Theory of Knowledge class
Ferrous Patella
school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
word.
My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
obstification.
So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
--
Ferrous Patella, who thought it was only a joke when saying:
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
unrestra...@hotmail.com
Ferrous Patella wrote:
> "Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
> use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
> very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
> in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
> word.
>
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
> what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
> there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
> the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
>
They are probably not using "theory" in the same sense that scientists
do. But there is certainly much to investigate philosphically in the
subject of knowledge - what is it? How do we aquire it? How do we
transmit it? What are the differences among knowledge, opinion,
speculation, etc?
Philosphy covers a big area. Would you want a class on Vertebrate
Evolution renamed to simply "Science Class"?
> --
> Ferrous Patella, who thought it was only a joke when saying:
> T.A., Philosophy Lab
> University of Ediacara
Kermit
Matt Silberstein
<mail1...@pop.net> in
<Xns96C56F40E9FC7...@199.45.49.11> wrote:
>"Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
>school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
>use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
>very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
>in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
>word.
>
>My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
>what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
>obstification.
>
>So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
>there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
>the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
They probably mean epistemology, only they used an English form of the
term, rather than ontology. What is wrong is wrong with studying
epistemology?
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
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Ferrous Patella
> On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 17:56:25 GMT, in talk.origins , Ferrous Patella
> <mail1...@pop.net> in
> <Xns96C56F40E9FC7...@199.45.49.11> wrote:
>
>>"Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
>>school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being
>>the use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge
>>(science) has a very specific definition which does not match how the
>>word is being used in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for
>>confusion over the word.
>>
>>My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
>>what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
>>obstification.
>>
>>So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or
>>is there another precise definition that applies in this context? And,
>>why the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy
>>class?
>
> They probably mean epistemology, only they used an English form of the
> term, rather than ontology. What is wrong is wrong with studying
> epistemology?
>
>
It is not the subject matter I object to. It is the packaging.
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
--A t.o. poster who wishes to remain anonymous
Longfellow
> "Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
> use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
> very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
> in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
> word.
>
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
> what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
> there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
> the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
Academia has long used the term in a somewhat less specific manner.
Only science requires a testable hypothesis to be drawable from a
theory. But then, only science demands a search for certainty; if it is
not achieved, that fact is recognized.
The idea of theory versus practice in general denotes what should be
versus what is for most people, sort of like what is intended versus
what has resulted. But for academia, theory is what is thought to be
the case, just as in science, but with no requirement for
falsifiability. It is assumed that a theory will stand or fall of its
own merit, just as in science, but the process by which it does so is
not prescribed; the peckerheads of the next generation are guaranteed to
have at everything their elders have done, so why worry about it! And
of course they are correct... ;)
So one is well advised to be somewhat meticulous in one's term usage,
and in the understanding of the usage of others, lest one become
unnecessarily confused. At least that works for me ;)
The Theory of Knowledge should well be a subject of philosophical
investigation, I think. And I'll go so far as to predict some of what
should result:
1) Knowledge can perhaps be defined as conceptual awareness, usually
verbal but not necessarily. A knowledge base is a repository of
conceptual awarenesses.
1a) The term concept denotes that which is sensed in common (seen with),
and necessarily implies plurality in some dimension, space and/or time.
The former is the case when two or more individuals witness a common
event, and the latter is the case where one individual compares two
different instances of witness; no further definition of either of these
is appropriate here.
2) At issue is a) how knowledge is acquired, b) how it is packaged, and
c) how it is considered.
3) The fundamental purpose of knowledge is survival, in whatever manner
is relevant. The fundamental use of knowledge is to enable prediction,
such that enhances survivability in whatever manner is relevant.
4) The human individual is the sole unit of knowledge processing. All
other manipulations of knowledge are aggregate processes.
There are others, I suppose, but those will do for the moment.
With regard 2), the consideration of knowledge itself can been deemed
the art of knowledge, the uniquely human consideration (an artifice) of
knowledge. That is properly called science.
With regard 3), the use of knowledge is the purview of philosophy (love
of wisdom). Wisdom is not knowledge, but can be drawn from the
application of knowledge, sort of the "wise use" of knowledge. The
simplest benchmark here is the verdict of history in whatever term: how
successful was the particular use of a particular bit of knowledge?
With regard 4), knowledge as a process must be understood to depend on
circumstance. A knowledge process confined to a single individual must
be deemed the result of that individual's survival processes in the
realm of mentation. The only appropriate evaluation of said process is
in terms of the single individual who owns that process. A knowledge
process that extends beyond the bounds of a single individual must be
considered appropriately: it is in some manner the result of the
individual processing of those individuals who are involved; it must be
evaluated according to some aggregate of the terms of the individuals
involved.
These above observations are deliberately crafted to address the general
case, where specific examples are expected to flesh them out in each
instance. But that is the nature of theory: general case statements
must be carefully crafted thus, lest they inadvertently exclude what
should not be excluded, or favor what should not be favored. It's very
hard for most people to think theoretically, because we don't live our
lives that way; they're filled with concrete and specific events and
circumstances. Which is why courses like philosophy are valuable, and
why the theory of knowledge itself is an excellent subject to consider.
Now, I would suggest that you express interest in what your daughter
learns: ask questions so she can teach you as she believes she's been
taught. NB: Do *not* critique or judge what she presents, because that
will be certain to blow the whole thing; but you know that, of course ;)
If what I have listed above is not included in some reasonable manner,
you can suspect the course has a specific and inappropriate agenda.
Make sense?
Longfellow
Neil W Rickert
>"Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
>school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
>use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
>very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
>in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
>word.
There is a branch of philosophy which is sometimes known as
"Epistemology" and is also known as "Theory of Knowledge". To me, it
seems to consist of little more than word games, but perhaps John
Wilkins can find some use for it.
I do wonder what this is doing in high school. Have they run out of
subject matter for their curriculum?
Ferrous Patella
[Snip Longfellow's description of ToK, I think ;) ]
> Now, I would suggest that you express interest in what your daughter
> learns: ask questions so she can teach you as she believes she's been
> taught. NB: Do *not* critique or judge what she presents, because that
> will be certain to blow the whole thing; but you know that, of course ;)
> If what I have listed above is not included in some reasonable manner,
> you can suspect the course has a specific and inappropriate agenda.
>
> Make sense?
Actually, I think the class should be very interesting, but my daughter is
not taking it this year. The only reason I caught wind of it is that the
teacher is also my daughter's volleyball coach. (I am hoping to get of
free moment with the teacher to get her take on ID and its implications
for ToK. Should be entertaining.)
As you said somewhere in what I snipped, one should be careful with the
term "theory" and I think this class title is potentially confusing usage.
In terms of taking an interest in what my daughter is taught, I saw the
course outline for her history class and thought it smacked of Political
Correctness. Keep in mind that I am your basic weak-kneed, granola-eating,
bed-wetting, tree-hugging liberal. So if it tweaks my antenna, something
must be up.
--
Ferrous Patella
Philosophy, n. A route of many roads leading from nowhere to nothing.
--Ambrose Rierce, The Devil's Dictionary
Ferrous Patella
It is part of the school's International Baccalaureate program. I guess
they figure if those kids get bored, bad things will happen.
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
Bobby D. Bryant
> "Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being
> the use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge
> (science) has a very specific definition which does not match how
> the word is being used in this case. ISTM that this is and
> invitation for confusion over the word.
Our usual gripe about the misuse of "theory" is based on the specific
meaning "theory" has in the empirical sciences. That does not, IMO,
invalidate use of the same word (with a different meaning) in things
like "Theory of Knowledge", "Computational Complexity Theory", etc.
Though it would certainly be nice if the general public understood
the difference. (I'm _assuming_ that the class doesn't take an
empirical approach to the topic.)
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging
> of what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model
> or is there another precise definition that applies in this context?
> And, why the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a
> philosophy class?
Do they suggest that it's *not* a philosophy class? Don't they have
other philosophy classes that don't have the word "philosophy" in the
title?
I would be more concerned about the course content than its title.
It could easily be a forum for creationist-style "you can't know
anything for sure, so maybe science is wrong and Genesis is right".
(Does your daughter's school have creationist issues?)
--
Bobby Bryant
Austin, Texas
John Wilkins
themselves".
Knowing how you know - how can that be a bad thing? Forcing you to argue for
your own views critically, and understanding there are other views - is that a
waste of time in high school?
--
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Biohumanities Project
University of Queensland - Blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
"Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other
hypothesis in natural science." Tractatus 4.1122
Ferrous Patella
[...]
> Our usual gripe about the misuse of "theory" is based on the specific
> meaning "theory" has in the empirical sciences. That does not, IMO,
> invalidate use of the same word (with a different meaning) in things
> like "Theory of Knowledge", "Computational Complexity Theory", etc.
>
> Though it would certainly be nice if the general public understood
> the difference. (I'm _assuming_ that the class doesn't take an
> empirical approach to the topic.)
My gripe is that (I assume) the class will at some point cover the
empirical way of knowing will be covered in the class and unless the two
definition will be differentiate at that point, confusion will ensue.
>
>
>> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging
>> of what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
>> obstification.
>>
>> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model
>> or is there another precise definition that applies in this context?
>> And, why the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a
>> philosophy class?
>
> Do they suggest that it's *not* a philosophy class? Don't they have
> other philosophy classes that don't have the word "philosophy" in the
> title?
>
> I would be more concerned about the course content than its title.
> It could easily be a forum for creationist-style "you can't know
> anything for sure, so maybe science is wrong and Genesis is right".
I do plan to ask the teacher about her take on ID. Not that I think
creationism is an issue but equal-timeism might be. Plus it could be a
great example of how not to "know" empirically.
> (Does your daughter's school have creationist issues?)
Definitely not, thanks to Rich Baldwin.
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
Bobby D. Bryant
> Actually, I think the class should be very interesting, but my
> daughter is not taking it this year. The only reason I caught wind
> of it is that the teacher is also my daughter's volleyball coach.
And who better to teach a philosophy class!
> (I am hoping to get of free moment with the teacher to get her take
> on ID and its implications for ToK. Should be entertaining.)
