. Any electrician or electrical
engineer-indeed, anyone who works with actual circuitry and a power
supply with current passing through the circuit-knows that successful
rewiring requires well-informed decisions, that is, both information
and intelligent design. What rewiring manifestly does not allow is
random changes. That's a great way to burn down your house or blow out
the motherboard on your computer.

A Clarifying Discussion and Confirming Discovery
-----------------------------------------------------------------
After his review was published, Marshall and I had a congenial
ninety-minute debate about the Cambrian problem on British radio. In
it, we may have clarified a misunderstanding about the nature of my
argument. Marshall seemed to think that I thought the essential
problem posed by the Cambrian explosion was the origin of new genes
specifically during the Cambrian period. Thus, he thought he had
refuted my argument by positing an earlier preadapted pre-Cambrian
genome that could be activated to produce new animals by rewiring gene
regulatory networks. Thus, at one point in our debate he cited
evidence suggesting that one of the key proteins for making animal
exoskeletons might have existed in pre-Cambrian times.

But, as I went on to explain in that conversation, the fundamental
problem posed by the origin of the animals was not necessarily the
origin of new genes specifically during the Cambrian period, but the
origin of the genetic information necessary to build animals, whether
that information first arose in the Cambrian period or earlier.
Pushing the origin of genetic information back into the pre-Cambrian
period left unanswered the question of its ultimate origin.

Recall also from Chapter 10 that mutagenesis experiments have
established the extreme rarity of functional genes and proteins among
the many possible ways of arranging nucleotide bases or amino acids
within their corresponding "sequence spaces."35 This rarity makes it
overwhelmingly more likely than not that a series of random mutational
searches will fail to generate even a single new gene or protein fold
within available evolutionary time. Marshall did not explain how a
random mutational search could have located the extremely rare
functional sequences of nucleotide bases capable of building protein
folds within an exponentially large sequence space of possible
arrangements. In other words, he does not explain how any evolutionary
mechanism could have solved the search problem described in Chapter
10. Instead, he simply assumes that the necessary genes for building
new forms of animal life arose earlier in the history of life, without
explaining how they did.

I did and still do suspect that much of the genetic information
necessary to account for the abrupt appearance of the Cambrian animals
arose in the Cambrian period. (Recent genetic analyses have confirmed
my view.) But I acknowledged that the genes necessary to build the
Cambrian animals might have arisen earlier without in any way solving
the fundamental problem. I noted that positing preexisting genetic
information (e.g., for building animal exoskeleton proteins) left
unanswered the question of the earlier origin of that genetic
information.36 To that, Marshall replied, "Fair enough." In so doing,
in my view, he effectively acknowledged the reality of the problem of
the ultimate origin of genetic information.37
</quote>

[Martin Harran]

On Tue, 26 Jul 2022 08:27:41 -0700 (PDT), Lawyer Daggett
<j.nobel...@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Monday, July 25, 2022 at 8:40:10 AM UTC-4, martin...@gmail.com wrote:
>> There has been a number of references here to Stephen Meyer's book
>> 'Return of the God Hypothesis: Three Scientific Discoveries That
>> Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe' but the impression is given that
> ...
>> I think he has mixed success here, For example, regarding the origins
>> of the Universe, he draws heavily on the anthropic principle and that
>> has essentially been argued to death. He does, however, identify what
>> I believe are some significant issues; for example, scientists
>> generally agree that what we recognise as natural forces only came
>> into existence with the Big Bang so whatever caused the Big Bang is
>> beyond natural forces - unless we say there was no cause, that the Big
>> Bang 'just happened', which would present its own problems for
>> science.
>
> I don't understand this phrase "problem for science". By that, I mean
>that I can imagine about 3 distinctly different meanings to assign to
>the phrase, and they all mean distinctly different things implying
>different presumptions and projecting to different resolutions.

By "science" here, I mean scientists in general. What I meant by
problems is that finding out explanations for why things happen is the
very essence of science; to say that something like the Big Bang "just
happened" would be writing off the possibility of any explanation
which would be the antithesis of science.

[John Harshman]

All this ignores or denies much of what we know, and it fundamentally
alters his argument about the Cambrian explosion: it's no longer about
the sudden origin of information but about the culmination of an
apparently slow process. Nor have recent genetic analyses confirmed his
view. Further, he continues to claim that the Cambrian explosion was
abrupt in the fossil record, which it was not.

Rather than repeat myself, I'll just link to this:

http://darwinsdoubtreviews.blogspot.com/2013/09/john-harshmans-technical-objections.html

And here's another recent publication that pushed some events farther
back in time:

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-022-01807-x

It's not something Meyer could have known about, but there are plenty of
other things he ignores, even when he notoriously cites some of them in
a footnote.

