Talk.Origins Informal Survey
Ananda Gupta
A recent discussion I had on another usenet group, besides doing very bad
things to my blood pressure, led me to wonder something. (I've posed
something similar to this question in talk.atheism too.)
Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism (E).
By the former I mean all the generally creationist views, from the YECs to
the intelligent-design people and everyone in between. By the latter I
mean the view that evolution is the mechanism by which life's complexity
arose, and that science properly done can *by itself* provide an
(incomplete and tentative, but progressively less so) answer to questions
about why organisms have the features they do, etc.
Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
(L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions (propositions
with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are meaningless, or always
false, or neither true nor false, or are true or false depending on
someone's perspective (an individual, a majority within a culture, etc.
This does leave open the possibility that a moral proposition can be true
AND false simultaneously, in cases where people disagree.) By the latter I
mean the view denying all of the above statements -- that is, the view
holding that moral statements are statements of fact, and as such are
either true or false, never both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity
are independent of anyone's perspective.
Informally, both on Usenet and in personal interactions, I have observed a
strong correlation between C and L -- that is, people who agree with C
generally agree with L as well (though not always; note that Mike Goodrich,
for example, apparently does not believe L, since he posted that God
defines good and evil, which implies that the truth of moral propositions
depends on God's perspective -- a relativist position). I am wondering
about the converse. Is there an equally strong correlation between E and
T? Hence the thread title: I am curious to see whether the people here who
believe E also believe T, in general. I am also curious to see whether the
people who believe E and believe T, believe T *because* they believe E, or
*for the same sort of reasons* they believe E.
I am *not* interested in getting into a discussion about the relative
merits of T and L here; for one thing, it would be off-topic, and for
another thing, it would almost certainly make me blow a gasket. (I have
learned, through some fairly aggravating experience, to be selective about
with whom to discuss philosophy, particularly given a tendency I have
observed among intelligent people who specialize in complex, difficult
disciplines to assume that their authority in those disciplines is
"transferable" to philosophy, without actually having studied philosophy in
any depth.)
So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you believe
T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do you
see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
another, or are they unrelated?
ASG
Paul Holbach
--
Rev. Dave Thompson, ULC
"If you can't eat their food, drink their liquor, fuck their
whores and take their money and STILL vote AGAINST them, you
don't belong in this business." -- Jess Unruh.
"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:Xns92E7ACF...@199.45.49.11...
> Hello talk.origins denizens,
>
> A recent discussion I had on another usenet group, besides doing very bad
> things to my blood pressure, led me to wonder something. (I've posed
> something similar to this question in talk.atheism too.)
>
> Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism (E).
> By the former I mean all the generally creationist views, from the YECs to
> the intelligent-design people and everyone in between. By the latter I
> mean the view that evolution is the mechanism by which life's complexity
> arose, and that science properly done can *by itself* provide an
> (incomplete and tentative, but progressively less so) answer to questions
> about why organisms have the features they do, etc.
> Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
> (L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions (propositions
> with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are meaningless, or always
> false, or neither true nor false, or are true or false depending on
> someone's perspective (an individual, a majority within a culture, etc.
> This does leave open the possibility that a moral proposition can be true
> AND false simultaneously, in cases where people disagree.) By the latter
I
> mean the view denying all of the above statements -- that is, the view
> holding that moral statements are statements of fact, and as such are
> either true or false, never both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity
> are independent of anyone's perspective.
The problem is that moral realism cannot exist by your definition. Even
among those who believe this there is little real consensus of what is or is
not moral, why it is moral, or what it is based on. You are trying to argue
a point that cannot possibly exist. You also beg the questions "whose idea
of morality is correct?" and "If someone is more pious or strict in their
moral beliefs, are they more moral and is their idea of morality closer or
further away from the truth?"
>
> Informally, both on Usenet and in personal interactions, I have observed a
> strong correlation between C and L -- that is, people who agree with C
> generally agree with L as well (though not always; note that Mike
Goodrich,
> for example, apparently does not believe L, since he posted that God
> defines good and evil, which implies that the truth of moral propositions
> depends on God's perspective -- a relativist position). I am wondering
> about the converse. Is there an equally strong correlation between E and
> T? Hence the thread title: I am curious to see whether the people here
who
> believe E also believe T, in general. I am also curious to see whether
the
> people who believe E and believe T, believe T *because* they believe E,
or
> *for the same sort of reasons* they believe E.
I rather doubt it. People who understand evolution don't base their
philosophical beliefs on it like creationists do their religions. Evolution
neither excludes any religious beliefs or precludes them. Creationists
assume, and wrongly so, that religion is the basis of morality, that
evolution excludes a belief in god, and that evolution takes the place of
religion, is the basis for moral relativism, and that moral relativism is
bad. All these assumptions have been voiced all over this group and not one
of them can be proven in any way. I think it's better to understand that we
are all moral relativists in some way and trying to argue a distinction does
no one any good.
>
> I am *not* interested in getting into a discussion about the relative
> merits of T and L here; for one thing, it would be off-topic, and for
> another thing, it would almost certainly make me blow a gasket. (I have
> learned, through some fairly aggravating experience, to be selective about
> with whom to discuss philosophy, particularly given a tendency I have
> observed among intelligent people who specialize in complex, difficult
> disciplines to assume that their authority in those disciplines is
> "transferable" to philosophy, without actually having studied philosophy
in
> any depth.)
>
> So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you believe
> T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
> believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do
you
> see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
> another, or are they unrelated?
I understand evolution, I don't believe that their are moral absolutes in
that there is some big moral code hanging in the sky, and I don't believe
one has anything to do with the other accept that both are rational
approaches to understanding life.
John Wilkins
> Hello talk.origins denizens,
>
> A recent discussion I had on another usenet group, besides doing very bad
> things to my blood pressure, led me to wonder something. (I've posed
> something similar to this question in talk.atheism too.)
>
> Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism (E).
> By the former I mean all the generally creationist views, from the YECs to
> the intelligent-design people and everyone in between. By the latter I
> mean the view that evolution is the mechanism by which life's complexity
> arose, and that science properly done can *by itself* provide an
> (incomplete and tentative, but progressively less so) answer to questions
> about why organisms have the features they do, etc.
>
> Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
> (L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions (propositions
> with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are meaningless, or always
> false, or neither true nor false, or are true or false depending on
> someone's perspective (an individual, a majority within a culture, etc.
> This does leave open the possibility that a moral proposition can be true
> AND false simultaneously, in cases where people disagree.) By the latter I
> mean the view denying all of the above statements -- that is, the view
> holding that moral statements are statements of fact, and as such are
> either true or false, never both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity
> are independent of anyone's perspective.
I am clearly an evotee (E). But I am *both* a descriptive moral
relativist (moral norms are societal) and a proscriptive moral realist
(moral justifications are true or false within a moral language game,
not within any other game). The contrasts are: realism v. idealism (or
internal realism) and relativism v. absolutism. I do not believe in
moral absolutes and I am not an idealist for anything except mathematics
and logic.
