Where is Nowhere Man?
AC
Man. Where is Lilith's response, NM? It seems that a week has passed. If
I may quote one of the rules *you* agreed to:
2h. Responders will be allowed up to one week to respond.
According to my saved copy of Lilith's post, it came out last Sunday, the
11th of May at 12:12:29 GMT. I suppose a broad stretching of the rules
would give NM until midnight tonight (GMT of course), but still, it seems
that our fine Creationist friend is rapidly running out of time.
--
A. Clausen
boikat
"AC" <maureen-t...@alberni.net> wrote in message
news:slrnbcfe89.fjp.m...@ts1.alberni.net...
Well, it takes a long time to figure out how to say "does not!" in new and
novel ways.
Boikat
>
> --
> A. Clausen
>
> maureen-t...@alberni.net
>
AC
Louann seems inclined towards mercy, and I suppose that's probably the right
thing to do. Still, it is telling that Nowhere Man has been shown incapable
of following the rules which he largely formulated (although the anti-Dana
comments were pretty good hints that this was the direction things would
go).
Perhaps Nowhere Man would be good enough to tell us what his timeline is?
Is he looking at an additional day? Two days? Three? He should be
requesting this of the judges and Lilith, of course, since it is to them
that he is responsible to.
--
A. Clausen
Hiero5ant
"AC" <maureen-t...@alberni.net> wrote in message
news:slrnbcfi8s.hfd.m...@ts1.alberni.net...
NM has an aresenal of YEC responses available to circumvent his
self-imposed time requirement. Among them:
1) "Jewish people measure 'days' differently."
2) "For God, a 'day' means 'a thousand years', and 'a thousand years'
means a 'day'."
3) "God created Lilith's posts in situ to give the *appearance* of a
week-long age."
4) "My response is available, but a vast conspiracy of secular
scientists refuse to publish it."
5) "In order to prove that my response doesn't exist, you'd have to be
omniscient, and you can't prove a negative."
6) "My goodness, that sure taught me a lesson. Perhaps in the future I
will actually learn about a theory before I have the arrogance to debate it
in public, thereby exposing my ignorance."
Ross Langerak
Perhaps he shouldn't have spent his time posting how devastating his
response would be? Or posting that he was just putting the finishing
touches on his response? How does one put finishing touches on "Does
not!"? Perhaps he is deciding whether to use one exclamation point or
three.
>
> --
> A. Clausen
>
> maureen-t...@alberni.net
>
>
AC
Let's face it. His grand opening shot was nothing more than a bunch of
unsupported assertions and handwaving. I can't imagine that his retort will
be any more than continuing that trend. But I suppose, in the interests of
fair play, so that NM and any other Creationist that cares to comment on
this can never say that we did not extend every opportunity.
I still say that we should give him no more than a week. Two weeks should
be more than enough for NM to deal with Lilith's points. Of course, I think
it would be common courtesy for NM to ask this himself.
So, where is Nowhere Man?
--
A. Clausen
Von Smith
He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
of order?
Von Smith
Fortuna nimis dat multis, satis nulli.
The Other Ted
>
[snip]
>
> Louann seems inclined towards mercy, and I suppose that's probably the right
> thing to do. Still, it is telling that Nowhere Man has been shown incapable
> of following the rules which he largely formulated (although the anti-Dana
> comments were pretty good hints that this was the direction things would
> go).
>
> Perhaps Nowhere Man would be good enough to tell us what his timeline is?
> Is he looking at an additional day? Two days? Three? He should be
> requesting this of the judges and Lilith, of course, since it is to them
> that he is responsible to.
</lurk>
But then again, there's a practical reason for "mercy." If NWM loses
the debate by going over time and getting called on it, he could always
claim his loss was due to a mere technicality... Let 'im take all the
time he needs.
Ted
<lurk>
Louann Miller
Not unlimited time; I agree with the points made about that in a
neighboring thread. And not an automatic extension without asking for
it. If he breaks his own rules, as appears likely to happen, I want it
acknowledged for the record.
I'm not sure my 'mercy' would be his choice, if he'd left himself one.
I do want and expect to see his hiney kicked. But I want his hiney
kicked _justly_, within the rules he was so insistent on setting up or
leaning a little toward him. Just so it's perfectly clear that winning
and losing is going to be decided on (to borrow a phrase) facts and
logic, with no room for him or Creationist readers to claim he was
treated unfairly.
Call it honor, call it style points, call it a desire to get the
creationist side really _well_ crushed; up to you. That's just how I
see it.
Louann
Thomas McDonald
"Von Smith" <drea...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8d74ec45.03051...@posting.google.com...
<snip>
> He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
> closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
> of order?
>
> Von Smith
> Fortuna nimis dat multis, satis nulli.
>
Von,
I'm not a judge (although I play one in my mind), but I think I can say,
and am certain that John "Welcher" McCoy would back me up on this*, that it
would be abusive and degrading and proof-positive of the Fall of Man and of
his low character for NWM to reject Lilith's reply to him on a technicality.
Tom McDonald
*Unless it was an odd-numbered day, and McCoy agreed with NWM. Then all
bets are off. :-)
Steve B.
news:<gBQxa.21561$cK5....@nwrdny02.gnilink.net>...
> > "AC" <maureen-t...@alberni.net> wrote in message
> > news:slrnbcfi8s.hfd.m...@ts1.alberni.net...
> > > On Sun, 18 May 2003 17:01:20 +0000 (UTC),
> > > boikat <boi...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > "AC" <maureen-t...@alberni.net> wrote in message
> > > > news:slrnbcfe89.fjp.m...@ts1.alberni.net...
....
> He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
> closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
> of order?
Technically he has until 10:11 PM CST (by my count) tonight to post before
Lilith can call him on it. But I doubt she'll make a stink if he's past-due.
--
Steve
Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
Don Cates
Smith) wrote:
[snip]
>
>He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
>closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
>of order?
They appeared in the closed thread at my news server; a day and a half
after they appeared separately.
--
Don Cates "he's a cunning rascal" (PN)
catshark
<catHO...@cc.UManitoba.CA> wrote:
>On Sun, 18 May 2003 20:42:08 +0000 (UTC), drea...@hotmail.com (Von
>Smith) wrote:
>
>[snip]
>>
>>He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
>>closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
>>of order?
>
>They appeared in the closed thread at my news server; a day and a half
>after they appeared separately.
Also, he has acknowledged having seen them and working on a reply. Trying
a point of order like that would be pretty lame. If he says that he didn't
see her response until they showed up in the debate thread, he could claim
that extra day and a half (or whatever) but no one seems hot to hold him to
the time limit anyway.
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
Cogito sum, ergo sum, cogito.
- Robert Carroll -
Vince
scientific enlightenment. No one can study this subject in depth and
walk away without new insight.
Within the subject he has chosen to champion lay such a trail of
deceit and half-truths that a man who begins to gnaw at its foundation
will become crushed as its rotten timbers come falling down. The
aftermath of lost faith leaves the same man empty for a time. Perhaps
in defeat he has learned a good thing.
If he chooses a lazy and unthoughtful path, where he disregards the
challange he brought into being, and he chooses to learn nothing from
it, then he earned his disgrace. Shun his essence, he deserves
nothing.
Bobby D. Bryant
His cybernym suggests that this isn't his first Usenet debate.
--
Bobby Bryant
Austin, Texas
John Wilkins
> On Sun, 18 May 2003 23:41:49 +0000 (UTC), Don Cates
> <catHO...@cc.UManitoba.CA> wrote:
>
> >On Sun, 18 May 2003 20:42:08 +0000 (UTC), drea...@hotmail.com (Von
> >Smith) wrote:
> >
> >[snip]
> >>
> >>He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
> >>closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
> >>of order?
> >
> >They appeared in the closed thread at my news server; a day and a half
> >after they appeared separately.
>
> Also, he has acknowledged having seen them and working on a reply. Trying
> a point of order like that would be pretty lame. If he says that he didn't
> see her response until they showed up in the debate thread, he could claim
> that extra day and a half (or whatever) but no one seems hot to hold him to
> the time limit anyway.
>
Well, give the man his due - he has replied. In time too.
--
John Wilkins
B'dies, Brutius
Jason Cortina
Yes, he did. Including the below:
> The second point you make is that theories should be supported by
> evidence. Keep in mind that this debate is about explanations not
> scientific theories.
Is anyone going to tell him that scientific theories *are* explanations?
--
Jason A Cortina
Where Are We Going And Why Am I In This Handbasket?
AC
Bobby D. Bryant <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote:
>
> His cybernym suggests that this isn't his first Usenet debate.
Our fine friend is back. Unfortunately, his post seems to be a synopsis of
a number of Creationist fallacies. But at least he's come back for round 2.
--
A. Clausen
Steve B.
"Jason Cortina" <jascortin...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:lcjgcvoh6ijgtsbrd...@4ax.com...
All scientific theories are explanations. Not all explanations are
scientific theories.
Dana Tweedy
"John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1fv7hg1.1jc9uw812ynxujN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
Yep, he did reply, and it's a hoot. NM before gave some hints of racism,
in his latest verbal assault, he pretty much lets the cat out of the bag.
He refers to some people as "attractive" and some as "ape like". Also,
check out his references. No scientific journals, but "Newsweek", the "New
York Times" and some pop sci magazines like "Popular Science", and "Science
Digest". Note also none of his references are newer than the early 80's.
Some other gems extracted from the mess:
According to MN, Primates don't have tails
NM claims to be familiar with evolutionary psychology.
NM repeats the claim about all hominid fossils fitting on a desk, or in a
"coffin".
NM states that radioactive dating is wrong, based only on an article in
"Popular Science".
"There's little tiny pygmies and giant... well giants. There are those who
are more attractive and
those who are more... well ape-like. It's a harsh but true fact about
people. There are going to be people who look as if they have ape-like
features."
You can catch a breeze from all the hand waving NM does in his post, and
those with an allergy to straw, had better stay back.
DJT
Von Smith
> On Sun, 18 May 2003 20:42:08 +0000 (UTC), drea...@hotmail.com (Von
> Smith) wrote:
>
> [snip]
> >
> >He could try the dodge that Lilith's posts never appeared in the
> >closed debate thread. What do our judges have to say about this point
> >of order?
>
> They appeared in the closed thread at my news server; a day and a half
> after they appeared separately.
Why, so they have. And I see that NM has posted his responses, too.
<movie trailer voice-over>
Nowhere Man is back! And he's lamer than ever!
<movie trailer voice-over>
John Wilkins
I never said it was a good reply; merely that, despite the skeptics
here, he delivered one.
I am going to look more closely at it tonight after work. If I can stop
giggling or swearing in frustration, I may respond. Already his
"redefinitions" of species make me want to bite a doorframe.
John Wilkins
> "Jason Cortina" <jascortin...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:lcjgcvoh6ijgtsbrd...@4ax.com...
> > On Mon, 19 May 2003 02:42:32 +0000 (UTC), wil...@wehi.edu.au (John
> > Wilkins) wrote:
> >
...
> > > Well, give the man his due - he has replied. In time too.
> >
> > Yes, he did. Including the below:
> >
> > > The second point you make is that theories should be supported by
> > > evidence. Keep in mind that this debate is about explanations not
> > > scientific theories.
> >
> > Is anyone going to tell him that scientific theories *are* explanations?
>
> All scientific theories are explanations. Not all explanations are
> scientific theories.
>
Examples? I cannot think of one actual explanation for cause and effect
relations that is not either a successful scientific explanation, or an
attempt at one. That, by the way, includes first cause arguments and
design arguments.
Steve B.
That's scientific theory, not scientific explanation. "Theory" is the key
word here. You know all too well that in science, theories are much more
prestigious than hypotheses or untested explanations.
For example, suppose I propose you just replied to my message to be
facetious. It's consistent with the evidence -- why else would an adept and
sophisticated philosopher of science pretend not to understand the nature of
a scientific theory -- but it's not well supported and could not be called
scientific theory.
R. Baldwin
news:1fv7q0r.18phr47wbgkvoN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
My kids have offered explanations before that I wouldn't exactly call
scientific. Of course, I did the same as a youth.
John Wilkins
I was not being facetious, contrary to your hypothesis, which, if it
panned out, would become both an explanation and perhaps part of a
theory (about me). All scientific theories are explanations, all
explanations are at the least part of a model of the way things behave
or came to be, and as such they are scientific. If they succeed in doing
this, of course.
Now, I believe you were about to give examples of explanations that work
and are *not* scientific or attempts to be scientific...
Steve B.
No, put the swearing in, I think we'd all enjoy seeing that side of John
Wilkins. I can't imagine how, but if there's some way you can incorporate
you biting into a doorframe -- do that too.
John Wilkins
I'll bet they were trying to give explanations in a way that, had they
succeeded, they would have claimed were scientific (I was *right* and
you were wrong dad! is a refrain I hear a lot).
R. Baldwin
This reminds me of an amusing anecdote. A couple of years ago my
youngest was caught in a lie. After some discussion about truth and
falsehood, he told me I was telling him a "naughty truth" since he
didn't like the feeling of being caught. He was about 3 at the time.
Steve B.
Why does an explanation have to be an explanation that works?
If it is not an explanation before it "pans out", for how long must it work
before it becomes an explanation?
What would make something qualify as attempting to be scientific?
Susan S
<twe...@cvn.net>:
[snip]
>
>Yep, he did reply, and it's a hoot. NM before gave some hints of racism,
>in his latest verbal assault, he pretty much lets the cat out of the bag.
>He refers to some people as "attractive" and some as "ape like". Also,
>check out his references. No scientific journals, but "Newsweek", the "New
>York Times" and some pop sci magazines like "Popular Science", and "Science
>Digest". Note also none of his references are newer than the early 80's.
>Some other gems extracted from the mess:
>
Oh, it's worse than that; he said that some people in Africa have
ape-like skulls.
Susan Silberstein
[snip]
Mike Dunford
[snip]
> I never said it was a good reply; merely that, despite the skeptics
> here, he delivered one.
>
> I am going to look more closely at it tonight after work. If I can stop
> giggling or swearing in frustration, I may respond. Already his
> "redefinitions" of species make me want to bite a doorframe.
I know the feeling. The frustration of not being able to respond has
me about ready to start chomping.
--Mike
Seppo Pietikainen
"Don't get angry with me, luv! I'm so late becaushe the aliensh tried
to kid-hic-nap me..."?
Well, *maybe* there's a scientific component there, somewhere... :)
Seppo P
AC
It's hard to make sense of. Jehovah's Witnesses, for all their flaws, are
not racist people.
--
A. Clausen
Problem
"Steve B." <s...@ccp.com> wrote in message
news:baa2jd$7pi$1...@ins22.netins.net...
I think the above comment should be used as the new motto for creationism
and intelligent design.
Louann Miller
<maureen-t...@alberni.net> wrote:
>On Mon, 19 May 2003 02:27:48 +0000 (UTC),
>Bobby D. Bryant <bdbr...@mail.utexas.edu> wrote:
>>
>> His cybernym suggests that this isn't his first Usenet debate.
>
>Our fine friend is back. Unfortunately, his post seems to be a synopsis of
>a number of Creationist fallacies. But at least he's come back for round 2.
He does seem to have more honor, or at least ability to feel shame,
than 90% of the creationist contingent.
(Which is not as harsh a remark as it sounds. I can't work out whether
my _own_ right actions are motivated by honor or sense of shame most
of the time; I'm certainly not going to try to judge the relative
percentages in someone else.)
L.
Bigdakine
>From: mdun...@hawaii.rr.com (Mike Dunford)
>Date: 5/18/03 11:00 PM Hawaiian Standard Time
>Message-id: <a1f96e9.03051...@posting.google.com>
Fortunately, you don't live in a ginger bread house like WIlkens.
First the door frame.. goes. Wonder whats next.
Stuart
Dr. Stuart A. Weinstein
Ewa Beach Institute of Tectonics
"To err is human, but to really foul things up
requires a creationist"
R. Baldwin
news:20030519160048...@mb-m07.aol.com...
> >Subject: Re: Where is Nowhere Man?
> >From: mdun...@hawaii.rr.com (Mike Dunford)
> >Date: 5/18/03 11:00 PM Hawaiian Standard Time
> >Message-id: <a1f96e9.03051...@posting.google.com>
> >
> >wil...@wehi.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote in message
> >news:<1fv7q3f.gdf8q01q5y3prN%wil...@wehi.edu.au>...
> >[snip]
> >>
> >> I never said it was a good reply; merely that, despite the
skeptics
> >> here, he delivered one.
> >>
> >> I am going to look more closely at it tonight after work. If I
can stop
> >> giggling or swearing in frustration, I may respond. Already his
> >> "redefinitions" of species make me want to bite a doorframe.
> >
> >I know the feeling. The frustration of not being able to respond
has
> >me about ready to start chomping.
>
> Fortunately, you don't live in a ginger bread house like WIlkens.
>
> First the door frame.. goes. Wonder whats next.
>
Probably the jamb.
John Wilkins
Because, if it fails to, it is not an explanation, but merely a semantic
scheme of an explanation. Like a formula of logic needs to be
interpreted to have any truth conditions, an explanation needs to have
solid references for each of the terms in its premises, *as well as*
logical validity, and true conclusions, in order to be an explanation.
That is, it has to "pan out".
>
> If it is not an explanation before it "pans out", for how long must it work
> before it becomes an explanation?
Usually just enough to be sure that the first time was not a fluke or a
misunderstanding. But there are no guarantees in science or in life.
>
> What would make something qualify as attempting to be scientific?
A decent explanatory structure (premises that deductively, but perhaps
probabilistically, connect to a conclusion that describes the observed
phenomena in a valid way), well defined and measureable phenomena, no
subjective terms. That'll do for a start.
>
> --
> Steve
>
> Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
John Wilkins
Doorframe with jamb... uuglglglgl...
Jason Cortina
Perhaps you can give an example of something you would consider
an explanation which does *not* work. AFAIK, an explanation
must at least potentially "work" or else all you have is a
collection of words with no actual connection to the object or
phenomenon being explained. If such is characterized as 'explanation',
why can't any random collection of words be declared an
explanation (thus stripping the word of any meaning)?
>
> If it is not an explanation before it "pans out", for how long must it work
> before it becomes an explanation?
>
> What would make something qualify as attempting to be scientific?
--
Jason A Cortina
Marge, please. Old people don't need companionship. They
need to be isolated and studied so that it can be determined
what nutrients they have that might be extracted for our
personal use.
-- Homer Simpson
David Jensen
<oesicvg9mafue234d...@4ax.com>:
>On Mon, 19 May 2003 07:53:00 +0000 (UTC), "Steve B." <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
...
>> Why does an explanation have to be an explanation that works?
>
>Perhaps you can give an example of something you would consider
>an explanation which does *not* work. AFAIK, an explanation
>must at least potentially "work" or else all you have is a
>collection of words with no actual connection to the object or
>phenomenon being explained. If such is characterized as 'explanation',
>why can't any random collection of words be declared an
>explanation (thus stripping the word of any meaning)?
I would think that _God_ would fall into that category.
Noelie S. Alito
>
> "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> news:1fv7q3f.gdf8q01q5y3prN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> >
> > I never said it was a good reply; merely that, despite the skeptics
> > here, he delivered one.
> >
> > I am going to look more closely at it tonight after work. If I can stop
> > giggling or swearing in frustration, I may respond. Already his
> > "redefinitions" of species make me want to bite a doorframe.
>
> No, put the swearing in, I think we'd all enjoy seeing that side of John
> Wilkins.
Ooh! In multiple languages, perhaps, or with lots of abstruse
polysyb-- polysabil-- long words.
> I can't imagine how, but if there's some way you can incorporate
> you biting into a doorframe -- do that too.
You're undermining his training! They'd just gotten to the point
where they could remove the protective covers from the doorframes.
Now they'll have to start coating them with bitrex again...or maybe
just disable his access to NM's posts.
Noelie
--
Bad philosopher! No whiskey!
Noelie S. Alito
Technically, *all* people in Africa have ape-like skulls.
Noelie
--
<http://www.anvari.org/fun/World_Trade_Center/Bush_Monkey.html>
Steve B.
There's at least two apparent problems with equating all explanations to
scientific theories.
1) All scientific theories are testable. Not all explanations are testable.
Logically, not all explanations can be scientific theories.
2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no need for the
term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are indistinguishable from
explanations.
John Wilkins
> "Steve B." <s...@ccp.com> wrote...
> >
> > "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> > news:1fv7q3f.gdf8q01q5y3prN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> <snip>
> > >
> > > I never said it was a good reply; merely that, despite the skeptics
> > > here, he delivered one.
> > >
> > > I am going to look more closely at it tonight after work. If I can stop
> > > giggling or swearing in frustration, I may respond. Already his
> > > "redefinitions" of species make me want to bite a doorframe.
> >
> > No, put the swearing in, I think we'd all enjoy seeing that side of John
> > Wilkins.
>
> Ooh! In multiple languages, perhaps, or with lots of abstruse
> polysyb-- polysabil-- long words.
I only swear in Australian (and a little German, thanks to Gisela, but
that was a long time ago, and I'm married now).
>
> > I can't imagine how, but if there's some way you can incorporate
> > you biting into a doorframe -- do that too.
>
> You're undermining his training! They'd just gotten to the point
> where they could remove the protective covers from the doorframes.
> Now they'll have to start coating them with bitrex again...or maybe
> just disable his access to NM's posts.
Mmmm... biterex[1].