>
> As you said somewhere in what I snipped, one should be careful with
> the term "theory" and I think this class title is potentially
> confusing usage.
OTOH, a class on the ToK is the _perfect_ place to inform students
about the varying meanings of 'theory'.
> In terms of taking an interest in what my daughter is taught, I saw
> the course outline for her history class and thought it smacked of
> Political Correctness. Keep in mind that I am your basic weak-kneed,
> granola-eating, bed-wetting, tree-hugging liberal. So if it tweaks
> my antenna, something must be up.
I don't think PC in history classes is anything new.
Bobby D. Bryant
> news:dfagem$3kr$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu by Bobby D. Bryant:
>
> [...]
>> Our usual gripe about the misuse of "theory" is based on the specific
>> meaning "theory" has in the empirical sciences. That does not, IMO,
>> invalidate use of the same word (with a different meaning) in things
>> like "Theory of Knowledge", "Computational Complexity Theory", etc.
>>
>> Though it would certainly be nice if the general public understood
>> the difference. (I'm _assuming_ that the class doesn't take an
>> empirical approach to the topic.)
>
> My gripe is that (I assume) the class will at some point cover the
> empirical way of knowing will be covered in the class and unless the two
> definition will be differentiate at that point, confusion will ensue.
Definitely, teaching something badly can be worse than not teaching it
at all. When you ask the teacher about her take on ID, ask her take
on what "theory" means as well.
>> (Does your daughter's school have creationist issues?)
>
> Definitely not, thanks to Rich Baldwin.
Is there a story to tell about that?
Ferrous Patella
> On Fri, 02 Sep 2005, Ferrous Patella <mail1...@pop.net> wrote:
>
>> Actually, I think the class should be very interesting, but my
>> daughter is not taking it this year. The only reason I caught wind
>> of it is that the teacher is also my daughter's volleyball coach.
>
> And who better to teach a philosophy class!
Actually, I think she is an English/philosophy teacher roped into coaching
volleyball. She knows the game pretty well considering. Quite the
Renaissance man. (Um...)
>
>
>> (I am hoping to get of free moment with the teacher to get her take
>> on ID and its implications for ToK. Should be entertaining.)
>>
>> As you said somewhere in what I snipped, one should be careful with
>> the term "theory" and I think this class title is potentially
>> confusing usage.
>
> OTOH, a class on the ToK is the _perfect_ place to inform students
> about the varying meanings of 'theory'.
>
I just think that titling the whole class "Theory of..." weighs it toward
one of those definitions.
[...]
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
Ferrous Patella
> On Fri, 02 Sep 2005, Ferrous Patella <mail1...@pop.net> wrote:
>
>> news:dfagem$3kr$1...@geraldo.cc.utexas.edu by Bobby D. Bryant:
>>
>> [...]
>>> Our usual gripe about the misuse of "theory" is based on the
>>> specific meaning "theory" has in the empirical sciences. That does
>>> not, IMO, invalidate use of the same word (with a different meaning)
>>> in things like "Theory of Knowledge", "Computational Complexity
>>> Theory", etc.
>>>
>>> Though it would certainly be nice if the general public understood
>>> the difference. (I'm _assuming_ that the class doesn't take an
>>> empirical approach to the topic.)
>>
>> My gripe is that (I assume) the class will at some point cover the
>> empirical way of knowing will be covered in the class and unless the
>> two definition will be differentiate at that point, confusion will
>> ensue.
>
> Definitely, teaching something badly can be worse than not teaching it
> at all. When you ask the teacher about her take on ID, ask her take
> on what "theory" means as well.
>
Was already on my list, although in the reverse order. Mind you I don't
think I be disappointed with the answers.
>>> (Does your daughter's school have creationist issues?)
>>
>> Definitely not, thanks to Rich Baldwin.
>
> Is there a story to tell about that?
>
He is on my local school board. He got started in school advocacy business
over a creationist issue.
Exponent
idea of what is actually a part of it. Empiricism is indeed a category
of epistemology, among others such as rationalism, idealism,
phenomenalism, and pragmatism. I'd suggest Wikipedia (as I do
frequently) as a great place for doing such skimming.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology)
I am actually quite thrilled that high schools are teaching philosophy.
In my opinion, philosophy is a better subject than any other,
including science and mathematics, for encouraging people to use their
brain to its fullest. I believe that a well taught philosophy class
will do nothing but aid the sciences. A mediocre philosophy class
would probably result in no harm or benefit, just like trig or biology
class do so often. Students merely find the subjects uninteresting,
rather than developing incorrect opinions about them. And I expect
many people to find philosophy dull; but for those that don't, it can
enhance their thinking capacity considerably.
Granted, a very poorly taught philosophy class could be bad, but that's
the case for any subject.
R. Baldwin
news:Xns96C5A93621E48...@199.45.49.11...
Actually, I got started on T.O over a creationist issue that came to the
school board. Some students presented a petition requesting that we not
teach evolution, and the T.O. website was extremely helpful in preparing a
response. It was PTA that got me started in school advocacy, in particular a
district science advisory committee.
R. Baldwin
> "Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
> use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
> very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
> in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
> word.
>
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
> what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
> there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
> the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
>
I suspect this is because your daughter's high school is an International
Baccalaureate high school. According to the IB Organization's web site, ToK
is integral to the IB curriculum:
"Theory of knowledge (TOK)
TOK is an interdisciplinary requirement intended to stimulate critical
reflection on the knowledge and experience gained inside and outside the
classroom. The course challenges students to question the bases of
knowledge, to be aware of subjective and ideological biases and to develop
the ability to analyse evidence that is expressed in rational argument.
"TOK is a key element in encouraging students to appreciate other cultural
perspectives. The course is unique to the IBO, which recommends at least 100
hours of teaching time spanning the programme's two years."
RAM
Ferrous Patella wrote:
> "Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
> use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
> very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
> in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
> word.
>
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
> what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
> there another precise definition that applies in this context?
Yes to various proposed testable theories of knowledge. This approach
emerged primarily from German phenomenology. Most notably Max Scheler
and Karl Mannheim. The latter wrote "Ideology and Utopia" which has
served as a major foundation to the sociology of knowledge. His theory
is greatly influenced by Marx and a dialectical approach to knowledge
generation. It has been tested and is still occasionally being examined
empirically. Unsurprisingly it is usually found to be limited in its
ability to adequately predict or explain the emergence of new ideas.
Nevertheless it is valuable read in seeing how Marx's ideas can lead to
insights about how competing ideas generate knowledge. And his work
helps in understanding our present ideological age. It is not an easy
read.
> And, why
> the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
I suspect that the class is really a "critical thinking" course. I
could be wrong, it happens often.
RAM
John Wilkins
and look under the entries for epistemology
I wouldn't put philosophy over math or science, or even history if taught
properly, but it would certainly be better than subjects that don't teach
either solid information or critical thinking.
James Picone
have inherent biases. Even science. Which isn't certain. Take that. I
like art! And religion! Lets not put them through the same rigorous
application of logic we put science and maths through!"
I should know, I'm doing the IB at high school. I have to study ToK. I
really don't enjoy it much.
TomS
<Xns96C56F40E9FC7...@199.45.49.11>, Ferrous Patella stated..."
>
>"Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
>school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
>use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
>very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
>in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
>word.
>
>My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
>what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
>obstification.
>
>So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
>there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
>the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
>
As one who has tiresomely noted that ID is not a theory of any kind,
scientific or otherwise, I would have no complaints at all about a
non-scientific theory not being "testable".
Roughly speaking, I think of a theory as something which offers
some kind of explanation about something or other; or it proposes some
sort of a connection from certain principles to the subject of the
theory.
Think of "the theory of music", "the theory of perspective", or
"the theory of the novel". Some of which might well be a topic for
an advanced high-school class.
--
---Tom S. <http://talkreason.org/articles/chickegg.cfm>
"a man who is not sometimes a fool, is always one."
Archdeacon William Paley
rja.ca...@excite.com
Sounds like a training in recognising bullshit. Could be useful.
Zachriel
> school. I have a couple of problems with this title.
The Theory of Knowledge is a specific branch of philosophy called
epistemology.
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/EPISTEMI.html
You object to the use of the word "theory" in this context, but that is the
nature of the English language that a word may have many meanings. These
meanings may often be related, which can lead to confusion unless the terms
are carefully defined. I prefer to always preface the words "theory",
"evidence", "assertion" and even "observation" with the word "scientific" to
indicate the exact meaning within the appropriate context, e.g.
* The scientific evidence strongly supports the Theory of Evolution.
* Evolution is the direct scientific observation of a change of alleles in
a population over time.
* That 'God so loved the world' is not a scientific assertion, but
religious.
* http://zachriel.blogspot.com/2005/08/beauty-is-truth.html
In fact, any Theory of Knowledge would be very concerned with the various
ways we know what we know, including the distinction between scientific
method and other ways of knowing. For instance, Bertrand Russell wrote a
"Theory of Knowledge".
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/russell1.htm
> The first being the
> use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
> very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
> in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
> word.
>
> My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
> what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
> obstification.
>
> So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
> there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
> the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
Nowadays, any Theory of Knowledge must necessarily have strong scientific
aspects, including neurology, memory and perception; but also philosophical
deduction, a priori knowledge, the valuation of direct or spiritual
experience, and so on.
(My own construction of the scientific method does not require naturalism in
any form, methodological or otherwise, but only the persistence of memory.)
>
> --
> Ferrous Patella, who thought it was only a joke when saying:
> T.A., Philosophy Lab
> University of Ediacara
>
--
Zachriel, angel that rules over memory, presides over the planet Jupiter.
Member AMF, Angelic Motive Force: Pushing planets on celestial spheres — one
epoch at a time.
http://zachriel.blogspot.com/
Robert J. Kolker
>
> (My own construction of the scientific method does not require naturalism in
> any form, methodological or otherwise, but only the persistence of memory.)
Memory of what? Aha! Nature makes it way back in!
Bob Kolker
Zachriel
"Robert J. Kolker" <now...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
news:3nu550F...@individual.net...
Scientific method: hypothesis, prediction, observation, validation, repeat.