>
> Informally, both on Usenet and in personal interactions, I have observed a
> strong correlation between C and L -- that is, people who agree with C
> generally agree with L as well (though not always; note that Mike Goodrich,
> for example, apparently does not believe L, since he posted that God
> defines good and evil, which implies that the truth of moral propositions
> depends on God's perspective -- a relativist position). I am wondering
> about the converse. Is there an equally strong correlation between E and
> T? Hence the thread title: I am curious to see whether the people here who
> believe E also believe T, in general. I am also curious to see whether the
> people who believe E and believe T, believe T *because* they believe E, or
> *for the same sort of reasons* they believe E.
There is, in logic, a fallacy known informally as the "genetic fallacy",
which states that one cannot evaluate the worth of something on the
basis of its origins (genesis). Knowing that my moral system evolved is
no reason to think that I cannot justify or condemn some action. So
while E may lead to T, it can also lead to L.
>
> I am *not* interested in getting into a discussion about the relative
> merits of T and L here; for one thing, it would be off-topic, and for
> another thing, it would almost certainly make me blow a gasket. (I have
> learned, through some fairly aggravating experience, to be selective about
> with whom to discuss philosophy, particularly given a tendency I have
> observed among intelligent people who specialize in complex, difficult
> disciplines to assume that their authority in those disciplines is
> "transferable" to philosophy, without actually having studied philosophy in
> any depth.)
>
> So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you believe
> T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
> believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do you
> see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
> another, or are they unrelated?
>
> ASG
HTH
--
John Wilkins
DARK IN HERE, ISN'T IT?
Hiero5ant
Ananda Gupta wrote in message ...
I "believe in" the neodarwinian synthesis because it provides the best
unification and explanation for a vast range of data - from the fossil
record to the twin nested hierarchy. I am a moral anti-realist because moral
imperatives cannot be true or false any more than "Please close the door"
can be true or false. I am an atheist because of the complete lack of
evidence for the existence of any supernatural forces in the universe
whatsoever.
If I were to become some sort of theist tommorrow, it would have to be
some form of Spinozan or Leibnizian pantheism or deism. This would not
affect my beliefs regarding evolution or moral anti-realism. Even if I went
whole-hog and believed in the racist, homophobic, baby-killing monster of
the Old Testament, I would still be an anti-realist and an "evolutionist".
If someone could somehow convince me of moral realism or quasi-realism,
this would have no effect on the evidence for evolution, or of God.
If it were discovered tomorrow that evolution is false, I still would
not infer that God exists, nor that moral properties are among the furniture
of the universe.
What *really* ticks off the antievolutionists is the same thing that
ticks off the other pomos: the belief that facts and evidence mean
something. Hence the "big tent" approach of ID that unifies YECs and OECs
against naturalism, which, combined with available evidence, fails to prove
that God exists. I wish I could remember who said it originally so that I
could give them credit [please come forward!], but the fact that
methodological naturalism *allows*for* the nonexistence of God is enough to
merit its condemnation in their eyes.
My two nuyen.
Hiero5ant
John Wilkins wrote in message
<1fndxeu.1kat9jn660pabN%wil...@wehi.edu.au>...
Casually, how much work would one have to do to convince you that
mathematics and logic are just special limiting cases of descriptive
normative relativism? Just curious.
Ananda Gupta
<1fndxeu.1kat9jn660pabN%wil...@wehi.edu.au>:
>I am clearly an evotee (E). But I am *both* a descriptive moral
>relativist (moral norms are societal) and a proscriptive moral realist
>(moral justifications are true or false within a moral language game,
>not within any other game). The contrasts are: realism v. idealism (or
>internal realism) and relativism v. absolutism. I do not believe in
>moral absolutes and I am not an idealist for anything except mathematics
>and logic.
>There is, in logic, a fallacy known informally as the "genetic fallacy",
>which states that one cannot evaluate the worth of something on the
>basis of its origins (genesis). Knowing that my moral system evolved is
>no reason to think that I cannot justify or condemn some action. So
>while E may lead to T, it can also lead to L.
Just out of curiosity, you qualified your description of the genetic
fallacy by saying it is so known "informally". How is it formally known?
Can it be schematized using the truth-functional connectives ('and', 'or',
'if-then', 'not', and 'if and only if')?
Thanks for your time in responding. (What does HTH stand for?)
>HTH
Ananda Gupta
<oPPL9.42258$_S2.3...@nwrddc01.gnilink.net>:
> I "believe in" the neodarwinian synthesis because it provides the
> best
>unification and explanation for a vast range of data - from the fossil
>record to the twin nested hierarchy. I am a moral anti-realist because
>moral imperatives cannot be true or false any more than "Please close
>the door" can be true or false. I am an atheist because of the complete
>lack of evidence for the existence of any supernatural forces in the
>universe whatsoever.
> If I were to become some sort of theist tommorrow, it would have to
> be
>some form of Spinozan or Leibnizian pantheism or deism. This would not
>affect my beliefs regarding evolution or moral anti-realism. Even if I
>went whole-hog and believed in the racist, homophobic, baby-killing
>monster of the Old Testament, I would still be an anti-realist and an
>"evolutionist".
> If someone could somehow convince me of moral realism or
> quasi-realism,
>this would have no effect on the evidence for evolution, or of God.
> If it were discovered tomorrow that evolution is false, I still
> would
>not infer that God exists, nor that moral properties are among the
>furniture of the universe.
Thanks for your time in responding. (I'll put you down as "E & T", but not
"T because of E.")
> What *really* ticks off the antievolutionists is the same thing
> that
>ticks off the other pomos: the belief that facts and evidence mean
>something. Hence the "big tent" approach of ID that unifies YECs and
>OECs against naturalism, which, combined with available evidence, fails
>to prove that God exists. I wish I could remember who said it originally
>so that I could give them credit [please come forward!], but the fact
>that methodological naturalism *allows*for* the nonexistence of God is
>enough to merit its condemnation in their eyes.
> My two nuyen.
Much appreciated. That is a good quote, btw.
John Wilkins
No idea. AFAIK it's a rhetorical fallacy of argument, a form of
argumentum ad hominem. Sometimes known as one of the "changing the
subject" fallacies.
>
> Thanks for your time in responding. (What does HTH stand for?)
>
> >HTH
Hope this helps
John Wilkins
> >I am clearly an evotee (E). But I am *both* a descriptive moral
> >relativist (moral norms are societal) and a proscriptive moral realist
> >(moral justifications are true or false within a moral language game,
> >not within any other game). The contrasts are: realism v. idealism (or
> >internal realism) and relativism v. absolutism. I do not believe in
> >moral absolutes and I am not an idealist for anything except mathematics
> >and logic.
>
> Casually, how much work would one have to do to convince you that
> mathematics and logic are just special limiting cases of descriptive
> normative relativism? Just curious.
Can either be descriptive or normative relativism. So, quite a lot,
really.
Andy Groves
Robert Pennock devotes part of his book "Tower of Babel" to discussing
this issue. I think your question speaks to the false dichotomy posed
by some creationists that moral values can only come from God, and
that accepting evolution is necessarily a rejection of God and hence
moral absolutes.
It is perfectly possible to accept the existence of moral absolutes
independent of any notion of God, and to simultaneously accept
evolution. That would sum up my own position.
