I discovered last week that I had made a big oversight in the following analysis:
> In other words, we are imagining a universe where gravity is a million times
> weaker than it is in our universe. For a planet to have the same gravitational
> pull on its surface as earth, it would have to be a million times as massive.
> That corresponds to having a hundred times the radius, and 10,000 times the
> surface area.
What I overlooked was that objects on the surface, being 100 times as far away
from the center as we are the surface of our earth, would have only 1/10,000 times
the weight that we do. It is only when we multiply the radius by another factor of 100,
to make the planet have a radius 10,000 times that of earth (ca. 40 million miles!)
that the weight of a creature our size would equal our earth weight.
Then the surface area would be a whopping 160 trillion square miles!
The differences don't stop there. Not having learned much about atmospheric science,
I don't know what influence this would have on the density of the air at the surface.
It's clear that the density of our atmosphere falls off with altitude at a tremendously
faster rate than the pull of gravity, but what could one expect with a 40 million mile radius?
Does anyone reading this have any clue about this?
> > Probabilities and the Fine‐Tuning Argument: a Sceptical View
> > Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew, Eric Vestrup
> Thank you for this reference, Daggett. I will look at it before too long,
> because it appeals to my mathematical background, which has
> made me aware of the pitfalls of probability theory.
> > Mind, Volume 110, Issue 440, October 2001, Pages 1027–1038,
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/110.440.1027
> It may also be relevant to this whole theme of how fine tuning affects our
> expectations of how a "typical" universe should look.
>
> However, this thread is not about fine tuning. It is about exploring universes
> that seem much more favorable to the development of intelligent life
> than our own; specifically, life of a much higher level of intelligence
> and abilities than our own.
> > Abstract
> > Proponents of the Fine‐Tuning Argument frequently assume that
> > the narrowness of the life‐friendly range of fundamental physical
> > constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe
> > ‘by chance’. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than
> > is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield
> > a probability at all because the resulting measure function is
> > non‐normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent
> > this problem and argue that they fail.
The usual method of getting a copy "through my institution" failed,
but I I will continue to try to get hold of this paper, and see
whether there are ways of circumventing the problem that the
authors hadn't thought of. But that is a separate issue from the following,
which IS relevant to this thread:
> By making the space of possibilities so enormous, the author[s]
> [seem] quite ready to acknowledge the possibility of a universe
> where gravity is much more feeble compared to electric forces than our own.
> And this thread is about possibilities, not probabilities.
>
>
> By the way, it's a 2001 paper. Any idea of how it has been received by the scientific
> and the philosophical and mathematical communities since then?
No answer to this so far. But I can probably get an idea of this myself,
given enough time.
Peter Nyikos
Professor, Dept. of Mathematics -- standard disclaimer--
Univ. of South Carolina in Columbia
http://people.math.sc.edu/nyikos