[erik simpson]

Your second cite is very interesting. Other Ediacaran critters have been identified as metazoan, but Auroralumina attenboroughii
is not only a recognizable animal of a familiar phylum, but a predator to boot. Tentacles aren't the best way to filter-feed micro-organisms,
so I wonder what it was eating.

[Glenn]

Oh look, a journalist is the sole reference to the claim of this rock pattern being a predator.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auroralumina

[John Harshman]

Maybe you should consult the actual article, the one in Nature, rather
than a Wikipedia stub.

[erik simpson]

Look a little harder: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medusozoa

[Glenn]

One single article that fits your belief system, that is.

[Glenn]

It is way past your nap time.

[Mark Isaak]

On 7/26/22 9:58 AM, Martin Harran wrote:

> [quoting Meyer]
> [...] Yet his review demonstrated-if

> inadvertently-that evolutionary biologists have not solved that
> problem and do not have a better explanation than intelligent design.

The simple fact that invalidates pretty much all of so-called
intelligent design theory is that "I don't know" is a better explanation
than intelligent design. It has the advantages of being honest, of not
blocking further research or leading it astray, of not multiplying
entities beyond necessity, and of being honest.

[Öö Tiib]

On Wednesday, 27 July 2022 at 04:50:11 UTC+3, Mark Isaak wrote:
> On 7/26/22 9:58 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> > [quoting Meyer]
> > [...] Yet his review demonstrated-if
> > inadvertently-that evolutionary biologists have not solved that
> > problem and do not have a better explanation than intelligent design.
>
> The simple fact that invalidates pretty much all of so-called
> intelligent design theory is that "I don't know" is a better explanation
> than intelligent design. It has the advantages of being honest, of not
> blocking further research or leading it astray, of not multiplying
> entities beyond necessity, and of being honest.

Being honest is often not popular enough but overdoing or over-claiming
it ;) can give opposite effect. I would like the intelligent designers to
speculate and to bullshit a bit more. Their "theory" contains nothing but
doubt and denial and so it is hard to call it dishonest. Dishonest is only
implying that they have anything at all. There are plenty of too wild
speculation in archeology or archaeological anthropology where
"I don't know" would sound more honest explanation.

[Martin Harran]

On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:34:24 -0700, Mark Isaak
<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:

>On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:

<snip stuff on which we largely agree>

>
>The origin of the universe is the ultimate unsolved problem. One point
>I bet Meyer leaves out is that even if a God of the gaps argument were
>valid here, it would not help, because it leaves open the question of
>where the god came from.

I don't see how that is an issue for people who believe that God
*always* existed.

>(Multiverse explanations suggested by more
>reputable scientists suffer the same problem.) I see only two general
>sorts of resolution: a universe infinite in duration, or an origin
>without causation.

I'm not sure what other religions subscribe to but Christians believe
that God is infinite (not the universe) and "origin" doesn't come into
it as God, having always existed, didn't have an origin.

>
>Regarding DNA coding and the Cambrian explosion, I grant there are
>plenty of unknowns, but I have never seen a hint of a need for
>supernatural exceptions to the normal operation of the universe. Does
>Meyer supply any such exceptions, or does he think the unknowns are
>sufficient for his point?
>
>> Identifying shortfalls in existing hypotheses and theories is one
>> thing, however, the real issue for me is how well Meyer makes the case
>> for his own beliefs.
>>
>> Meyer claims that he is not making a 'God of the Gaps' argument. He > says instead that he is using an *Inference to the Best Metaphysical
>> Explanation* approach ...
>
>See what I mean about his arranging arguments to fit his conclusions?

Not quite sure what you mean there. I don't think he is particularly
arranging arguments, he is simply identifying shortcomings in
alternative ideas and claiming his ideas are right because they are
'last man standing'. (Which I've already said is not valid logic.)

>
>I've snipped the rest of your review, having no significant issues with
>it. (Though I am a little curious what sort of violence Meyer does to
>Bayes in his justification of a personal God.)

Not sure if this covers what you are curious about (it is an extract
from a much longer piece about Bayesian analysis. Hopefully his
equations aren't overly mangled by the text restrictions of Usenet
posting.