>
> Noelie
As a serial nailbiter from way back, I of course tried to stop. One of
the ways was to coat my nails with this really nasty stuff (I can't
recall the brand name). I came to like it. I came, in fact, to *desire*
it.
I still bite my nails, occasionally. I no longer use that stuff. They
keep me away from volatile chemicals now, too.
John Wilkins
> "Susan S" <ot...@ix.netcom.com> wrote...
> > In talk.origins I read this message from "Dana Tweedy"
> > <twe...@cvn.net>:
> >
> > [snip]
> > >
> > >Yep, he did reply, and it's a hoot. NM before gave some hints of
> > >racism, in his latest verbal assault, he pretty much lets the cat out
> > >of the bag. He refers to some people as "attractive" and some as "ape
> > >like". Also, check out his references. No scientific journals, but
> > >"Newsweek", the "New York Times" and some pop sci magazines like
> > >"Popular Science", and "Science Digest". Note also none of his
> > >references are newer than the early 80's. Some other gems extracted
> > >from the mess:
> > >
> > Oh, it's worse than that; he said that some people in Africa have
> > ape-like skulls.
>
> Technically, *all* people in Africa have ape-like skulls.
>
Technically, so do all Americans :-)
--
John Wilkins
Innuendo: A game of skill and fun for all the family
John Wilkins
Explanation is relative to some state of background knowledge. If an
explanation is given that conflicts with background knowledge then we
say it is a faux explanation. So an ordinary explanation is either
consistent with scientific explanation, or it fails, since science forms
the background knowledge against which we cast explanations. If it is
consistent, then it can be recast as a scientific explanation. If not,
of course, then it is no explanation at all.
So I would say that if it is not testable at least when cast as a
scientific theoretical explanation, it is not an explanation but merely
the shell of one.
>
> 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no need for
> the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are indistinguishable
> from explanations.
So? This seems to me a good thing.
I'm still waiting for you to give some examples
Noelie S. Alito
Well, yes. (I have some non-ape-like skulls, too.)
Noelie
--
Three little birdies sittin' in a nest, tryin' to show which one was best,
One flew east, and one flew west....
John Wilkins
> "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> news:1fv98kg.19h9x4g1npgo9pN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> > Noelie S. Alito <noe...@deadspam.com> wrote:
> >
> > > "Susan S" <ot...@ix.netcom.com> wrote...
> > > > In talk.origins I read this message from "Dana Tweedy"
> > > > <twe...@cvn.net>:
> > > >
> > > > [snip]
> > > > >
> > > > >Yep, he did reply, and it's a hoot. NM before gave some hints of
> > > > >racism, in his latest verbal assault, he pretty much lets the cat out
> > > > >of the bag. He refers to some people as "attractive" and some as "ape
> > > > >like". Also, check out his references. No scientific journals, but
> > > > >"Newsweek", the "New York Times" and some pop sci magazines like
> > > > >"Popular Science", and "Science Digest". Note also none of his
> > > > >references are newer than the early 80's. Some other gems extracted
> > > > >from the mess:
> > > > >
> > > > Oh, it's worse than that; he said that some people in Africa have
> > > > ape-like skulls.
> > >
> > > Technically, *all* people in Africa have ape-like skulls.
> > >
> > Technically, so do all Americans :-)
>
> Well, yes. (I have some non-ape-like skulls, too.)
>
Must be time for a Pratchett quote
--
John Wilkins
Nobby was said to have the body of a sixteen year old. Nobody knew where
he kept it.
Thomas McDonald
"Noelie S. Alito" <noe...@deadspam.com> wrote in message
news:bac2s6$rkfai$1...@ID-117948.news.dfncis.de...
Noelie,
How do you choose which one to wear each day?
Tom McDonald
Steve B.
You're dodging. Scientific theories have to be testable. Explanations don't.
> > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no need for
> > the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
indistinguishable
> > from explanations.
>
> So? This seems to me a good thing.
>
> I'm still waiting for you to give some examples
Last Thursdayism.
catshark
Technically, they all have ape brains.
It's just more ironic in the case of creationists.
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
Ellsburg's First Law:
"Anybody can be as stupid as necessary to keep his job."
- Daniel Ellsburg -
Coffey's Corollary:
"Replace job with dogma, and the law holds."
- Mitchell Coffey -
John Wilkins
...
> > So I would say that if it is not testable at least when cast as a
> > scientific theoretical explanation, it is not an explanation but merely
> > the shell of one.
>
> You're dodging. Scientific theories have to be testable. Explanations don't.
Of course they do. If it explains something, an explanation offered must
make a difference that can be experientially tested. If I explain the
sun rising as "Snorg makes it bright when it suits him to", there is no
test that could possibly not fit in with that. Therefore it explains
nothing. But if I say, "the earth rotates on its axis every 23 hours, 56
minutes and 4.15 seconds sidereal time", the *slightest* deviation from
that value makes a testable difference and invalidates the explanation.
>
> > > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no need for
> > > the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
> indistinguishable
> > > from explanations.
> >
> > So? This seems to me a good thing.
> >
> > I'm still waiting for you to give some examples
>
> Last Thursdayism.
No possible experiential difference resides in that. If the universe is
1 second, one week, or six millenia old, it matters not, so long as it
*looks* 4.5 billion years old in a 13.7 billion year old universe. There
is no explanation in Omphalmism to be had - even if it were in some
Metaphysical sense true, all explanations must be cast in terms of
empirical data and the differences they make. If I explan the evolution
of life and the cosmos in terms of modern physics and biology, then that
is an explanation (because it can be tested) - it really doesn't matter
if the world is a vat-dream. Vat-dream accounts are not explanations,
but mere logical possibilities.
The only *meaningful* sense of "explanation" is one that effectively
restricts it to a scientific explanation (leaving metaphorical
"explanations" that merely make one feel better to one side), and this
should not surprise us - science is all about *learning* about the
world. The best explanations of any period must be scientific.
Everything else is just imitation. Accept no substitutes... sorry; got
carried away there, thought I was an ad exec.
Steve B.
> Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
> ...
>
> > > So I would say that if it is not testable at least when cast as a
> > > scientific theoretical explanation, it is not an explanation but
merely
> > > the shell of one.
> >
> > You're dodging. Scientific theories have to be testable. Explanations
don't.
>
> Of course they do. If it explains something, an explanation offered must
> make a difference that can be experientially tested. If I explain the
> sun rising as "Snorg makes it bright when it suits him to", there is no
> test that could possibly not fit in with that. Therefore it explains
> nothing. But if I say, "the earth rotates on its axis every 23 hours, 56
> minutes and 4.15 seconds sidereal time", the *slightest* deviation from
> that value makes a testable difference and invalidates the explanation.
Why does a plain old explanation have to testable? You've just reasserted
that an explanation must "make a difference that can be experientially
tested". Are you saying the one billion plus Christians in the world think
they have explanations, but they're really meaningless as explanations?
> > > > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no need
for
> > > > the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
> > indistinguishable
> > > > from explanations.
> > >
> > > So? This seems to me a good thing.
Redundancy is a good thing?
> > > I'm still waiting for you to give some examples
> >
> > Last Thursdayism.
>
> No possible experiential difference resides in that. If the universe is
> 1 second, one week, or six millenia old, it matters not, so long as it
> *looks* 4.5 billion years old in a 13.7 billion year old universe. There
> is no explanation in Omphalmism to be had - even if it were in some
> Metaphysical sense true, all explanations must be cast in terms of
> empirical data and the differences they make. If I explan the evolution
> of life and the cosmos in terms of modern physics and biology, then that
> is an explanation (because it can be tested) - it really doesn't matter
> if the world is a vat-dream. Vat-dream accounts are not explanations,
> but mere logical possibilities.
>
> The only *meaningful* sense of "explanation" is one that effectively
> restricts it to a scientific explanation (leaving metaphorical
> "explanations" that merely make one feel better to one side), and this
> should not surprise us - science is all about *learning* about the
> world. The best explanations of any period must be scientific.
> Everything else is just imitation. Accept no substitutes... sorry; got
> carried away there, thought I was an ad exec.
So supernatural explanations are meaningless by your definition. Omphalmism
can explain how the Bible is true. The everyday use of "explanation" means
to clarify something, to give an answer to a question. But not necessarily a
correct answer or a testable answer.
John Wilkins
> "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> news:1fv9d82.1wp1lm01cqdn7nN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> > Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > > > So I would say that if it is not testable at least when cast as a
> > > > scientific theoretical explanation, it is not an explanation but
> merely
> > > > the shell of one.
> > >
> > > You're dodging. Scientific theories have to be testable. Explanations
> don't.
> >
> > Of course they do. If it explains something, an explanation offered must
> > make a difference that can be experientially tested. If I explain the
> > sun rising as "Snorg makes it bright when it suits him to", there is no
> > test that could possibly not fit in with that. Therefore it explains
> > nothing. But if I say, "the earth rotates on its axis every 23 hours, 56
> > minutes and 4.15 seconds sidereal time", the *slightest* deviation from
> > that value makes a testable difference and invalidates the explanation.
>
> Why does a plain old explanation have to testable? You've just reasserted
> that an explanation must "make a difference that can be experientially
> tested". Are you saying the one billion plus Christians in the world think
> they have explanations, but they're really meaningless as explanations?
So you *do* have an example in mind :-) I *knew* we'd get there
eventually...
How are they explanations (I mean by this, God as the creator
explaining, for example, why a child died in horrible pain, or why the
universe is capable of sustaining us, and so on)? In what way do they
actually *explain*? I know they make people feel better about the
universe, or nasty aspects of it like children dying in horrible pain,
but that is not to explain it. Claims like "it is providence" or "God
wanted it" are not explanatory because so far as we know, this applies
to *any* circumstances whatsoever.
Explain how these "explanations" actually explain.
Etiologies explain by telling us how what we are now is formed by what
we were (this is the "explanation" of the Eden myth), but since nothing
is ruled out or in by it, I fail to see how it explains *anything*. At
best it is a justification for the necessity for a compact with God. It
may also serve to "explain" why Christ needed to die, etc. But this is
internal - holding to Christian doctrine does nothing to explain things
*outside* Christian doctrine. At best *this* is just a process of
ramifying the set of beliefs to be as consistent as possible.
>
> > > > > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no
> > > > > need for the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
> > > > > indistinguishable from explanations.
> > > >
> > > > So? This seems to me a good thing.
>
> Redundancy is a good thing?
You don't think, if I am right, that knowing real explanation is a
matter of science is informative? It is not redundant to assert this if
you previously didn't know it, even implicitly.
>
> > > > I'm still waiting for you to give some examples
> > >
> > > Last Thursdayism.
> >
> > No possible experiential difference resides in that. If the universe is
> > 1 second, one week, or six millenia old, it matters not, so long as it
> > *looks* 4.5 billion years old in a 13.7 billion year old universe. There
> > is no explanation in Omphalmism to be had - even if it were in some
> > Metaphysical sense true, all explanations must be cast in terms of
> > empirical data and the differences they make. If I explan the evolution
> > of life and the cosmos in terms of modern physics and biology, then that
> > is an explanation (because it can be tested) - it really doesn't matter
> > if the world is a vat-dream. Vat-dream accounts are not explanations,
> > but mere logical possibilities.
> >
> > The only *meaningful* sense of "explanation" is one that effectively
> > restricts it to a scientific explanation (leaving metaphorical
> > "explanations" that merely make one feel better to one side), and this
> > should not surprise us - science is all about *learning* about the
> > world. The best explanations of any period must be scientific.
> > Everything else is just imitation. Accept no substitutes... sorry; got
> > carried away there, thought I was an ad exec.
>
> So supernatural explanations are meaningless by your definition.
> Omphalmism can explain how the Bible is true. The everyday use of
> "explanation" means to clarify something, to give an answer to a question.
> But not necessarily a correct answer or a testable answer.
Again, this is a matter of maximising internal consistency. It is
rational revision, perhaps, but not explanation in the wider sense.
Christianity explains nothing (nor does any religion or global belief
system); at best it enables one to order the world in ways that are
satisfying. Science, on the other hand, enables *veryone* to explain the
world.
>
> --
> Steve
>
> Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
Steve B.
There goes my tautometer...
> Etiologies explain by telling us how what we are now is formed by what
> we were (this is the "explanation" of the Eden myth), but since nothing
> is ruled out or in by it, I fail to see how it explains *anything*. At
> best it is a justification for the necessity for a compact with God. It
> may also serve to "explain" why Christ needed to die, etc. But this is
> internal - holding to Christian doctrine does nothing to explain things
> *outside* Christian doctrine. At best *this* is just a process of
> ramifying the set of beliefs to be as consistent as possible.
I agree that these explanations are not testable explanations. If they were,
they'd be scientific theories.
> > > > > > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no
> > > > > > need for the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
> > > > > > indistinguishable from explanations.
> > > > >
> > > > > So? This seems to me a good thing.
> >
> > Redundancy is a good thing?
>
> You don't think, if I am right, that knowing real explanation is a
> matter of science is informative? It is not redundant to assert this if
> you previously didn't know it, even implicitly.
That's doesn't make sense to me. If an explanation is indistinguishable from
a scientific theory, one of them is redundant.
I understand your idea of an explanation, but I have yet to see how you just
justify it. In common use an explanation is just a description of how
something happened. It doesn't have to be testable or falsifiable. But of
course we're both just repeating ourselves. So if I was to concede and merge
explanation with scientific theory into a lump of redundancy, what word
would we have left to describe the all these statements: "Because God wanted
it that way", "Because of gravity", and "Because John Wilkins said so"?
> John Wilkins
> B'dies, Brutius
And what does that mean?
catshark
>
>"John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
>news:1fv9lyk.1oim0wj12u0bu2N%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
>> Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
>>
>> > "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
>> > news:1fv9d82.1wp1lm01cqdn7nN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
>> > > Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
[snip]
>
>I understand your idea of an explanation, but I have yet to see how you just
>justify it. In common use an explanation is just a description of how
>something happened. It doesn't have to be testable or falsifiable. But of
>course we're both just repeating ourselves. So if I was to concede and merge
>explanation with scientific theory into a lump of redundancy, what word
>would we have left to describe the all these statements:
>"Because God wanted
>it that way",
"I don't know"
>"Because of gravity",
"Mass counts"
>and "Because John Wilkins said so"?
"Hey, John's buying!"
>
>> John Wilkins
>> B'dies, Brutius
>
>And what does that mean?
"Oznians can mangle more than one language"
---------------
J. Pieret
---------------
Nunc Id Vides, Nunc Ne Vides
- Unseen University Motto -
Dick C
>
> "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> news:1fv9d82.1wp1lm01cqdn7nN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
>> Of course they do. If it explains something, an explanation offered
>> must make a difference that can be experientially tested. If I
>> explain the sun rising as "Snorg makes it bright when it suits him
>> to", there is no test that could possibly not fit in with that.
>> Therefore it explains nothing. But if I say, "the earth rotates on
>> its axis every 23 hours, 56 minutes and 4.15 seconds sidereal time",
>> the *slightest* deviation from that value makes a testable difference
>> and invalidates the explanation.
>
> Why does a plain old explanation have to testable? You've just
> reasserted that an explanation must "make a difference that can be
> experientially tested". Are you saying the one billion plus Christians
> in the world think they have explanations, but they're really
> meaningless as explanations?
Steve, you have confused meaningfull with testable. A scientific
explanation must be testable, a plain old explanation should be
testable. A religious explanation need not be tesatable to be
meaningfull. As a matter of fact, religious explanations are often
times better off not being testable.
The usefulness of testing depends upon the field the explanation is
made in
Explanations about god creating man are very meaningfull to the
various religions, but are untestable, and are useless in science.
On the other hand, what science has to say about the origins of man
is testable, very useful to science, but meaningless in religion.
The old saying, what goes up must come down, is useful, meaningful,
testable, and false.
> So supernatural explanations are meaningless by your definition.
> Omphalmism can explain how the Bible is true. The everyday use of
> "explanation" means to clarify something, to give an answer to a
> question. But not necessarily a correct answer or a testable answer.
Supernatural explanations are meaningless in science, if they posit
untestable gods and creations, that is because they are useless,
and untestable.
--
Dick #1349
"Believe those who are seeking the truth; doubt those who find it."
Andre Gide, French author and critic (1869-1951).
Home Page: dickcr.iwarp.com
email: dic...@localnet.com
Steve B.
"Dick C" <dic...@localnet.boo.com> wrote in message
news:Xns938142A00B2C...@216.168.3.50...
I agree with everything you said. Take it up with Wilkins, according to him
only testable explanations are meaningful and only meaningful explanations
are explanations. According the Wilkins philosophy, all explanations are
scientific theories. I think he's gone mad, but only time will tell if that
particular explanation (excuse me, scientific theory) pans out.
Andrew Arensburger
> Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
>> All scientific theories are explanations. Not all explanations are
>> scientific theories.
>>
> relations that is not either a successful scientific explanation, or an
> attempt at one.
How about, "The reason you have to take a nap is that Mommy is
tired"? (Or its classical variant, "Grandma feels cold, so you have to
wear a sweater.")
--
Andrew Arensburger, Systems guy University of Maryland
arensb.no-...@glue.umd.edu Office of Information Technology
Now we dolly back, now we fade to black... and roll credits!
Andrew Arensburger
> If he is getting a response together, I'm sure he has begun a path of
> scientific enlightenment. No one can study this subject in depth and
> walk away without new insight.
I warn you not to underestimate the power of the Dark Side.
(Sorry, I just rewatched all five Star Wars movies (ugh!) and
couldn't help myself.)
--
Andrew Arensburger, Systems guy University of Maryland
arensb.no-...@glue.umd.edu Office of Information Technology
"Come to the dark side, Luke. Nine out of ten use it;
no other side can match it."
Mark Isaak
wrote:
>Redundancy is a good thing?
Yes. Affirmative. Correct. For sure.
Seriously, redundancy serves useful purposes. In engineering,
redundancy provides back-up in case part of the system fails. In
language, it provides variety and encourages slightly different ways
of thinking about things.
On this "explanation" debate, I think you and Wilkins are forgetting
that not only can multiple terms have the same meaning, but also a
word can have multiple meanings. You and Wilkins define "explanation"
differently. I don't think either of you can say the other is wrong,
because the word can have both meanings.
And both meanings are useful. We need a word for the useful sort of
explanation as Wilkins uses the word. "Scientific theory" won't cut
it, because the word has to function in non-scientific contexts.
There is a blue pencil beside my computer. The explanation is that my
girlfriend put it there. I would not call that a scientific theory
because it doesn't apply to anything but that one pencil today, and
science (to me, at least) implies the ability to generalize the
results. We also need a word for the useless explanations such as
Last Tuesdayism, religious assertions, and just plain gibberish given
as (or in lieu of) a reason for something. I would really like to see
a new word coined for the latter sense, but until that happens, we are
stuck with "explanation" for it.
--
Mark Isaak at...@earthlink.net
Don't read everything you belive.
John Wilkins
Explore the difference between use and mention...
>
> > Etiologies explain by telling us how what we are now is formed by what
> > we were (this is the "explanation" of the Eden myth), but since nothing
> > is ruled out or in by it, I fail to see how it explains *anything*. At
> > best it is a justification for the necessity for a compact with God. It
> > may also serve to "explain" why Christ needed to die, etc. But this is
> > internal - holding to Christian doctrine does nothing to explain things
> > *outside* Christian doctrine. At best *this* is just a process of
> > ramifying the set of beliefs to be as consistent as possible.
>
> I agree that these explanations are not testable explanations. If they were,
> they'd be scientific theories.
So, tell us how they *do* explain. What is the structure of that kind of
non-scientific explanation? C'mon, stop skating around this central
issue. What is explanation such that these things explain anything?
>
> > > > > > > 2) The term "scientific theory" would be redundant. There's no
> > > > > > > need for the term "scientific theory" if scientific theories are
> > > > > > > indistinguishable from explanations.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So? This seems to me a good thing.
> > >
> > > Redundancy is a good thing?
> >
> > You don't think, if I am right, that knowing real explanation is a
> > matter of science is informative? It is not redundant to assert this if
> > you previously didn't know it, even implicitly.
>
> That's doesn't make sense to me. If an explanation is indistinguishable from
> a scientific theory, one of them is redundant.
Not really. Science is a lot more than explanation, and explanation does
not involve those extra aspects of science necessarily (but it *is* an
invitation to employ them later).
And since it is clear that in ordinary usage we don't understand that
explanations have to be scientific, and I am able to argue that they do,
then that realisation must be informative. I am telling you something
you did not previously know (when I convince you, that is). No
redundancy here. Later, when all recognise this necessary truth, then it
would be redundant.
Sounds good to me. Yes, that works...
I have given a short summary of the received view on explanation in my
Evolution and Science FAQ, but I will expand on it. In my opinion, to
explain is to restrict the range of outcomes to a determinate subset of
limited scope, preferably to the exact observed outcome, on the basis of
a set of principles and the initial states:
I: Initial conditions including boundary conditions +
G: General principles ("laws" if you like the term; I don't)
=========================================================
O: Observed outcome
This is a deductive relationship. Then we can say that the general
principles G explain the outcome O. An explanation is successful just to
the extent that I + G determine logically O, and that both I and O are
empirically true.
Now, is there some *other* sense of "explanation" that you know of? If
not, then this notion means that *all* explanation is, at heart,
scientific. If so, please give it. I am on my knees here, begging you to
deliver it...
>
> > John Wilkins
> > B'dies, Brutius
>
> And what does that mean?