Philosophically, the reliability of memory is an assumption. Our memories
and records might be falsified or illusory. Perhaps the world was created
Last Thursday. Memory doesn't have to have a natural basis.
So what distinguishes scientific research from a dream or spiritual
experience? Because the scientific method may require memory, but memory
alone is not sufficient. Each observation must be validated by the
scientific method, that is, independent observers must be able to replicate
the observations. The scientific method is an inductive system, and all it
requires is that we can "ratchet up" or refine our knowledge over time. Zeus
may be supernatural, but if He shows up on Mount Olympus every Thursday
afternoon, then we have the start of a scientific investigation. When the
Ancients predicted the course of planets, they were doing science even
though they thought the planets were supernatural.
The distinction between natural and supernatural isn't required, and the
memory assumption is simpler and requires fewer tangential assumptions. For
instance, artificial intelligence is more than capable of using scientific
induction to explore various universes without making any explicit
assumptions other than remembering where it's been, forming generalizations,
making predictions, then remembering which predictions were correct,
relating them back to the generalizations, refining the generalizations,
etc.
The scientific method is just that, a method.
http://zachriel.blogspot.com/2005/08/scientific-method.html
Robert J. Kolker
> "Robert J. Kolker" <now...@nowhere.com> wrote in message
> news:3nu550F...@individual.net...
>
>>Zachriel wrote:
>>
>>>(My own construction of the scientific method does not require naturalism
>>>in
>>>any form, methodological or otherwise, but only the persistence of
>>>memory.)
>>
>>Memory of what? Aha! Nature makes it way back in!
>>
>>Bob Kolker
>>
>
>
>
> Scientific method: hypothesis, prediction, observation, validation, repeat.
Observation of what? Aha! Nature makes it way back in. Science is
predicated on the notion that there is an Out There out there.
There is something Out There to oberve and remember.
Bob Kolker
Zachriel
Actually, you don't have to have any particular metaphysical beliefs.
You don't even have to believe science has anything meaningful to say
about the universe. Nihilists can still do science.
>
> There is something Out There to oberve and remember.
Please define nature v. non-nature.
>
> Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
>
>
>
> Please define nature v. non-nature.
Nature is that which is indepedndent of human will or wishing. If we all
disappeared tomorrow the water would still go over the falls. The world
is. We just happen to be here.
Bob Kolker
Joe Cummings
wrote:
>"Theory of Knowledge" is the name of a course at my daughter's high
>school. I have a couple of problems with this title. The first being the
>use of the word "theory", given that one way of knowledge (science) has a
>very specific definition which does not match how the word is being used
>in this case. ISTM that this is and invitation for confusion over the
>word.
>
>My other beef is a general distaste for the fashionable repackaging of
>what appears to a philosophy class for reasons that can only be
>obstification.
>
>So I ask, is there actually a ToK in the sense of a testable model or is
>there another precise definition that applies in this context? And, why
>the need for smoke and mirrors instead of calling it a philosophy class?
Maybe "theories of knowledge" would be a better title.
Have fun,
Joe Cummings
Emma Pease
> Exponent wrote:
>> I would suggest browsing through a reference on epistemology, to get an
>> idea of what is actually a part of it. Empiricism is indeed a category
>> of epistemology, among others such as rationalism, idealism,
>> phenomenalism, and pragmatism. I'd suggest Wikipedia (as I do
>> frequently) as a great place for doing such skimming.
>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology)
>>
>> I am actually quite thrilled that high schools are teaching philosophy.
>> In my opinion, philosophy is a better subject than any other,
>> including science and mathematics, for encouraging people to use their
>> brain to its fullest. I believe that a well taught philosophy class
>> will do nothing but aid the sciences. A mediocre philosophy class
>> would probably result in no harm or benefit, just like trig or biology
>> class do so often. Students merely find the subjects uninteresting,
>> rather than developing incorrect opinions about them. And I expect
>> many people to find philosophy dull; but for those that don't, it can
>> enhance their thinking capacity considerably.
>>
>> Granted, a very poorly taught philosophy class could be bad, but that's
>> the case for any subject.
>>
> A much better source for philosophical articles is the Stanford Encyclopedia
[of Philosophy]
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/
though they are waiting on some authors to write articles in the area
(note the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles are peer
reviewed in contrast to wikipedia).
> and look under the entries for epistemology
>
> I wouldn't put philosophy over math or science, or even history if taught
> properly, but it would certainly be better than subjects that don't teach
> either solid information or critical thinking.
Emma
Disclaimer: the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy office is two
doors down from mine, but, I'm not responsible for any material in it.
--
\----
|\* | Emma Pease Net Spinster
|_\/ Die Luft der Freiheit weht
John Wilkins
Yes. And they get revised about every six months based on reviewers' comments.
>
>
>>and look under the entries for epistemology
>>
>>I wouldn't put philosophy over math or science, or even history if taught
>>properly, but it would certainly be better than subjects that don't teach
>>either solid information or critical thinking.
>
>
> Emma
>
> Disclaimer: the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy office is two
> doors down from mine, but, I'm not responsible for any material in it.
I am.
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
[snip]
>
>I wouldn't put philosophy over math or science, or even history if taught
>properly, but it would certainly be better than subjects that don't teach
>either solid information or critical thinking.
Personally I put history first, but that is because I learn much
better with a story attached. Tell me a fact and I may remember, tell
me the story of how people knew one thing, then learned another, then
found flaws in that and learned something else, and I remember the
whole thing.
One of the problems that can develop if you don't learn via a
historical presentation is that you judge the past by the present
rather than the opposite. If you learn first about oxygen, then about
phlogiston you laugh at them. If you learn about how they came up with
phlogiston, then rejected it for oxygen both seems sensible with
oxygen just providing a better answer.
BTW, and on this and the original topic, I just read _Realists and
nominalists_ by Meyrick Heath Carre, a historical account of the
development of some philosophical ideas from Augustine to Ockham. (A
search of the library just turned up _Realism and nominalism
revisited_ which looks worth reading as well.) A nice long essay on
the subject that clarified some points of both epistemology and
ontology that had confused me. I see the appeal of Realism though, of
course, I still reject it. They were searching for TRUTH (TM). And, of
course, Red is more TRUE than some color of an item. The essay was
also helpful in separating, for me, Realism and Essentialism.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
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John Wilkins
...
> BTW, and on this and the original topic, I just read _Realists and
> nominalists_ by Meyrick Heath Carre, a historical account of the
> development of some philosophical ideas from Augustine to Ockham. (A
> search of the library just turned up _Realism and nominalism
> revisited_ which looks worth reading as well.) A nice long essay on
> the subject that clarified some points of both epistemology and
> ontology that had confused me. I see the appeal of Realism though, of
> course, I still reject it. They were searching for TRUTH (TM). And, of
> course, Red is more TRUE than some color of an item. The essay was
> also helpful in separating, for me, Realism and Essentialism.
>
>
I'll chase them up in the library. Sound interesting.
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dflbru$200g$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>...
>
>> BTW, and on this and the original topic, I just read _Realists and
>> nominalists_ by Meyrick Heath Carre, a historical account of the
>> development of some philosophical ideas from Augustine to Ockham. (A
>> search of the library just turned up _Realism and nominalism
>> revisited_ which looks worth reading as well.) A nice long essay on
>> the subject that clarified some points of both epistemology and
>> ontology that had confused me. I see the appeal of Realism though, of
>> course, I still reject it. They were searching for TRUTH (TM). And, of
>> course, Red is more TRUE than some color of an item. The essay was
>> also helpful in separating, for me, Realism and Essentialism.
>>
>>
>I'll chase them up in the library. Sound interesting.
Quickies for you, likely. The first is a Oxford Press item from the
30's and assumes just enough knowledge to be interesting to me, the
second is from something like St Augustine Press and so should be very
interesting. I still nominate Ockham for person of the X period for
any value of X that includes him. In a very real sense he created
science and lawful government. And separated philosophy from theology.
Not bad for a Brit.
Walter Bushell
John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
--
Guns don't kill people; automobiles kill people.
Walter Bushell
John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
But there is no material on the web site.
John Wilkins
> In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>
>
>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>
>
> I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
> corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>
concrete particular not an abstract universal.
Mt1
it's greek, was used first by philosophers. I don't see why you can
object to a word having 2 different meanings.
Mt1
in their logic as any scientist. Hell, they are the ones who actually
study (and "discovered") logic in the first place. They were also some
of the first, and most brilliant, mathematicians. I don't really like
the way some in the anti-creationism community look down on philosophy
as though it were some secular version of theology, just a pure
speculatory field with no rigor. Some look at the social sciences this
way too. I guess it's more of an anti-induction attitude than anything
else.
Robert J. Kolker
Mathematics comes from the Greek word for expert or advanced scholar. In
Plato's academy there were two classes of participants:
1. The mathematiki, the more expert and learned.
2. The acusmatiki, the listners. Literally, auditors. They were supposed
to be quiet, sit still and learn.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
> Philosophy isn't a secular version of theology. They are as rigorous
> in their logic as any scientist.
The main difference between philsophy departments and physics
departments is this:
In the philosophy departments they have paper and pens. In the physics
departments they have paper, pens and wastebaskets.
> Hell, they are the ones who actually
> study (and "discovered") logic in the first place. They were also some
> of the first, and most brilliant, mathematicians. I don't really like
> the way some in the anti-creationism community look down on philosophy
> as though it were some secular version of theology, just a pure
> speculatory field with no rigor. Some look at the social sciences this
> way too. I guess it's more of an anti-induction attitude than anything
> else.
What was the last philosophical system rigorously tested by experimental
and quantitative means? There was a good reason why science and
philsophy parted company.
Bob Kolker
>
Mt1
that because a science doesn't quantify concepts, it means it demands
less logical rigor? Philosophy does not attempt to explain concepts by
quantitative means. The field has the same peer review process that
eliminates the junk and demands logical rigor. Philosophers spend just
as many hours doing their research as natural scientists (and social
scientists). So what's the problem? Science and philosophy never
parted company. Only a certain subset of the natural scientific
community decided they were better than all other areas of science,
especially philosophy which is regarded as little more than secular
theology.