<quote>
Causal-Adequacy Considerations
So why does a cosmic beginning seem unexpected from a naturalistic
point of view? It does so primarily because naturalism or materialism
can offer no ready causal explanation for such a beginning. If the
"cosmos is all that is," per Carl Sagan, then nothing else exists
beyond or separate from it that could act as its cause. Naturalists
before the discovery of the beginning of the universe felt confident
in positing an eternally and necessarily existing universe that did
not require a causal explanation. But several classes of observational
astronomical evidence (see Chapters 4 and 5), the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin
(BGV) theorem, and even the Hawking-Penrose-Ellis singularity theorems
(see Chapter 6) all indicate that the physical universe had a
beginning.
Consequently, the origin of the universe would seem to require-by the
principle of causality or sufficient reason-a cause. But since,
according to naturalism, nothing exists except the natural world
(i.e., the universe of matter, energy, space, and time), then nothing
else could have functioned as the cause of its coming into existence.
The beginning of the universe thus raises a question that naturalists,
almost by definition, cannot answer, namely, "What caused the whole of
nature or the physical universe itself to come into existence?" For
this reason, naturalism, in its basic form at least, does not qualify
as a causally adequate explanation for the presumed fact, variously
attested, of the beginning of the universe.
The Hawking-Penrose-Ellis singularity theorems amplify this
conclusion. If sometime in the finite past, either the curvature of
space reached an infinite and/or the radius and spatial volume of the
universe collapsed to zero units, then at that point there would be no
space and no place for matter and energy to reside. Consequently, the
possibility of a materialistic explanation would also evaporate, since
at that point neither material particles nor energy fields would
exist. Indeed, since matter and energy cannot exist until space (and
probably time) begins to exist, a materialistic explanation involving
either material particles or energy fields-before space and time
existed-makes no sense. As I used to tell my students, "If you
extrapolate back all the way to a singularity, you eventually reach a
point where there is no matter left to do the causing."
As we saw in Chapter 6, physicists now question whether the
Hawking-Penrose-Ellis result can be extended all the way back to the
very beginning. Many have instead adopted eternal chaotic inflationary
models of the origin of the universe. But, as we saw, the
Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem applies just as much to these inflationary
models as it does to the standard big bang model. Consequently, this
theorem leaves "no escape," as Vilenkin has put it, from the
conclusion that the universe ultimately did have a beginning.
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 6, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem
implies that time had a beginning. And since time and space are linked
(not only in general relativity, but in newer theories of quantum
gravity), affirming a beginning to time would seem to imply a
beginning to space as well, even if space began with a finite
(nonzero) volume. In any case, if the universe began to exist, as BGV
affirms, then that would imply that whatever properties we associate
with the universe-space, matter, and energy as well as time-also began
to exist. Indeed, it makes no sense metaphysically to say that the
universe of space and time, matter and energy began to exist a finite
time ago and also to affirm that "before that" (i.e., in time) time or
space or matter or energy already existed as well. Since space,
matter, and energy are fundamental features of the universe, the
proposition "The universe began to exist a finite time ago" implies
that those features of the universe came into existence as well.
For this reason, the BGV theorem reinforces the same metaphysical
implications as the Penrose-Hawking-Ellis singularity theorems,
whatever physicists think of the applicability of the singularity
theorems to the universe in its very earliest and smallest phase.
Indeed, the BGV theorem implies the causal inadequacy of all
materialistic explanations for the origin of the universe, since,
again, before the ultimate beginning of the material universe, neither
matter nor energy would have yet existed.16

A Bayesian Take
Bayesian analysis can clarify and amplify this conclusion. In the
first place, since basic naturalism denies the existence of any entity
beyond the universe that could act to cause the origin of the
universe, proponents of basic naturalism expect an eternal
self-existent universe and would not expect evidence of the origin of
the universe a finite time ago. Yet since theism does affirm the
existence of a transcendent entity beyond the space, time, matter, and
energy of our universe, theists might well expect to find evidence of
the universe having a temporally finite beginning. Thus, using
Bayesian analysis, we can affirm that the likelihood of evidence of a
temporal beginning is greater given theism than given basic
naturalism. Or stated symbolically, P(E | T) >> P(E | Nb).
Many philosophers think that there is no compelling a priori reason to
regard either a naturalistic or a theistic worldview as much more
probable than the other.17 If so, we can also employ Bayesian
reasoning to affirm that the probability of the theistic hypothesis
given the evidence of a cosmic beginning is greater than the
probability of basic naturalism given that same evidence. Or stated
symbolically, P(T | E) >> P(Nb | E). Thus, theism provides a better
explanation of the temporal beginning of the universe than does
naturalism.
Bayesian analysis can also help resolve a possible objection to the
argument presented here. Up to this point, I've argued that theists
have various reasons to expect that the universe might have had a
definite beginning in time. Nevertheless, given that theists conceive
of God as a personal agent with free will-indeed, one with a unique
(and debatable) relationship to time-some could reasonably object to
this claim. For example, some could argue that since God is an agent
with free will, we have no way of knowing whether God would have
created time a finite time ago or whether God might have chosen to
create by maintaining all moments of time into existence from eternity
past (as proponents of the cosmological argument from contingency
presuppose as a possibility). Consequently, some might argue that it
is impossible, given a theistic conception of God, to establish that
God would necessarilyhave created a temporally finite universe.
Therefore, it could be argued that theists do not have definitive
grounds for expecting a finite universe.
Of course, theists do not have absolute grounds for expecting a finite
universe. Yet it does not follow that they do not have greater grounds
for expecting such a universe than philosophical naturalists do.
Indeed, even though theists cannot establish that God would
necessarily have created a temporally finite universe, theism does
offer reasons (as explained above) for suspecting that God might well
have done so. Indeed, since theism posits the existence of a being
with relevant causal powers beyond space and time, the God of theism
could have acted to bring time and space into existence, thus leaving
evidence of a universe with a beginning. On the other hand, given
basic naturalism, no entity outside space and time exists that could
have acted to bring the universe, space, and time into existence a
finite time ago. Consequently, the tenets of basic naturalism do not
lead us to expect evidence of a temporally finite beginning of the
universe, whereas theists might-or might well-expect such evidence.
Thus, theism offers a greater expectation of such evidence than
naturalism. Using Bayesian terms, the likelihood of evidence for a
cosmic beginning is greater given theism than basic naturalism, or P(E
| T) >> P(E | Nb).