Andy
Hiero5ant
John Wilkins wrote in message
D'oh! I should have said, of course, "limiting cases of normative
systems to which descriptive relativism applies." The basic thrust of the
thesis for which I wish I had the time to formulate is that Nominalism
regarding math and logic can be justified by an appeal to normative
antirealism (descriptive) -- rules governing numbers and sentences are just
commands, orders to manipulate symbols in a certain way. "Please close the
door" is a cousin of "Please use the words 'parallel lines' in the following
way..." Or am I misconstruing what you call your "idealism" regarding math
and logic as Platonism? My apologies if I did.
John Wilkins
Well, that's a view not too distant from my own. A Wignerian view of
mathmatics, I suspect, too. However, I do not see mathematics as
*including* normative statements so much as *comprised* of the range of
allowable "moves" in that "game". In short, I guess that works out to
the same thing.
As to idealism, I must apologise for using a word with every possible
meaning under the sun. Until the time of Locke, a realist was someone
who thought that abstract concepts were real, and idealists were fools
who thought that ideas existed only in the mind. Since I have been doing
a bit of reading in the field of the early medieval nominalist debates
for my thesis, I unconsiously used it that way. Maths is all in the mind
of organisms that measure the world...
Ananda Gupta
<991ea4ae.02121...@posting.google.com>:
>Robert Pennock devotes part of his book "Tower of Babel" to discussing
>this issue. I think your question speaks to the false dichotomy posed
>by some creationists that moral values can only come from God, and
>that accepting evolution is necessarily a rejection of God and hence
>moral absolutes.
>
>It is perfectly possible to accept the existence of moral absolutes
>independent of any notion of God, and to simultaneously accept
>evolution. That would sum up my own position.
Thanks for the response.
I will put you down as one who "believes E and L". Certainly the dichotomy
you describe (and I agree that it is false) is no doubt among the reasons
why some creationists (and theists generally) feel obliged to stick to
their guns. Incidentally, and I resisted saying this in the original post
because, as before, I have no desire to get into a discussion about the
merits of L and T, I would characterize my own position as you did yours.
ASG
Adam Marczyk
I'm a supporter of evolution and a moral realist; I believe quite firmly
that the neo-Darwinian synthesis of evolution is the only tenable
explanation for the diversity of life on earth. I also believe that
morality consists of statements that are meaningful, true, and not
dependent on anyone's perspective. I don't know if you could say I believe
these things for the same reason, though. Evolution is my conclusion
because I feel the empirical evidence supports it, i.e. it is true, but I
don't think moral statements are "true" in quite the same way that
scientific ones are. Morality is more philosophical, begins with some basic
axioms from which you derive the rest of the system, while evolution is a
scientific system that is constantly being revised as new evidence turns
up.
--
a.a. #2001
"We have loved the stars too fondly to be fearful of the night."
--Tombstone epitaph of two amateur astronomers,
quoted in Carl Sagan's _Cosmos_
http://www.ebonmusings.org ICQ: 8777843 PGP Key ID: 0x5C66F737
Ananda Gupta
<v00134f...@corp.supernews.com>:
>> So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you
>> believe T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the
>> reasons you believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also
>> believe L -- do you see any tension between the two, or do you think
>> they complement one another, or are they unrelated?
>
>I'm a supporter of evolution and a moral realist; I believe quite firmly
>that the neo-Darwinian synthesis of evolution is the only tenable
>explanation for the diversity of life on earth. I also believe that
>morality consists of statements that are meaningful, true, and not
>dependent on anyone's perspective. I don't know if you could say I
>believe these things for the same reason, though. Evolution is my
>conclusion because I feel the empirical evidence supports it, i.e. it is
>true, but I don't think moral statements are "true" in quite the same
>way that scientific ones are. Morality is more philosophical, begins
>with some basic axioms from which you derive the rest of the system,
>while evolution is a scientific system that is constantly being revised
>as new evidence turns up.
Thanks for the response. Another tick in the "E and L" column. Your
comment about morality not being like science is apt, I think.
Interestingly, some early 20th century philosophers did believe ethics was
exactly like science -- the only difference was that instead of starting
with observations of physical phenomena we start with moral intuitions. I
don't think anyone today goes that far, though. But people did believe
that.
ASG
Sverker Johansson
I strongly suspect that many many theists who claim to be C&L actually
hold the same position as Goodrich. "Relative to God" equals "Absolute"
in their minds. I have yet to meet a theist who accepted that moral
propositions could be independent of God, which is what strict L would
imply.
It is commonly stated by theists that their god cannot act immorally.
But is that because their god is constrained by an absolute morality,
or because morality is defined by their god? The former implies that
their god is not supreme, that there is something higher. The latter
implies moral relativism, as you noted above. I cannot think of any
alternative that escapes both.
This is very close to my views as well. Ananda can put a tick for me
in the same column.
--
Best regards, HLK, Physics
Sverker Johansson U of Jonkoping
----------------------------------------------
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH - adapted from
CREATIONISM IS SCIENCE George Orwell
Rodjk
Hmmm... I thought it was "Happy to Help".
Means the same, but when has that ever stopped a philosopher?
:-)
Rodjk #613
Ananda Gupta
<3E003A0...@hlk.no.hj.spam.se>:
>I strongly suspect that many many theists who claim to be C&L actually
>hold the same position as Goodrich. "Relative to God" equals
>"Absolute" in their minds. I have yet to meet a theist who accepted
>that moral propositions could be independent of God, which is what
>strict L would imply.
Indeed. Someone might say that God by definition has no failures of
conscience (that's what it means to be morally perfect) but even then that
would still just mean that God always perceives moral reality as it is.
It's still independent of him.
In fact, one might even take theistic moral relativism even further, by
pointing out that if the will of God defines what is moral, and the will of
God is inherently incomprehensible to humans, then at least part of what is
moral will be inherently incomprehensible to humans. This opens the door
to the most extreme form of moral skepticism.
>It is commonly stated by theists that their god cannot act immorally.
>But is that because their god is constrained by an absolute morality,
>or because morality is defined by their god? The former implies that
>their god is not supreme, that there is something higher.
This, I think, is questionable. The old problem of "can God create a rock
too big for he himself to lift" is escapable by arguing that such a rock is
logically equivalent to a square circle -- omnipotence, therefore, is not
defined as "the power to do anything" but rather "the power to do whatever
can be done." In this sense God's power is defined in terms of logical
necessity, but that doesn't really mean that logical necessity is "higher
than" God. One might take a similar tack with what one might call "moral
necessity" -- the requirement of God's nature to do only what is good.
Nonetheless, I suspect that many theists share your intuition that if there
is a God his divine nature is called into question if there are rules he
*has* to obey or not be God, and that this does lead them towards a
disguised species of moral relativism.
>This is very close to my views as well. Ananda can put a tick for me
>in the same column.
So ticking. Thanks for your response.
ASG
Pete
Tricky, tricky. I'm not a philosopher, so I don't want to 'transfer my
authority' to philosophy. Of course, it would be nice if *some*
philosophers wouldn't 'transfer' *their* 'authority' to science either
(although some of them are ok, like that Wilkins guy ;), and I don't
mind Lawrence Sklar either, but then again, I live in Michigan ).