>
I am an Australian, so I must mangle language. I choose to mangle Latin.
Ask yourself what the stereotypical Australian greeting is, and then
what it might be in Latin. Then think that I am a philosophicall trained
Australian, and think Monty Python. It's layered...
--
John Wilkins
> "Dick C" <dic...@localnet.boo.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns938142A00B2C...@216.168.3.50...
> > "Steve B." <s...@ccp.com> wrote in news:bacd91$deh$1...@ins22.netins.net:
> >
...
> > > So supernatural explanations are meaningless by your definition.
> > > Omphalmism can explain how the Bible is true. The everyday use of
> > > "explanation" means to clarify something, to give an answer to a
> > > question. But not necessarily a correct answer or a testable answer.
> >
> > Supernatural explanations are meaningless in science, if they posit
> > untestable gods and creations, that is because they are useless,
> > and untestable.
>
> I agree with everything you said. Take it up with Wilkins, according to him
> only testable explanations are meaningful and only meaningful explanations
> are explanations. According the Wilkins philosophy, all explanations are
> scientific theories. I think he's gone mad, but only time will tell if that
> particular explanation (excuse me, scientific theory) pans out.
>
Of course I am mad. As a matter of fact, we are all mad. ... Sorry, I
had a Pink Floyd moment there.
What I am saying is that the set of scientific explanations and the set
of all (true, working, successful, whatever) explanations are
extensionally identical. This is not to say they are *defined* the same
way (intensional identity), merely that it happens to be true that if
soemthing really *does* explain something else, then the explanation is
a full or partial scientific explanation.
So I would say that supernatural explanations are useless not only in
*science*, but in *everything*. They tell us nothing.
John Wilkins
Okay, you spotted the Deliberate Error. I was being Socratic, trying to
get Steve to work out for himself the difference between actual
explanations (those which truly explain) and the sort of "folk"
explanations which we often confuse for real explanations.
There is a term for the latter - comforting myths. This is not to
denigrate them, or insist they are untrue, because myths can be true and
there is no reason why something that comforts us need be untrue (it
comforts me to think my kids love me. They probably do anyway).
But myths are not explanations - they do not explain anything, for
explanation is the restriction of possible outcomes given some set of
prior conditions, to the observed outcome or something very like it. No
other sense of "explanation" has any meat on it that I can see. Myths
provide *meaning*, not *explanation*.
Giving "reasons for" something is the source of the ambiguity. In
classical use, to give a reason literally meant to find some rational
necessity, and of *course* this includes mythopoeic functions like "God
is the reason for it all". But the sense of "rational" this relied upon
is long dead.
John Wilkins
> John Wilkins <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote:
> > Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
> >> All scientific theories are explanations. Not all explanations are
> >> scientific theories.
> >>
> > Examples? I cannot think of one actual explanation for cause and effect
> > relations that is not either a successful scientific explanation, or an
> > attempt at one.
>
> How about, "The reason you have to take a nap is that Mommy is
> tired"? (Or its classical variant, "Grandma feels cold, so you have to
> wear a sweater.")
I rest my case :-)
Dick C
Wilkins will pretty well agree with what I said. He was talking about
scientific explanations, and you conflated meaningful and testable, and
then threw in religon. He did not.
Steve B.
> Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
>
> > "John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
> > news:1fv9lyk.1oim0wj12u0bu2N%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> > > Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
....
> > > Etiologies explain by telling us how what we are now is formed by what
> > > we were (this is the "explanation" of the Eden myth), but since
nothing
> > > is ruled out or in by it, I fail to see how it explains *anything*. At
> > > best it is a justification for the necessity for a compact with God.
It
> > > may also serve to "explain" why Christ needed to die, etc. But this is
> > > internal - holding to Christian doctrine does nothing to explain
things
> > > *outside* Christian doctrine. At best *this* is just a process of
> > > ramifying the set of beliefs to be as consistent as possible.
> >
> > I agree that these explanations are not testable explanations. If they
were,
> > they'd be scientific theories.
>
> So, tell us how they *do* explain. What is the structure of that kind of
> non-scientific explanation? C'mon, stop skating around this central
> issue. What is explanation such that these things explain anything?
Explanations tell us a why a given outcome should occur. It is a form of
statement and all forms of statements that tell us a why a given outcome
should occur are explanations. Yes, *all* of them. They cannot be a random
conglomeration of words, they must be a statement that tells us a why a
given outcome should occur.
....
> > That's doesn't make sense to me. If an explanation is indistinguishable
from
> > a scientific theory, one of them is redundant.
>
> Not really. Science is a lot more than explanation, and explanation does
> not involve those extra aspects of science necessarily (but it *is* an
> invitation to employ them later).
>
> And since it is clear that in ordinary usage we don't understand that
> explanations have to be scientific, and I am able to argue that they do,
> then that realisation must be informative. I am telling you something
> you did not previously know (when I convince you, that is). No
> redundancy here. Later, when all recognise this necessary truth, then it
> would be redundant.
Trying to change the world? In effect, you just said exactly what I said. If
you go with the common definitions there is no reducancy between the terms,
but if you go with yours there *is*. I don't have to accept your conclusions
to recognize the redundancy you propose.
....
> > I understand your idea of an explanation, but I have yet to see how you
just
> > justify it. In common use an explanation is just a description of how
> > something happened. It doesn't have to be testable or falsifiable. But
of
> > course we're both just repeating ourselves. So if I was to concede and
merge
> > explanation with scientific theory into a lump of redundancy, what word
> > would we have left to describe the all these statements: "Because God
wanted
> > it that way", "Because of gravity", and "Because John Wilkins said so"?
>
> Sounds good to me. Yes, that works...
You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part you liked
and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both testable and
non-testable statements that tell us a why a given outcome should occur?
> I have given a short summary of the received view on explanation in my
> Evolution and Science FAQ, but I will expand on it. In my opinion, to
> explain is to restrict the range of outcomes to a determinate subset of
> limited scope, preferably to the exact observed outcome, on the basis of
> a set of principles and the initial states:
>
> I: Initial conditions including boundary conditions +
> G: General principles ("laws" if you like the term; I don't)
> =========================================================
> O: Observed outcome
>
> This is a deductive relationship. Then we can say that the general
> principles G explain the outcome O. An explanation is successful just to
> the extent that I + G determine logically O, and that both I and O are
> empirically true.
The problem with this definition is that it relies on observed principles to
created an outcome. That works great for scientific explanations, but not
for others.
In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
There's no general principles we know of that could lead to such an event.
But it is an explanation because it tells us why O should come about. It's
not testable because we can't reproduce the conditions. However, it could
conform to your definition if the general principles don't have to be
observable.
I: Nothing
G: God
=========================================================
O: Heavens, earth
> Now, is there some *other* sense of "explanation" that you know of? If
> not, then this notion means that *all* explanation is, at heart,
> scientific. If so, please give it. I am on my knees here, begging you to
> deliver it...
Essentially, I understand explanation as your definition, but without
necessary observed general principles. Supernatural explanations are valid
as explanations but are not testable and invalid as scientific theories.
Since supernatural explanations are generally always after the fact and
never make accurate predictions about the future, I find little reason to
believe there is any merit to them. So we can conclude that all scientific
theories have the intrinsic properties of explanations, but not all
explanations have the intrinsic properties of scientific theories.
I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of the benefit
of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's just not semantically
true. A more correct phrasing would be that God adds nothing to the
explanation.
Or so it seems...
> > > John Wilkins
> > > B'dies, Brutius
> >
> > And what does that mean?
> >
> I am an Australian, so I must mangle language. I choose to mangle Latin.
> Ask yourself what the stereotypical Australian greeting is, and then
> what it might be in Latin. Then think that I am a philosophicall trained
> Australian, and think Monty Python. It's layered...
I've never been heavily educated on Monty Python but I did enjoy one of the
movies I watched. Those British have an interesting sense of humor. Is it
true about the ratio of women to men in Australia or is that just a ploy to
cut down the male population in other countries?
Steve B.
Actually, *he* conflated the meanings. That's where the question you jumped
on came from in the first place. I claimed that ordinary explanations are
not always testable. He then tried to demonstrate that if an explanation is
not testable, it is not meaningful, and therefore not an explanation.
Really, your beef is with him. Honest.
John Wilkins
Yes! So, once again, tell us how *these particular* "explanations" do
this. I see *nothing* in the statements that tell us why a given outcome
occurred. So far all you have done is assert that they do this.
For instance, from "In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth" (or whatever is your preferred translation) how do you derive an
explanation of the form of the earth or the orbital distance of the
earth from the Sun, etc.? Or if you can't do this, tell me what it is it
*does* explain, and how.
>
> ....
>
> > > That's doesn't make sense to me. If an explanation is indistinguishable
> from
> > > a scientific theory, one of them is redundant.
> >
> > Not really. Science is a lot more than explanation, and explanation does
> > not involve those extra aspects of science necessarily (but it *is* an
> > invitation to employ them later).
> >
> > And since it is clear that in ordinary usage we don't understand that
> > explanations have to be scientific, and I am able to argue that they do,
> > then that realisation must be informative. I am telling you something
> > you did not previously know (when I convince you, that is). No
> > redundancy here. Later, when all recognise this necessary truth, then it
> > would be redundant.
>
> Trying to change the world? In effect, you just said exactly what I said. If
> you go with the common definitions there is no reducancy between the terms,
> but if you go with yours there *is*. I don't have to accept your conclusions
> to recognize the redundancy you propose.
Arguing from terms is a fallacy; in fact, several fallacies. But it does
*not* follow that it is useless to make the distinction, nor does it
follow that there is a redundancy *until* it is widely accepted. *Then*
there is a redundancy. For example, if "ape" is defined to include
humans, then "A human is an ape" is a tautology. But right now, we are
arguing this definition (and have been for a century and a half - so far
common usage hasn't caught up), so it is *not* redundant to say "A human
is an ape" - it is *informative*. Do you see the analogy?
>
> ....
>
> > > I understand your idea of an explanation, but I have yet to see how you
> just
> > > justify it. In common use an explanation is just a description of how
> > > something happened. It doesn't have to be testable or falsifiable. But
> of
> > > course we're both just repeating ourselves. So if I was to concede and
> merge
> > > explanation with scientific theory into a lump of redundancy, what word
> > > would we have left to describe the all these statements: "Because God
> wanted
> > > it that way", "Because of gravity", and "Because John Wilkins said so"?
> >
> > Sounds good to me. Yes, that works...
>
> You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part you liked
> and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both testable and
> non-testable statements that tell us a why a given outcome should occur?
Oops, sorry, I did that indeed.
I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them "myths",
but without the connotation that this makes them false or irrational.
But the last - because John Wilkins said so - would not be mythological
until knowledge of the nature of John Wilkins (as an educated authority
on all topics) was no longer justifiable through experience. In short,
if the generalisation was unsupported, then there is no explanation. Of
course this goes one step *back* from the nature of explanation to the
nature of the generalisations we *use* in explanation, and how we arrive
at them.
>
> > I have given a short summary of the received view on explanation in my
> > Evolution and Science FAQ, but I will expand on it. In my opinion, to
> > explain is to restrict the range of outcomes to a determinate subset of
> > limited scope, preferably to the exact observed outcome, on the basis of
> > a set of principles and the initial states:
> >
> > I: Initial conditions including boundary conditions +
> > G: General principles ("laws" if you like the term; I don't)
> > =========================================================
> > O: Observed outcome
> >
> > This is a deductive relationship. Then we can say that the general
> > principles G explain the outcome O. An explanation is successful just to
> > the extent that I + G determine logically O, and that both I and O are
> > empirically true.
>
> The problem with this definition is that it relies on observed principles to
> created an outcome. That works great for scientific explanations, but not
> for others.
What I am saying is that the others do not work, so this is a flaw in
those "explanation-claims" not in the equation of explanation with
science.
>
> In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
>
> There's no general principles we know of that could lead to such an event.
> But it is an explanation because it tells us why O should come about. It's
> not testable because we can't reproduce the conditions. However, it could
> conform to your definition if the general principles don't have to be
> observable.
>
> I: Nothing
> G: God
> =========================================================
> O: Heavens, earth
Here I demur. This has the schematic structure of an explanation, but is
not, in fact explanatory. How is there a deductive relation from the
non-existence of anything, and the existence of God, to the existence of
something (other than God)? What possible outcomes does God constrain?
Is God a generalisation - a regularity of outcome given initial
conditions? No to all of these; there is nothing there that "explains"
anything.
>
> > Now, is there some *other* sense of "explanation" that you know of? If
> > not, then this notion means that *all* explanation is, at heart,
> > scientific. If so, please give it. I am on my knees here, begging you to
> > deliver it...
>
> Essentially, I understand explanation as your definition, but without
> necessary observed general principles. Supernatural explanations are valid
> as explanations but are not testable and invalid as scientific theories.
> Since supernatural explanations are generally always after the fact and
> never make accurate predictions about the future, I find little reason to
> believe there is any merit to them. So we can conclude that all scientific
> theories have the intrinsic properties of explanations, but not all
> explanations have the intrinsic properties of scientific theories.
>
> I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of the benefit
> of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's just not semantically
> true. A more correct phrasing would be that God adds nothing to the
> explanation.
That is a better claim. The introduction of "God" into an explanation is
not additionally explanatory. It *is* mythological, in the sense that it
adds *meaning* to the outcome, but the explanation has to involve
constraint on outcomes to explain anything, and we know that no possible
state of affairs is contradictory to the existence of God or God's
"attributes".
>
> Or so it seems...
>
> > > > John Wilkins
> > > > B'dies, Brutius
> > >
> > > And what does that mean?
> > >
> > I am an Australian, so I must mangle language. I choose to mangle Latin.
> > Ask yourself what the stereotypical Australian greeting is, and then
> > what it might be in Latin. Then think that I am a philosophicall trained
> > Australian, and think Monty Python. It's layered...
>
> I've never been heavily educated on Monty Python but I did enjoy one of the
> movies I watched. Those British have an interesting sense of humor. Is it
> true about the ratio of women to men in Australia or is that just a ploy to
> cut down the male population in other countries?
Then you are not aware of the sketch involving the Philosophy Department
of Wooloomooloo, where all the philosophers are named Bruce.
And yes, all Australian males are so manly we need at least three
ordinary women each, so as not to exhaust them. However Australian
womean are equally manly, and so the ratio tend towards a slight
imbalance. In other countries, Australian males need three women, out of
a sense of humanity.
>
> --
> Steve
>
> Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is more
fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that condition.
--
Steve B.
(My newsreader wouldn't let me post to the other thread, so I'm replying here.
If you're reading this, then I guess it worked)
....
> > Explanations tell us a why a given outcome should occur. It is a form of
> > statement and all forms of statements that tell us a why a given outcome
> > should occur are explanations. Yes, *all* of them. They cannot be a random
> > conglomeration of words, they must be a statement that tells us a why a
> > given outcome should occur.
>
> Yes! So, once again, tell us how *these particular* "explanations" do
> this. I see *nothing* in the statements that tell us why a given outcome
> occurred. So far all you have done is assert that they do this.
>
> For instance, from "In the beginning God created the heavens and the
> earth" (or whatever is your preferred translation) how do you derive an
> explanation of the form of the earth or the orbital distance of the
> earth from the Sun, etc.? Or if you can't do this, tell me what it is it
> *does* explain, and how.
What it explains is that God is the cause and that without God, the heavens and
the earth would not exist. Why is it so satisfying to people if it doesn't
function as an explanation?
....
> > Trying to change the world? In effect, you just said exactly what I said. If
> > you go with the common definitions there is no reducancy between the terms,
> > but if you go with yours there *is*. I don't have to accept your conclusions
> > to recognize the redundancy you propose.
>
> Arguing from terms is a fallacy; in fact, several fallacies. But it does
> *not* follow that it is useless to make the distinction, nor does it
> follow that there is a redundancy *until* it is widely accepted. *Then*
> there is a redundancy. For example, if "ape" is defined to include
> humans, then "A human is an ape" is a tautology. But right now, we are
> arguing this definition (and have been for a century and a half - so far
> common usage hasn't caught up), so it is *not* redundant to say "A human
> is an ape" - it is *informative*. Do you see the analogy?
Yes, I see what you're saying. But it's not a very exact analogy. "A human is an
ape," may be a tautology but the terms human and ape are not redundant to each
other. They have different meanings. But I do see what you're saying. Your
argument is that any correct rendering of the term "explanation" *should* be
redundant to scientific theory. Your statements may be informative, but that
wasn't my point. My argument here was that if the two terms were truly redundant
it would either detract from the meaning of scientific theory or inflate the
meaning of explanation. The redundancy itself would not be a bad thing, but the
results of the redundancy on language would.
....
> > You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part you liked
> > and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both testable and
> > non-testable statements that tell us a why a given outcome should occur?
>
> Oops, sorry, I did that indeed.
>
> I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them "myths",
> but without the connotation that this makes them false or irrational.
Isn't the definition of myth "false and irrational"?
> But the last - because John Wilkins said so - would not be mythological
> until knowledge of the nature of John Wilkins (as an educated authority
> on all topics) was no longer justifiable through experience. In short,
[rolling eyes]
> if the generalisation was unsupported, then there is no explanation. Of
> course this goes one step *back* from the nature of explanation to the
> nature of the generalisations we *use* in explanation, and how we arrive
> at them.
You sure are stubborn. We seem to have two different ideas of what the "nature
of explanation" is. My idea is the one that generally everyone uses and your
idea is one that must have testable power.
> > > I have given a short summary of the received view on explanation in my
> > > Evolution and Science FAQ, but I will expand on it. In my opinion, to
> > > explain is to restrict the range of outcomes to a determinate subset of
> > > limited scope, preferably to the exact observed outcome, on the basis of
> > > a set of principles and the initial states:
> > >
> > > I: Initial conditions including boundary conditions +
> > > G: General principles ("laws" if you like the term; I don't)
> > > =========================================================
> > > O: Observed outcome
> > >
> > > This is a deductive relationship. Then we can say that the general
> > > principles G explain the outcome O. An explanation is successful just to
> > > the extent that I + G determine logically O, and that both I and O are
> > > empirically true.
> >
> > The problem with this definition is that it relies on observed principles to
> > created an outcome. That works great for scientific explanations, but not
> > for others.
>
> What I am saying is that the others do not work, so this is a flaw in
> those "explanation-claims" not in the equation of explanation with
> science.
There you go again, stating that an explanation has to "work". Define "work"
please.
> > In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
> >
> > There's no general principles we know of that could lead to such an event.
> > But it is an explanation because it tells us why O should come about. It's
> > not testable because we can't reproduce the conditions. However, it could
> > conform to your definition if the general principles don't have to be
> > observable.
> >
> > I: Nothing
> > G: God
> > =========================================================
> > O: Heavens, earth
>
> Here I demur. This has the schematic structure of an explanation, but is
> not, in fact explanatory. How is there a deductive relation from the
> non-existence of anything, and the existence of God, to the existence of
> something (other than God)? What possible outcomes does God constrain?
> Is God a generalisation - a regularity of outcome given initial
> conditions? No to all of these; there is nothing there that "explains"
> anything.
It is a purely historical explanation. It constrains all outcomes where God did
not create the heavens and the earth. I don't see why you have to understand the
general principles that govern God before you can use him as an explanation.
....
> > I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of the benefit
> > of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's just not semantically
> > true. A more correct phrasing would be that God adds nothing to the
> > explanation.
>
> That is a better claim. The introduction of "God" into an explanation is
> not additionally explanatory. It *is* mythological, in the sense that it
> adds *meaning* to the outcome, but the explanation has to involve
> constraint on outcomes to explain anything, and we know that no possible
> state of affairs is contradictory to the existence of God or God's
> "attributes".
Of course not. Well, we may discover someday that the heavens and earth never
existed. That would falsify the Biblical God. Other than that, it's totally
un-testable (is there a better word for un-testable?).
> > > > > John Wilkins
> > > > > B'dies, Brutius
> > > >
> > > > And what does that mean?
> > > >
> > > I am an Australian, so I must mangle language. I choose to mangle Latin.
> > > Ask yourself what the stereotypical Australian greeting is, and then
> > > what it might be in Latin. Then think that I am a philosophicall trained
> > > Australian, and think Monty Python. It's layered...
> >
> > I've never been heavily educated on Monty Python but I did enjoy one of the
> > movies I watched. Those British have an interesting sense of humor. Is it
> > true about the ratio of women to men in Australia or is that just a ploy to
> > cut down the male population in other countries?
>
> Then you are not aware of the sketch involving the Philosophy Department
> of Wooloomooloo, where all the philosophers are named Bruce.
>
> And yes, all Australian males are so manly we need at least three
> ordinary women each, so as not to exhaust them. However Australian
> womean are equally manly, and so the ratio tend towards a slight
> imbalance. In other countries, Australian males need three women, out of
> a sense of humanity.
Someday, the Google Usenet archive will doubtlessly provide countless insights
into your personality for historians attempting to reconstruct your character.
> > Steve
> >
> > Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
>
> Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is more
> fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that condition.
Secular Christianity?
Mark Isaak
wrote:
>> I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them "myths",
>> but without the connotation that this makes them false or irrational.
>
>Isn't the definition of myth "false and irrational"?
That's one definition (roughly). The other definition (again
roughly), is "sacred, folkloric, and considered true."
I haven't yet got to the post where Wilkins answers me, but my first
reaction is that "myth" has enough conflicting meanings already. It
doesn't need more.