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Walter Bushell wrote:
>> In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>
>>
>> I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>> corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>
>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
And so, not Real.
John Wilkins
> On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 09:58:32 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>
>
>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>
>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>
>>>
>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>
>>
>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>
>
> And so, not Real.
>
otherwise).
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfod4i$18oh$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>> On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 09:58:32 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>
>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>
>>>
>>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>
>>
>> And so, not Real.
>>
>But real (I'm so glad you got that distinction. It causes no end of confusion
>otherwise).
Real I got some time ago, but I tended to fold it in with Essentials.
Both are "wrong", but Essentialism has more subtlety to the error,
Realism is just flat out wrong.
John Wilkins
> On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 14:03:29 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfod4i$18oh$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>
>
>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 09:58:32 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>>><jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>>>John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>>
>>>
>>>And so, not Real.
>>>
>>
>>But real (I'm so glad you got that distinction. It causes no end of confusion
>>otherwise).
>
>
> Real I got some time ago, but I tended to fold it in with Essentials.
> Both are "wrong", but Essentialism has more subtlety to the error,
> Realism is just flat out wrong.
I'm not sure what the problem is with essentials. They are diagnostic or
definitional, that's all. The problem lies not with the *concept* but with the
larger project of science by definition that the late scholastics employed and
which survived in one form or another through to Kant. You can't get to the
heart of things by defining them, unless your ideas are already well informed
empirically.
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfolaa$18fq$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>> On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 14:03:29 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfod4i$18oh$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 09:58:32 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>>>><jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>>>>John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>And so, not Real.
>>>>
>>>
>>>But real (I'm so glad you got that distinction. It causes no end of confusion
>>>otherwise).
>>
>>
>> Real I got some time ago, but I tended to fold it in with Essentials.
>> Both are "wrong", but Essentialism has more subtlety to the error,
>> Realism is just flat out wrong.
>
>I'm not sure what the problem is with essentials.
That is because you have successfully modified the concepts.
>They are diagnostic or
>definitional, that's all.
Which is not how they have been viewed or used by most proponents or
by those using naive essentialism today.
> The problem lies not with the *concept* but with the
>larger project of science by definition that the late scholastics employed and
>which survived in one form or another through to Kant. You can't get to the
>heart of things by defining them, unless your ideas are already well informed
>empirically.
I think the problem goes further back (though I admit I have to do
more to separate Realism). They seem to see essentials, not as
definitional, but as, for lack of the appropriate technical term,
controlling. The essential determined the nature. I suspect that you
really (sorry) think that the only thing that has essentials is words.
"Species", to pick a term almost entirely at random, has some
essential qualities. We use them as definitions or to make diagnoses,
but the stuff in the world has no essence.
Ferrous Patella
> Philosophy came before mathematics, and I'm guessing the word, since
> it's greek, was used first by philosophers. I don't see why you can
> object to a word having 2 different meanings.
>
It is because the two meanings will be used in close proximity to each
other in the class, thus having potential for confusion.
--
Ferrous Patella (Homo gerardii)
T.A., Philosophy Lab
University of Ediacara
"Nature as God's "reality" show - what a concept!"
--A t.o. poster who wishes to remain anonymous
John Wilkins
I like to think I have gone back to the sources, and not used the strawmen
conceptions imposed on the biological debate by Mayr and others.
>
>
>>They are diagnostic or
>>definitional, that's all.
>
>
> Which is not how they have been viewed or used by most proponents or
> by those using naive essentialism today.
Well, yes, it is, in the philosophy of language - see Putnam. When you and I
met Devitt, that was what he was talking about. I am inclined now to think
this is a perfectly fair sense of "essentialism". What we deal with in biology
is something rather derived and skewed.
>
>
>>The problem lies not with the *concept* but with the
>>larger project of science by definition that the late scholastics employed and
>>which survived in one form or another through to Kant. You can't get to the
>>heart of things by defining them, unless your ideas are already well informed
>>empirically.
>
>
> I think the problem goes further back (though I admit I have to do
> more to separate Realism). They seem to see essentials, not as
> definitional, but as, for lack of the appropriate technical term,
> controlling. The essential determined the nature. I suspect that you
> really (sorry) think that the only thing that has essentials is words.
> "Species", to pick a term almost entirely at random, has some
> essential qualities. We use them as definitions or to make diagnoses,
> but the stuff in the world has no essence.
>
But "species" in the older logics which we are discussing, *were* words. Or
rather, they were "special terms differentiated out of general terms" (per
genus ad differentiam). They were "predicates".
Sure, things had essences in a material sense, but you hardly ever find the
medieval logicians asserting that these are open to inspection - species are
"second intention" terms - something we form in the mind. Material essences
were hardly talked about until the 19thC, and late in that century at that.
Walter Bushell
John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> Walter Bushell wrote:
> > In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> > John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> >
> >
> >>http://plato.stanford.edu/
> >
> >
> > I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
> > corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
> >
> No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
> concrete particular not an abstract universal.
A legal fiction is a concrete particular? It is composed only of ideas
which are abstractions.
John Wilkins
> In article <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>
>
>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>
>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>
>>>
>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>
>>
>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>
>
> A legal fiction is a concrete particular? It is composed only of ideas
> which are abstractions.
>
individual is a fiction, perhaps, but that idea exists in a historical context
and only there, so it, too, is a concrete particular (IMO - this is arguable
in some philosophical contexts).
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-8E4C75....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
Nope, it is a thing, in the world. Contracts are the agreements
between people, that the agreements are in their heads (even if
documented on paper) does not make them non-physical. Abstracts are
not Real (I would dare say nothing is Real) and no individual is a
universal. (And, hence, there are not universals since the Universe
only has individuals.)
Walter Bushell
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 05:09:21 -0400, in talk.origins , Walter Bushell
> <pr...@panix.com> in <proto-8E4C75....@reader1.panix.com>
> wrote:i
>
> >In article <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> > John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> >
> >> Walter Bushell wrote:
> >> > In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> >> > John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>http://plato.stanford.edu/
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
> >> > corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
> >> >
> >> No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
> >> concrete particular not an abstract universal.
> >
> >A legal fiction is a concrete particular? It is composed only of ideas
> >which are abstractions.
>
> Nope, it is a thing, in the world. Contracts are the agreements
> between people, that the agreements are in their heads (even if
> documented on paper) does not make them non-physical. Abstracts are
> not Real (I would dare say nothing is Real) and no individual is a
> universal. (And, hence, there are not universals since the Universe
> only has individuals.)
if contracts are physical, what is their mass (you may answer in terms
of energy units if that is easier)?
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-56B1DA....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
How about my image in a mirror? Is that physical and, if so, what is
its mass? The mass of the contract, I suppose, is the sum total of the
masses of the people involved. Or the mass of their brains. Or the
mass of those parts of the brain that are involved with the agreement.
Or any of a number of other ways to state it.
Walter Bushell
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> How about my image in a mirror? Is that physical and, if so, what is
> its mass? The mass of the contract, I suppose, is the sum total of the
> masses of the people involved. Or the mass of their brains. Or the
> mass of those parts of the brain that are involved with the agreement.
> Or any of a number of other ways to state it.
But none of them work. When the contract is broken the energy should be
released.
R. Baldwin
news:dfrjtc$16p5$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au...
> Walter Bushell wrote:
>> In article <dfnup9$267o$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>
>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>
>>>
>>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>
>>
>> A legal fiction is a concrete particular? It is composed only of ideas
>> which are abstractions.
>>
> Stanford University is a concrete particular. The idea that it is a
> corporate
> individual is a fiction, perhaps, but that idea exists in a historical
> context
> and only there, so it, too, is a concrete particular (IMO - this is
> arguable
> in some philosophical contexts).
>
Is it perhaps a gestalt?
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-CD5CC8....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
Ok, now you are just joking, right?
Matt Silberstein
I sometimes forget, are focused on biology. Biological essences, if
they are definitional and diagnostic, are not metaphysical essences.
Diagnostics and definitions still refer to the human analysis, not the
things analyzed. As any good philosopher, you are trying to pull the
old ideas into your own. So you want to subsume essentialism into your
Nominalism. Me, as a dedicated follower of Ockham (not that sissy
Abelard) I want to stomp out (or, at least, on) essentialism It is the
metaphysical concept of essences that pollutes so much thinking. At
the moment I am involved in a discussion with someone who insists that
there is an "instant" at which non-life becomes life. (And so,
obviously, abiogenesis is impossible.) This stems from a naive notion
that there is some essential quality to life, things either have it or
they don't.
[snip]
>But "species" in the older logics which we are discussing, *were* words. Or
>rather, they were "special terms differentiated out of general terms" (per
>genus ad differentiam). They were "predicates".
ISTM that they saw species as in the world, not of the word. Man (to
pick yet another concept almost entirely at random) had some essential
quality *in the world* that made him man. It was not simply that we
had a predicate noun that happen to refer to a group.
>Sure, things had essences in a material sense, but you hardly ever find the
>medieval logicians asserting that these are open to inspection - species are
>"second intention" terms - something we form in the mind. Material essences
>were hardly talked about until the 19thC, and late in that century at that.
I have to disagree. I think this notion of species, of essential
qualities, permeates the thinking. We see it in political thought, in
law, and in metaphysics. At least we see it strongly before Ockham.
Augustine had it from Plato and I am pretty sure so did Aquinas.
Philosophers may have figured it out after Abelard and Ockham won the
day, but others still get confused to this day.
John Wilkins
John Wilkins
> On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 11:17:29 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfqnr9$2j7e$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>=20
>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 16:22:02 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>>><jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfolaa$18fq$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 14:03:29 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
>>>>><jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dfod4i$18oh$3...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>On Thu, 08 Sep 2005 09:58:32 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
e:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>>>>>>>John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
a=20
>>>>>>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
Hence, a=20
>>>>>>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>And so, not Real.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
confusion=20
>>>>>>otherwise).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Real I got some time ago, but I tended to fold it in with Essentials.