Anyway, I guess, I would put myself as a E + (t<->L). I think that
morals a result of both biological (evolutionary based) predisposition
(and as such are 'absolute') and historical and societal forces (which
give it some relativist properties). But all in all, the core morals
are probably innate, so put me in as E+L, I guess, although that would
be somewhat simplifiying. I just don't believe that a 'superbeing'
(God) is needed to give us morals. I think they are a product of
evolution + society.
---Pete
Mitchell Coffey
Why does the world map so well so often to maths? And if maths is all
in the mind, why does it matter that I keep getting my maths wrong?
Mitchell Coffey
Kermit
I concur.
The fundamentalists who raised me always insisted that God would not
and could not act immorally, implying a moral code to which he must
adhere.
I suppose I am a provisional moral absolutist. Analagous to science,
in which an assertion is made and believed, but which is subject to
revision in light of further data. As a science-friendly atheist, I do
not have the luxury of having my moral precepts handed to me on a
silver platter, and I must "discover" them for myself. I believe that
many are in my position and being perceived as moral relativists by
Fundamentalists and some other theists.
I would also suggest that some of them are confusing mere cultural
artifacts with moral codes. I have seen people treat fashion and food
as matters of morality. "Proper behavior" can cover quite a bit of
ground. I suspect the asociation of scientific thinking with moral
relativism is not as strong as some folks see it.
--- Kermit
Hiero5ant
Mitchell Coffey wrote in message ...
This is the puddle-shaped hole scenario of Wilkins' alternate sig.
Math works for the same reason the vertebrate eye works: it did so in the
past, and if it didn't, we wouldn't use it.
John Wilkins
> wil...@wehi.edu.au (John Wilkins) wrote...
Not all (or even, I suspect most) maths maps onto the world. All maths
is a tautology; it asserts the equivalence of symbols. Someof that
tautology is useful to describe some limited aspects of the world;
eventually we may find some maths to describe the entire world. There
will always be more maths that does not describe the world. Max Tegmark
has a paper on this on the web somewhere.
It matters that you get your maths right because if you don't, you --
a. don't get paid
b. fail the exam
c. can't make the computer work right
d. owe the IRS yours and your children's souls, yea unto the n-th
generation
e. build bridges that fall down, or
f. get shortchanged at the newsstand/hotdog vendor/appliance store.
I hope this clears it up for you :-)
--
John Wilkins
"Listen to your heart, not the voices in your head" - Marg Simpson
Bryan Saint Germain
<9q6M9.46478$4W1....@nwrddc02.gnilink.net>
I love Wilkins's sigline, but isn't that first sentence perilously close
to admitting that we don't know Maths from a hole in the ground? ;-)
John Wilkins
Well, it's better than saying we don't know sine from shinola.
Hiero5ant
John Wilkins wrote in message
I was hoping this wouldn't put everyone off on a tangent...
Bryan Saint Germain
Sorry. I was composing my own reply to the original post in this thread,
and it was taking forever. I siezed on the opening to shake off my own
gloom. Have finished the serious reply, as well. Am officially leaving
myself wide open to the same treatment . . .
Bryan Saint Germain
<Xns92E7ACF...@199.45.49.11>
>T? Hence the thread title: I am curious to see whether the people here who
>believe E also believe T, in general. I am also curious to see whether the
>people who believe E and believe T, believe T *because* they believe E, or
>*for the same sort of reasons* they believe E.
>
>I am *not* interested in getting into a discussion about the relative
>merits of T and L here; for one thing, it would be off-topic, and for
>another thing, it would almost certainly make me blow a gasket. (I have
>learned, through some fairly aggravating experience, to be selective about
>with whom to discuss philosophy, particularly given a tendency I have
>observed among intelligent people who specialize in complex, difficult
>disciplines to assume that their authority in those disciplines is
>"transferable" to philosophy, without actually having studied philosophy in
>any depth.)
>
>So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you believe
>T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
>believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do you
>see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
>another, or are they unrelated?
>
I found your survey questions challenging, precisely because yours are two
of several questions that confronted me as I dealt repeatedly with the
loss of loved ones over the past decade. I will attempt an answer here,
although putting my ideas into words is still a bit scary for me.
On the first of your dichotomies, you'll find me today fully in the
evolutionist camp. I agree that the modern concepts of evolution are
sufficient to explain all of life's complexity. I have not always felt
this way -- there was a recent time when I doubted whether the several
evolutionary mechanisms were truly sufficient. An attempt to appreciate
the unimaginable span of time since life's beginnings on Earth has made,
for me, the difference.
Choosing a position on the second of your dichotomies is challenging. I
believe (per your definitions and the thoughts below) that I am a
relativist; I would like to hear your confirmation or correction on that.
I do *not* think that moral propositions are meaningless, although I do
understand that particular philosophical argument. I think they
communicate important messages. Truth/Falsity is problematic for me.
I consider "rape is wrong" to be a guideline that I can apply to judging
myself and others. But I don't assume that the proposition exists in a
Platonic sense, nor that some non-physical being has proposed it. I think
that the pervious two statements may not be logically consistent.
I accept that my moral concepts might be partly or wholly the result of my
European Catholic upbringing post-WWII. I also accept that a readiness to
accept at least some of them might have been built into my brain by
evolution. I continue to read and to think about this; thank you for the
chance to put it into words.
Bryan Saint Germain
Ananda Gupta
<93b3b741.02121...@posting.google.com>:
>Tricky, tricky. I'm not a philosopher, so I don't want to 'transfer my
>authority' to philosophy. Of course, it would be nice if *some*
>philosophers wouldn't 'transfer' *their* 'authority' to science either
>(although some of them are ok, like that Wilkins guy ;), and I don't
>mind Lawrence Sklar either, but then again, I live in Michigan ).
I agree that the problem probably does run the other way as well; I was
just describing my own observations. The philosophers I know tend to be
either genuine experts on particular parts of science (the rarer case) or
very tentative. But I would definitely agree there is a problem with
philosophers (and other humanities types) thinking that just because some
of the questions they think about are "prior to" the scientific method and
practice, they're thereby entitled to make scientific pronouncements. (The
Sokal hoax comes to mind here as an example of what can happen when
humanities types fall victim to this particular hubris.)
>Anyway, I guess, I would put myself as a E + (t<->L). I think that
>morals a result of both biological (evolutionary based) predisposition
>(and as such are 'absolute') and historical and societal forces (which
>give it some relativist properties). But all in all, the core morals
>are probably innate, so put me in as E+L, I guess, although that would
>be somewhat simplifiying. I just don't believe that a 'superbeing'
>(God) is needed to give us morals. I think they are a product of
>evolution + society.
So marking (albeit with an asterisk :) ). Thanks for your response.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
<d_7M9.46067$_S2.2...@nwrddc01.gnilink.net>:
>> Well, it's better than saying we don't know sine from shinola.
>
> I was hoping this wouldn't put everyone off on a tangent...
Hopefully the digression won't be... protracted.
Ananda Gupta
<1575bfdc.02121...@posting.google.com>:
>I concur.
>The fundamentalists who raised me always insisted that God would not
>and could not act immorally, implying a moral code to which he must
>adhere.
>
>I suppose I am a provisional moral absolutist. Analagous to science,
>in which an assertion is made and believed, but which is subject to
>revision in light of further data. As a science-friendly atheist, I do
>not have the luxury of having my moral precepts handed to me on a
>silver platter, and I must "discover" them for myself. I believe that
>many are in my position and being perceived as moral relativists by
>Fundamentalists and some other theists.