Mark Isaak
Wilkins) wrote:
>Mark Isaak <at...@earthlinkNOSPAM.net> wrote:
>> You and Wilkins define "explanation"
>> differently. I don't think either of you can say the other is wrong,
>> because the word can have both meanings.
>>
>> And both meanings are useful. We need a word for the useful sort of
>> explanation as Wilkins uses the word. [...]
>> We also need a word for the useless explanations such as
>> Last Tuesdayism, religious assertions, and just plain gibberish given
>> as (or in lieu of) a reason for something. I would really like to see
>> a new word coined for the latter sense, but until that happens, we are
>> stuck with "explanation" for it.
>
>There is a term for the latter - comforting myths. This is not to
>denigrate them, or insist they are untrue, because myths can be true and
>there is no reason why something that comforts us need be untrue (it
>comforts me to think my kids love me. They probably do anyway).
>
>But myths are not explanations - they do not explain anything, for
>explanation is the restriction of possible outcomes given some set of
>prior conditions, to the observed outcome or something very like it. No
>other sense of "explanation" has any meat on it that I can see. Myths
>provide *meaning*, not *explanation*.
Okay, I can accept "comforting myth." But not just "myth", which has
a great deal of meaning and implication unrelated to the "explanation
that doesn't really explain" issue. The "comforting" qualifier is
essential.
John Wilkins
> (My newsreader wouldn't let me post to the other thread, so I'm replying here.
> If you're reading this, then I guess it worked)
>
> ....
>
> > > Explanations tell us a why a given outcome should occur. It is a form of
> > > statement and all forms of statements that tell us a why a given outcome
> > > should occur are explanations. Yes, *all* of them. They cannot be a random
> > > conglomeration of words, they must be a statement that tells us a why a
> > > given outcome should occur.
> >
> > Yes! So, once again, tell us how *these particular* "explanations" do
> > this. I see *nothing* in the statements that tell us why a given outcome
> > occurred. So far all you have done is assert that they do this.
> >
> > For instance, from "In the beginning God created the heavens and the
> > earth" (or whatever is your preferred translation) how do you derive an
> > explanation of the form of the earth or the orbital distance of the
> > earth from the Sun, etc.? Or if you can't do this, tell me what it is it
> > *does* explain, and how.
>
> What it explains is that God is the cause and that without God, the
> heavens and the earth would not exist. Why is it so satisfying to people
> if it doesn't function as an explanation?
Because it is a comforting myth, as I have said. In what way is it an
explanation of the existence of the heavens and earth? I suppose it
works like a conditional statement: If there were no God there would be
no universe. How is the explanatory power of *that* statement
established? It cannot be (at least via rational argument of
experience), there are just too few samples to base it on, and it is not
a logical necessity. Hence there is no explanation of anything.
>
> ....
>
> > > Trying to change the world? In effect, you just said exactly what I
> > > said. If you go with the common definitions there is no reducancy
> > > between the terms, but if you go with yours there *is*. I don't have
> > > to accept your conclusions to recognize the redundancy you propose.
> >
> > Arguing from terms is a fallacy; in fact, several fallacies. But it does
> > *not* follow that it is useless to make the distinction, nor does it
> > follow that there is a redundancy *until* it is widely accepted. *Then*
> > there is a redundancy. For example, if "ape" is defined to include
> > humans, then "A human is an ape" is a tautology. But right now, we are
> > arguing this definition (and have been for a century and a half - so far
> > common usage hasn't caught up), so it is *not* redundant to say "A human
> > is an ape" - it is *informative*. Do you see the analogy?
>
> Yes, I see what you're saying. But it's not a very exact analogy. "A human
> is an ape," may be a tautology but the terms human and ape are not
> redundant to each other. They have different meanings. But I do see what
> you're saying. Your argument is that any correct rendering of the term
> "explanation" *should* be redundant to scientific theory. Your statements
> may be informative, but that wasn't my point. My argument here was that if
> the two terms were truly redundant it would either detract from the
> meaning of scientific theory or inflate the meaning of explanation. The
> redundancy itself would not be a bad thing, but the results of the
> redundancy on language would.
Language evolves to meet the new understanding it is supposed to convey.
But I am making a stronger claim than this - I am claiming that the two
sets, however defined, turn out on analysis to be coterminous. I am not
saying they (intensionally) "mean" the same thing, I am saying they
(extensionally) *are* the same thing.
>
> ....
>
> > > You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part you
> > > liked and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both testable
> > > and non-testable statements that tell us a why a given outcome should
> > > occur?
> >
> > Oops, sorry, I did that indeed.
> >
> > I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them "myths",
> > but without the connotation that this makes them false or irrational.
>
> Isn't the definition of myth "false and irrational"?
No. The definition of myth varies, but one meaning is that it is a
unifying conception for some conceptual tradition. Some myths are false
and irrational. Some are false and rational. Some are true and
irrational, &c. "Rational" is a relative term that depends on the
standards employed (something can be irrational in art that is quite
rational in engineering).
>
> > But the last - because John Wilkins said so - would not be mythological
> > until knowledge of the nature of John Wilkins (as an educated authority
> > on all topics) was no longer justifiable through experience. In short,
>
> [rolling eyes]
[smirking]
>
> > if the generalisation was unsupported, then there is no explanation. Of
> > course this goes one step *back* from the nature of explanation to the
> > nature of the generalisations we *use* in explanation, and how we arrive
> > at them.
>
> You sure are stubborn. We seem to have two different ideas of what the
> "nature of explanation" is. My idea is the one that generally everyone
> uses and your idea is one that must have testable power.
People use all kinds of words in all kinds of ways. This does not make
them right or consistent, nor is there any necessity to conform to the
common usages. That way lies pretzel logic ("Babylon sister shake it").
I have been noted to be stubborn once or twice before. Few people hang
around long enough to make that observation - you deserve kudos for
endurance.
>
> > > > I have given a short summary of the received view on explanation in
> > > > my Evolution and Science FAQ, but I will expand on it. In my
> > > > opinion, to explain is to restrict the range of outcomes to a
> > > > determinate subset of limited scope, preferably to the exact
> > > > observed outcome, on the basis of a set of principles and the
> > > > initial states:
> > > >
> > > > I: Initial conditions including boundary conditions +
> > > > G: General principles ("laws" if you like the term; I don't)
> > > > =========================================================
> > > > O: Observed outcome
> > > >
> > > > This is a deductive relationship. Then we can say that the general
> > > > principles G explain the outcome O. An explanation is successful
> > > > just to the extent that I + G determine logically O, and that both I
> > > > and O are empirically true.
> > >
> > > The problem with this definition is that it relies on observed
> > > principles to created an outcome. That works great for scientific
> > > explanations, but not for others.
> >
> > What I am saying is that the others do not work, so this is a flaw in
> > those "explanation-claims" not in the equation of explanation with
> > science.
>
> There you go again, stating that an explanation has to "work". Define
> "work" please.
Explanation involves showing how the outcome is necessitated by the
things doing the explaining (how the explanans is forced by the
explanandum). Any putative explanation that fails to do this is simply
not explaining anything. That is what I mean by "work" here. If there is
no direct and deductive relationship between the explanandum and the
explanans, there is just no explanation. You can call it one, if you
liek, but as Lincoln noted of dog's tails and legs, calling something by
a name doesn't make it one.
>
> > > In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
> > >
> > > There's no general principles we know of that could lead to such an
> > > event. But it is an explanation because it tells us why O should come
> > > about. It's not testable because we can't reproduce the conditions.
> > > However, it could conform to your definition if the general principles
> > > don't have to be observable.
> > >
> > > I: Nothing
> > > G: God
> > > =========================================================
> > > O: Heavens, earth
> >
> > Here I demur. This has the schematic structure of an explanation, but is
> > not, in fact explanatory. How is there a deductive relation from the
> > non-existence of anything, and the existence of God, to the existence of
> > something (other than God)? What possible outcomes does God constrain?
> > Is God a generalisation - a regularity of outcome given initial
> > conditions? No to all of these; there is nothing there that "explains"
> > anything.
>
> It is a purely historical explanation. It constrains all outcomes where
> God did not create the heavens and the earth. I don't see why you have to
> understand the general principles that govern God before you can use him
> as an explanation.
Here is a historical explanation: Rommel beat the Allies in a battle
because he was the better strategist and had good intelligence of the
Allies' positions and capabilities. Therefore he was able to exploit
their weaknesses.
This sets up the initial and general explananda - the knowledge he had
and the way he was able to use it. Had he not had the knowledge, or been
a less capable strategist, he might have lost the battle (you have to
hold some things constant in an explanation, which is called the
"ceteris paribus" or "all things being equal" clause). There is a
(probabilistic) deductive relationship between that initial conditions
and the general principles and the outcome.
Now, in what way does the existince of God and Nothing deductive imply
the creation of the universe? Is there some reason to think that, a
priori, he would not leave things as they were (or in this case, were
not)? After all, a general principle is that God is self-complete and
self-sufficient, isn't it?
>
> ....
>
> > > I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of the
> > > benefit of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's just not
> > > semantically true. A more correct phrasing would be that God adds
> > > nothing to the explanation.
> >
> > That is a better claim. The introduction of "God" into an explanation is
> > not additionally explanatory. It *is* mythological, in the sense that it
> > adds *meaning* to the outcome, but the explanation has to involve
> > constraint on outcomes to explain anything, and we know that no possible
> > state of affairs is contradictory to the existence of God or God's
> > "attributes".
>
> Of course not. Well, we may discover someday that the heavens and earth
> never existed. That would falsify the Biblical God. Other than that, it's
> totally un-testable (is there a better word for un-testable?).
Try unconfirmable. Confirmation is important in explanations, pace
Popper.
>
> > > > > > John Wilkins
> > > > > > B'dies, Brutius
> > > > >
> > > > > And what does that mean?
> > > > >
> > > > I am an Australian, so I must mangle language. I choose to mangle
> > > > Latin. Ask yourself what the stereotypical Australian greeting is,
> > > > and then what it might be in Latin. Then think that I am a
> > > > philosophicall trained Australian, and think Monty Python. It's
> > > > layered...
> > >
> > > I've never been heavily educated on Monty Python but I did enjoy one
> > > of the movies I watched. Those British have an interesting sense of
> > > humor. Is it true about the ratio of women to men in Australia or is
> > > that just a ploy to cut down the male population in other countries?
> >
> > Then you are not aware of the sketch involving the Philosophy Department
> > of Wooloomooloo, where all the philosophers are named Bruce.
> >
> > And yes, all Australian males are so manly we need at least three
> > ordinary women each, so as not to exhaust them. However Australian
> > womean are equally manly, and so the ratio tend towards a slight
> > imbalance. In other countries, Australian males need three women, out of
> > a sense of humanity.
>
> Someday, the Google Usenet archive will doubtlessly provide countless
> insights into your personality for historians attempting to reconstruct
> your character.
*blink*
I have a character?
*blink* *blink*
Historians might be interested in me?
*blink* *blink* *blink*
My jokes don't work on Usenet?
>
> > > Steve
> > >
> > > Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
> >
> > Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is more
> > fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that condition.
>
> Secular Christianity?
Paranoid schizophrenia with a religious mania.
--
Steve B.
(Trying third time to send message; all other messages have been going through;
very confusing; demands explanation; going insane; can't go on rambling much
longer)
"John Wilkins" <wil...@wehi.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1fvazyd.1029xg396znooN%wil...@wehi.edu.au...
> Steve B. <s...@ccp.com> wrote:
....
> > > Yes! So, once again, tell us how *these particular* "explanations" do
> > > this. I see *nothing* in the statements that tell us why a given outcome
> > > occurred. So far all you have done is assert that they do this.
> > >
> > > For instance, from "In the beginning God created the heavens and the
> > > earth" (or whatever is your preferred translation) how do you derive an
> > > explanation of the form of the earth or the orbital distance of the
> > > earth from the Sun, etc.? Or if you can't do this, tell me what it is it
> > > *does* explain, and how.
> >
> > What it explains is that God is the cause and that without God, the
> > heavens and the earth would not exist. Why is it so satisfying to people
> > if it doesn't function as an explanation?
>
> Because it is a comforting myth, as I have said. In what way is it an
> explanation of the existence of the heavens and earth? I suppose it
> works like a conditional statement: If there were no God there would be
> no universe. How is the explanatory power of *that* statement
> established? It cannot be (at least via rational argument of
> experience), there are just too few samples to base it on, and it is not
> a logical necessity. Hence there is no explanation of anything.
There you go with testability again. The common explanation must only be
logically possible. If a statement gives the "sensation" of an explanation, it's
an explanation. I'll cover more on this below.
....
> > Yes, I see what you're saying. But it's not a very exact analogy. "A human
> > is an ape," may be a tautology but the terms human and ape are not
> > redundant to each other. They have different meanings. But I do see what
> > you're saying. Your argument is that any correct rendering of the term
> > "explanation" *should* be redundant to scientific theory. Your statements
> > may be informative, but that wasn't my point. My argument here was that if
> > the two terms were truly redundant it would either detract from the
> > meaning of scientific theory or inflate the meaning of explanation. The
> > redundancy itself would not be a bad thing, but the results of the
> > redundancy on language would.
>
> Language evolves to meet the new understanding it is supposed to convey.
> But I am making a stronger claim than this - I am claiming that the two
> sets, however defined, turn out on analysis to be coterminous. I am not
> saying they (intensionally) "mean" the same thing, I am saying they
> (extensionally) *are* the same thing.
This would also be a Chez What, if I thought anyone else would back me up. When
speaking of definitions, two definitions that mean the same things *are* the
same definition... by definition!
> > ....
> >
> > > > You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part you
> > > > liked and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both testable
> > > > and non-testable statements that tell us a why a given outcome should
> > > > occur?
> > >
> > > Oops, sorry, I did that indeed.
> > >
> > > I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them "myths",
> > > but without the connotation that this makes them false or irrational.
> >
> > Isn't the definition of myth "false and irrational"?
>
> No. The definition of myth varies, but one meaning is that it is a
> unifying conception for some conceptual tradition. Some myths are false
> and irrational. Some are false and rational. Some are true and
> irrational, &c. "Rational" is a relative term that depends on the
> standards employed (something can be irrational in art that is quite
> rational in engineering).
If the myth is rational, how is it a myth and not simply a story? If the myth is
true, what makes it a myth and not just irrational? It all depends on the
definition you choose. Often times people dismiss religious books as collections
of myths. There's a clear connotation of falsity in the dismissal and it's
always associated with the word myth. If we go with your definition, the
dismissal is meaningless, as the "myths" could very well be factual.
....
> > You sure are stubborn. We seem to have two different ideas of what the
> > "nature of explanation" is. My idea is the one that generally everyone
> > uses and your idea is one that must have testable power.
>
> People use all kinds of words in all kinds of ways. This does not make
> them right or consistent, nor is there any necessity to conform to the
> common usages. That way lies pretzel logic ("Babylon sister shake it").
Sure, we can redefine words all we like, but it makes communication difficult.
As long as long the communicators understand each other, things work pretty
well. But we can't run around contradicting people because we feel a word should
be defined contrary to it's established use. This reminds me of a Calvin &
Hobbes strip where Calvin discovers the plasticity of words and declares to his
dad that he will no longer be able to communicate with him.
Calvin: "Hey Dad, know what I figured out? The meaning
of words isn't a fixed thing! Any word can mean anything!
By giving words new meanings, ordinary English can become
an exclusionary code! Two generations can be divided by the
same language! To that end, I'll be inventing new definitions
for common words, so we'll be unable to communicate. Don't
you think that's totally spam? It's lubricated! Well, I'm
phasing."
Dad: "Marvy. Fab. Far out."
-- Calvin & Hobbes, Bill Watterson
> I have been noted to be stubborn once or twice before. Few people hang
> around long enough to make that observation - you deserve kudos for
> endurance.
How could I not? Opportunities like these don't come along every day...
Why does the "explanandum" have to be forced by the "explanans"? In the
explanation, "Van Gogh painted Starry Night," how is Starry Night necessitated
by Van Gogh?
....
> > It is a purely historical explanation. It constrains all outcomes where
> > God did not create the heavens and the earth. I don't see why you have to
> > understand the general principles that govern God before you can use him
> > as an explanation.
>
> Here is a historical explanation: Rommel beat the Allies in a battle
> because he was the better strategist and had good intelligence of the
> Allies' positions and capabilities. Therefore he was able to exploit
> their weaknesses.
>
> This sets up the initial and general explananda - the knowledge he had
> and the way he was able to use it. Had he not had the knowledge, or been
> a less capable strategist, he might have lost the battle (you have to
> hold some things constant in an explanation, which is called the
> "ceteris paribus" or "all things being equal" clause). There is a
> (probabilistic) deductive relationship between that initial conditions
> and the general principles and the outcome.
>
> Now, in what way does the existince of God and Nothing deductive imply
> the creation of the universe? Is there some reason to think that, a
> priori, he would not leave things as they were (or in this case, were
> not)? After all, a general principle is that God is self-complete and
> self-sufficient, isn't it?
I've never understood how anyone can deduce anything about God. But that's
beside the point. Here is another historical explanation: The Rebel Alliance
destroyed the Death Star because they had stolen plans of the Death Star.
Therefore they were able to exploit it's weaknesses.
An explanation has no binding to reality. If it did, I could not have gave that
explanation. The existence of God does not deductive imply the creation of the
universe. God is the "general explananda". Had God not created the heavens and
earth, they would not be in existence. At least, according to the explanation.
> > ....
> >
> > > > I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of the
> > > > benefit of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's just not
> > > > semantically true. A more correct phrasing would be that God adds
> > > > nothing to the explanation.
> > >
> > > That is a better claim. The introduction of "God" into an explanation is
> > > not additionally explanatory. It *is* mythological, in the sense that it
> > > adds *meaning* to the outcome, but the explanation has to involve
> > > constraint on outcomes to explain anything, and we know that no possible
> > > state of affairs is contradictory to the existence of God or God's
> > > "attributes".
> >
> > Of course not. Well, we may discover someday that the heavens and earth
> > never existed. That would falsify the Biblical God. Other than that, it's
> > totally un-testable (is there a better word for un-testable?).
>
> Try unconfirmable. Confirmation is important in explanations, pace
> Popper.
Confirmation is important in scientific theories.
> > > > > > > John Wilkins
> > > > > > > B'dies, Brutius
> > > > > >
Genius is never recognized in it's own time. A hundred years from now, after the
old heretical use of explanation is finally exposed in it's fruitless nakedness
and overthrown, you doubtlessly will be recognized as a pioneer in the
collective efforts leading up to it's destruction.
> > > > Steve
> > > >
> > > > Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
> > >
> > > Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is more
> > > fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that condition.
> >
> > Secular Christianity?
>
> Paranoid schizophrenia with a religious mania.
And how would you distinguish that from Christianity?
John Wilkins
Steve B. <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
> (Trying third time to send message; all other messages have been going
> through; very confusing; demands explanation; going insane; can't go on
> rambling much longer)
All part of my fiendish plan to drive you insane and thus amenable to my
ideas. <insert mad scientist laugh here>
As will I. I particularly want to know how this "common explanation"
actualy does anything.
>
> ....
>
> > > Yes, I see what you're saying. But it's not a very exact analogy. "A
> > > human is an ape," may be a tautology but the terms human and ape are
> > > not redundant to each other. They have different meanings. But I do
> > > see what you're saying. Your argument is that any correct rendering of
> > > the term "explanation" *should* be redundant to scientific theory.
> > > Your statements may be informative, but that wasn't my point. My
> > > argument here was that if the two terms were truly redundant it would
> > > either detract from the meaning of scientific theory or inflate the
> > > meaning of explanation. The redundancy itself would not be a bad
> > > thing, but the results of the redundancy on language would.
> >
> > Language evolves to meet the new understanding it is supposed to convey.
> > But I am making a stronger claim than this - I am claiming that the two
> > sets, however defined, turn out on analysis to be coterminous. I am not
> > saying they (intensionally) "mean" the same thing, I am saying they
> > (extensionally) *are* the same thing.
>
> This would also be a Chez What, if I thought anyone else would back me up.
> When speaking of definitions, two definitions that mean the same things
> *are* the same definition... by definition!
Are you aware of the set theoretic distinction between intension and
extension? I suspect not, or you wouldn't have thought what I said was a
Chez Watt.
An intensionally defined set is one formed from a rule - "All the x's
that are Y". On this account an explanation would be "All the statements
that are <something>" (we are currently arguing over what that something
is). An extensional set is one that is "defined" (or rather delimited)
by being mappable without remainder onto some other set. In this case I
was saying that it *happens* that all that is an explanation maps onto a
scientific account. This is not to *define* "explanation" as "science"
but to note that a true explanation is one that is (or could become) a
scientific account. This itself needs explanation, which I am trying to
provide by noting that explanations must make a measurable or noticeable
difference, and surprise, surprise! so does science.
>
> > > ....
> > >
> > > > > You didn't answer the question. You just focused in on the part
> > > > > you liked and salivated. What word do we use to encompass both
> > > > > testable and non-testable statements that tell us a why a given
> > > > > outcome should occur?
> > > >
> > > > Oops, sorry, I did that indeed.
> > > >
> > > > I answered this in a post in answer to Mark Isaak. I call them
> > > > "myths", but without the connotation that this makes them false or
> > > > irrational.
> > >
> > > Isn't the definition of myth "false and irrational"?