The assessment of Bayesian likelihoods, based upon causal-adequacy
considerations, helps us to characterize the relative strength of our
expectations of observing specific evidence given different
hypotheses. That in turn allows us to make judgments about which of
the competing hypotheses is more likely to be true, even if we cannot
put exact numbers on the probabilities (Fig. 12.3).
Recall the analogous, if homespun, example from the previous chapter.
Though I, while hiking through the forest, could not say in advance
how likely it would be that a person would leave a steeping cup of tea
on the table, I recognized immediately that the cup of tea was better
explained by the hypothesis of an inhabited cabin than by the reverse.
Why? Because I knew that a person could have made a cup of tea,
whereas nothing in an uninhabited house could have done so.
Consequently, had I been inclined to use Bayesian analysis, I would
have also understood that the probability of observing a steeping cup
of tea was much higher if the house was inhabited than the
reverse-even, again, if I could not say definitely in advance that a
person would necessarily leave such evidence and even if I could not
have quantified precisely the probability of finding such evidence in
that case.
In a similar way, even though theists cannot say in advance that God
definitely would have to create a universe exhibiting evidence of a
temporal beginning, we recognize that the evidence of such a beginning
is more likely given theism than naturalism. If there is, further, no
overriding reason a priorito prefer naturalism over theism (see n.
17), it follows, given Bayesian probabilistic equations, that the
probability of the hypothesis of theism is much greater than the
probability of naturalism given the evidence of a beginning of the
universe. Thus, theism provides a better explanation of that evidence
than does naturalism.

</quote>

[Martin Harran]

On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:34:24 -0700, Mark Isaak
<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:

<Snip for focus>

>Another point you allude to (in parts I snipped) but that, I gather,
>Meyer doesn't cover, is that his whole book is utterly pointless.
>People don't need evidence in order to believe in God, especially not
>evidence from the Cambrian or from esoteric microbiology.

I wanted to respond to this but it would have been buried after all
that Bayesian stuff so I'm doing it here.

You are right in principle about Faith not requiring evidence but it's
not as simple as that in practice. Somewhere along the line, people of
Faith have to reconcile their beliefs with irrefutable knowledge
produced using science. In regard to evolution, that is not a problem
for theistic evolutionists like myself who have no problems in
reconciling the ToE with their beliefs. The ID movement has a
different agenda, however. You have to take into account their
development from the Wedge Strategy which has no desire to reconcile
science and religion, it sets out to replace science with religious
belief.

[Martin Harran]

On Tue, 26 Jul 2022 10:56:06 -0700, John Harshman

Let's get back to basics. Meyer's approach is essentially two steps:

Step 1: there are gaps in our knowledge

Step 2: God is a better explanation for those gaps than anything
science has to offer.

We both agree that he fails in Step 2, albeit for different reasons,
so the only question is whether the gaps in his Step 1 even exist. It
seems to me that you are arguing that the gaps he claims exist
regarding the Cambrian are much smaller than he makes them out to be;
I don't think that you are disputing that there are gaps of some sort.
Am I correct?