Yes, the accusation of moral relativism is commonly heard from theists, in
my experience. On its face it seems to have some credence; how can there
be laws without a lawgiver? Yet I think this off-the-cuff sort of
statement does not really address the real questions at stake.
>I would also suggest that some of them are confusing mere cultural
>artifacts with moral codes. I have seen people treat fashion and food
>as matters of morality. "Proper behavior" can cover quite a bit of
>ground. I suspect the asociation of scientific thinking with moral
>relativism is not as strong as some folks see it.
Indeed. Thanks for the response.
Hiero5ant
Ananda Gupta wrote in message ...
Ouch! I didn't think such a pun would be within the radius of the
cascade. But I guess that's all a function of what angle you approach it
from.
Ananda Gupta
<pps10votfls9cjl7p...@4ax.com>:
>I found your survey questions challenging, precisely because yours are
>two of several questions that confronted me as I dealt repeatedly with
>the loss of loved ones over the past decade. I will attempt an answer
>here, although putting my ideas into words is still a bit scary for me.
I'm sorry for your losses.
>On the first of your dichotomies, you'll find me today fully in the
>evolutionist camp. I agree that the modern concepts of evolution are
>sufficient to explain all of life's complexity. I have not always felt
>this way -- there was a recent time when I doubted whether the several
>evolutionary mechanisms were truly sufficient. An attempt to appreciate
>the unimaginable span of time since life's beginnings on Earth has made,
>for me, the difference.
Indeed. A friend of mine, who experienced a similar solidification of his
view, once put it thus: "I finally figured out that I didn't need to
abandon the incredulity I felt; I just had to stop using it as a premise."
>Choosing a position on the second of your dichotomies is challenging. I
>believe (per your definitions and the thoughts below) that I am a
>relativist; I would like to hear your confirmation or correction on
>that.
I'll try. Probably the best I can do is to suggest some other questions
you might ask yourself. (And I do mean ask yourself; I'd be happy to talk
about the answers various people give in e-mail, but not here. Of course,
I'm not the thread police, so if this particular branch of this thread
turns into a discussion thereof, I'll be content to lurk.)
>I do *not* think that moral propositions are meaningless, although I do
>understand that particular philosophical argument. I think they
>communicate important messages. Truth/Falsity is problematic for me.
>I consider "rape is wrong" to be a guideline that I can apply to judging
>myself and others. But I don't assume that the proposition exists in a
>Platonic sense, nor that some non-physical being has proposed it. I
>think that the pervious two statements may not be logically consistent.
Well, I can definitely say that the fact that you don't assume the latter
two things you say you don't assume does not commit you to either position.
When you say the truth or falsity of moral propositions is problematic to
you, that may commit you one way or the other depending on what you mean by
"problematic". If "problematic" = "not obvious in all, or even most,
cases", then that wouldn't commit you either way. If "problematic" =
"incoherent", or "not possible in principle", then that rules out moral
realism.
>I accept that my moral concepts might be partly or wholly the result of
>my European Catholic upbringing post-WWII. I also accept that a
>readiness to accept at least some of them might have been built into my
>brain by evolution. I continue to read and to think about this; thank
>you for the chance to put it into words.
Here are some questions that philosophers sometimes ask to clarify readers'
views on moral realism vs. relativism (and sometimes realism vs.
skepticism*):
1. Consider three statements. They are: "Chocolate ice cream tastes better
than vanilla", "People ought not to rape other people", and "The sun
occupies the center of the solar system." What do these statements have in
common? What don't they have in common? Also, what would *arguments*
about each of these statements (suppose you have someone who affirms each
and someone who denies each) have in common? Not have in common?
2. Consider the attitude towards slavery in two different cultures: America
in 1820 and America in 2002. Obviously the attitude has changed in those
182 years. Does it make sense to characterize this change as "moral
progress"? Indeed, is there such thing as moral progress? If so, how do
we distinguish moral progress from other kinds of cultural changes?
3. Suppose a person disagrees with the large majority of his fellow
citizens (or those who live in the same culture) on some moral question.
Is it possible that he is right and everyone else is wrong? Can they all
be right even though they disagree? Does the existence of disagreement on
a particular subject tell us anything about the subject itself?
4. We use our five physical senses to become aware of facts about the
physical world. If there are "moral facts", how might we become aware of
them -- especially given that people from different cultures tend to
disagree very strongly about the nature of these alleged "moral facts", yet
rarely disagree about what their physical senses tell them? Is it possible
to have the same level of certainty about moral facts that we have in
(some) empirical facts?
And I'll hold off putting a tick mark for you in any of my columns. :)
*: By skepticism I do not mean the general attitude that we should be wary
of what we read, that we should generally acquire reasons for holding the
beliefs we do, etc. Rather I mean the philosophical view that people
cannot know anything -- that knowledge is impossible.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
<wdaM9.48410$4W1....@nwrddc02.gnilink.net>:
>>> I was hoping this wouldn't put everyone off on a tangent...
>>
>> Hopefully the digression won't be... protracted.
>>
>
> Ouch! I didn't think such a pun would be within the radius of the
>cascade. But I guess that's all a function of what angle you approach it
>from.
I surrender. :)
Bryan Saint Germain
>Bryan Saint Germain <sa...@NOSPAMmind.net> wrote in
><pps10votfls9cjl7p...@4ax.com>:
>
>>I found your survey questions challenging, precisely because yours are
>>two of several questions that confronted me as I dealt repeatedly with
>>the loss of loved ones over the past decade. I will attempt an answer
>>here, although putting my ideas into words is still a bit scary for me.
>
>I'm sorry for your losses.
>
>>On the first of your dichotomies, you'll find me today fully in the
>>evolutionist camp. I agree that the modern concepts of evolution are
>>sufficient to explain all of life's complexity. I have not always felt
>>this way -- there was a recent time when I doubted whether the several
>>evolutionary mechanisms were truly sufficient. An attempt to appreciate
>>the unimaginable span of time since life's beginnings on Earth has made,
>>for me, the difference.
>
>Indeed. A friend of mine, who experienced a similar solidification of his
>view, once put it thus: "I finally figured out that I didn't need to
>abandon the incredulity I felt; I just had to stop using it as a premise."
I like that a lot. If you still correspond with this friend, please ask
whether I can quote that (with attribution, if desired).
>>Choosing a position on the second of your dichotomies is challenging. I
>>believe (per your definitions and the thoughts below) that I am a
>>relativist; I would like to hear your confirmation or correction on
>>that.
>
>I'll try. Probably the best I can do is to suggest some other questions
>you might ask yourself. (And I do mean ask yourself; I'd be happy to talk
>about the answers various people give in e-mail, but not here. Of course,
>I'm not the thread police, so if this particular branch of this thread
>turns into a discussion thereof, I'll be content to lurk.)
>
>>I do *not* think that moral propositions are meaningless, although I do
>>understand that particular philosophical argument. I think they
>>communicate important messages. Truth/Falsity is problematic for me.