> >
> > No. The definition of myth varies, but one meaning is that it is a
> > unifying conception for some conceptual tradition. Some myths are false
> > and irrational. Some are false and rational. Some are true and
> > irrational, &c. "Rational" is a relative term that depends on the
> > standards employed (something can be irrational in art that is quite
> > rational in engineering).
>
> If the myth is rational, how is it a myth and not simply a story? If the
> myth is true, what makes it a myth and not just irrational? It all depends
> on the definition you choose. Often times people dismiss religious books
> as collections of myths. There's a clear connotation of falsity in the
> dismissal and it's always associated with the word myth. If we go with
> your definition, the dismissal is meaningless, as the "myths" could very
> well be factual.
>
This is a non sequitur. A scientific explanation can also function as a
myth (see the way that "skeptical societies" use science to unify their
social group). I am merely saying that the set of all explanations and
the set of all myths are *not* extensionally identical - they do not map
directly onto each other.
"Myth" does not mean false or irrational. It can be, however. We address
that on a case by case basis. But something that purports to be an
explanation can be a myth and not an explanation. God creating the
universe is one of these myths.
> ....
>
> > > You sure are stubborn. We seem to have two different ideas of what the
> > > "nature of explanation" is. My idea is the one that generally everyone
> > > uses and your idea is one that must have testable power.
> >
> > People use all kinds of words in all kinds of ways. This does not make
> > them right or consistent, nor is there any necessity to conform to the
> > common usages. That way lies pretzel logic ("Babylon sister shake it").
>
> Sure, we can redefine words all we like, but it makes communication
> difficult. As long as long the communicators understand each other, things
> work pretty well. But we can't run around contradicting people because we
> feel a word should be defined contrary to it's established use. This
> reminds me of a Calvin & Hobbes strip where Calvin discovers the
> plasticity of words and declares to his dad that he will no longer be able
> to communicate with him.
>
> Calvin: "Hey Dad, know what I figured out? The meaning
> of words isn't a fixed thing! Any word can mean anything!
> By giving words new meanings, ordinary English can become
> an exclusionary code! Two generations can be divided by the
> same language! To that end, I'll be inventing new definitions
> for common words, so we'll be unable to communicate. Don't
> you think that's totally spam? It's lubricated! Well, I'm
> phasing."
>
> Dad: "Marvy. Fab. Far out."
>
> -- Calvin & Hobbes, Bill Watterson
The Standard Philosophical Reference here is Humpty Dumty's statement
that "A word means whatever I choose it to me. It is a matter of who is
to be master, that's all." Oddly, both Humpty and Calvin overlook that
the meaning of words is a *community* ascription, not an individual and
subjective one.
A scientific community, or a philosophical or theological or whatever
professional discipline, has words that serve purposes for that
community. We are discussing the philosophy of explanation here, and so
the philosophical uses take priority over the often self-contradictory
meanings of words in the general language community (of course, on can
be a member of more than one community simultaneously - one of the
amazing juggling acts hominids seem to be capable of).
In a technical discourse, it is important that terms have an unambiguous
reference (extension) and meaning (intension). If you say in ordinary
language, "God explains the world" then that is vague and unclear. What
exactly is it that this does. If you do not refer to God but say, "the
word explains the world", no loss of anything occurs. God being part of
the "explanation" or not makes not the lightest *logical* difference;
nor does it make an empirical difference. The only difference it makes
is that it comforts the ones who accept it, and unifies them as a social
group. For this reason I think this is *not* an explanation, but a
comforting myth.
>
> > I have been noted to be stubborn once or twice before. Few people hang
> > around long enough to make that observation - you deserve kudos for
> > endurance.
>
> How could I not? Opportunities like these don't come along every day...
Well, given the level of my stubbornness, actually they do.
>
....
> > > > What I am saying is that the others do not work, so this is a flaw in
> > > > those "explanation-claims" not in the equation of explanation with
> > > > science.
> > >
> > > There you go again, stating that an explanation has to "work". Define
> > > "work" please.
> >
> > Explanation involves showing how the outcome is necessitated by the
> > things doing the explaining (how the explanans is forced by the
> > explanandum). Any putative explanation that fails to do this is simply
> > not explaining anything. That is what I mean by "work" here. If there is
> > no direct and deductive relationship between the explanandum and the
> > explanans, there is just no explanation. You can call it one, if you
> > liek, but as Lincoln noted of dog's tails and legs, calling something by
> > a name doesn't make it one.
>
> Why does the "explanandum" have to be forced by the "explanans"? In the
> explanation, "Van Gogh painted Starry Night," how is Starry Night
> necessitated by Van Gogh?
This is where it gets messy. Human actions are multiply explicable. You
can explain the behaviour in terms of inner reasons (Van Gogh painted
Starry Night to explore impressionist techniques), or in social terms
(Van Gogh was contributing to the movement known as Impressionism
because of factors {X, Y, ... Z}), or in psychological terms (Van Gogh
was forced to paint Starry Night because he had a visual neurological
aberration and was incipiently psychotic), and so on. Human explanations
are perhaps the *least* translucent[1] forms of explanations.
But any explanation must conform to the general schema of the N-D model
(that's nomological-deductive model, as expounded by Hempel); so let us
see what could be being explained here:
Starry Night exists - why?
Van Gogh was a painter
General rule: any painting must have a painter.
========
Vincent van Gogh painted it. (As opposed to Paul Gaugin or Pierre
Monet). [Explains the existence of Starry Night]
or
Van Gogh painted Starry Night - why?
Van Gogh wanted to do X
General rule: Anyone wanting to do X would paint something like Starry
Night
=========
Van Gogh painted Starry Night to achieve X [Explains the goal for
painting Starry Night, rather than some other painting to achieve a
different goal]
or
Van Gogh painted an Impressionist painting, "Starry Night" - why?
Van Gogh was a member of the Impressionist Movement
General rule: Any member of the Impressionist Movement would paint an
Impressionist painting
=========
Starry Night is an Impressionist painting [rather than a cubist or
realist painting]
Every explanation ranges over a field of possible outcomes - alternative
states - and reduces that field to the one observed (perhaps only
partially - there may be a host of *other* paintings Vincent might have
painted at that time in his life - the explanation works so long as it
excludes the alternatives under consideration; not all possible
alternatives). Even a *partial* explanation must do some restriction of
considered alternatives.
Science considers all empirical alternatives (actually, it doesn't -
science considers all currently "viable" or "plausible" alternatives
based on the current theoretical basis of the disciplines involved. It's
the best we limited cognitive devices can do); if an explanation relies
on empirical (observable) states as the initial explanans along with the
general rules, then even if the explanation is at best a sketch, it is a
scientific explanation, and just to the extent it fails to do this, it
fails to be an explanation.
[We might call axiomatic theorems in pure maths or logic non-empirical
explanations, but I think that just takes us too far out of the senses
being discussed here.]
Not so. In the n-d model, all that is required are the initial states,
the general rules, and the observed outcome. You can do this as well
with fictional worlds as with real ones, so long as there are tests that
are internally coherent. Suppose the fictional world includes a general
rule that "bad guys always anticipate good guys' use of weaknesses"
(like Terry Pratchett has the element narrativium in his Discworld,
making stories work out no matter what). Then we could test the Death
Star explanation and show that it fails to explain - you might require a
deus ex machina intervention to explain their success (midichlorions,
pshaw! They sound like chlorine adapted bugs in a swimming pool).
Explanation must be internal to a theoretical framework in which general
rules apply. Inferences about God and the world fail to have any such
rules or framework, and so they are not explanatory. How big a
statistical sample do we have about universes and Gods, anyway? :-)
>
> > > ....
> > >
> > > > > I understand why you want to reject this, most likely because of
> > > > > the benefit of being able to say God explains nothing. But it's
> > > > > just not semantically true. A more correct phrasing would be that
> > > > > God adds nothing to the explanation.
> > > >
> > > > That is a better claim. The introduction of "God" into an
> > > > explanation is not additionally explanatory. It *is* mythological,
> > > > in the sense that it adds *meaning* to the outcome, but the
> > > > explanation has to involve constraint on outcomes to explain
> > > > anything, and we know that no possible state of affairs is
> > > > contradictory to the existence of God or God's "attributes".
> > >
> > > Of course not. Well, we may discover someday that the heavens and
> > > earth never existed. That would falsify the Biblical God. Other than
> > > that, it's totally un-testable (is there a better word for
> > > un-testable?).
> >
> > Try unconfirmable. Confirmation is important in explanations, pace
> > Popper.
>
> Confirmation is important in scientific theories.
We agree. One of us must be ill. [Reference to Darwin and his minister
friend.] Oh, I see, you mean that to emphasise that explanations are not
the same as scientific theories. Well, I must ask once more for an
accoutn of how "common explanations" do their explaining. Is it merely a
semantic connotation or impression that the thing to be explained has
been? Is that all that you need? Or what? Please be specific.
>
....
> > > Someday, the Google Usenet archive will doubtlessly provide countless
> > > insights into your personality for historians attempting to
> > > reconstruct your character.
> >
> > *blink*
> > I have a character?
> >
> > *blink* *blink*
> > Historians might be interested in me?
> >
> > *blink* *blink* *blink*
> > My jokes don't work on Usenet?
>
> Genius is never recognized in it's own time. A hundred years from now,
> after the old heretical use of explanation is finally exposed in it's
> fruitless nakedness and overthrown, you doubtlessly will be recognized as
> a pioneer in the collective efforts leading up to it's destruction.
Nice of you to say so, but I think Hempel will continue to get the
lion's share of the credit, along with Frederick Suppe.
Suppe, Frederick. 1977. The search for philosophic understanding of
scientific theories. In The structure of scientific theories, edited by
F. Suppe. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 3-232.
---. 1988. The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
>
> > > > > Steve
> > > > >
> > > > > Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
> > > >
> > > > Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is
> > > > more fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that
> > > > condition.
> > >
> > > Secular Christianity?
> >
> > Paranoid schizophrenia with a religious mania.
>
> And how would you distinguish that from Christianity?
Christianity is not, in se, a delusional state. I know a good many
Christians who have a solid handle on the real world. But putting
religious belief prior to experience of the real world is just
schizophrenic (in the technical sense of that word).
---
1. People often say something is "opaque", which means it *blocks*
illumination, or "transparent", which means it canot be seen. These seem
odd to me, but "translucent" - transmits light but modifies it - is just
right, IMO.
--
John Wilkins
"And this is a damnable doctrine" - Charles Darwin, Autobiography
Hiero5ant
still don't have the Usenet jargon right.
"John Wilkins" <john.w...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:1fvhjq6.6ezlhl1ae13abN%john.w...@bigpond.com...
> Renamed thread - this is a single topic debate now.
>
> Steve B. <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
<snip>
Steve,
The standard philosophical illustration of the principle John is trying
to convey is the following:
All members of the set of renates (animals with kidneys) are members of the
set of chordates (animals with spinal chords), and all members of the set of
chordates are members of the set of renates.
But being a renate is not the same property as being a chordate.
Thus, the two sets are intensionally distinct, and extensionally
identical. Syntax has yet to gobble up semantics in the world of set theory.
<snip>
H,R.Gruemm
It's time to play advocatus diaboli again.
One way to construct the real numbers is to define them as Dedekind
cuts (i.e. as subsets x of the rationals such that if r1 is in x and
r2<r1, then r2 is also in x. For example, the square root of 2 is
represented by the set of all rationals r such that r^2<2). In this
way, every real number corresponds to a subset aka property of the
real numbers.
Now there are many ways to define Euler's e: 1+1/1!+1/2!+1/3!+ ... or
lim (1+1/n)^n etc. *) Are the corresponding sets intensionally
distinct (they are obviously extensionally identical) or not ? Does
every single one correspond to a different property ("being e") or not
?
I submit mathematicians have good reasons to stick with extensionality
(it is even an axiom in Zermelo-Fränkel set theory!).
Regards,
HRG.
*) Bourbaki defines e via a solution of a simple differential equation
(y' = y with initial value y(0)=1; e = y(1) ).
Steve B.
"John Wilkins" <john.w...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:1fvhjq6.6ezlhl1ae13abN%john.w...@bigpond.com...
....
> > > Language evolves to meet the new understanding it is supposed to convey.
> > > But I am making a stronger claim than this - I am claiming that the two
> > > sets, however defined, turn out on analysis to be coterminous. I am not
> > > saying they (intensionally) "mean" the same thing, I am saying they
> > > (extensionally) *are* the same thing.
> >
> > This would also be a Chez What, if I thought anyone else would back me up.
> > When speaking of definitions, two definitions that mean the same things
> > *are* the same definition... by definition!
>
> Are you aware of the set theoretic distinction between intension and
> extension? I suspect not, or you wouldn't have thought what I said was a
> Chez Watt.
I do now.
> An intensionally defined set is one formed from a rule - "All the x's
> that are Y". On this account an explanation would be "All the statements
> that are <something>" (we are currently arguing over what that something
> is). An extensional set is one that is "defined" (or rather delimited)
> by being mappable without remainder onto some other set. In this case I
> was saying that it *happens* that all that is an explanation maps onto a
> scientific account. This is not to *define* "explanation" as "science"
> but to note that a true explanation is one that is (or could become) a
> scientific account. This itself needs explanation, which I am trying to
> provide by noting that explanations must make a measurable or noticeable
> difference, and surprise, surprise! so does science.
Let me make sure I got this strait. Explanations and scientific theories both
refer to the same conceptual structure? I would agree with this. I also agree
that the d-n model is a good description of this structure. But to use an
example from Hiero5ant, even though renates and chordates both happen to refer
to the same extant animals, renates are not chordates!
Even though explanations and scientific theories both refer to the same type of
structure, explanations are *not* scientific theories. They are only
extensionally identical, and only in a limited sense. We both agree what
scientific theories are, but not what explanations are. Even if I conceded right
now to your definition of an explanation, it would still be true that not all
explanations are scientific theories. Only extenstionally, would they be the
same. "Intentionally", they are not. Explanations do not have to be rigorously
tested and accepted in the scientific community.
....
> > If the myth is rational, how is it a myth and not simply a story? If the
> > myth is true, what makes it a myth and not just irrational? It all depends
> > on the definition you choose. Often times people dismiss religious books
> > as collections of myths. There's a clear connotation of falsity in the
> > dismissal and it's always associated with the word myth. If we go with
> > your definition, the dismissal is meaningless, as the "myths" could very
> > well be factual.
> >
> This is a non sequitur. A scientific explanation can also function as a
> myth (see the way that "skeptical societies" use science to unify their
> social group). I am merely saying that the set of all explanations and
> the set of all myths are *not* extensionally identical - they do not map
> directly onto each other.
>
> "Myth" does not mean false or irrational. It can be, however. We address
> that on a case by case basis. But something that purports to be an
> explanation can be a myth and not an explanation. God creating the
> universe is one of these myths.
Okay, I don't want to get in a discussion of the nature of myths at the moment,
but it's still true that if a myth can be a rigorously tested scientific theory,
that a dismissal of the validity of a text as a "myth" would be pointless and
deceptive.
This is completely unfair. You just shifted the playing field so that you win by
default. Now we just adhere to philosophical definitions of which you've been
giving me from the start. I demand some reason to believe that un-testable
explanations are not meaningful. You always flow from the preconceived idea that
explanations must be testable on the basis that only testable explanations are
meaningful. So why is it that only testable explanations have content?
> In a technical discourse, it is important that terms have an unambiguous
> reference (extension) and meaning (intension). If you say in ordinary
> language, "God explains the world" then that is vague and unclear. What
> exactly is it that this does. If you do not refer to God but say, "the
> word explains the world", no loss of anything occurs. God being part of
> the "explanation" or not makes not the lightest *logical* difference;
> nor does it make an empirical difference. The only difference it makes
> is that it comforts the ones who accept it, and unifies them as a social
> group. For this reason I think this is *not* an explanation, but a
> comforting myth.
"God explains the world" is far from "God created the heavens and earth". It
would be functionally similar to changing "Van Gogh painted Starry Night" to
"Van Gogh explains Starry Night". "God explains the world", is not a comforting
myth, it's a sentence without content. It has no content because it is not clear
how exactly God explains the world.
....
> > Why does the "explanandum" have to be forced by the "explanans"? In the
> > explanation, "Van Gogh painted Starry Night," how is Starry Night
> > necessitated by Van Gogh?
>
> This is where it gets messy. Human actions are multiply explicable. You
> can explain the behaviour in terms of inner reasons (Van Gogh painted
> Starry Night to explore impressionist techniques), or in social terms
> (Van Gogh was contributing to the movement known as Impressionism
> because of factors {X, Y, ... Z}), or in psychological terms (Van Gogh
> was forced to paint Starry Night because he had a visual neurological
> aberration and was incipiently psychotic), and so on. Human explanations
> are perhaps the *least* translucent[1] forms of explanations.
>
> But any explanation must conform to the general schema of the N-D model
> (that's nomological-deductive model, as expounded by Hempel); so let us
> see what could be being explained here:
>
> Starry Night exists - why?
>
> Van Gogh was a painter
> General rule: any painting must have a painter.
> ========
> Vincent van Gogh painted it. (As opposed to Paul Gaugin or Pierre
> Monet). [Explains the existence of Starry Night]
The heavens and earth exist - why?
God is a creator
General rule: The heavens and earth must have a creator
=======================================================
God created them (As opposed to Ra, Krishna, or Mizu-Ha-No-Me)
This explains the existence of the heavens and earth. It does not explain *how*
the heavens and earth were created any more than the above explanation explains
how Van Gogh pained Starry Night. It is not scientific -- we have not observed
Gods or heavens and earths being created by them and we cannot test it. But it
follows the proper structure of an explanation, explaining why the heavens and
earth are in existence and excludes possible creators. It conforms to the rule
of "heavens and earth" requiring a creator. It is logically possible and
therefore is an explanation.
Now, if you can provide some reason to believe that all explanations must be
testable or must only invoke observed rules, I will concede.
> or
>
> Van Gogh painted Starry Night - why?
>
> Van Gogh wanted to do X
> General rule: Anyone wanting to do X would paint something like Starry
> Night
> =========
> Van Gogh painted Starry Night to achieve X [Explains the goal for
> painting Starry Night, rather than some other painting to achieve a
> different goal]
>
> or
>
> Van Gogh painted an Impressionist painting, "Starry Night" - why?
>
> Van Gogh was a member of the Impressionist Movement
> General rule: Any member of the Impressionist Movement would paint an
> Impressionist painting
> =========
> Starry Night is an Impressionist painting [rather than a cubist or
> realist painting]
Those are good examples, btw.
> Every explanation ranges over a field of possible outcomes - alternative
> states - and reduces that field to the one observed (perhaps only
> partially - there may be a host of *other* paintings Vincent might have
> painted at that time in his life - the explanation works so long as it
> excludes the alternatives under consideration; not all possible
> alternatives). Even a *partial* explanation must do some restriction of
> considered alternatives.
>
> Science considers all empirical alternatives (actually, it doesn't -
> science considers all currently "viable" or "plausible" alternatives
> based on the current theoretical basis of the disciplines involved. It's
> the best we limited cognitive devices can do); if an explanation relies
> on empirical (observable) states as the initial explanans along with the
> general rules, then even if the explanation is at best a sketch, it is a
> scientific explanation, and just to the extent it fails to do this, it
> fails to be an explanation.
I'll comment on this below.
You lost me there, John.
> Explanation must be internal to a theoretical framework in which general
> rules apply. Inferences about God and the world fail to have any such
> rules or framework, and so they are not explanatory. How big a
> statistical sample do we have about universes and Gods, anyway? :-)
And how many samples do we have of Death Stars being destroyed? Both the Star
Wars explanation and the God explanation conform to the rules on which they are
based. You accept the Star Wars explanation as an explanation even though it is
clearly fantasy. But to some, perhaps it is not fantasy. It really happened.
There was a real Death Star and real Rebels. The same with the Bible. Genesis
1:1 is clearly fantasy to some, but accepted truth to others. Belief that it
happened, or objective evidence that the principles or entities are real, bears
nothing on the explanatory form.
The scientifically revealed world may be the "real world" to you, but it is
certainly not to many other people. Genesis 1:1 is an explanation that is as
internally coherent as the Star Wars explanation. You may choose to call them
fantasies or myths, but they are certainly internally coherent explanations.
Although, I'm always open to be demonstrated as wrong.
....
> > > Try unconfirmable. Confirmation is important in explanations, pace
> > > Popper.
> >
> > Confirmation is important in scientific theories.
>
> We agree. One of us must be ill. [Reference to Darwin and his minister
> friend.] Oh, I see, you mean that to emphasise that explanations are not
> the same as scientific theories. Well, I must ask once more for an
> accoutn of how "common explanations" do their explaining. Is it merely a
> semantic connotation or impression that the thing to be explained has
> been? Is that all that you need? Or what? Please be specific.
As I outlined above, an explanation simply needs to follow an explanatory form.
The form you laid out in the d-n model seems very adequate, barring any
metaphysical necessitation of the conclusion from the premise. An explanation
restricts the causes of an effect.
God created the heavens and earth (instead of some other creator); Van Gogh
painted Starry Night (instead of some other painter); Selection and mutation
cause change in a gene pool (instead of some other mechanisms)
> ....
> > > > Someday, the Google Usenet archive will doubtlessly provide countless
> > > > insights into your personality for historians attempting to
> > > > reconstruct your character.
> > >
> > > *blink*
> > > I have a character?
> > >
> > > *blink* *blink*
> > > Historians might be interested in me?
> > >
> > > *blink* *blink* *blink*
> > > My jokes don't work on Usenet?