[Martin Harran]

On Tue, 26 Jul 2022 18:48:39 -0700, Mark Isaak
<eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:

>On 7/26/22 9:58 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> [quoting Meyer]
>> [...] Yet his review demonstrated-if
>> inadvertently-that evolutionary biologists have not solved that
>> problem and do not have a better explanation than intelligent design.
>
>The simple fact that invalidates pretty much all of so-called
>intelligent design theory is that "I don't know" is a better explanation
>than intelligent design. It has the advantages of being honest, of not
>blocking further research or leading it astray, of not multiplying
>entities beyond necessity, and of being honest.

I agree totally with what you say there but the same applies to
scientists, some of whom seem very reluctant to say "I don't know."

[RonO]

I agree with what you have written above. Meyer even claims that he is
only using the junk as God of the Gaps arguments (well, he lies about
not doing that even as he explains how he is using them as only god of
the gaps arguments). He claims to be interested in the science, but in
his discussion with Shermer he claims that he doesn't want to use the
junk to better understand what the God might be or might have done, and
he emphatically declares that he does not want to use the junk to
understand the god that he believes in. He does not want to use the
junk to understand his religious beliefs. He only wants to use the junk
as disembodied bits of denial, so that he can go on believing that his
god might exist.

It was pointed out in both the Arkansas Federal court case and The
Louisiana Supreme Court case that just putting up denial of what you
don't like does not support the creationist alternative. Meyer knows
this because he definitely does not want to believe in the god
responsible for the Big Bang and the Cambrian explosion. He doesn't
want to understand how the Big Bang and Cambrian explosion relates to
his religious beliefs. He only wants to use the gaps to claim that some
god might exist. He doesn't want to use the gaps to better understand
his god. Just like MarkE he knows that he doesn't want to believe in
the god that fills the gap.

https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/PJsqZMUiYCo/m/CHP6mmE9BQAJ

Ron Okimoto

[broger...@gmail.com]

I don't know where to snip; all I want to do is say that I don't think it obvious that "the Universe had a beginning." Although some popularizations of the Big Bang suggest that the universe started at the Big Bang as an infinitely dense, infinitely small singularity, that's not the way cosmologists actually understand it. It would be more correct to say, I think, that nobody knows what happened in the first 10^-X seconds (where -X is something like -30) after the Big Bang, and certainly nobody knows what happened before it, or whether all the material stuff that exists was included in it. If you extrapolate cosmic expansion backwards in time you get to a very hot, very dense state, and then you get to a state in which you would, at least, have to have figured out how to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity to model what was happening. So, here again "I don't know" is a pretty good answer.

Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4

[Martin Harran]

You seem to be treating the word 'beginning' somewhat semantically;
would it make it easier for you if I said "this Universe" or "the
Universe as we know it"?

>Although some popularizations of the Big Bang suggest that the universe started at the Big Bang as an infinitely dense, infinitely small singularity, that's not the way cosmologists actually understand it. It would be more correct to say, I think, that nobody knows what happened in the first 10^-X seconds (where -X is something like -30) after the Big Bang, and certainly nobody knows what happened before it, or whether all the material stuff that exists was included in it.

Meyer claims that natural forces as we know them came into existence
at the Big Bang and cannot have been the cause of it. Are you
disgreeing with him?

>If you extrapolate cosmic expansion backwards in time you get to a very hot, very dense state, and then you get to a state in which you would, at least, have to have figured out how to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity to model what was happening. So, here again "I don't know" is a pretty good answer.
>
>Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4

You're saying we don't know what happened before the Big Bang but
you're sending me to a video that explains what happened before the
Big Bang … sounds a bit contradictory!

(Haven't time to watch it just now; I'll do so at some stage.)

[John Harshman]

There are of course many, many gaps in the fossil record, in terms of
missing time, missing places, and missing species. Meyer actually denies
that those gaps exist when it suits him, claiming that they represent
reality and that the record is complete. Many of the gaps he represents
as reality don't actually exist, and the gap is in his text. In
particular, he ignores about 20 million years of the early Cambrian, in
which metazoan fossils slowly increase in size and diversity, what's
called the "small shelly fauna" and the ichnofossil record.

But of course we don't know everything. We just know much more than
Meyer lets on.

[broger...@gmail.com]

It does make a difference, right? At least to someone who wants to see the Big Bang as the moment of Creation. For such a person it may well be important that before the Big Bang there was simply nothing at all, rather than some condition of matter that we just don't know about. And important that whatever expanded in the Big Bang is all that there is. You may not be such a person, but I think the theological appeal of the Big Bang to such a person is only really there if they think of it as creation ex nihilo, rather than a change in state of something that was there already.