>>I consider "rape is wrong" to be a guideline that I can apply to judging
>>myself and others. But I don't assume that the proposition exists in a
>>Platonic sense, nor that some non-physical being has proposed it. I
>>think that the previous two statements may not be logically consistent.
>ASG
I appreciate your quick replies. I leave early tomorrow on family
business, and will take these new questions with me and ponder them.
Bryan Saint Germain
Life is half spent before we know what it is.
-- George Herbert
Ananda Gupta
>I like that a lot. If you still correspond with this friend, please ask
>whether I can quote that (with attribution, if desired).
It was in casual conversation, and this friend is laid back about that sort
of thing. So quote away.
>I appreciate your quick replies. I leave early tomorrow on family
>business, and will take these new questions with me and ponder them.
You're welcome. Ponder away. :)
ASG
Bill Rogers
>
> A recent discussion I had on another usenet group, besides doing very bad
> things to my blood pressure, led me to wonder something. (I've posed
> something similar to this question in talk.atheism too.)
>
> Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism (E).
> By the former I mean all the generally creationist views, from the YECs to
> the intelligent-design people and everyone in between. By the latter I
> mean the view that evolution is the mechanism by which life's complexity
> arose, and that science properly done can *by itself* provide an
> (incomplete and tentative, but progressively less so) answer to questions
> about why organisms have the features they do, etc.
I do not think that C and E are entirely distinct. Where would you
include someone who believed in "front-loaded" design. They would
claim that the theory of evolution adequately explained why organisms
have the features they do, etc, but would still claim that the
observed result was "intended" by God.
But in any case, count me, provisionally, an E.
>
> Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
> (L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions (propositions
> with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are meaningless, or always
> false, or neither true nor false, or are true or false depending on
> someone's perspective (an individual, a majority within a culture, etc.
> This does leave open the possibility that a moral proposition can be true
> AND false simultaneously, in cases where people disagree.) By the latter I
> mean the view denying all of the above statements -- that is, the view
> holding that moral statements are statements of fact, and as such are
> either true or false, never both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity
> are independent of anyone's perspective.
>
<snip>
I think I fall under (L) here. However, I always wonder why the
absolutists think that relative morality is meaningless. We can more
or less collectively agree that murder or child abuse or treason or
torture are "relatively" wrong. We do not need, in my mind, to prove
that there is a God and that He agrees with our judgments. There are
probably good evolutionary explanations for the origin of our moral
judgments; that is a good thing, in that it means that we will fairly
often, as a species, have pretty compatible, consensus views as to
what is right or wrong, at least in a broad sense. That consensus view
is, for my money, the closest we could ever get to an "absolute"
morality, but it isn't very close.
In fact, I think relgiously absolute moral systems have less influence
on people's behavior than they may claim. I am faithful to my wife
because I love her and promised in front of friends and family that I
would be so, not because the Bible says "Thou shalt not commit
adultery," and I expect that the same is true for many Christians and
other theists. The ancient classical world managed fairly well with a
morality based on shame and honor in the absence of particularly moral
gods.
>
> If you believe E, do you believe
> T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
> believe E?
No, the reasons are completely unrelated. I believe E because of
evidence compatible with and supportive of the TOE. I believe L
because I do not see enough evidence to support the existence of God
or some other external, absolute source of morality, and because I
think "relative" morality is quite important, and certainly adequate
for deciding how to live.
> Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do you
> see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
> another, or are they unrelated?
>
> ASG
Bill
Richard Harter
(Kermit) wrote:
>I concur.
>The fundamentalists who raised me always insisted that God would not
>and could not act immorally, implying a moral code to which he must
>adhere.
IIRC Socrates introduced this chestnut. An obvious reply is that the
moral code and divine omnipotence are but different aspects of a
single nature. God neither obeys the moral code nor creates; God is
the moral code (amonth other things).
Richard Harter, c...@tiac.net,
http://home.tiac.net/~cri, http://www.varinoma.com
In the 60's people took acid to make the world weird. Now the
world is weird and people take Prozac to make it normal.
Ananda Gupta
<8984713a.02121...@posting.google.com>:
>a...@verizon.net (Ananda Gupta) wrote in message
>news:<Xns92E7ACF...@199.45.49.11>...
>> Hello talk.origins denizens,
>>
>> A recent discussion I had on another usenet group, besides doing very
>> bad things to my blood pressure, led me to wonder something. (I've
>> posed something similar to this question in talk.atheism too.)
>>
>> Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism
>> (E). By the former I mean all the generally creationist views, from
>> the YECs to the intelligent-design people and everyone in between. By
>> the latter I mean the view that evolution is the mechanism by which
>> life's complexity arose, and that science properly done can *by
>> itself* provide an (incomplete and tentative, but progressively less
>> so) answer to questions about why organisms have the features they do,
>> etc.
>
>I do not think that C and E are entirely distinct. Where would you
>include someone who believed in "front-loaded" design. They would
>claim that the theory of evolution adequately explained why organisms
>have the features they do, etc, but would still claim that the
>observed result was "intended" by God.
I think the key words above are "by itself" -- that is, science needs no
other considerations to answer the questions it concerns itself with. That
said, if one believes in God but does not believe that God created
organisms as they are now, only that he approves of what happened, then
that would put one in the 'E' camp, I think.
Confused -- you don't believe in moral facts, but you believe moral
realism? Are you sure you meant 'L' and not 'T'?
Sverker Johansson
>
> On Wed, 18 Dec 2002 21:05:59 +0000 (UTC), freehand...@hotmail.com
> (Kermit) wrote:
>
> >I concur.
> >The fundamentalists who raised me always insisted that God would not
> >and could not act immorally, implying a moral code to which he must
> >adhere.
>
> IIRC Socrates introduced this chestnut. An obvious reply is that the
> moral code and divine omnipotence are but different aspects of a
> single nature. God neither obeys the moral code nor creates; God is
> the moral code (amonth other things).
But doesn't this bring us back to morality being defined by God?
Alternatively, one might interpret this position as God being
defined as the moral code -- but this I find hard to reconcile
with the sentient God of most theists.
--
Best regards
Sverker Johansson
--------------------------------------------------------
Humans breed pigs for a purpose -- making bacon.
Does that make a pig's life meaningful _for_the_pig_ ?
--------------------------------------------------------
Mark Isaak
Gupta) wrote:
>Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
>(L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions (propositions
>with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are meaningless, or always
>false, or neither true nor false, or are true or false depending on
>someone's perspective (an individual, a majority within a culture, etc.
>This does leave open the possibility that a moral proposition can be true
>AND false simultaneously, in cases where people disagree.) By the latter I
>mean the view denying all of the above statements -- that is, the view
>holding that moral statements are statements of fact, and as such are
>either true or false, never both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity
>are independent of anyone's perspective.
I am an evotee and, to some extent, a moral realist. I believe some
moral propositions are consistent enough across human cultures to call
them true or false. However, that does not apply to all moral
propsitions; some are relative. To further complicate things, it is
possible for a single action to be good according to one "real" moral
proposition and bad according to another. Morality is even messier
than biology.
--
Mark Isaak at...@earthlink.net
Don't read everything you belive.
Richard Harter
<lsj.h...@homo.sapiens.se> wrote:
>Richard Harter wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 18 Dec 2002 21:05:59 +0000 (UTC), freehand...@hotmail.com
>> (Kermit) wrote:
>>
>> >I concur.