> >
> > Genius is never recognized in it's own time. A hundred years from now,
> > after the old heretical use of explanation is finally exposed in it's
> > fruitless nakedness and overthrown, you doubtlessly will be recognized as
> > a pioneer in the collective efforts leading up to it's destruction.
>
> Nice of you to say so, but I think Hempel will continue to get the
> lion's share of the credit, along with Frederick Suppe.
>
> Suppe, Frederick. 1977. The search for philosophic understanding of
> scientific theories. In The structure of scientific theories, edited by
> F. Suppe. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 3-232.
>
> ---. 1988. The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism.
> Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
There's always someone ahead of you. What I think a fascinating topic to write
on would be faith. You should put together a work on the nature and evolution of
faith and contrast it to other established concepts. You should reveal the
bigotry in those who respect religious beliefs but who dismiss nutters. The most
established and renounced works are the controversial ones. Not to say that one
should peruse popularity -- works that are popular and controversial are often
forgotten with the others. But in every era, there's a work that's dying to be
published. In our era, everyone tippy-toes around the notion of faith because
few people have the guts to talk about it. Is there any justification for
placing one faith over another? What work does someone refer to when wanting to
talk about this issue in terms of modern scientific understanding? Is it not a
messy situation that's resulted from an overgrown branch of superstitious apes
gaining scientific understanding? Doesn't someone need to help clean it up?
> > > > > > Steve
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Reality is a crutch for those who can't handle religion.
> > > > >
> > > > > Suppose you explain *that*? Do you *really* think that religion is
> > > > > more fundamental than reality? There's a clinical name for that
> > > > > condition.
> > > >
> > > > Secular Christianity?
> > >
> > > Paranoid schizophrenia with a religious mania.
> >
> > And how would you distinguish that from Christianity?
>
> Christianity is not, in se, a delusional state. I know a good many
> Christians who have a solid handle on the real world. But putting
> religious belief prior to experience of the real world is just
> schizophrenic (in the technical sense of that word).
Don't you have to take on Christ's beliefs to be a Christian? Don't you have to
believe that all men came from Adam? Don't you have to believe that God created
everything in six days? Don't you have to believe in the real metaphysical
resurrection of Jesus and the miracles he performed? Don't you have to believe
in end-times and Armageddon? Don't you have to preach these things to others? Is
that a solid handle on the real world? Only fundamentalists take these beliefs
to heart any more. But they all lie and bear false witness and don't show love
to others. Are there really *any* Christians?
Or to be a Christian, do you only have to select Christ's teachings that suit
your fancy? Is one teaching enough or is there number? Perhaps 15 teachings is
enough? If so, I'm a Christian. I believe many of Jesus' teachings are wise and
beneficial for all. You're a Christian too, right? Don't you believe we should
show love to one another?
....
--
John Wilkins
Actually, renates *are* chordates, they are just defined differently.
Like saying "the path to the house" or "the shortest distance between
the gate and that door" might refer to the one and the same trajectory,
but they are defined in different ways.
>
> Even though explanations and scientific theories both refer to the same
> type of structure, explanations are *not* scientific theories. They are
> only extensionally identical, and only in a limited sense. We both agree
> what scientific theories are, but not what explanations are. Even if I
> conceded right now to your definition of an explanation, it would still be
> true that not all explanations are scientific theories. Only
> extenstionally, would they be the same. "Intentionally", they are not.
> Explanations do not have to be rigorously tested and accepted in the
> scientific community.
I have tried to be fairly careful in what I claimed. I claimed that all
*real* explanations turn out to be actual or nascent scientific
explanations or accounts. I did not say they were "intensionally" (the
"s" there is significant) the same - in fact I repeatedly said they were
not.
Intension means, roughly, a definition. It does not mean inten*t*ion, or
goal-directed propensity to behave.
Explanations in science must be *susceptible* to rigorous and complete
testing. As a matter of economy, many are not, so other rules of thumb
are used, such as coherence with the overall background knowledge of the
discipline and its ancillary theories. I argue that this is exactly true
of "ordinary" explanations, and that an ordinary explanation succeeds
just to the extent that a fully elaborated scientific explanation would
have in that context.
>
> ....
>
> > > If the myth is rational, how is it a myth and not simply a story? If
> > > the myth is true, what makes it a myth and not just irrational? It all
> > > depends on the definition you choose. Often times people dismiss
> > > religious books as collections of myths. There's a clear connotation
> > > of falsity in the dismissal and it's always associated with the word
> > > myth. If we go with your definition, the dismissal is meaningless, as
> > > the "myths" could very well be factual.
> > >
> > This is a non sequitur. A scientific explanation can also function as a
> > myth (see the way that "skeptical societies" use science to unify their
> > social group). I am merely saying that the set of all explanations and
> > the set of all myths are *not* extensionally identical - they do not map
> > directly onto each other.
> >
> > "Myth" does not mean false or irrational. It can be, however. We address
> > that on a case by case basis. But something that purports to be an
> > explanation can be a myth and not an explanation. God creating the
> > universe is one of these myths.
>
> Okay, I don't want to get in a discussion of the nature of myths at the
> moment, but it's still true that if a myth can be a rigorously tested
> scientific theory, that a dismissal of the validity of a text as a "myth"
> would be pointless and deceptive.
I do not dismiss myths. I merely provided a term to cover the things you
think are explanations (but are not, actually); it also happens to cover
some explanations as well. It is an overlapping set.
>
> > > ....
> > >
> > > > > You sure are stubborn. We seem to have two different ideas of what
> > > > > the "nature of explanation" is. My idea is the one that generally
> > > > > everyone uses and your idea is one that must have testable power.
> > > >
> > > > People use all kinds of words in all kinds of ways. This does not
> > > > make them right or consistent, nor is there any necessity to conform
> > > > to the common usages. That way lies pretzel logic ("Babylon sister
> > > > shake it").
> > >
> > > Sure, we can redefine words all we like, but it makes communication
> > > difficult. As long as long the communicators understand each other,
> > > things work pretty well. But we can't run around contradicting people
> > > because we feel a word should be defined contrary to it's established
> > > use. ...
....
> > A scientific community, or a philosophical or theological or whatever
> > professional discipline, has words that serve purposes for that
> > community. We are discussing the philosophy of explanation here, and so
> > the philosophical uses take priority over the often self-contradictory
> > meanings of words in the general language community (of course, on can
> > be a member of more than one community simultaneously - one of the
> > amazing juggling acts hominids seem to be capable of).
>
> This is completely unfair. You just shifted the playing field so that you
> win by default. Now we just adhere to philosophical definitions of which
> you've been giving me from the start. I demand some reason to believe that
> un-testable explanations are not meaningful. You always flow from the
> preconceived idea that explanations must be testable on the basis that
> only testable explanations are meaningful. So why is it that only testable
> explanations have content?
Because other putative explanations have no conceptual power. They don't
*do* anything except comfort us. Unless and until you provide me with an
account of this. Which, despite several appeals, you haven't.
Put it like this: I *know* of one account of explanation that works - it
has probative force, it shows why explanations in one disciplined field
(science, and to an extent, philosophy) work, and there are to my
knowledge no other accounts of explanation that can do this. You have
some as-yet unexpounded notion of "explanation" which you do not seem to
be able to define, but which you are certain takes priority over the
proposed account of Hempelian explanation. Why should we take your
accoutn to be an account of explanation *at all*?
As to unfairness. I would defer if there *was* a general notion of
explanation in contradiction to, or at last inconsistent with, the n-d
model. But there simply isn't.
>
> > In a technical discourse, it is important that terms have an unambiguous
> > reference (extension) and meaning (intension). If you say in ordinary
> > language, "God explains the world" then that is vague and unclear. What
> > exactly is it that this does. If you do not refer to God but say, "the
> > word explains the world", no loss of anything occurs. God being part of
> > the "explanation" or not makes not the lightest *logical* difference;
> > nor does it make an empirical difference. The only difference it makes
> > is that it comforts the ones who accept it, and unifies them as a social
> > group. For this reason I think this is *not* an explanation, but a
> > comforting myth.
>
> "God explains the world" is far from "God created the heavens and earth".
> It would be functionally similar to changing "Van Gogh painted Starry
> Night" to "Van Gogh explains Starry Night". "God explains the world", is
> not a comforting myth, it's a sentence without content. It has no content
> because it is not clear how exactly God explains the world.
Agree. We must one of us be ill again.
But neither is it clear how "God created the heavens and the earth"
explains anything, either.
>
> ....
>
> > > Why does the "explanandum" have to be forced by the "explanans"? In the
> > > explanation, "Van Gogh painted Starry Night," how is Starry Night
> > > necessitated by Van Gogh?
> >
> > This is where it gets messy. Human actions are multiply explicable. You
> > can explain the behaviour in terms of inner reasons (Van Gogh painted
> > Starry Night to explore impressionist techniques), or in social terms
> > (Van Gogh was contributing to the movement known as Impressionism
> > because of factors {X, Y, ... Z}), or in psychological terms (Van Gogh
> > was forced to paint Starry Night because he had a visual neurological
> > aberration and was incipiently psychotic), and so on. Human explanations
> > are perhaps the *least* translucent[1] forms of explanations.
> >
> > But any explanation must conform to the general schema of the N-D model
> > (that's nomological-deductive model, as expounded by Hempel); so let us
> > see what could be being explained here:
> >
> > Starry Night exists - why?
> >
> > Van Gogh was a painter
> > General rule: any painting must have a painter.
> > ========
> > Vincent van Gogh painted it. (As opposed to Paul Gaugin or Pierre
> > Monet). [Explains the existence of Starry Night]
>
> The heavens and earth exist - why?
>
> God is a creator
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Assuming the conclusion, hence a petitio, hence non-explanatory.
> General rule: The heavens and earth must have a creator
> =======================================================
> God created them (As opposed to Ra, Krishna, or Mizu-Ha-No-Me)
>
> This explains the existence of the heavens and earth. It does not explain
> *how* the heavens and earth were created any more than the above
> explanation explains how Van Gogh pained Starry Night. It is not
> scientific -- we have not observed Gods or heavens and earths being
> created by them and we cannot test it. But it follows the proper structure
> of an explanation, explaining why the heavens and earth are in existence
> and excludes possible creators. It conforms to the rule of "heavens and
> earth" requiring a creator. It is logically possible and therefore is an
> explanation.
>
> Now, if you can provide some reason to believe that all explanations must
> be testable or must only invoke observed rules, I will concede.
I already have - it does work and advances out knowledge wherever it has
been used, and nothing else has that function.
>
> > or
> >
> > Van Gogh painted Starry Night - why?
> >
> > Van Gogh wanted to do X
> > General rule: Anyone wanting to do X would paint something like Starry
> > Night
> > =========
> > Van Gogh painted Starry Night to achieve X [Explains the goal for
> > painting Starry Night, rather than some other painting to achieve a
> > different goal]
> >
> > or
> >
> > Van Gogh painted an Impressionist painting, "Starry Night" - why?
> >
> > Van Gogh was a member of the Impressionist Movement
> > General rule: Any member of the Impressionist Movement would paint an
> > Impressionist painting
> > =========
> > Starry Night is an Impressionist painting [rather than a cubist or
> > realist painting]
>
> Those are good examples, btw.
Ta.
>
> > Every explanation ranges over a field of possible outcomes - alternative
> > states - and reduces that field to the one observed (perhaps only
> > partially - there may be a host of *other* paintings Vincent might have
> > painted at that time in his life - the explanation works so long as it
> > excludes the alternatives under consideration; not all possible
> > alternatives). Even a *partial* explanation must do some restriction of
> > considered alternatives.
> >
> > Science considers all empirical alternatives (actually, it doesn't -
> > science considers all currently "viable" or "plausible" alternatives
> > based on the current theoretical basis of the disciplines involved. It's
> > the best we limited cognitive devices can do); if an explanation relies
> > on empirical (observable) states as the initial explanans along with the
> > general rules, then even if the explanation is at best a sketch, it is a
> > scientific explanation, and just to the extent it fails to do this, it
> > fails to be an explanation.
>
> I'll comment on this below.
>
> > [We might call axiomatic theorems in pure maths or logic non-empirical
> > explanations, but I think that just takes us too far out of the senses
> > being discussed here.]
> > >
....
> > > An explanation has no binding to reality. If it did, I could not have
> > > gave that explanation. The existence of God does not deductive imply
> > > the creation of the universe. God is the "general explananda". Had God
> > > not created the heavens and earth, they would not be in existence. At
> > > least, according to the explanation.
> >
> > Not so. In the n-d model, all that is required are the initial states,
> > the general rules, and the observed outcome. You can do this as well
> > with fictional worlds as with real ones, so long as there are tests that
> > are internally coherent. Suppose the fictional world includes a general
> > rule that "bad guys always anticipate good guys' use of weaknesses"
> > (like Terry Pratchett has the element narrativium in his Discworld,
> > making stories work out no matter what). Then we could test the Death
> > Star explanation and show that it fails to explain - you might require a
> > deus ex machina intervention to explain their success (midichlorions,
> > pshaw! They sound like chlorine adapted bugs in a swimming pool).
>
> You lost me there, John.
Okay, try this.
You say, an explanation need not apply to the real world, and adduced a
fictional example (the Death Star). I reply that so long as the
explanation is internally coherent in that fictional world, there is a
proper and testable explanation.
Now suppose I give you this explanation:
"The Goobers exploited a weakness in the Gromps' gazopny and so they
"galumphed the Gizmo".
What explanatory power does this have? None. There is no domain in which
those terms have extension. But elaborate a sufficiently rich "universe"
in which the terms do have a reference, and you can test a statement
like this. It might be that, in that narrative universe, gazopnys are
never galumphed. In this case we can show the explanation to be false
(relative to that narrative universe). If the event occurred anyway,
then we might have to introduce some *other* over-riding factor (my deus
ex machina) to explain it. Maybe Gork intervened to galumph the gazopny
(and Gork is a Gahl, and Gahls can do that sort of thing, or maybe they
just hate Gizmos, and intervened in another way simultaneously with the
galumphing). This is how narratives are formed...
>
> > Explanation must be internal to a theoretical framework in which general
> > rules apply. Inferences about God and the world fail to have any such
> > rules or framework, and so they are not explanatory. How big a
> > statistical sample do we have about universes and Gods, anyway? :-)
>
> And how many samples do we have of Death Stars being destroyed? Both the
> Star Wars explanation and the God explanation conform to the rules on
> which they are based. You accept the Star Wars explanation as an
> explanation even though it is clearly fantasy. But to some, perhaps it is
> not fantasy. It really happened. There was a real Death Star and real
> Rebels. The same with the Bible. Genesis 1:1 is clearly fantasy to some,
> but accepted truth to others. Belief that it happened, or objective
> evidence that the principles or entities are real, bears nothing on the
> explanatory form.
I agree, which is why I give you the previous statement.
>
> The scientifically revealed world may be the "real world" to you, but it
> is certainly not to many other people. Genesis 1:1 is an explanation that
> is as internally coherent as the Star Wars explanation. You may choose to
> call them fantasies or myths, but they are certainly internally coherent
> explanations. Although, I'm always open to be demonstrated as wrong.
1. It is sufficiently poor in explanatory power that such statements are
not testable in that narrative universe (how could we test this in
biblical terms?)
2. It is intended (or at least represented as intended) to apply to the
experienced physical world, and to act as an explanation of it.
In the Star Wars case, certain assumptions define the universe (it has
to, or there would be no narrative structure, or drama). One of these is
that sufficiently powerful weapons can destroy structures (of which the
Death Star is an extreme case in point). They even give the schematics
of the explanation in the "briefing session".
>
> ....
>
> > > > Try unconfirmable. Confirmation is important in explanations, pace
> > > > Popper.
> > >
> > > Confirmation is important in scientific theories.
> >
> > We agree. One of us must be ill. [Reference to Darwin and his minister
> > friend.] Oh, I see, you mean that to emphasise that explanations are not
> > the same as scientific theories. Well, I must ask once more for an
> > accoutn of how "common explanations" do their explaining. Is it merely a
> > semantic connotation or impression that the thing to be explained has
> > been? Is that all that you need? Or what? Please be specific.
>
> As I outlined above, an explanation simply needs to follow an explanatory
> form. The form you laid out in the d-n model seems very adequate, barring
> any metaphysical necessitation of the conclusion from the premise. An
> explanation restricts the causes of an effect.
>
> God created the heavens and earth (instead of some other creator); Van
> Gogh painted Starry Night (instead of some other painter); Selection and
> mutation cause change in a gene pool (instead of some other mechanisms)
But God does *not* necessitate the physical world, even in the Genesis
narrative, since God is shown as choosing to create, and there is no
necessity for him to do so. This is a tenet of all theist theology. So
there is no explanation to be had. One *might* have one if God had said,
"I'm lonely as hell and these angels are a bunch of yes-men. So I will
create someone to keep me company." There are implicit generalisations
here (lonely entities seek company, omnipotent ones creat it), and we
might ask how *tehse* are arrived at, but at least then we'd have the
schematics of an explanation in place. And in fact, theologians spent a
lot of time considering "explanations" of this form, only to realise
that they conflicted with other core beliefs (the self-sufficiency of
God, &c.).
>
> > ....
....
It's a well-worked field. I have little to add beyond Wittgesntein's On
Certainty.
No, I am not a Christian (although I once was). There are two
definitions of "Christian" - one is intensional, one is extensional. The
intensional definition has it that a Christian is someone who
<believes/follows> doctrines <of Christ/of the Bible/of the Church>, and
so forth. It has an essential character. This, of course, is relative to
the particular version of Christian belief one accepts.
The extensional definition is effectively, anyone who inherits and
transmits the tradition (from the Latin for "carry") of "Christianity",
which is a lineage that derives ultimately from the followers of Jesus
in Judea around 35CE. Such traditions can change over time, as they are
evolutionary lineages in their own right. This is the *source* of those
different versions that provide the doctrines used in the intensional
definitions.
My own ethical position does not involve love - I reserve love to my
family and friends. It does, however, incorporate a duty of care to
those who cannot protect themselves, and a general notion of civil
rights for everyone in the species.
Can you set your linewrap at 75 characters? My newsreader objects to an
lines over 80 characters, so a single quotation level is a pain.
Steve B.
I'm giving up on that old thread)
"John Wilkins" <john.w...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
news:1fvk3c2.90c6xa1p4jzkiN%john.w...@bigpond.com...
> Steve B. <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
>
> > "John Wilkins" <john.w...@bigpond.com> wrote in message
> > news:1fvhjq6.6ezlhl1ae13abN%john.w...@bigpond.com...
....
> > Let me make sure I got this strait. Explanations and scientific
theories
> > both refer to the same conceptual structure? I would agree with this. I
> > also agree that the d-n model is a good description of this structure.
But
> > to use an example from Hiero5ant, even though renates and chordates
both
> > happen to refer to the same extant animals, renates are not chordates!
>
> Actually, renates *are* chordates, they are just defined differently.
> Like saying "the path to the house" or "the shortest distance between
> the gate and that door" might refer to the one and the same trajectory,
> but they are defined in different ways.
Renates are not chordates! It just so happens that all extant renates are
*also* chordates! Saying renates are chordates confuses language. You mean
to tell me, you're going to hang a sign on your wall that says "Renates are
chordates," and the day kidney-less aliens with spines step onto our
planet, you'll blush and throw it in the trash can?
> > Even though explanations and scientific theories both refer to the same
> > type of structure, explanations are *not* scientific theories. They are
> > only extensionally identical, and only in a limited sense. We both
agree
> > what scientific theories are, but not what explanations are. Even if I
> > conceded right now to your definition of an explanation, it would still
be
> > true that not all explanations are scientific theories. Only
> > extenstionally, would they be the same. "Intentionally", they are not.
> > Explanations do not have to be rigorously tested and accepted in the
> > scientific community.
>
> I have tried to be fairly careful in what I claimed. I claimed that all
> *real* explanations turn out to be actual or nascent scientific
> explanations or accounts. I did not say they were "intensionally" (the
> "s" there is significant) the same - in fact I repeatedly said they were
> not.
>
> Intension means, roughly, a definition. It does not mean inten*t*ion, or
> goal-directed propensity to behave.
Oops.
> Explanations in science must be *susceptible* to rigorous and complete
> testing. As a matter of economy, many are not, so other rules of thumb
> are used, such as coherence with the overall background knowledge of the
> discipline and its ancillary theories. I argue that this is exactly true
> of "ordinary" explanations, and that an ordinary explanation succeeds
> just to the extent that a fully elaborated scientific explanation would
> have in that context.
It looks like you're trying another goalpost shift here. You're replacing
scientific theory with scientific explanation. You're trying to demonstrate
how all true explanations are scientific theories. After all the time
you've spent showing misinformed people that evolution is not *only* a
theory, I don't see how you can even make the statement that started all
this. If a scientific theory is no more than an explanation then we might
as well call them explanations and be done with it.
I did some Googleing.
Not to worry. It's not what I care enough about. But
consider this: if there was no Flood (there wasn't),
or Exodus (there wasn't), and if the Davidian dynasty
is mostly post hoc myth-building (which is what I am
arguing here) what becomes of your reliance upon
history in your faith? [...]
John Wilkins, http://tinyurl.com/cnwu
Here you directly contrast fact again myth when talking about the Bible.
Would not your use of myth here be meaningless, as myths can be factual?
Actually it was a caliph of Alexandria who is supposed
to have said it, at the burning of the Library of
Alexandria, but it is a myth.