> >Although some popularizations of the Big Bang suggest that the universe started at the Big Bang as an infinitely dense, infinitely small singularity, that's not the way cosmologists actually understand it. It would be more correct to say, I think, that nobody knows what happened in the first 10^-X seconds (where -X is something like -30) after the Big Bang, and certainly nobody knows what happened before it, or whether all the material stuff that exists was included in it.
> Meyer claims that natural forces as we know them came into existence
> at the Big Bang and cannot have been the cause of it. Are you
> disgreeing with him?

It may well be that natural forces ***as we know them*** did not cause the Big Bang, since we don't know how such forces behave under the conditions prior to the Big Bang, or in the conditions in the first 10^-30something seconds after the Big Bang. All he is saying is that we do not know what caused the Big Bang, which is also what lots of cosmologists are saying. Meyer, it seems, would like to label the unknown cause of the Big Bang "God." But if you do that, all you get is a God whose only property is that of being whatever unknown cause it was that caused the Big Bang. Any additional properties you want to impute to "God" you need to get from faith**. And if you've got faith, you're all set anyway.

**Well, I suppose someone could assemble all the things someone considers inadequately unexplained things and say God is whatever......
1. Caused the Big Bang
2. Caused the bacterial flagellum
3. Caused the diversification of animal life in the Cambrian
4. Caused the bombardier beetle's defense system to be the way it is
5. Reconciles quantum mechanics and general relativity
6. Causes consciousness
7. Et cetera

It does seem like rather a grab bag of properties, which leaves out many of the properties that a proper theist in a mainline religion wants in a God.

> >If you extrapolate cosmic expansion backwards in time you get to a very hot, very dense state, and then you get to a state in which you would, at least, have to have figured out how to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity to model what was happening. So, here again "I don't know" is a pretty good answer.
> >
> >Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
> >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4
> You're saying we don't know what happened before the Big Bang but
> you're sending me to a video that explains what happened before the
> Big Bang … sounds a bit contradictory!
>
> (Haven't time to watch it just now; I'll do so at some stage.)

When you do have time to watch it, you'll see that it explains that we don't know what happened before the Big Bang; I sent it because it gives a better explanation of the Big Bang than lots of popularizations.

[Mark Isaak]

I agree with you, but I think it is also necessary to say that
speculation, even wild speculation, is an important exercise. It simply
needs to be clearly labeled as such.

[Mark Isaak]

Yes, I actually understand that. I guess the point I should have made
is that Meyer's audience is the theologically naive.

[Mark Isaak]

On 7/27/22 3:33 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:34:24 -0700, Mark Isaak
> <eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>
>> On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>
> <snip stuff on which we largely agree>
>
>>
>> The origin of the universe is the ultimate unsolved problem. One point
>> I bet Meyer leaves out is that even if a God of the gaps argument were
>> valid here, it would not help, because it leaves open the question of
>> where the god came from.
>
> I don't see how that is an issue for people who believe that God
> *always* existed.

Good point, but it raises the question of why God acted when he did.

And if this is the only universe god created, then the a-priori
probability of its creation goes to zero (the probability of picking a
given real number from an infinite line) in the Bayesian analysis Meyer
uses, not the high number he expects.

It is, of course, also possible that God has been active eternally,
creating (and destroying?) universes all the infinite meta-time. I
don't see a tangible difference between this and non-theistic multiverse
ideas.

>> (Multiverse explanations suggested by more
>> reputable scientists suffer the same problem.) I see only two general
>> sorts of resolution: a universe infinite in duration, or an origin
>> without causation.
>
> I'm not sure what other religions subscribe to but Christians believe
> that God is infinite (not the universe) and "origin" doesn't come into
> it as God, having always existed, didn't have an origin.

Another point worth keeping in mind is whether "origin of time" has any
meaning. Time, by definition, has always existed. That does not mean
it has existed through an infinite past. It's tempting, when
considering origins of the universe, to speculate back in time before
time itself, but that, of course, is invalid. I don't know how to wrap
my mind about the beginning of time, but such an exercise is, I think,
important.

And lest people miss my point, everything I said about time above
applies also to god, or at least to a god that "does" things, which
places it in time.

[...]

It looks like Meyer is picking his prior probabilities through gut
feeling, not evidence. I'm also surprised that he makes no attempt to
explain what Bayesian analysis is and how it works. Or does he do this
earlier in the book in a different context?

[jillery]

On Tue, 26 Jul 2022 20:57:01 -0700 (PDT), Öö Tiib <oot...@hot.ee>
wrote:

There's a difference between "X is possible" and "X is a fact".

--
You're entitled to your own opinions.
You're not entitled to your own facts.