>>>>>Both are "wrong", but Essentialism has more subtlety to the error,
>>>>
>>>>I'm not sure what the problem is with essentials.=20
>>>
>>>
>>>That is because you have successfully modified the concepts.
>>
men=20
>>conceptions imposed on the biological debate by Mayr and others.
>=20
> I sometimes forget, are focused on biology. Biological essences, if
> they are definitional and diagnostic, are not metaphysical essences.
> Diagnostics and definitions still refer to the human analysis, not the
> things analyzed. As any good philosopher, you are trying to pull the
> old ideas into your own. So you want to subsume essentialism into your
> Nominalism. Me, as a dedicated follower of Ockham (not that sissy
> Abelard) I want to stomp out (or, at least, on) essentialism It is the
> metaphysical concept of essences that pollutes so much thinking. At
> the moment I am involved in a discussion with someone who insists that
> there is an "instant" at which non-life becomes life. (And so,
> obviously, abiogenesis is impossible.) This stems from a naive notion
> that there is some essential quality to life, things either have it or
>=20
> [snip]
>=20
>=20
>>But "species" in the older logics which we are discussing, *were* words=
. Or=20
>>rather, they were "special terms differentiated out of general terms" (=
per=20
>>genus ad differentiam). They were "predicates".
>=20
> ISTM that they saw species as in the world, not of the word. Man (to
> pick yet another concept almost entirely at random) had some essential
> quality *in the world* that made him man. It was not simply that we
> had a predicate noun that happen to refer to a group.
>=20
>>Sure, things had essences in a material sense, but you hardly ever find=
the=20
>>medieval logicians asserting that these are open to inspection - specie=
s are=20
>>"second intention" terms - something we form in the mind. Material esse=
nces=20
>>were hardly talked about until the 19thC, and late in that century at t=
hat.
>=20
>=20
> I have to disagree. I think this notion of species, of essential
> qualities, permeates the thinking. We see it in political thought, in
> law, and in metaphysics. At least we see it strongly before Ockham.
> Augustine had it from Plato and I am pretty sure so did Aquinas.
> Philosophers may have figured it out after Abelard and Ockham won the
> day, but others still get confused to this day.
>=20
But we don't see it in connection with species of living things. In fact,=
we=20
see precisely the opposite. Aristotle allowed that there were "the more a=
nd=20
the less" in living beings (granted, they were accidental properties).=20
Theophrastus simply referred to genos and eidos indifferently. Porphyry=20
discussed species independently of living things, and suggested they migh=
t be=20
in the mind, echoed by Boethius, and later Peter Lombard.
"As for genera and species, [Porphyry] says, I shall decline for the pres=
ent=20
to say (1) whether they subsist or are posited in bare [acts of] understa=
nding=20
only, (2) whether, if they subsist, they are corporeal or incorporeal, an=
d (3)=20
whether [they are] separated from sensibles or posited in sensibles and a=
gree=20
with them. For that is a most noble matter, and requires a longer=20
investigation." [Porphyry's Isagoge]
The nominalist debate has deep roots. Martianus Capella, a late neo-Plato=
nist,=20
wrote of a genus being a collection of forms under one name, and species =
are=20
=93man, horse, lion=94. He wrote, =93we also call species forms=94 which =
have a =93name=20
and definition=94. =93The term and definition of genus are thus determine=
d.=94 IOW,=20
"species" is a form under definition. This is at best a nominal essential=
ism.=20
I can't find essentialism WRT living beings.
The conception of species in this debate centered largely on the objects =
of=20
knowledge rather than on anything particularly biological. However, as=20
evidenced in Book IV of John Scotus Eriugena=92s De divisione naturae (Th=
e=20
division of nature) of the 9th century, biological examples are used to=20
illustrate the discussions.
Well, here's Ockham's take from the Seven Quodlibita:
... that concept is called a second intention which signifies precisely=20
intentions naturally significative, or which sort are genus, species,=20
difference, and others of this sort [i.e., heads of predicables] for as t=
he=20
concept of man is predicated of all men ..., so too one common concept, w=
hich=20
is the second intention, is predicated of first intentions [a conception =
of a=20
thing formed by the first or direct application of the mind to the indivi=
dual=20
object; an idea or image] which stand for things, as in saying, man is a=20
species, ass is a species, whiteness is a species, animal is a genus, bod=
y is=20
a genus; in the manner in which name is predicated of different names ...=
and=20
this second intention thus signifies first intentions naturally, and can =
stand=20
for them in a proposition, just as the first intention signifies external=
=20
things naturally. [quod IV ques. 19]
Ockham is asserting that the "essential" nature of general terms of secon=
d=20
intention signifies what we might more recently have called "sense=20
impressions", not the inner essences of the living beings.
So, from the early Classical era through to the Nominalists, species of=20
*living* beings don't seem to require any kind of natural or material ess=
ence,=20
despite Aristotle's belief that the essence is the being of things. I wil=
l=20
grant you that science by definition was thought to be a good heuristic=20
largely because science was usually thought to be a matter of working out=
=20
common sense in a Socratic manner.
In the late medieval period, Aquinas not only allows a distinction betwee=
n=20
formal and material division, but that new species can arise (but only fr=
om=20
the outworking of the *causal* powers that makes them, not essential prop=
erties:
"These [species infimae or specialissimae] are called individuals, in so =
far=20
as they are not further divisible formally. Individuals however are calle=
d=20
particulars in so far as they are not further divisible neither materiall=
y nor=20
formally." [In Summa Theologiae, lib. X Met. Lect 10, 2123]
Thomas allows that living species can be generated by spontaneous generat=
ion=20
from putrefaction (Summa I.73.1. Obj 3). However, he says
"Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in=20
various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of=20
animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and=20
elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise=20
occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different=20
species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even thes=
e=20
existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. =85 Hen=
ce it=20
is written (Eccles. 1:10), =93Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath a=
lready=20
gone before, in the ages that were before us.=94" [loc. cit. Reply to Obj=
ection 3]
Species are *always* understood to be the forms that are generated by som=
e=20
active power. They are *never* thought to be the essential properties of=20
definition. So, where is this essentialism of material form? So far as I =
can=20
tell, it arises sometime between... wait for it... 1870 to 1890, by=20
neo-scholastically inclined biologists well after Darwin. I wrote a book =
about=20
it ;-)
--=20
Walter Bushell
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 19:58:52 -0400, in talk.origins , Walter Bushell
> <pr...@panix.com> in <proto-CD5CC8....@reader1.panix.com>
> wrote:
>
> >In article <4d63i19fdo5djnebt...@4ax.com>,
> > Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >
> >> How about my image in a mirror? Is that physical and, if so, what is
> >> its mass? The mass of the contract, I suppose, is the sum total of the
> >> masses of the people involved. Or the mass of their brains. Or the
> >> mass of those parts of the brain that are involved with the agreement.
> >> Or any of a number of other ways to state it.
> >
> >But none of them work. When the contract is broken the energy should be
> >released.
>
> Ok, now you are just joking, right?
I believe your were maintaining the position that contracts were
physical things, in which case it seems reasonable to see if they follow
the rules of physics. Contract law is enforced by judges and juries, not
physicists, so it is my position that contracts (like the beauty of a
Bach fugue or money) are purely subjective or metaphysical.
Walter Bushell
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
[snip]
> I sometimes forget, are focused on biology. Biological essences, if
> they are definitional and diagnostic, are not metaphysical essences.
> Diagnostics and definitions still refer to the human analysis, not the
> things analyzed. As any good philosopher, you are trying to pull the
> old ideas into your own. So you want to subsume essentialism into your
> Nominalism. Me, as a dedicated follower of Ockham (not that sissy
> Abelard) I want to stomp out (or, at least, on) essentialism It is the
> metaphysical concept of essences that pollutes so much thinking. At
> the moment I am involved in a discussion with someone who insists that
> there is an "instant" at which non-life becomes life. (And so,
> obviously, abiogenesis is impossible.) This stems from a naive notion
> that there is some essential quality to life, things either have it or
> they don't.
[snip]
The rejection of vitalism means life is a non physical phenomena. Even
in a dead cell some vital processes can occur.
Walter Bushell
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> I sometimes forget, are focused on biology. Biological essences, if
> they are definitional and diagnostic, are not metaphysical essences.
> Diagnostics and definitions still refer to the human analysis, not the
> things analyzed. As any good philosopher, you are trying to pull the
> old ideas into your own. So you want to subsume essentialism into your
> Nominalism. Me, as a dedicated follower of Ockham (not that sissy
> Abelard) I want to stomp out (or, at least, on) essentialism It is the
> metaphysical concept of essences that pollutes so much thinking. At
> the moment I am involved in a discussion with someone who insists that
> there is an "instant" at which non-life becomes life. (And so,
> obviously, abiogenesis is impossible.) This stems from a naive notion
> that there is some essential quality to life, things either have it or
> they don't.
>
> [snip]
First of all, life is a metaphysical conception, at least if we reject
vitalism. Even cell don't shut down all at once, and for humans, many
cells can function after the person is dead.
R. Baldwin
Are you really that sure it equals 20?
John Wilkins
> "John Wilkins" <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
> news:dfudfl$1501$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au...
>>Species are *always* understood to be the forms that are generated by som=
>>e=20
>>active power. They are *never* thought to be the essential properties
>>of=20
>>definition. So, where is this essentialism of material form? So far as I =
>>can=20
>>tell, it arises sometime between... wait for it... 1870 to 1890, by=20
>>neo-scholastically inclined biologists well after Darwin. I wrote a book =
>>about=20
...
>
> Are you really that sure it equals 20?
>
Frackin' Thunderbird... I'll try again.
--
John Wilkins
But we don't see it in connection with species of living things. In fact, we
see precisely the opposite. Aristotle allowed that there were "the more and
the less" in living beings (granted, they were accidental properties).
Theophrastus simply referred to genos and eidos indifferently. Porphyry
discussed species independently of living things, and suggested they might be
in the mind, echoed by Boethius, and later Peter Lombard.