>> >The fundamentalists who raised me always insisted that God would not
>> >and could not act immorally, implying a moral code to which he must
>> >adhere.
>>
>> IIRC Socrates introduced this chestnut. An obvious reply is that the
>> moral code and divine omnipotence are but different aspects of a
>> single nature. God neither obeys the moral code nor creates; God is
s/creates/creates it/
>> the moral code (amonth other things).
s/amonth/among/
>
>But doesn't this bring us back to morality being defined by God?
>
>Alternatively, one might interpret this position as God being
>defined as the moral code -- but this I find hard to reconcile
>with the sentient God of most theists.
You are hung up on "defined". Definition is something humans do to
characterize things (leave us ignore for the nonce this business of
dividing the perceptible world into things.)
Under the conception I am pushing God, considered from a certain
viewpoint, is the moral code, i.e., the moral code is an intrinsic
part of his nature rather than something He defines, and is a sentient
being when He is considered from a somewhat different viewpoint. This
conception is no more contradictory than saying that a certain car is
red and has a stick shift.
Bill Rogers
Oops, you are right, I meant T, sorry about that.
Ananda Gupta
<r5u40v8ju4dv0hbf1...@4ax.com>:
>On Tue, 17 Dec 2002 22:00:31 +0000 (UTC), a...@verizon.net (Ananda
>Gupta) wrote:
>> Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral
>> realism (L). By the former I mean the view that moral propositions
>> (propositions with "ought" or "should" or "good" or "evil") are
>> meaningless, or always false, or neither true nor false, or are true
>> or false depending on someone's perspective (an individual, a majority
>> within a culture, etc. This does leave open the possibility that a
>> moral proposition can be true AND false simultaneously, in cases where
>> people disagree.) By the latter I mean the view denying all of the
>> above statements -- that is, the view holding that moral statements
>> are statements of fact, and as such are either true or false, never
>> both, have meaning, and whose truth or falsity are independent of
>> anyone's perspective.
>
>I am an evotee and, to some extent, a moral realist. I believe some
>moral propositions are consistent enough across human cultures to call
>them true or false.
OK, but just to clarify, you would say that the degree of consistency
between cultures determines truth or falsity?
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>> Confused -- you don't believe in moral facts, but you believe moral
>> realism? Are you sure you meant 'L' and not 'T'?
>
>Oops, you are right, I meant T, sorry about that.
Excellent. Putting you down in the E & T column.
ASG
Mark Isaak
Gupta) wrote:
That is a question I am still struggling with. There are some beliefs
that are consistent between cultures (or were before science rose in
prominence) that are factually wrong, such as belief in divination and
a solid firmament. This makes me believe that some consistent moral
beliefs, like maybe the desirability of revenge, might also be wrong.
However, I cannot convince myself that consitency between cultures is
meaningless. After all, morality is culturally determined as a
proximate cause at least. If different cultures come to the same
conclusions, that indicates something.
I think cultural consistency determies the truth of falsity of some
overarching principles, such as common good and love thy neighbor.
Beliefs contrary to these principles might also be culturally
consistent, but logical consistency of the moral system is more
important. But the short answer to your question is yes. I think.
Sverker Johansson
OK, I can see what you mean. It makes as much (or as little) sense
as the classical Trinity. I am very far from buying it, but I can
accept it as a tenable position.
Am I correct in seeing a parallel with the position that the
natural laws of the universe are an aspect of God?
Stanley Friesen
>Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism (E).
>
>Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral realism
>
>Informally, both on Usenet and in personal interactions, I have observed a
>strong correlation between C and L -- that is, people who agree with C
>generally agree with L as well (though not always; note that Mike Goodrich,
>for example, apparently does not believe L, since he posted that God
>defines good and evil, which implies that the truth of moral propositions
>depends on God's perspective -- a relativist position).
I am not sure I would consider this a relativist position. God is
viewed here as an absolute and final authority, indeed the *sole*
authority. This position is usually combined with the idea that God's
specifications of good and evil are *intrinsic* to his nature.
> I am wondering
>about the converse. Is there an equally strong correlation between E and
>T? Hence the thread title: I am curious to see whether the people here who
>believe E also believe T, in general. I am also curious to see whether the
>people who believe E and believe T, believe T *because* they believe E, or
>*for the same sort of reasons* they believe E.
> ...
>So, any personal statements are welcome. If you believe E, do you believe
>T, and if so, are your reasons for believing T similar to the reasons you
>believe E? Ditto for the people who believe E and also believe L -- do you
>see any tension between the two, or do you think they complement one
>another, or are they unrelated?
Obviously I support E.
On the other issue, I am more or less agnostic. Moral relativism has
problems to my way of thinking, but I also distrust absolutes - the real
world doesn't seem to be susceptible to a simple binary partition of
good versus evil.
If anybody wishes I can expand upon my issues with moral relativism.
(Well, and I could also expand upon the other as well).
The peace of God be with you.
Stanley Friesen
Stanley Friesen
>
>1. Consider three statements. They are: "Chocolate ice cream tastes better
>than vanilla", "People ought not to rape other people", and "The sun
>occupies the center of the solar system." What do these statements have in
>common? What don't they have in common? Also, what would *arguments*
>about each of these statements (suppose you have someone who affirms each
>and someone who denies each) have in common? Not have in common?
They are all predications - they attribute a value to some state or
event.
A is a purely subjective statement. Two people can make opposite
statements in this regard *without* contradicting one another, since the
scope of the statement is purely individual. I would not even bother to
argue about it. Given different statements of this sort I would just
say "tastes differ".
B is at the very least a normative statement concerning interpersonal
relationships, it is *not* an objective fact about the world per se. To
be meaningful it must considered be applicable to a whole society (or
not). One key basis for arguing about it would be either the social
value of the restriction - what benefits and costs accrue to society as
a whole due to having or not having this restriction. There is also the
issue of intrinsic value, but I am not sure how one would argue that.
C purports to be an objective fact about the real world that is
independent of any individual. The sole valid basis for arguing such a
matter is material evidence, though discussing individuals motives for
taking various positions may be helpful in keeping the discussion going.
>
>2. Consider the attitude towards slavery in two different cultures: America
>in 1820 and America in 2002. Obviously the attitude has changed in those
>182 years. Does it make sense to characterize this change as "moral
>progress"?
My bias is to say - yes it does.
>Indeed, is there such thing as moral progress? If so, how do
>we distinguish moral progress from other kinds of cultural changes?
Moral progress makes things better for ever more people??
Moral progress reduces conflict in human relationships??
>
>3. Suppose a person disagrees with the large majority of his fellow
>citizens (or those who live in the same culture) on some moral question.
>Is it possible that he is right and everyone else is wrong?
I am not sure I would use the term "right" here - perhaps more
enlightened? More progressive?
> Can they all be right even though they disagree?
It depends - do the two positions have different social impacts? (There
are actually moral questions where the particular choice does not matter
so long as all in a society use the same rules).
> Does the existence of disagreement on
>a particular subject tell us anything about the subject itself?
Probably not.