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 11:33:14 +0100, Martin Harran
<martin...@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:34:24 -0700, Mark Isaak
><eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>
>>On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>
><snip stuff on which we largely agree>
>
>>
>>The origin of the universe is the ultimate unsolved problem. One point
>>I bet Meyer leaves out is that even if a God of the gaps argument were
>>valid here, it would not help, because it leaves open the question of
>>where the god came from.
>
>I don't see how that is an issue for people who believe that God
>*always* existed.

I don't see how Harran could not see that is an issue for people who
believe that God *always* existed. That belief explicitly contradicts
the presumption that all effects necessarily have causes. To say that
God could have *always* existed necessarily allows the that the Cosmos
could have *always* existed. Harran's and Meyer's dishonest special
pleading about God is a fatal flaw.

<snip remaining>

[jillery]

Harran asserts a false equivalence above. To say "X is possible" is
not the same as to say "X is a fact". Even Harran should understand
the difference.

--

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:04:16 +0100, Martin Harran
<martin...@gmail.com> wrote:

>On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 04:19:34 -0700 (PDT), "broger...@gmail.com"
><broger...@gmail.com> wrote:

[...]

>>Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
>>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4
>
>You're saying we don't know what happened before the Big Bang but
>you're sending me to a video that explains what happened before the
>Big Bang … sounds a bit contradictory!
>
>(Haven't time to watch it just now; I'll do so at some stage.)

Harran above practices the very thing he criticizes in his OP, to
criticize something before knowng what it actually says.

[Glenn]

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 12:40:12 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 11:33:14 +0100, Martin Harran
> <martin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >On Mon, 25 Jul 2022 10:34:24 -0700, Mark Isaak
> ><eci...@curioustaxonomyNOSPAM.net> wrote:
> >
> >>On 7/25/22 5:36 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
> >
> ><snip stuff on which we largely agree>
> >
> >>
> >>The origin of the universe is the ultimate unsolved problem. One point
> >>I bet Meyer leaves out is that even if a God of the gaps argument were
> >>valid here, it would not help, because it leaves open the question of
> >>where the god came from.

That makes no sense. If the God argument were valid, the origin of the universe would have a solution. What came before that is irrelevant, in that limited context. But Mark would lose his bet, since Meyer does discuss this and related issues.

> >
> >I don't see how that is an issue for people who believe that God
> >*always* existed.

Irrelevant, and non responsive.

> I don't see how Harran could not see that is an issue for people who
> believe that God *always* existed. That belief explicitly contradicts
> the presumption that all effects necessarily have causes.

Who presumes that, and why is such a 'presumption" scientific?

>To say that
> God could have *always* existed necessarily allows the that the Cosmos
> could have *always* existed.

No, God is not claimed to be the "Cosmos".

> Harran's and Meyer's dishonest special
> pleading about God is a fatal flaw.
>

Mindless twaddle.

[Glenn]

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 12:45:12 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:04:16 +0100, Martin Harran
> <martin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 04:19:34 -0700 (PDT), "broger...@gmail.com"
> ><broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
> >>Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
> >>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4
> >
> >You're saying we don't know what happened before the Big Bang but
> >you're sending me to a video that explains what happened before the
> >Big Bang … sounds a bit contradictory!
> >
> >(Haven't time to watch it just now; I'll do so at some stage.)
> Harran above practices the very thing he criticizes in his OP, to
> criticize something before knowng what it actually says.
> --

Actually Martin is basing his claim on your own words. If it "actually" says something different, then you misrepresented the video. That the video title is what you represented as being "one on" what happened before the Big Bang, you clearly misrepresent the video, and also as the title is misleading, since it does not address what happened before the BB. What the speaker claims is that we don't know. You knew that.

What you practice is what most all atheist evolutionists practice, deceit, dishonesty, etc. All the juicy stuff you want to attribute to others, with your incessant insults and claims.

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 13:14:01 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
wrote:

>On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 12:45:12 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
>> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:04:16 +0100, Martin Harran
>> <martin...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 04:19:34 -0700 (PDT), "broger...@gmail.com"
>> ><broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> [...]
>> >>Since you liked another FermiLab video, here is one on "what happened before the Big Bang."
>> >>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dr6nNvw55C4
>> >
>> >You're saying we don't know what happened before the Big Bang but
>> >you're sending me to a video that explains what happened before the
>> >Big Bang … sounds a bit contradictory!
>> >
>> >(Haven't time to watch it just now; I'll do so at some stage.)
>> Harran above practices the very thing he criticizes in his OP, to
>> criticize something before knowng what it actually says.
>> --
>Actually Martin is basing his claim on your own words.

Since Harran posted his claim in the OP, that could be the case only
if he knew what I was going to post. IIRC pretending to read minds is
one of few things Harran has not done.