John Wilkins, http://tinyurl.com/cnyr
So what if it's a myth? He wanted to know if it was factual or not. And as
you've set me strait, myths can be factual. Many make a much more
derogatory use of myth, but it seems you at least see myths as not factual.
Because you're being too ambiguous. What is "do"? How can we tell if an
explanation "does" anything or not?
> Put it like this: I *know* of one account of explanation that works - it
> has probative force, it shows why explanations in one disciplined field
> (science, and to an extent, philosophy) work, and there are to my
> knowledge no other accounts of explanation that can do this. You have
> some as-yet unexpounded notion of "explanation" which you do not seem to
> be able to define, but which you are certain takes priority over the
> proposed account of Hempelian explanation. Why should we take your
> accoutn to be an account of explanation *at all*?
>
> As to unfairness. I would defer if there *was* a general notion of
> explanation in contradiction to, or at last inconsistent with, the n-d
> model. But there simply isn't.
I've already accepted the structure of the n-d model as an explanatory form
and defined an explanation as a statement that conforms to it.
It explains that God was the creator. Of all possible creators,
God/Yahweh/Jehovah was the creator. What is unclear?
No, the conclusion is that "God created the heavens and earth". That is not
assumed in "God is a creator".
> > General rule: The heavens and earth must have a creator
> > =======================================================
> > God created them (As opposed to Ra, Krishna, or Mizu-Ha-No-Me)
> >
> > This explains the existence of the heavens and earth. It does not
explain
> > *how* the heavens and earth were created any more than the above
> > explanation explains how Van Gogh pained Starry Night. It is not
> > scientific -- we have not observed Gods or heavens and earths being
> > created by them and we cannot test it. But it follows the proper
structure
> > of an explanation, explaining why the heavens and earth are in
existence
> > and excludes possible creators. It conforms to the rule of "heavens and
> > earth" requiring a creator. It is logically possible and therefore is
an
> > explanation.
> >
> > Now, if you can provide some reason to believe that all explanations
must
> > be testable or must only invoke observed rules, I will concede.
>
> I already have - it does work and advances out knowledge wherever it has
> been used, and nothing else has that function.
Our knowledge is advanced. The creator could have been anyone or anything.
It is explained that the creator is God/Yahweh/Jehovah.
....
An explanation need not apply to the "real world" because the "real world"
is total subjective. No two people have the same idea of what the "real
world" is. It would be impossible for an explanation to some vague notion
of the "real world", so it only must be internally coherent. It must apply
to the rules in which does explaining.
With scientific explanations, those rules force explanations to conform
rules of science like testability. The rules are observed and testable
rules and laws of nature. We invoke only observed or testable entities. And
we all know a scientific theory is a scientific explanation which is well
tested and supported.
Star Wars explanations must follow the rules of the Star Wars universe to
be internally coherent. According to the Star Wars reality, there was
indeed a Death Star that was destroyed and a Rebel Alliance who stole it's
top-secret plans and attacked it. So the explanation pans out. Biblical
explanations must follow the rules of the Biblical universe to be
internally coherent. According the Biblical reality, there was indeed a
creator (God/Yahweh/Jehovah) and a heavens and earth that was created and
required a creator. So the explanation pans out.
Now, somewhere is history we figured out that testable explanation led to
technological advances. Many, decided to interpret this to mean that there
is some truth to scientific explanation because they get results in
advancement. Others, like yourself I assume, decided to build their
worldview on testable explanations. But none of this has anything to do
with the explanatory structure that we've discussed. It seems to me that
technological advancement is an arbitrary criteria to base explanatory
power on.
> Now suppose I give you this explanation:
>
> "The Goobers exploited a weakness in the Gromps' gazopny and so they
> "galumphed the Gizmo".
>
> What explanatory power does this have? None. There is no domain in which
> those terms have extension. But elaborate a sufficiently rich "universe"
> in which the terms do have a reference, and you can test a statement
> like this. It might be that, in that narrative universe, gazopnys are
> never galumphed. In this case we can show the explanation to be false
> (relative to that narrative universe). If the event occurred anyway,
> then we might have to introduce some *other* over-riding factor (my deus
> ex machina) to explain it. Maybe Gork intervened to galumph the gazopny
> (and Gork is a Gahl, and Gahls can do that sort of thing, or maybe they
> just hate Gizmos, and intervened in another way simultaneously with the
> galumphing). This is how narratives are formed...
Exactly. Wow, one of us must be *really* ill. That's how the Biblical
narrative was formed as well. Although, the Biblical narrative dealt with
much more observed things and very often crossed over between the realms of
testable and unconformable. But that has nothing to do with the internal
coherence of the narrative.
....
> > The scientifically revealed world may be the "real world" to you, but
it
> > is certainly not to many other people. Genesis 1:1 is an explanation
that
> > is as internally coherent as the Star Wars explanation. You may choose
to
> > call them fantasies or myths, but they are certainly internally
coherent
> > explanations. Although, I'm always open to be demonstrated as wrong.
>
> 1. It is sufficiently poor in explanatory power that such statements are
> not testable in that narrative universe (how could we test this in
> biblical terms?)
We would seek, through reading of the narrative, to understand the premises
and rules on which the narrative is constructed. Some would argue it's
impossible to construct an internally coherent scheme of all books of the
Bible as we have them today. At least each individual book is much more
internal consistency. After reading the Genesis account we can conclude
general principles about the narrative. (a) God is a creator; (b) The
heavens and earth required a creator. The acknowledges that the heavens and
earth exist. The Genesis explanation is internally coherent because it
follows these principles through.
To the simpleton, this is satisfying because his immediate pressing
question was answered. To the scientist, this is not very satisfying,
because the scientist wants to *reduce* the number things that need
explaining. Explanations like this, would of course stop science in it's
tracks. To the philosopher, well I imagine that depends on the
philosopher's philosophy.
> 2. It is intended (or at least represented as intended) to apply to the
> experienced physical world, and to act as an explanation of it.
I would agree, it certainly appears that way to me.
> In the Star Wars case, certain assumptions define the universe (it has
> to, or there would be no narrative structure, or drama). One of these is
> that sufficiently powerful weapons can destroy structures (of which the
> Death Star is an extreme case in point). They even give the schematics
> of the explanation in the "briefing session".
....
> > God created the heavens and earth (instead of some other creator); Van
> > Gogh painted Starry Night (instead of some other painter); Selection
and
> > mutation cause change in a gene pool (instead of some other mechanisms)
>
> But God does *not* necessitate the physical world, even in the Genesis
> narrative, since God is shown as choosing to create, and there is no
> necessity for him to do so. This is a tenet of all theist theology. So
> there is no explanation to be had. One *might* have one if God had said,
> "I'm lonely as hell and these angels are a bunch of yes-men. So I will
> create someone to keep me company."
That's the answer to a different question, "Why did God create the heavens
and earth?" The question answered at Genesis 1:1 is, "Why do the heavens
and earth exist?" God does not necessitate the heavens and earth any more
than Van Gogh necessitates Starry Night.
> There are implicit generalisations
> here (lonely entities seek company, omnipotent ones creat it), and we
> might ask how *tehse* are arrived at, but at least then we'd have the
> schematics of an explanation in place. And in fact, theologians spent a
> lot of time considering "explanations" of this form, only to realise
> that they conflicted with other core beliefs (the self-sufficiency of
> God, &c.).
I personally don't see how any sense can be made of God's actions. I think
of a snail trying to understand this discussion. Is he wasting his time?
Are theologians?
....
The literary world must be entirely different than the one I and most of
the population is familiar with. Have you ever written any books?
....
Here we go again... ;)
> intensional definition has it that a Christian is someone who
> <believes/follows> doctrines <of Christ/of the Bible/of the Church>, and
> so forth. It has an essential character. This, of course, is relative to
> the particular version of Christian belief one accepts.
I know no Christian groups by this definition. Jesus was very clear about
his teachings.
> The extensional definition is effectively, anyone who inherits and
> transmits the tradition (from the Latin for "carry") of "Christianity",
> which is a lineage that derives ultimately from the followers of Jesus
> in Judea around 35CE. Such traditions can change over time, as they are
> evolutionary lineages in their own right. This is the *source* of those
> different versions that provide the doctrines used in the intensional
> definitions.
By this definition, the "Church" could switch to Satan worship and would
still be Christian. Still, how does one determine if a denomination did or
did not branch from the original tradition? I would argue that all have.
> My own ethical position does not involve love - I reserve love to my
> family and friends. It does, however, incorporate a duty of care to
> those who cannot protect themselves, and a general notion of civil
> rights for everyone in the species.
How can you expect to contribute the betterment of the species without an
all inclusive love of mankind?
> Can you set your linewrap at 75 characters? My newsreader objects to an
> lines over 80 characters, so a single quotation level is a pain.
I'll try it again. Last time I tried it, everyone's text got wrap-attacked.
--
Mark Isaak
<sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
>Renates are not chordates! It just so happens that all extant renates are
>*also* chordates! Saying renates are chordates confuses language. You mean
>to tell me, you're going to hang a sign on your wall that says "Renates are
>chordates," and the day kidney-less aliens with spines step onto our
>planet, you'll blush and throw it in the trash can?
Renates *are* chordates, but renatism is not chordatism.
Steve B.
"Mark Isaak" <at...@earthlinkNOSPAM.net> wrote in message
news:rcgcdvkikajvaiaqh...@4ax.com...
> On Wed, 28 May 2003 16:22:22 +0000 (UTC), "Steve B."
> <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
> >Renates are not chordates! It just so happens that all extant renates
are
> >*also* chordates! Saying renates are chordates confuses language. You
mean
> >to tell me, you're going to hang a sign on your wall that says "Renates
are
> >chordates," and the day kidney-less aliens with spines step onto our
> >planet, you'll blush and throw it in the trash can?
>
> Renates *are* chordates, but renatism is not chordatism.
I notice you didn't answer the question. ;)
--
Steve
Reality leaves a lot to the imagination.
-- John Lennon
John Harshman
Mark Isaak wrote:
> On Wed, 28 May 2003 16:22:22 +0000 (UTC), "Steve B."
> <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
>
>>Renates are not chordates! It just so happens that all extant renates are
>>*also* chordates! Saying renates are chordates confuses language. You mean
>>to tell me, you're going to hang a sign on your wall that says "Renates are
>>chordates," and the day kidney-less aliens with spines step onto our
>>planet, you'll blush and throw it in the trash can?
>>
>
> Renates *are* chordates, but renatism is not chordatism.
What Steve is trying to say is that there is no necessary connection
between having kidneys and having a notochord. The characters that
currently diagnose groups were presumably assembled over time, and not
all at once. So there was once an animal with a notochord but no
kidneys, or kidneys but no notochord. Or to put it another way, the
characters that diagnose the crown group are not the same as the ones
that diagnose the stem group. And we find this to be true all the time
with fossils. Just look at the difficulty of defining a set of
characters to diagnose birds, when all the various extinct theropods are
taken into account.
(Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
As Wilkins might say.)
Hiero5ant
"Steve B." <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote in message
news:bb5iuu$62vsd$1...@ID-195893.news.dfncis.de...
All renates are chordates.
You've slipped into the "what if you're wrong? wouldn't you then be
wrong?" mode.
To answer the question explicitly, the claim that all renates are
chordates will be retracted when and only when a counterexample is
presented. It seems as though you are denying that anyone is allowed to make
statements of the form "All Fs are Gs".
Steve B.
"John Harshman" <jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote in message
news:3ED64142...@pacbell.net...
>
>
> Mark Isaak wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 28 May 2003 16:22:22 +0000 (UTC), "Steve B."
> > <sburke_r...@heartland.net> wrote:
> >
> >>Renates are not chordates! It just so happens that all extant renates are
> >>*also* chordates! Saying renates are chordates confuses language. You mean
> >>to tell me, you're going to hang a sign on your wall that says "Renates are
> >>chordates," and the day kidney-less aliens with spines step onto our
> >>planet, you'll blush and throw it in the trash can?
> >>
> >
> > Renates *are* chordates, but renatism is not chordatism.
>
>
> What Steve is trying to say is that there is no necessary connection
> between having kidneys and having a notochord. The characters that
> currently diagnose groups were presumably assembled over time, and not
> all at once. So there was once an animal with a notochord but no
> kidneys, or kidneys but no notochord. Or to put it another way, the
> characters that diagnose the crown group are not the same as the ones
> that diagnose the stem group. And we find this to be true all the time
> with fossils. Just look at the difficulty of defining a set of
> characters to diagnose birds, when all the various extinct theropods are
> taken into account.
Mark I. and John W. both fully understand what I mean and what you just said.
It's the semantics that are being argued over. As John W. explained, something
can be intensionally the same or extensionally the same. This all started when
John W. picked at one of my statements on extensial grounds. Of course, in every
day language we speak in intensional terms, so this is a silly nit-pick.
> (Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
> be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
> resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
> As Wilkins might say.)
Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of aliens
stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously evolving without
kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I don't see how "renates are
chordates" is proper in all contexts.
Steve
John Harshman
Steve B. wrote:
And I've forgotten the difference too. Can I get a restatement,
preferably attached to the renate/chordate examples?
>>(Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
>>be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
>>resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
>>As Wilkins might say.)
>
> Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of aliens
> stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously evolving without
> kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I don't see how "renates are
> chordates" is proper in all contexts.
No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
Steve B.
I said that all scientific theories are explanations, but not all explanations
are scientific theories. Naturally, Wilkins saw the opportunity to educate me
and couldn't restrain himself. Really, we've unofficially reached an agreement
on the relationship between explanations and scientific theories. Now we're
arguing over what qualifies as an explanation. I think I've finally got him, but
common sense leaves me with nagging doubts.
> >>(Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
> >>be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
> >>resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
> >>As Wilkins might say.)
> >
> > Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of
aliens
> > stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously evolving
without
> > kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I don't see how "renates
are
> > chordates" is proper in all contexts.
>
>
> No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
> kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
> only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
> evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
It all depends on your definition.
Steve
Steve B.
No, that's not what I'm doing. All humans are apes. Statements of that form only
work with classes. When speaking of taxa, it doesn't work the same. I can say,
"All extant renates are chordates." Either there were renates before chordates
or there were chordates before renates. So it would depend on which feature
developed first, taxonomically.
But you are right, if renate and chordate are taxonomic specifications, my
example doesn't work. I thought he was talking of renates and chordates as if
they were classes. In that case, a fairly easy surgical operation could put a
quick stop to the "renates are chordates" line.
Steve
John Wilkins
I'm working on a reply, but the analogy was
scientific explanation:general explanation::renate:chordate
i.e., they are coextensive but not defined the same. However, I am
*further* arguing that explanation in general is defined the same way as
scientific explanation, but that many things *called* explanations are
not actually explanatory. I am unsure if this is getting through... and
not just to Steve B.
>
> >>(Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
> >>be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
> >>resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
> >>As Wilkins might say.)
If he was being clear, he might.
> >
> > Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of
> > aliens stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously
> > evolving without kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I
> > don't see how "renates are chordates" is proper in all contexts.
>
>
> No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
> kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
> only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
> evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
Secondary loss fails to work on intensional grounds, but can be
accommodated in extensional grounds. Snakes remain Tetrapods, but they
are no longer defineable as "four legged creatures". Maybe it's just my
warped brain, but I really don't think that is a hard distinction to
get.
--
John Harshman
Steve B. wrote:
You got to watch yourself when dealing with philosophers, for they are
subtle and quick to anger.
>>>>(Then again, the kidneyless aliens idea won't work, because aliens can't
>>>>be either renates or chordates, even if they have structures that
>>>>resemble kidneys and notochords. The terms refer to taxa, not classes.
>>>>As Wilkins might say.)
>>>>
>>>Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of
>>>
> aliens
>
>>>stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously evolving
>>>
> without
>
>>>kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I don't see how "renates
>>>
> are
>
>>>chordates" is proper in all contexts.
>>>
>>
>>No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
>>kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
>>only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
>>evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
>
> It all depends on your definition.
Argue this with Wilkins: taxa are individuals, not classes.
John Harshman
John Wilkins wrote:
Wouldn't that violate the rules of your secret philosopher's oath, though?
>>>Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of
>>>aliens stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously
>>>evolving without kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I
>>>don't see how "renates are chordates" is proper in all contexts.
>>>
>>
>>No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
>>kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
>>only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
>>evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
>>
>
> Secondary loss fails to work on intensional grounds, but can be
> accommodated in extensional grounds. Snakes remain Tetrapods, but they
> are no longer defineable as "four legged creatures". Maybe it's just my
> warped brain, but I really don't think that is a hard distinction to
> get.
Let's see if I can figure it out. If I can, then it's not a hard
distinction; however, the inverse is not necessarily true. Are things
extensionally the same that way because two sets share all known
members, and things intensionally the same that way because their
definitions logically require the two sets to share all the same
members? So, e.g. a cladistic version of classical Reptilia would be
intensionally the same as Amniota, but the rotiferan stem-group is only
extensionally the same as the rotiferan crown-group (there being no
known stem-rotifers, and almost no known fossil rotifers).
Steve B.
>
>
> Steve B. wrote:
>
> > "John Harshman" <jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote in message
> > news:3ED677A0...@pacbell.net...
.....
> > I said that all scientific theories are explanations, but not all
explanations
> > are scientific theories. Naturally, Wilkins saw the opportunity to educate
me
> > and couldn't restrain himself. Really, we've unofficially reached an
agreement
> > on the relationship between explanations and scientific theories. Now we're
> > arguing over what qualifies as an explanation. I think I've finally got him,
but
> > common sense leaves me with nagging doubts.
>
>
> You got to watch yourself when dealing with philosophers, for they are
> subtle and quick to anger.
And they know lots of big words.
.....
> >>No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
> >>kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
> >>only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
> >>evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
> >
> > It all depends on your definition.
>
>
> Argue this with Wilkins: taxa are individuals, not classes.
I must stick to one thing at a time as to not overwhelm Wilkins with my vast
knowledge.
Steve
John Wilkins
Don't know. I fell asleep midway through the three hour reading of the
qualifying clauses...
>
> >>>Use whatever analogy you like, but the logic here is clear. Instead of
> >>>aliens stepping onto our planet, imagine some chordate spontaneously
> >>>evolving without kidneys into a population of non-renate chordates. I
> >>>don't see how "renates are chordates" is proper in all contexts.
> >>>
> >>
> >>No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses its
> >>kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod. The
> >>only scenario that works is the one I have described: if notochords
> >>evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that are not renates.
> >>
> >
> > Secondary loss fails to work on intensional grounds, but can be
> > accommodated in extensional grounds. Snakes remain Tetrapods, but they
> > are no longer defineable as "four legged creatures". Maybe it's just my
> > warped brain, but I really don't think that is a hard distinction to
> > get.
>
>
> Let's see if I can figure it out. If I can, then it's not a hard
> distinction; however, the inverse is not necessarily true. Are things
> extensionally the same that way because two sets share all known
> members, and things intensionally the same that way because their
> definitions logically require the two sets to share all the same
> members? So, e.g. a cladistic version of classical Reptilia would be
> intensionally the same as Amniota, but the rotiferan stem-group is only
> extensionally the same as the rotiferan crown-group (there being no
> known stem-rotifers, and almost no known fossil rotifers).
Bing! Hand that man a cigar!
Now all we have to do is work out how intensions are arrived at - should
be trivial... [This is an Ironic statement... so far 2500 years of
philosophy hasn't managed to sort it out to everyone's satisfaction,
although I think Quine did, and the rest haven't yet caught up.]
John Wilkins
> "John Harshman" <jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote in message
> news:3ED68531...@pacbell.net...
> >
> >
> > Steve B. wrote:
> >
> > > "John Harshman" <jharshman....@pacbell.net> wrote in message
> > > news:3ED677A0...@pacbell.net...
>
> .....
>
> > > I said that all scientific theories are explanations, but not all
> > > explanations are scientific theories. Naturally, Wilkins saw the
> > > opportunity to educate me and couldn't restrain himself. Really, we've
> > > unofficially reached an agreement on the relationship between
> > > explanations and scientific theories. Now we're arguing over what
> > > qualifies as an explanation. I think I've finally got him, but common
> > > sense leaves me with nagging doubts.
Well, I have ideas about common sense, too...
> >
> >
> > You got to watch yourself when dealing with philosophers, for they are
> > subtle and quick to anger.
>
> And they know lots of big words.
Periphrastic bombastic obfuscation! Eschew it!
Actually, philosophers *don't know a lot of big words. The trick lies in
being able to redefine simple words and put them in massively qualified
and subordinately claused sentences.
>
> .....
>
> > >>No, that scenario doesn't work either. A chordate species that loses
> > >>its kidneys is still a renate, just like a snake is still a tetrapod.
> > >>The only scenario that works is the one I have described: if
> > >>notochords evolved before kidneys, then there are stem-chordates that
> > >>are not renates.
> > >
> > > It all depends on your definition.
> >
> >
> > Argue this with Wilkins: taxa are individuals, not classes.
>
> I must stick to one thing at a time as to not overwhelm Wilkins with my
> vast knowledge.
>
I read this before lunch, which is why I am still conscious and
breathing... ;-)
John has touched on the core issue here - are words names of classes (in
which case "explanation" can be defined), or are they the names of
practices (in which case it can only be pointed at and traced)?