>
>4. We use our five physical senses to become aware of facts about the
>physical world. If there are "moral facts", how might we become aware of
>them -- especially given that people from different cultures tend to
>disagree very strongly about the nature of these alleged "moral facts", yet
>rarely disagree about what their physical senses tell them?
I am not certain there are moral "facts", just better or worse morals.
> Is it possible
>to have the same level of certainty about moral facts that we have in
>(some) empirical facts?
No.
Ananda Gupta
<e4i70vk8u0dt58fmf...@4ax.com>:
>a...@verizon.net (Ananda Gupta) wrote:
>>
>A is a purely subjective statement. Two people can make opposite
>statements in this regard *without* contradicting one another, since the
>scope of the statement is purely individual. I would not even bother to
>argue about it. Given different statements of this sort I would just
>say "tastes differ".
>
>B is at the very least a normative statement concerning interpersonal
>relationships, it is *not* an objective fact about the world per se. To
>be meaningful it must considered be applicable to a whole society (or
>not). One key basis for arguing about it would be either the social
>value of the restriction - what benefits and costs accrue to society as
>a whole due to having or not having this restriction. There is also the
>issue of intrinsic value, but I am not sure how one would argue that.
I'm going to stray from my vow not to get into a discussion specifically on
this subject, but not very far. Namely, I would venture to say that the
two issues you suggest are separate (costs and benefits vs. intrinsic
value) are not in fact separate, since unless one takes happiness (or
whatever is being measured by "benefits") as intrinsically valuable, and
unhappiness (or whatever is being measured by "costs") as intrinsically to
be avoided, then it's not clear why we should want to maximize net benefits
when considering what social norm to adopt. (Why not maximize total
costs?)
The terms "costs" and "benefits" belong to the language of economics, which
the economist David Friedman once called "applied utilitarianism": because
many (but not all) of the people who developed the foundation of modern
economics were heavily influenced by utilitarianism. (Adam Smith, perhaps
the most central figure in the development of modern economics, was not a
utilitarian; he was a sort of Aristotelian sentimentalist, believing that
morality is centered on virtue, not evaluation of actions, and that people
have a moral sense which allows them to discern virtuous people from
vicious ones. However, since the body of his work predated the
utilitarians, who knows what he might have thought had he written 30 years
later.) Utilitarianism, of course, is a moral theory, one which holds that
moral action is that which maximizes aggregate human happiness -- a view
deeply consonant with the economists' project. It is a realist view
("moral realism" and "moral relativism" are not ethical theories, but meta-
ethical theories).
What I am getting at is that talk about costs and benefits assumes a
utilitarian sort of framework, and since utilitarianism is realist, that
means one is implicitly endorsing realism by adopting a policy position
suggested by the methods of economics. You can't be a utilitarian AND a
moral relativist.
>C purports to be an objective fact about the real world that is
>independent of any individual. The sole valid basis for arguing such a
>matter is material evidence, though discussing individuals motives for
>taking various positions may be helpful in keeping the discussion going.
Of course material evidence only takes you so far; at some point you must
adopt some explanation as to why your observations of that evidence are
reliable.
>> 2. Consider the attitude towards slavery in two different cultures:
>> America in 1820 and America in 2002. Obviously the attitude has
>> changed in those 182 years. Does it make sense to characterize this
>> change as "moral progress"?
>
>My bias is to say - yes it does.
>
>> Indeed, is there such thing as moral progress? If so, how do
>> we distinguish moral progress from other kinds of cultural changes?
>
>Moral progress makes things better for ever more people??
>Moral progress reduces conflict in human relationships??
Both of these suggestions are certainly plausible. But both also
presuppose the existence of moral facts in that, e.g., the latter
proposition presupposes that reduced conflict in human relationships is
*good*.
>>
>> 3. Suppose a person disagrees with the large majority of his fellow
>> citizens (or those who live in the same culture) on some moral
>> question. Is it possible that he is right and everyone else is wrong?
>
>I am not sure I would use the term "right" here - perhaps more
>enlightened? More progressive?
Certainly -- "more enlightened" is a perfectly legitimate rephrase.
>> Can they all be right even though they disagree?
>
>It depends - do the two positions have different social impacts? (There
>are actually moral questions where the particular choice does not matter
>so long as all in a society use the same rules).
Such as? (I'm curious.) I can think of lots of *non*-moral questions
where the specific choice makes no difference as long as there is
agreement, such as which side of the road we drive on.
>> 4. We use our five physical senses to become aware of facts about the
>> physical world. If there are "moral facts", how might we become aware
>> of them -- especially given that people from different cultures tend
>> to disagree very strongly about the nature of these alleged "moral
>> facts", yet rarely disagree about what their physical senses tell
>> them?
>
>I am not certain there are moral "facts", just better or worse morals.
Well, presumably "better" morals are those closer to the truth, just as
better scientific theories make better predictions about their subjects
because they are closer to modeling the *true* physical reality than the
worse theories. At least, I can't think of any other reasonable meaning
for "better" morals -- typically the adjective "better", when referring to
things having to do with knowledge, means "closer to the truth". "I have a
better understanding of biology than Jack does" means, more or less, "My
knowledge of biology is a more complete picture of the *truth* about living
things than Jack's."
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>a...@verizon.net (Ananda Gupta) wrote:
>> Distinguish two positions, broadly: creationism (C) and evolutionism
>> (E). ...
>>
>> Now distinguish two more positions: moral relativism (T) and moral
>> realism (L). ...
>>
>> Informally, both on Usenet and in personal interactions, I have
>> observed a strong correlation between C and L -- that is, people who
>> agree with C generally agree with L as well (though not always; note
>> that Mike Goodrich, for example, apparently does not believe L, since
>> he posted that God defines good and evil, which implies that the truth
>> of moral propositions depends on God's perspective -- a relativist
>> position).
>
>I am not sure I would consider this a relativist position. God is
>viewed here as an absolute and final authority, indeed the *sole*
>authority. This position is usually combined with the idea that God's
>specifications of good and evil are *intrinsic* to his nature.
Meaning, presumably, that they are immutable: *independent* of God's will.
If that is the case, then it is perhaps misleading to say that God
"defines" good and evil. Rather, one might say he exists in accordance
with his own nature, and that makes him morally perfect, but he is still
not capable of redefining good or evil action. This is certainly not a
limit on his power, but it does suggest that moral reality is not something
God can change.
ASG
Richard Harter
<lsj.h...@homo.sapiens.se> wrote:
>Richard Harter wrote:
[snip]
>> Under the conception I am pushing God, considered from a certain
>> viewpoint, is the moral code, i.e., the moral code is an intrinsic
>> part of his nature rather than something He defines, and is a sentient
>> being when He is considered from a somewhat different viewpoint. This
>> conception is no more contradictory than saying that a certain car is
>> red and has a stick shift.
>
>OK, I can see what you mean. It makes as much (or as little) sense
>as the classical Trinity. I am very far from buying it, but I can
>accept it as a tenable position.
>
>Am I correct in seeing a parallel with the position that the
>natural laws of the universe are an aspect of God?
I would think so. One essential difference is that the natural laws
are discoverable by science; the techniques that serve so well in
uncovering the natural laws do not seem to suffice for uncovering the
moral laws. Not all aspects of God are equally knowable nor may they
be grasped by all the same methods.