"As for genera and species, [Porphyry] says, I shall decline for the present
to say (1) whether they subsist or are posited in bare [acts of] understanding
only, (2) whether, if they subsist, they are corporeal or incorporeal, and (3)
whether [they are] separated from sensibles or posited in sensibles and agree
with them. For that is a most noble matter, and requires a longer
investigation." [Porphyry's Isagoge]
The nominalist debate has deep roots. Martianus Capella, a late neo-Platonist,
wrote of a genus being a collection of forms under one name, and species are
"man, horse, lion". He wrote, "we also call species forms" which have a "name
and definition". "The term and definition of genus are thus determined." IOW,
"species" is a form under definition. This is at best a nominal essentialism.
I can't find essentialism WRT living beings.
The conception of species in this debate centered largely on the objects of
knowledge rather than on anything particularly biological. However, as
evidenced in Book IV of John Scotus Eriugena's De divisione naturae (The
division of nature) of the 9th century, biological examples are used to
illustrate the discussions.
Well, here's Ockham's take from the Seven Quodlibita:
.... that concept is called a second intention which signifies precisely
intentions naturally significative, or which sort are genus, species,
difference, and others of this sort [i.e., heads of predicables] for as the
concept of man is predicated of all men ..., so too one common concept, which
is the second intention, is predicated of first intentions [a conception of a
thing formed by the first or direct application of the mind to the individual
object; an idea or image] which stand for things, as in saying, man is a
species, ass is a species, whiteness is a species, animal is a genus, body is
a genus; in the manner in which name is predicated of different names ... and
this second intention thus signifies first intentions naturally, and can stand
for them in a proposition, just as the first intention signifies external
things naturally. [quod IV ques. 19]
Ockham is asserting that the "essential" nature of general terms of second
intention signifies what we might more recently have called "sense
impressions", not the inner essences of the living beings.
So, from the early Classical era through to the Nominalists, species of
*living* beings don't seem to require any kind of natural or material essence,
despite Aristotle's belief that the essence is the being of things. I will
grant you that science by definition was thought to be a good heuristic
largely because science was usually thought to be a matter of working out
common sense in a Socratic manner.
In the late medieval period, Aquinas not only allows a distinction between
formal and material division, but that new species can arise (but only from
the outworking of the *causal* powers that makes them, not essential properties:
"These [species infimae or specialissimae] are called individuals, in so far
as they are not further divisible formally. Individuals however are called
particulars in so far as they are not further divisible neither materially nor
formally." [In Summa Theologiae, lib. X Met. Lect 10, 2123]
Thomas allows that living species can be generated by spontaneous generation
from putrefaction (Summa I.73.1. Obj 3). However, he says
"Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in
various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of
animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and
elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise
occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different
species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these
existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. 85 Hence it
is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already
gone before, in the ages that were before us."" [loc. cit. Reply to Objection 3]
Species are *always* understood to be the forms that are generated by some
active power. They are *never* thought to be the essential properties of
definition. So, where is this essentialism of material form? So far as I can
tell, it arises sometime between... wait for it... 1870 to 1890, by
neo-scholastically inclined biologists well after Darwin. I wrote a book about
it ;-)
Walter Bushell
John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
> Frackin' Thunderbird... I'll try again.
You should be able to obtain better than Thunderbird, that stuff will
_kill_ you.
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-E7B5E4....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
>In article <onq4i11nc2oecnrps...@4ax.com>,
> Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>> I sometimes forget, are focused on biology. Biological essences, if
>> they are definitional and diagnostic, are not metaphysical essences.
>> Diagnostics and definitions still refer to the human analysis, not the
>> things analyzed. As any good philosopher, you are trying to pull the
>> old ideas into your own. So you want to subsume essentialism into your
>> Nominalism. Me, as a dedicated follower of Ockham (not that sissy
>> Abelard) I want to stomp out (or, at least, on) essentialism It is the
>> metaphysical concept of essences that pollutes so much thinking. At
>> the moment I am involved in a discussion with someone who insists that
>> there is an "instant" at which non-life becomes life. (And so,
>> obviously, abiogenesis is impossible.) This stems from a naive notion
>> that there is some essential quality to life, things either have it or
>> they don't.
>>
>> [snip]
>
>First of all, life is a metaphysical conception, at least if we reject
>vitalism.
No, it is not metaphysical, not more than species is or the
hydrological cycle or storm. Life is a name we give to a variety of
identifiable phenomena. That they have gray edges is rather normal for
real observations.
> Even cell don't shut down all at once, and for humans, many
>cells can function after the person is dead.
Again, so? The person is not alive, the heart is. The heart is dead,
but some cells are alive. The cells are dead, but some processes still
continue. I see nothing metaphysical here.
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-E25D24....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
No, it does not. It means it is not a Material phenomena, it is still
physical.
>Even
>in a dead cell some vital processes can occur.
So?
David Jensen
Walter Bushell <pr...@panix.com> wrote in
<proto-0532B9....@reader1.panix.com>:
>In article <dfuqr6$2edd$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>
>> Frackin' Thunderbird... I'll try again.
>
>You should be able to obtain better than Thunderbird, that stuff will
>_kill_ you.
I suppose it's a bit like Fosters, identified as shite in the country of
origin, but advertised as a premium drink in forn lands.
rja.ca...@excite.com
I dunno if just anyone is allowed to play here, and I never get
straight how the horsey moves, but your image in a mirror is, in fact,
you, just as the Sun in the sky is the Sun for eight minutes after God
plucks it away to put in his pocket. Or rather, that you observe
yourself in a mirror is no different to someone else observing you in a
mirror or even without one.
Generally I like the idea that a thing is real if it doesn't go away
when you stop believing in it. It seems to me that if the parties to a
contract all stop believing in it, then effectively the contract no
longer exists, and therefore it wasn't real.
R. Baldwin
news:kjj6i1hbric018s55...@4ax.com...
You'll know it by the brown bag.
What's the word?
Matt Silberstein
As I have said, I am less focused on biology than you are. Species in
biology may not be essential, that does not mean that there was not
the general idea of essentialism. In fact, given the disdain the
(some) Christian, and fewer but still some Greek, philosophers had for
living things and all this messy stuff here, it does not surprise me
that they would allow that biological species did not have essential
qualities. That is just more evidence, they might say, of how they are
corrupt.
>"As for genera and species, [Porphyry] says, I shall decline for the present
>to say (1) whether they subsist or are posited in bare [acts of] understanding
>only, (2) whether, if they subsist, they are corporeal or incorporeal, and (3)
>whether [they are] separated from sensibles or posited in sensibles and agree
>with them. For that is a most noble matter, and requires a longer
>investigation." [Porphyry's Isagoge]
Yep, but Boethius will go on to say that universals have corporeal
reality.
>The nominalist debate has deep roots. Martianus Capella, a late neo-Platonist,
>wrote of a genus being a collection of forms under one name, and species are
>"man, horse, lion". He wrote, "we also call species forms" which have a "name
>and definition". "The term and definition of genus are thus determined." IOW,
>"species" is a form under definition. This is at best a nominal essentialism.
>I can't find essentialism WRT living beings.
I don't think that Nominalism starts with Ockham, I simply that Ockham
sharpened the stake and drove it in. That the beast still wanders
around is sad, but it is dead. (Ok, bad metaphor, sue me.)
[snip]
>So, from the early Classical era through to the Nominalists, species of
>*living* beings don't seem to require any kind of natural or material essence,
>despite Aristotle's belief that the essence is the being of things. I will
>grant you that science by definition was thought to be a good heuristic
>largely because science was usually thought to be a matter of working out
>common sense in a Socratic manner.
I accept, since you say so, that those versed in this did not apply
essentialist species notions to living things. None the less, we see
plenty of essentialism at play from creationists and from those who
just plain don't understand evolution. The failure to grasp the notion
of change over time is, I think, due to a naive (at best)
essentialism. "That (pointing furiously) is one of that, it can't be
different without being a different thing". That "that" refers to a
general population with varying characteristics is hard for them to
grasp (we see that difficulty from our side as well). That "that" is a
temporally distinct aggregation is even more difficult. I think this
is one of the reasons people jumped on (the misleading preposition is
fortuitous) Punk Eek, it seems to allow an essentialist view. It was
that, not it is this. Just a sudden jerk.
>In the late medieval period, Aquinas not only allows a distinction between
>formal and material division, but that new species can arise (but only from
>the outworking of the *causal* powers that makes them, not essential properties:
>
>"These [species infimae or specialissimae] are called individuals, in so far
>as they are not further divisible formally. Individuals however are called
>particulars in so far as they are not further divisible neither materially nor
>formally." [In Summa Theologiae, lib. X Met. Lect 10, 2123]
>
>Thomas allows that living species can be generated by spontaneous generation
>from putrefaction (Summa I.73.1. Obj 3). However, he says
>
>"Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in
>various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of
>animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and
>elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise
>occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different
>species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these
>existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. 85 Hence it
>is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already
>gone before, in the ages that were before us."" [loc. cit. Reply to Objection 3]
>
>Species are *always* understood to be the forms that are generated by some
>active power. They are *never* thought to be the essential properties of
>definition. So, where is this essentialism of material form? So far as I can
>tell, it arises sometime between... wait for it... 1870 to 1890, by
>neo-scholastically inclined biologists well after Darwin. I wrote a book about
>it ;-)
I might have comment on this, but I have to think more (yes, more, I
have done it in the past).
Matt Silberstein
"rja.ca...@excite.com" <rja.ca...@excite.com> in
<1126390685.7...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com> wrote:
An interesting notion. Rather disturbing since I could swear that I
have many qualities (depth, etc.) that the image lacks.
>just as the Sun in the sky is the Sun for eight minutes after God
>plucks it away to put in his pocket. Or rather, that you observe
>yourself in a mirror is no different to someone else observing you in a
>mirror or even without one.
That was not the question, the question is what is that image? Walter
want's it to have mass, I assume, since he wants a contract to have
mass. I would say that they do and it works pretty much the same.
>Generally I like the idea that a thing is real if it doesn't go away
>when you stop believing in it. It seems to me that if the parties to a
>contract all stop believing in it, then effectively the contract no
>longer exists, and therefore it wasn't real.