A species is a historical individual (no argument please - I have pretty
well heard all the arguments going back to Aristotle). A species name
identifies some group of organisms that are appropriately related to the
type specimen. You cannot define most if not all species, no matter how
well you describe them, unless you do so as a description of all the
individual organisms that make it up.
So too for all taxa - define "renates" how you like, it is a historical
individual, and does not include circulation-filtering aliens, or kidney
machines, because they do not descend from the LCA of all renates. So
the "definition" of renates as kidney-bearing organisms is *pointing* at
all taxa that have a homologous organ, not at convergent organs that do
the same task. Hence it is not a definition, as such, it is an
"ostension" (from pointing, as in ostentatious).
Now, can we analogically apply this to a word or practice like
explanation? I think we can - ideas have histories and do not exist in
Plato's heaven (the street address of which is currently unknown). We
apply a term to a practice in a process of "baptism" naming. We then try
to figure out what works well in practice and what is at the edges f the
concept or just an inappropriate hanger-on. So we try the tricks of
analytic philosophy (which is in my view better seen as empirical
philosophy) and see how far the definitions can be extended.
Explanation extends so far as the borders of the n-d model,
appropriately elaborated for probabilistic and retrospective
explanations; and it happens that it is coterminous with scientific
explanations. What we ordinarily call an explanation (I went to get milk
at the shop - why? Because that's where one gets milk) is identical in
form and function. Or, it is not an explanation (why did you buy
cigarettes? Because I *want* to, that's why) but a justification or it
has some other social task, like identity-building.
So in doing this we are separating the homologies of the term from the
homoplasies and the wrongly identified traits that are neither.
John Wilkins
All people who work in my office are within 5m of the fire
extinguisher...
Are "people who work in my office" or "the fire extinguisher" classes?
Is this a class statement:
Forall(x) Forall(y) (Wx -> Fx)
where
W : Works in my office
F : Is near the fire extinguisher?
Draw a Venn diagram and populate the sets with individuals. Now remove
the circles. What classes do you have left over?
> When speaking of taxa, it doesn't work the same. I can
> say, "All extant renates are chordates." Either there were renates before
> chordates or there were chordates before renates. So it would depend on
> which feature developed first, taxonomically.
>
> But you are right, if renate and chordate are taxonomic specifications, my
> example doesn't work. I thought he was talking of renates and chordates as
> if they were classes. In that case, a fairly easy surgical operation could
> put a quick stop to the "renates are chordates" line.
>
<draws big breath. Holds for the count of ten. Gets dizzy. Exhales>
Classes = intensional sets
Groups = extensional sets
Some groups instantiate classes. No group *is* a class, and no class
*is* a group.
Not all sets are classes.
"Renate" is either a class term or it is a group term. If it is a class
term, then it can be defined (as "the class of all organisms that have
kidneys, defined as organs that filter their circulation and extract
unneeded fluids for elimination). If it is a group term, then it is
defined as "the group of organisms that have kidneys, or are secondarily
kidney-less", which is an extensional "definition".
Steve B.
*nods*
Steve
John Wilkins
You have entirely missed the point of the intension-extension
distinction. Renates *are* chordates (in all cases we know of - this is
philosophy, so the example itself is irrelevant). They are not *defined*
the same (one is a class based on having kidneys, the other based on
having spinal chords); that is the difference in intension. But they
happen to *be* the same; that is the extension.
Parenthetically, if aliens arrived, whatever organs they used to filter
toxins and eliminate them from their circulatory systems would not be
kidneys no matter how functionally or histologically similar they were.
Identity of that kind is evolutionary homology, not functional
similarity. Ditto their nervous system.
Now if we find a kidney-less chordate, then we can say that the
extensions no longer match. The intensions, though, will not have
changed (since intensions are eternal and static).
>
> > > Even though explanations and scientific theories both refer to the
> > > same type of structure, explanations are *not* scientific theories.
> > > They are only extensionally identical, and only in a limited sense. We
> > > both agree what scientific theories are, but not what explanations
> > > are. Even if I conceded right now to your definition of an
> > > explanation, it would still be true that not all explanations are
> > > scientific theories. Only extenstionally, would they be the same.
> > > "Intentionally", they are not. Explanations do not have to be
> > > rigorously tested and accepted in the scientific community.
> >
> > I have tried to be fairly careful in what I claimed. I claimed that all
> > *real* explanations turn out to be actual or nascent scientific
> > explanations or accounts. I did not say they were "intensionally" (the
> > "s" there is significant) the same - in fact I repeatedly said they were
> > not.
> >
> > Intension means, roughly, a definition. It does not mean inten*t*ion, or
> > goal-directed propensity to behave.
>
> Oops.
Common mistake.
>
> > Explanations in science must be *susceptible* to rigorous and complete
> > testing. As a matter of economy, many are not, so other rules of thumb
> > are used, such as coherence with the overall background knowledge of the
> > discipline and its ancillary theories. I argue that this is exactly true
> > of "ordinary" explanations, and that an ordinary explanation succeeds
> > just to the extent that a fully elaborated scientific explanation would
> > have in that context.
>
> It looks like you're trying another goalpost shift here. You're replacing
> scientific theory with scientific explanation. You're trying to demonstrate
> how all true explanations are scientific theories. After all the time
> you've spent showing misinformed people that evolution is not *only* a
> theory, I don't see how you can even make the statement that started all
> this. If a scientific theory is no more than an explanation then we might
> as well call them explanations and be done with it.
No, instead I'm being deflationary about scientific theories. They are
just explanations, or accounts. Some of them are more well-defined
mathematically; some have greater scope than others. But in the end they
are just explanations. Incidentally, the theories I was talking about
are the *background* theories, not those included as part of the
structure of the current explanation.
Is that in *this* context? And anyway it is not contradictory. I am
saying that myth-building unifies a society. This is what it does here.
The fact is, this particular myth happens to be historically false
(according to current archeology). Some myths are true. This one (on the
historicity of which the interlocutor was probably building his faith)
is not. Point made.
>
> Actually it was a caliph of Alexandria who is supposed
> to have said it, at the burning of the Library of
> Alexandria, but it is a myth.
>
> John Wilkins, http://tinyurl.com/cnyr
>
> So what if it's a myth? He wanted to know if it was factual or not. And as
> you've set me strait, myths can be factual. Many make a much more
> derogatory use of myth, but it seems you at least see myths as not
> factual.
I, too, use ordinary language from time to time. Sue me. This is about
the technical meaning of a technical term in epistemology.
We already established that - if it restricts the range of outcomes to
one or more very like the one observed, as a matter of logical
deducation. But that is question begging, so I will merely ask again,
what is it that explanations *do* if not this? Words are tools,, so if
they get employed they do *something* - I am not asking you to invent
anything, merely to deliver the tasks and roles that "explanation" has
other than what I say they do.
>
> > Put it like this: I *know* of one account of explanation that works - it
> > has probative force, it shows why explanations in one disciplined field
> > (science, and to an extent, philosophy) work, and there are to my
> > knowledge no other accounts of explanation that can do this. You have
> > some as-yet unexpounded notion of "explanation" which you do not seem to
> > be able to define, but which you are certain takes priority over the
> > proposed account of Hempelian explanation. Why should we take your
> > accoutn to be an account of explanation *at all*?
> >
> > As to unfairness. I would defer if there *was* a general notion of
> > explanation in contradiction to, or at last inconsistent with, the n-d
> > model. But there simply isn't.
>
> I've already accepted the structure of the n-d model as an explanatory
> form and defined an explanation as a statement that conforms to it.
As *an* explanatory form - I am saying it is *the* explanatory form -
are there any others? If not, then my argument stands.
>
> > > > In a technical discourse, it is important that terms have an
> > > > unambiguous reference (extension) and meaning (intension). If you
> > > > say in ordinary language, "God explains the world" then that is
> > > > vague and unclear. What exactly is it that this does. If you do not
> > > > refer to God but say, "the word explains the world", no loss of
> > > > anything occurs. God being part of the "explanation" or not makes
> > > > not the lightest *logical* difference; nor does it make an empirical
> > > > difference. The only difference it makes is that it comforts the
> > > > ones who accept it, and unifies them as a social group. For this
> > > > reason I think this is *not* an explanation, but a comforting myth.
> > >
> > > "God explains the world" is far from "God created the heavens and
> > > earth". It would be functionally similar to changing "Van Gogh painted
> > > Starry Night" to "Van Gogh explains Starry Night". "God explains the
> > > world", is not a comforting myth, it's a sentence without content. It
> > > has no content because it is not clear how exactly God explains the
> > > world.
> >
> > Agree. We must one of us be ill again.
> >
> > But neither is it clear how "God created the heavens and the earth"
> > explains anything, either.
>
> It explains that God was the creator. Of all possible creators,
> God/Yahweh/Jehovah was the creator. What is unclear?
How does that explain the *world*? As opposed to some other world (a
demon dimension in Buffyspeak, for example, or a universe where the
constants force stars to collapse, or even non-existence of the universe
in the first place)? The thing to be explained in not "why is YHWH the
creator?" but "Why is a creator necessary?" or "Why is *this* observed
universe the one that occurred (and the subsidiary questions, why do we
see the stars, galaxies, life forms, geology... we do see?".
>
...
> > > The heavens and earth exist - why?
> > >
> > > God is a creator
> > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >
> > Assuming the conclusion, hence a petitio, hence non-explanatory.
>
> No, the conclusion is that "God created the heavens and earth". That is
> not assumed in "God is a creator".
You've been reading postmodernist texts, haven't you?
>
> > > General rule: The heavens and earth must have a creator
> > > =======================================================
> > > God created them (As opposed to Ra, Krishna, or Mizu-Ha-No-Me)
> > >
> > > This explains the existence of the heavens and earth. It does not
> > > explain *how* the heavens and earth were created any more than the
> > > above explanation explains how Van Gogh pained Starry Night. It is not
> > > scientific -- we have not observed Gods or heavens and earths being
> > > created by them and we cannot test it. But it follows the proper
> > > structure of an explanation, explaining why the heavens and earth are
> > > in existence and excludes possible creators. It conforms to the rule
> > > of "heavens and earth" requiring a creator. It is logically possible
> > > and therefore is an explanation.
> > >
> > > Now, if you can provide some reason to believe that all explanations
> > > must be testable or must only invoke observed rules, I will concede.
> >
> > I already have - it does work and advances out knowledge wherever it has
> > been used, and nothing else has that function.
>
> Our knowledge is advanced. The creator could have been anyone or anything.
> It is explained that the creator is God/Yahweh/Jehovah.
So the explanandum is "Why is God the creator?" not "why is there a
universe?". What universes or states does it rule out?
So you *have* been reading postmodernist texts. [Joke: Do you think you
have read them as the author intended?]
"Real world" here means only empirically observable, measurable, and
intersubjective. No metaphysics is implied.
>
> With scientific explanations, those rules force explanations to conform
> rules of science like testability. The rules are observed and testable
> rules and laws of nature. We invoke only observed or testable entities.
> And we all know a scientific theory is a scientific explanation which is
> well tested and supported.
Explanation is not a law of nature, it is an epistemic probative rule.
We don't *need* to explain things - many animals don't, though whether
from inability or deliberate choice to avoid debates like these, I
cannot say.
>
> Star Wars explanations must follow the rules of the Star Wars universe to
> be internally coherent. According to the Star Wars reality, there was
> indeed a Death Star that was destroyed and a Rebel Alliance who stole it's
> top-secret plans and attacked it. So the explanation pans out. Biblical
> explanations must follow the rules of the Biblical universe to be
> internally coherent. According the Biblical reality, there was indeed a
> creator (God/Yahweh/Jehovah) and a heavens and earth that was created and
> required a creator. So the explanation pans out.
There is no "Star Wars" reality; there is some narrative universe
generated by a writer. If the writer decides to add a "law of SW Nature"
liek there being invisible pixies who behave in some manner, then
nothing can stop him or her.
>
> Now, somewhere is history we figured out that testable explanation led to
> technological advances. Many, decided to interpret this to mean that there
> is some truth to scientific explanation because they get results in
> advancement. Others, like yourself I assume, decided to build their
> worldview on testable explanations. But none of this has anything to do
> with the explanatory structure that we've discussed. It seems to me that
> technological advancement is an arbitrary criteria to base explanatory
> power on.
Why?
And exactly *what* explanatory structure have we discussed other than
the one that applies entirely to scientific explanations?
>
> > Now suppose I give you this explanation:
> >
> > "The Goobers exploited a weakness in the Gromps' gazopny and so they
> > "galumphed the Gizmo".
> >
> > What explanatory power does this have? None. There is no domain in which
> > those terms have extension. But elaborate a sufficiently rich "universe"
> > in which the terms do have a reference, and you can test a statement
> > like this. It might be that, in that narrative universe, gazopnys are
> > never galumphed. In this case we can show the explanation to be false
> > (relative to that narrative universe). If the event occurred anyway,
> > then we might have to introduce some *other* over-riding factor (my deus
> > ex machina) to explain it. Maybe Gork intervened to galumph the gazopny
> > (and Gork is a Gahl, and Gahls can do that sort of thing, or maybe they
> > just hate Gizmos, and intervened in another way simultaneously with the
> > galumphing). This is how narratives are formed...
>
> Exactly. Wow, one of us must be *really* ill. That's how the Biblical
> narrative was formed as well. Although, the Biblical narrative dealt with
> much more observed things and very often crossed over between the realms of
> testable and unconformable. But that has nothing to do with the internal
> coherence of the narrative.
I'm tempted to ask which of the many narratives in the Bible you mean,
but that would be a cheap shot. Instead I merely note that the narrative
universe of the Bible includes talking snakes, mustard seeds being the
smallest seed, planets stopping rotating (or stars revolving around
planets), and so forth. So it there is an explanatory function in the
Bible, it lacks any reality as such. Or, it is not explanatory in the
sense of actually *explaining* things...
>
> ....
>
> > > The scientifically revealed world may be the "real world" to you, but
> > > it is certainly not to many other people. Genesis 1:1 is an
> > > explanation that is as internally coherent as the Star Wars
> > > explanation. You may choose to call them fantasies or myths, but they
> > > are certainly internally coherent explanations. Although, I'm always
> > > open to be demonstrated as wrong.
> >
> > 1. It is sufficiently poor in explanatory power that such statements are
> > not testable in that narrative universe (how could we test this in
> > biblical terms?)
>
> We would seek, through reading of the narrative, to understand the
> premises and rules on which the narrative is constructed. Some would argue
> it's impossible to construct an internally coherent scheme of all books of
> the Bible as we have them today. At least each individual book is much
> more internal consistency. After reading the Genesis account we can
> conclude general principles about the narrative. (a) God is a creator; (b)
> The heavens and earth required a creator. The acknowledges that the
> heavens and earth exist. The Genesis explanation is internally coherent
> because it follows these principles through.
Sorry, but this rules out nothing. For any situation we might encounter
(say, we unearth a variant of Genesis at Qumran with God co-creating
with Asheroth, or using the body of Tiamat as the raw material) the end
results are exactly the same WRT the world. So it does not explain the
world the way, say cosmologists who argue that any theory that
*requires* our universe to have the physical constants it does, would be
explaining it.
But making inferences *about* God is not *explaining* things in terms of
God. *Of course* we use our sacred texts to make inferences about God
(they are called doctrines, by the way) - but it *explains nothing*.
>
> To the simpleton, this is satisfying because his immediate pressing
> question was answered. To the scientist, this is not very satisfying,
> because the scientist wants to *reduce* the number things that need
> explaining. Explanations like this, would of course stop science in it's
> tracks. To the philosopher, well I imagine that depends on the
> philosopher's philosophy.
Don't introduce reduction - it is a red herring. Any explanation at all
(whether done by scientists or not) requires parsimony, or else the
following two "ordinary" explanations would be equally preferable:
1. The man died because he was stabbed during a robbery.
2. The man died because when a knife wielding robber confronted him, and
invisible pixie seized the knife, and shoved it into the body of the
man, leaving no physical traces for CSI to find, and replaced it in the
robber's hands.
Why do *ordinary* folk - twelve good men and true, as the old phrasing
had it - reject these sorts of "explanations"? Why, it is parsimony.
They realise that "explanation" No. 2 is not an explanation. It is
narratively coherent, and all that. It just doesn't rule out anything.
>
...
> > But God does *not* necessitate the physical world, even in the Genesis
> > narrative, since God is shown as choosing to create, and there is no
> > necessity for him to do so. This is a tenet of all theist theology. So
> > there is no explanation to be had. One *might* have one if God had said,
> > "I'm lonely as hell and these angels are a bunch of yes-men. So I will
> > create someone to keep me company."
>
> That's the answer to a different question, "Why did God create the heavens
> and earth?" The question answered at Genesis 1:1 is, "Why do the heavens
> and earth exist?" God does not necessitate the heavens and earth any more
> than Van Gogh necessitates Starry Night.
No, the question posed is, Why do the heavens and the earth exist? which
is *not* explained by "God made them" because if only the earth existed
and there were no heavens, or vice versa, or the earth was covered in
water, or ... the answer "God made it that way" would equally apply. In
fact, for *all possible cases* that answer applies equally. Therefore it
applies *as an explanation* in none of them.
>
> > There are implicit generalisations
> > here (lonely entities seek company, omnipotent ones creat it), and we
> > might ask how *tehse* are arrived at, but at least then we'd have the
> > schematics of an explanation in place. And in fact, theologians spent a
> > lot of time considering "explanations" of this form, only to realise
> > that they conflicted with other core beliefs (the self-sufficiency of
> > God, &c.).
>
> I personally don't see how any sense can be made of God's actions. I think
> of a snail trying to understand this discussion. Is he wasting his time?
> Are theologians?
As an ex-theology student I have Opinions. But that is peripheral to
this discussion we are having here.
>
> ....
>
> > > There's always someone ahead of you. What I think a fascinating topic
> > > to write on would be faith. You should put together a work on the
> > > nature and evolution of faith and contrast it to other established
> > > concepts. You should reveal the bigotry in those who respect religious
> > > beliefs but who dismiss nutters. The most established and renounced
> > > works are the controversial ones. Not to say that one should peruse
> > > popularity -- works that are popular and controversial are often
> > > forgotten with the others. But in every era, there's a work that's
> > > dying to be published. In our era, everyone tippy-toes around the
> > > notion of faith because few people have the guts to talk about it. Is
> > > there any justification for placing one faith over another? What work
> > > does someone refer to when wanting to talk about this issue in terms
> > > of modern scientific understanding? Is it not a messy situation that's
> > > resulted from an overgrown branch of superstitious apes gaining
> > > scientific understanding? Doesn't someone need to help clean it up?
> >
> > It's a well-worked field. I have little to add beyond Wittgesntein's On
> > Certainty.
>
> The literary world must be entirely different than the one I and most of
> the population is familiar with. Have you ever written any books?
Got a couple in prep now. One is on species concepts...
But I am *not* literary. That, sir, is a slur on my fine character.
>
> ....
>
...
> > No, I am not a Christian (although I once was). There are two
> > definitions of "Christian" - one is intensional, one is extensional. The
>
> Here we go again... ;)
>
> > intensional definition has it that a Christian is someone who
> > <believes/follows> doctrines <of Christ/of the Bible/of the Church>, and
> > so forth. It has an essential character. This, of course, is relative to
> > the particular version of Christian belief one accepts.
>
> I know no Christian groups by this definition. Jesus was very clear about
> his teachings.
Roman Catholic Church, Anglican/Episcopalian Church, Orthodox Church,
Baptist Church, Methodist Church... all follow traditions that Jesus did
not teach. They do, however, claim to have authority to teach them.
Whether they are Christian depends therefore on what you think is a
"Christian teaching". That in turn depends on what tradition *you* are
part of, unless it happens you audited Jesus' lectures...
>
> > The extensional definition is effectively, anyone who inherits and
> > transmits the tradition (from the Latin for "carry") of "Christianity",
> > which is a lineage that derives ultimately from the followers of Jesus
> > in Judea around 35CE. Such traditions can change over time, as they are
> > evolutionary lineages in their own right. This is the *source* of those
> > different versions that provide the doctrines used in the intensional
> > definitions.
>
> By this definition, the "Church" could switch to Satan worship and would
> still be Christian. Still, how does one determine if a denomination did or
> did not branch from the original tradition? I would argue that all have.
There never *was* an "original" tradition - from the start it was a
mixed bag. And yes, all have diverged in some manner - this is
inevitable since we no longer speak Aramaic nor think that disease is
caused by demons...
>
> > My own ethical position does not involve love - I reserve love to my
> > family and friends. It does, however, incorporate a duty of care to
> > those who cannot protect themselves, and a general notion of civil
> > rights for everyone in the species.
>
> How can you expect to contribute the betterment of the species without an
> all inclusive love of mankind?
I do nothing for the species as such - I do it for my relatives. It
happens that I am more related to the rest of my species than to most
other organisms (some of my rellies.... really).
>
> > Can you set your linewrap at 75 characters? My newsreader objects to an
> > lines over 80 characters, so a single quotation level is a pain.
>
> I'll try it again. Last time I tried it, everyone's text got wrap-attacked.
>
Yours do anyway. I spend half my time rewrapping them manually.
Steve B.
I would think the classes are more like:
W : People working in your office
F : People within 5 meters of the fire extinguisher
All Ws are Fs, in your example (if it's given that Ws are all really within
5 meters of the fire extinguisher). So I'm not sure what you're saying
here.
According to some of the fine posters here, the definition would have to be
something more like, "the class of all organisms that have kidneys and have
descended from [x] ancestor".
Steve