> If it "actually" says something different, then you misrepresented the video. That the video title is what you represented as being "one on" what happened before the Big Bang, you clearly misrepresent the video, and also as the title is misleading, since it does not address what happened before the BB. What the speaker claims is that we don't know. You knew that.

In your haste to post more mindless noise, you confuse yourself. It
was Rogers who cited the video, not me. More to the point, Rogers put
the characterization that twisted your knickers in quotes, to show the
video's relevance to context. Also, you elevate the significance of
the video's title. Finally, "Big Bang" has multiple meanings. Not
sure if the distinctions would make any sense to a Big Bang denier.

>What you practice is what most all atheist evolutionists practice, deceit, dishonesty, etc. All the juicy stuff you want to attribute to others, with your incessant insults and claims.

You have no idea what I want.
You are the last person to complain about insults.

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:59:31 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
wrote:

>Mindless twaddle.

[Glenn]

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 2:45:11 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:59:31 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
> wrote:
>
> >Mindless twaddle.
> --

So you need to change your knickers now. Without context, quoting it is more mindless twaddle. Argue with that.

[Glenn]

Not the last, by any account. I mistook what Bill wrote for what you wrote, but that changes nothing since your reaction to Martin's response is yours alone.

I have some idea what you want, by observing your behavior. You may deny that I have such ability, but you can not deny that it is possible, practiced and accepted in science. Oops, you actually can deny it. You can deny the sun comes up in the morning.
Examples above include "you elevate the significance of the video's title". However, it appears that Martin would be the one that did that, and my part was to identify that.
Does the sun come up in the morning, jillery?

[IDentity]

"Something" has obviously always existed.

God is just a name refering to that something. So is Brahman, TAO,
The Great Spirit etc.. In that sense God (Brahman, TAO, The Great
Spirit etc.) has always existed.

Scientifically speaking God is the Ether, which correctly defined is
the fundamental substance of which everything is made, and not just
some "phenomena" among all the other socalled phenomena.

Not realizing that is the key misunderstanding which leads to an
infinite number of other misunderstandings.

Science went astray when it rejected the existence of the Ether
because it didn't understand what it actually is.

Like Mooji said: "People don't see God because they think God is
something else [than what He/She/It actually is]".

Correct definitions is everything, if you want to have a meaningful
discussion.

[Bob Casanova]

On Thu, 28 Jul 2022 01:23:49 +0200, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by IDentity <iden...@invalid.org>:

>
>"Something" has obviously always existed.
>

"obviously"

I do not think that means whet you think it means.

--

Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:57:53 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>

wrote:

>On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 2:45:11 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
>> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:59:31 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >Mindless twaddle.
>> --

>Without context


Mindless twaddle is context independent. That's what makes it
mindless twaddle.

[jillery]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:55:37 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>

Your objection above would make sense if you had actually written
something about my response to Harran's post.

>I have some idea what you want, by observing your behavior. You may deny that I have such ability, but you can not deny that it is possible, practiced and accepted in science. Oops, you actually can deny it. You can deny the sun comes up in the morning.
>Examples above include "you elevate the significance of the video's title". However, it appears that Martin would be the one that did that, and my part was to identify that.
>Does the sun come up in the morning, jillery?

Do you think your question above has something to do with my response
to Harran's post?

[Martin Harran]

On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 08:32:23 -0700, Mark Isaak

He expalins it earlier in the book, too long for cut'n paste here.

[israel socratus]

“God was always invented to explain mystery. God is always invented to explain
those things that you do not understand. Now, when you finally discover
how something works … you don't need him anymore. But … you leave him to create
the universe because we haven't figured that out yet.” /Richard P. Feynman/

[Glenn]

On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 10:15:12 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 14:57:53 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
> wrote:
>
> >On Wednesday, July 27, 2022 at 2:45:11 PM UTC-7, jillery wrote:
> >> On Wed, 27 Jul 2022 12:59:31 -0700 (PDT), Glenn <GlennS...@msn.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Mindless twaddle.
> >> --
> >Without context
>
>
> Mindless twaddle is context independent. That's what makes it
> mindless twaddle.
> --

And dogs is dogs.

[Glenn]

Nah, that makes sense even if I didn't write anything about your response to Martin's post.

> >I have some idea what you want, by observing your behavior. You may deny that I have such ability, but you can not deny that it is possible, practiced and accepted in science. Oops, you actually can deny it. You can deny the sun comes up in the morning.

> >Examples above include "you elevate the significance of the video's title". However, it appears that Martin would be the one that did that, and my part was to identify that.

> >Does the sun come up in the morning, jillery?

> Do you think your question above has something to do with my response
> to Harran's post?
> --

Why should it?