So the Holy Roman Empire was not real because it is gone, right? And
that pain in my foot that I don't have at the moment is not real
either. I think you have to work on that notion of real. Real things
can "go away" for a variety of reasons. If the thing exists as mental
states, then when the mental states change the thing can disappear.
That does not mean it was not real. But real was not the question
either. I prefer to say that contracts/pain/images are *physical*. All
of those exist as physical brain states, not as real things external
to human minds.
rja.ca...@excite.com
Well, no, a mirror image is 3D.
> >just as the Sun in the sky is the Sun for eight minutes after God
> >plucks it away to put in his pocket. Or rather, that you observe
> >yourself in a mirror is no different to someone else observing you in a
> >mirror or even without one.
>
> That was not the question, the question is what is that image? Walter
> want's it to have mass, I assume, since he wants a contract to have
> mass. I would say that they do and it works pretty much the same.
I do not see why this is a difficult question. What are you looking at
when you are looking in a mirror? You are looking at yourself. It's a
no-brainer. (Unless you're driving, when mirrors are used in a
different special way.)
> >Generally I like the idea that a thing is real if it doesn't go away
> >when you stop believing in it. It seems to me that if the parties to a
> >contract all stop believing in it, then effectively the contract no
> >longer exists, and therefore it wasn't real.
>
> So the Holy Roman Empire was not real because it is gone, right? And
> that pain in my foot that I don't have at the moment is not real
> either. I think you have to work on that notion of real. Real things
> can "go away" for a variety of reasons. If the thing exists as mental
> states, then when the mental states change the thing can disappear.
> That does not mean it was not real. But real was not the question
> either. I prefer to say that contracts/pain/images are *physical*. All
> of those exist as physical brain states, not as real things external
> to human minds.
Well, sure. Real things can go away when they do, in fact, go away, or
otherwise cease to exist or to happen. I suppose the point is if a
thing goes away /because/ you stopped believing in it. An experiment
might be designed in which it was difficult to tell whether that was
the case, but... well, a contract, like a treaty, is a
not-entirely-solid thing, anyway. It's often the case that if /one/
party to a contract or a treaty decides to act as though it doesn't
exist, then for practical purposes it doesn't.
A contract amounts, I think, to a mutual agreement to voluntarily
circumbscribe one's own actions. Each party will perform a service, or
will refrain from imposing a nuisance, in expectation of similar
service rendered or nuisance abated or money changing hands. Contracts
are often strengthened by a superior authority such as the machinery of
the state agreeing to support enforcement of the contract and to punish
delinquency from it, but really this is just adding another party to
the contract.
But, for that matter, it may be difficult to distinguish events that
take place under a contract from what would have happened anyway - one
could look at the contract where a petty offender may be set free by
the authorities on the understanding that his offence will not be held
against him if he behaves himself from now on. If he does, is that
because of that contract? Mightn't it have happened anyway?
(Old Vulcan saying: a difference that makes no difference, is no
difference.)
Whether pain is a real thing is a subject of much discussion, and
occasionally of light verse.
Matt Silberstein
"rja.ca...@excite.com" <rja.ca...@excite.com> in
<1126557005....@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com> wrote:
How about odor? Blood flow? Sorry, but the mirror image is not me. It
is, depending on what level of dereference you choose, either some
light reflecting off the mirror or it is some activation in my brain.
Either way, it is physical.
>> >just as the Sun in the sky is the Sun for eight minutes after God
>> >plucks it away to put in his pocket. Or rather, that you observe
>> >yourself in a mirror is no different to someone else observing you in a
>> >mirror or even without one.
>>
>> That was not the question, the question is what is that image? Walter
>> want's it to have mass, I assume, since he wants a contract to have
>> mass. I would say that they do and it works pretty much the same.
>
>I do not see why this is a difficult question. What are you looking at
>when you are looking in a mirror? You are looking at yourself. It's a
>no-brainer. (Unless you're driving, when mirrors are used in a
>different special way.)
Sure, I am looking at myself, that does not mean that the *image* is
me. The *image* is the *image*, it is not the thing reflected.
So, what is the contract if these things are so easy?
>> >Generally I like the idea that a thing is real if it doesn't go away
>> >when you stop believing in it. It seems to me that if the parties to a
>> >contract all stop believing in it, then effectively the contract no
>> >longer exists, and therefore it wasn't real.
>>
>> So the Holy Roman Empire was not real because it is gone, right? And
>> that pain in my foot that I don't have at the moment is not real
>> either. I think you have to work on that notion of real. Real things
>> can "go away" for a variety of reasons. If the thing exists as mental
>> states, then when the mental states change the thing can disappear.
>> That does not mean it was not real. But real was not the question
>> either. I prefer to say that contracts/pain/images are *physical*. All
>> of those exist as physical brain states, not as real things external
>> to human minds.
>
>Well, sure. Real things can go away when they do, in fact, go away, or
>otherwise cease to exist or to happen. I suppose the point is if a
>thing goes away /because/ you stopped believing in it.
A contract is an agreement between individuals. It does not go away if
people stop believing in it, it goes away when the parties die, it
expires, or when a court dissolves it. Belief does not play a role at
all.
> An experiment
>might be designed in which it was difficult to tell whether that was
>the case, but... well, a contract, like a treaty, is a
>not-entirely-solid thing, anyway. It's often the case that if /one/
>party to a contract or a treaty decides to act as though it doesn't
>exist, then for practical purposes it doesn't.
That is a different, and misleading, point. The issue here has nothing
to do with the details (I was going to say accidents, but I avoided
it) of contract law. We could talk about a language or a star's
popularity or any of a number of things. The question is where and how
they exist. Walter seems to claim that they are metaphysical, but I am
not sure what that means.
[snip]
Matt Silberstein
<pr...@panix.com> in <proto-0EEEC9....@reader1.panix.com>
wrote:
>In article <amk4i112ep575oqg7...@4ax.com>,
> Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 19:58:52 -0400, in talk.origins , Walter Bushell
>> <pr...@panix.com> in <proto-CD5CC8....@reader1.panix.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >In article <4d63i19fdo5djnebt...@4ax.com>,
>> > Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >> How about my image in a mirror? Is that physical and, if so, what is
>> >> its mass? The mass of the contract, I suppose, is the sum total of the
>> >> masses of the people involved. Or the mass of their brains. Or the
>> >> mass of those parts of the brain that are involved with the agreement.
>> >> Or any of a number of other ways to state it.
>> >
>> >But none of them work. When the contract is broken the energy should be
>> >released.
>>
>> Ok, now you are just joking, right?
>
>I believe your were maintaining the position that contracts were
>physical things,
They are.
>in which case it seems reasonable to see if they follow
>the rules of physics. Contract law is enforced by judges and juries, not
>physicists,
I was not aware that physicists enforced anything.
>so it is my position that contracts (like the beauty of a
>Bach fugue or money) are purely subjective or metaphysical.
Ok, you are not joking. In which case I will try to walk you through
this and then John can try to fix the damage I cause. Let's start with
the back and work forward.
Metaphysical does not mean supernatural ghosties or spiritual or
anything like that. Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy roughly
speaking covering the issues Aristotle covered in the book that came
after Physics on the shelf.* The areas of metaphysics under discussion
here are epistemology, the study of how we know things, and ontology,
the study of what it means to "be", it is the study of what is.
Subjectivity is an entirely different notion. Subjective means
observer dependent. Something can be universally seen by humans, but
still observer dependent. I can say "this room is hot", that is a
subjective judgment based on what makes me comfortable. 400 F would
make any human uncomfortable, it is still subjective to say "this room
is hot".
Alive, is not (necessarily) a subjective statement and it not
metaphysical. Things that are alive are things that meet some set of
criteria. Our inability to agree on the criteria does not mean that
the judgment is subjective, it means that there are multiple meanings.
Quite likely I could give my criteria and you could use them to come
to the same conclusion I do and visa versa. That makes the designation
objective. Contracts are not subjective. You may be confused because
there is disagreement on the content of the agreement. And, either
way, that does not make them non-physical.
*In some way I suppose Metaphysics is to Physics the same way that
_Ethics_ is to _Politics_, except that _Politics_ follows, both
spatially and temporally, _Ethics_.
David Ewan Kahana
>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>> On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 09:16:45 -0400, in talk.origins , Walter Bushell
>> <p...@panix.com> in <proto-56B1DA.09164509092...@reader1.panix.com>
>> wrote:
[snip]
>> How about my image in a mirror? Is that physical and, if so, what is
>> its mass? The mass of the contract, I suppose, is the sum total of the
>> masses of the people involved. Or the mass of their brains. Or the
>> mass of those parts of the brain that are involved with the agreement.
>> Or any of a number of other ways to state it.
Hmmm ...
My point of view ... your image in a mirror is a construct of your
brain. As such, it's a physical thing, but one that exists only for
the time that you're looking in the mirror. It's contained in the
momentary activity of some collection of neurons, which activity
requires certain chemical reactions to take place. These chemical
reactions use up a certain amount of free energy. The mass equivalent
of that free energy could be called the mass of your image. Its
value will depend on how long you continue to look in the mirror.
Narcissus' image would likely be heavier than all others.
David
David Ewan Kahana
Alternatively, you could say that the image is that subset of
photons reaching your eyes, which were first reflected from the
surface of your body and then reflected from the mirror.
Again, the mass equivalent of the image would be
time-dependent.
David
John Wilkins
He does? Corporeal? Cite? I know he was a Realist, but I don't know that he
insisted universals had to be instantiated.
I agree that creationists are often essentialists, but note that this, too, is
a very recent phenomenon. Creationism did not exist until fixity of species
was asserted - this might be John Ray in the 1680s. But as biological
essentialism doesn't exist until, at the *earliest*, the 1840s (and in my view
not until the 1870s) fixism and essentialism are disconnected.
There is a third kind of essentialism (after logical and biological) -
psychological. Recent cognitive research indicates we are born "essentialists"
in a psychological sense. I think that this is "defined" as essentialism
because of the way the term gets used in social theory (particularly in
connection with racism). But they all have in common the notion that a general
idea must have necessary and sufficient properties for any application.
...
Matt Silberstein
<d...@bnl.gov> in
<1126561589.0...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com> wrote:
Yes for either post. It depends on how many dereferences you make, but
either way it is physical and has all the properties of any other
physical thing. Everything in the world is physical.
John Wilkins
> In article <m603i155o70209de3...@4ax.com>,
> Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPref...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
>>On Fri, 09 Sep 2005 05:09:21 -0400, in talk.origins , Walter Bushell
>><pr...@panix.com> in <proto-8E4C75....@reader1.panix.com>
>>wrote:i
>>
>>
>>>John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>Walter Bushell wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>In article <dfbnqg$1a40$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au>,
>>>>> John Wilkins <jo...@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>http://plato.stanford.edu/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>I would put Stanford University in the abstract class, as it is a
>>>>>corporation, hence, a legal fiction.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>No, it is a historical individual with a location, and duration. Hence, a
>>>>concrete particular not an abstract universal.
>>>
>>>which are abstractions.
>>
>>Nope, it is a thing, in the world. Contracts are the agreements
>>between people, that the agreements are in their heads (even if
>>documented on paper) does not make them non-physical. Abstracts are
>>not Real (I would dare say nothing is Real) and no individual is a
>>universal. (And, hence, there are not universals since the Universe
>>only has individuals.)
>
>
> if contracts are physical, what is their mass (you may answer in terms
> of energy units if that is easier)?
>
Matt Silberstein
<jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dg554b$20jb$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>Matt Silberstein wrote:
[snip]
>> Yep, but Boethius will go on to say that universals have corporeal
>> reality.
>
>He does? Corporeal? Cite? I know he was a Realist, but I don't know that he
>insisted universals had to be instantiated.
Just checked, I was wrong. Oops.
[snip]
>
>I agree that creationists are often essentialists, but note that this, too, is
>a very recent phenomenon. Creationism did not exist until fixity of species
>was asserted - this might be John Ray in the 1680s. But as biological
>essentialism doesn't exist until, at the *earliest*, the 1840s (and in my view
>not until the 1870s) fixism and essentialism are disconnected.
Roughly speaking I am interested in the 14th Century and modern times,
the rest is just detail.
Ok, ;-)
>There is a third kind of essentialism (after logical and biological) -
>psychological. Recent cognitive research indicates we are born "essentialists"
>in a psychological sense. I think that this is "defined" as essentialism
>because of the way the term gets used in social theory (particularly in
>connection with racism). But they all have in common the notion that a general
>idea must have necessary and sufficient properties for any application.
Yep.
John Wilkins
> On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 10:05:30 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dg554b$20jb$1...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>
>
>>Matt Silberstein wrote:
>
>
> [snip]
>
>
>>>Yep, but Boethius will go on to say that universals have corporeal
>>>reality.
>>
>>He does? Corporeal? Cite? I know he was a Realist, but I don't know that he
>>insisted universals had to be instantiated.
>
>
> Just checked, I was wrong. Oops.
Thereby proving that the Darwinist conspiracy is founded upon lies and [*fx:
Kettle against skull*]... sorry, where was I again?
>
>
> [snip]
>
>>I agree that creationists are often essentialists, but note that this, too, is
>>a very recent phenomenon. Creationism did not exist until fixity of species
>>was asserted - this might be John Ray in the 1680s. But as biological
>>essentialism doesn't exist until, at the *earliest*, the 1840s (and in my view
>>not until the 1870s) fixism and essentialism are disconnected.
>
>
> Roughly speaking I am interested in the 14th Century and modern times,
> the rest is just detail.
>
> Ok, ;-)
Philistine - the 12thC is much more interesting. And modern times *begin* in
the 17thC to me...
>
>
>>There is a third kind of essentialism (after logical and biological) -
>>psychological. Recent cognitive research indicates we are born "essentialists"
>>in a psychological sense. I think that this is "defined" as essentialism
>>because of the way the term gets used in social theory (particularly in
>>connection with racism). But they all have in common the notion that a general
>>idea must have necessary and sufficient properties for any application.
>
>
> Yep.
>
--
rja.ca...@excite.com
Only as much as the image of anyone you look at /without/ a mirror is a
physical thing distinct from the person him/herself. It's Plato's cave
if you want to make that distinction, but I still think that you
looking at A.N.Other right in front of you, you looking at A.N.Other in
a mirror, and you looking at your own reflection, are, philosophically
speaking, closely similar acts.
I'm stretching to get belief in because I like the quote. I suppose
it's specifically the belief that the parties to a contract will abide
by the contract, or can be obliged to abide by the contract. A court
is not necessarily relevant; if courts are involved at all, I consider
they merely are another party to the contract, i.e. the court
undertakes to use its authority, and the police, etc., to ensure that
other parties meet their obligations. And what about a verbal (that
is, oral) contract? They're hard to prove. What about a non-verbal
contract? Say you want to pull out of a side road in your car, and an
oncoming car slows down flashes headlights? I think that's a contract
that they will wait for you to pull out into the main road instead of
exercising their right of way. But if there's a misunderstanding...
Now if a contract is a paper document, probably existing as multiple
copies, that's concrete.
Matt Silberstein
I like the turmoil of the three popes and all that chaos. And for me
modern times begins with my earliest memories. What a coincidence.
[snip]
Matt Silberstein
"rja.ca...@excite.com" <rja.ca...@excite.com> in
<1126616634.6...@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com> wrote:
Well dah.
> It's Plato's cave
>if you want to make that distinction,
Blink! Say what? I am trying to stomp on the cave.
>but I still think that you
>looking at A.N.Other right in front of you, you looking at A.N.Other in
>a mirror, and you looking at your own reflection, are, philosophically
>speaking, closely similar acts.
Yep. I have no idea why anyone would think otherwise.
All of which is interesting to contract issues, but irrelevant to this
discussion. And, yes, you are stretching what belief means.
>Now if a contract is a paper document, probably existing as multiple
>copies, that's concrete.
Sorry, but mental agreements are as physical as paper. They are as
physical as tune. Or pain. Or images.
John Wilkins
> On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 14:04:54 +1000, in talk.origins , John Wilkins
> <jo...@wilkins.id.au> in <dg5j56$242n$2...@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au> wrote:
>>>Roughly speaking I am interested in the 14th Century and modern times,
>>>the rest is just detail.
>>>
>>>Ok, ;-)
>>
>>Philistine - the 12thC is much more interesting. And modern times *begin* in
>>the 17thC to me...
>
>
> I like the turmoil of the three popes and all that chaos. And for me
> modern times begins with my earliest memories. What a coincidence.
>
> [snip]
The modern period begins with *my* earliest memories, too. In the 17thC.
rja.ca...@excite.com
I thought /you/ were the guy wondering what his reflection is. Mus
orge otigoc.
Maybe it was your mirror image who posted instead.
Well, first of all I do want to dispose of the superior authority who
enforces a contract. That authority is itself a legal construct, and
not a fundamental philosophical principle. Or, in philosophical terms,
I call them another party to the contract.
Now in looking at the unspoken contracts between road users, which I
have seen often violated, what I want to show is that there is a
continuum of reasonable hypothetical scenarios from notarized documents
down to situations where it is barely possible to say that a contract
does exist - and beyond that, to situations where there really is no
common understanding at all between the people who might be the parties
to a contract. And that a contract finds physical existence merely as
a pattern of behaviour, including the behaviour of thoughts. I hope
this is uncontroversial, but because of it I am reluctant to accept a
contract as an entity in and of itself, an object of philosophical
consideration, separately from the parties involved in the contract.
In fact, I think that by fully understanding the parties involved, you
completely understand their contract, so far as there is anything there
to understand. And on the other hand, without understanding the
parties to a contract, you don't properly understand the contract. So
if you're interested in understanding real things, then you shouldn't
be looking for contracts.
Pain is an effect in the brain usually produced by some physical
dis-ease elsewhere in the body, which can be varied by popping the
appropriate pill, by cutting nerves, or by various other means; a tune
depends very much on whether or when the performer and the listener are
under or over the age of thirty; and I suppose that proper professional
philosophers have already weighed up the question of whether the letter
P can be said to appear in the familiar twentieth-century trademark
"CCCP".
Matt Silberstein
"rja.ca...@excite.com" <rja.ca...@excite.com> in
<1126650142....@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com> wrote:
I asked a rhetorical question regarding images to add them to
contracts as the kind of thing under discussion. I have no problem
with recognizing the physicality of an image or understanding that it
exists in my brain (or in the light traveling, depending where we
point the reference). Images, like moral judgments or contracts, are
the kind of thing that many people tend to think are non-physical.
Sorry, but I am bored by this contract discussion. It is an example, I
don't really care about details of contract law.
>Now in looking at the unspoken contracts between road users, which I
>have seen often violated, what I want to show is that there is a
>continuum of reasonable hypothetical scenarios from notarized documents
>down to situations where it is barely possible to say that a contract
>does exist - and beyond that, to situations where there really is no
>common understanding at all between the people who might be the parties
>to a contract. And that a contract finds physical existence merely as
>a pattern of behaviour, including the behaviour of thoughts. I hope
>this is uncontroversial, but because of it I am reluctant to accept a
>contract as an entity in and of itself, an object of philosophical
>consideration, separately from the parties involved in the contract.
Who is saying any such thing. I don't care whether you want to say it
is the behavior or the agreement or whatever. Whatever of those you
end up with, they have a physical instantiation.
[snip]
David Ewan Kahana
> On 12 Sep 2005 14:46:29 -0700, in talk.origins , "David Ewan Kahana"
> <d...@bnl.gov> in
> <1126561589.0...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> >[snip]
> >
> >Alternatively, you could say that the image is that subset of
[snip]
> Yes for either post. It depends on how many dereferences you make, but
> either way it is physical and has all the properties of any other
> physical thing. Everything in the world is physical.
>
Probably I didn't need to say anything.
I think we're in agreement. Words therefore also are physical, even if
they do not denote.
David
Matt Silberstein
<d...@bnl.gov> in
<1126663032.4...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com> wrote:
Yep. This is a key point. The words are physical and exist and the
ideas are physical and exist, but that does not mean that the thing
pointed at has any existence. I mean other than pointing to the idea.