I'm back from my unavoidable posting break, and I hope you are still reading this thread, Kalkidas.
There's lots we could still discuss about what we and Bill Rogers wrote below.
On Friday, June 23, 2023 at 10:25:16 AM UTC-4, Kalkidas wrote:
> On 6/22/2023 7:07 PM,
peter2...@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Thursday, June 22, 2023 at 8:10:15 PM UTC-4, Kalkidas wrote:
> >> On 6/22/2023 3:20 PM,
broger...@gmail.com wrote:
> >>> On Thursday, June 22, 2023 at 6:10:15 PM UTC-4, Kalkidas wrote:
> >>>> On 6/22/2023 11:43 AM,
broger...@gmail.com wrote:
> >>>>> On Thursday, June 22, 2023 at 1:35:16 PM UTC-4, Kalkidas wrote:
> >
> >>>>>> Now, pain and suffering exist where? In the senses of the body.
> >>>>>> Therefore, Epicurus' philosophy is literally "sensual hedonism", i.e.
> >>>>>> bodily pleasure.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In the quote I gave you from Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus explicitly refers to "trouble in the soul," he restricts neither pleasures nor pains to those of the body.
> >
> >>>> But atomistic materialism necessitates that the soul is a mere
> >>>> collection of atoms just like the body. So yet again, Epicurus, ignoring
> >>>> standard ideas of the soul as a non-material conscious spiritual entity,
> >>>> has idiosyncratically defined "soul" for his own purposes. Indeed, the
> >>>> soul of Epicurus is just another body.
All true as far as Epicurus was concerned, but we now have a more
many-faceted understanding of physics than he did; that accounts
for what I wrote next.
> > Our understanding of the universe has progressed to the point where
> > this may be a false dichotomy. People who dare to suggest the following
> > possibility are likely to be misrepresented as believing it and therefore
> > being cranks and kooks, but I've learned to live with misrepresentations
> > like this, and so I state it here.
> >
> > Might the seat of our consciousness be dark matter pervading our
> > bodies, the way Epicurus thought it lay in special atoms pervading
> > our bodies? That would be a modern "third way" between Epicurus
> > and the materialistic claim that our bodies, made just of the
> > familiar old atoms, are responsible for our conscious selves.
A slight amendation: our seat of consciousness could be localized
in our brains. Descartes suggested the pineal gland, but I think the
relay center of the brain, the thalamus, is a better candidate for that.
> >
> >>>>> You are reading Cartesian dualism into a philosopher who worked a couple of thousand years before such dualism became a "standard idea."
> >
> >>>> That's rich. I have not even remotely suggested "Cartesian dualism".
> >>>
> >>> Sure you have - "Standard ideas of the soul as a non-material conscious, spiritual entity" is straight up Cartesian dualism.
By the same standards, Bill is espousing Epicureanism.
> >
> > Actually, Descartes generally avoided the word "soul," and tried to argue from first principles for
> > the nature of the "mind" as being identical with the conscious ("thinking") self. By the way, the word "self"
> > is used in the standard translations of the Chandogya Upanishad for the word "atman." It parts
> > company with Christian views of the soul by its apparent support at the end for the dogma that "atman is Brahman."
It's a fascinating conclusion to one of the longest Upanishads. It passes through four phases
as to what the self is. The first, embraced by the demons but not by the hero of the dialogue, the god Indra,
is materialism that is incompatible with a life after death. The second is that the self, after death,
is like one experiencing a pleasant dream. But Indra objects that dreams can also be nightmares.
His "guru," Prajapati, admits this but later gives the third phase, which is what many Hindus
(and many non-Hindu Western popularizers) think of as Nirvana: a dreamless sleep.
But Indra isn't satisfied: this is too much like Epicureanism: the self is like one gone to annihilation.
The fourth and final phase is one that is harmonious with Christian belief in heaven, except
at the very end, where the individual self is identified with the Supreme Person
(*uttama* *purusa*). Traditional Christianity is based on three divine Persons as the
supreme being, who remain separate from the souls of created beings in heaven.
Here I snipped things to which you did not reply; ironically, it is centered on the very thing
on which others picked up; but you didn't respond to them.
> > And now I come to what you added this time around:
> >
> >> The key point you're missing is that in "Cartesian dualism" there is no
> >> causal relationship from res cogitans to res extensa. I have not
> >> proposed Cartesian dualism.
> >
> > You are describing epiphenomenalism, not Cartesian dualism,
> > which is a philosophy of mind-body interactionism.
> I don't think I am describing that at all. I don't regard the mind, or
> soul, or consciousness, as something that "pops out" of matter when it
> reaches a certain configuration. I regard matter and spirit as eternally
> separate but related energies.
That is compatible with what I wrote: epiphenomenalism is, at bottom,
a philosophy that consciousness, whatever its source, has no effect
on our behavior -- "no causal causal relationship from res cogitans to res extensa."
It then goes on to say that our physical bodies ("res extensa") have everything to do with
what we are conscious *of*. It is a physicalist brand of determinism.
> My understanding is that Descartes, while proposing two very different
> substances, was then unable to discover how they related to one another
> in a causal way, in terms of their mutual influence. He suggested that
> perhaps the pineal gland was some sort of interface between the
> inanimate res extensa and the thinking res cogitans.
He might have done better to choose the thalamus; see above.
>But nothing ever
> came of this idea, and so "Cartesian dualism" was abandoned by philosophers.
I don't think that was the only reason, but the vastly over-rated Gilbert Ryle
may have achieved this end polemically, by his taunt, "How does the ghost work the machine?"
Anyone espousing interactionism was severely handicapped by inability
to articulate how what they intuitively knew -- that we do have free will --
could be accounted for.
> Had he known about the Vedic philosophy -- which preceded that of the
> Greeks by many centuries, things might have turned out differently. He
> would have seen that his two substances are actually sister energies of
> the Supreme Lord, and it is the Lord who integrates them into the world
> Descartes observed.
Hume took this integration for granted, without espousing a role for the Supreme Lord,
while Leibnitz explained it by his theory of monads that were put into perfect harmony by the same Lord.
All this is mind-body parallellism, which I talked about next.
> >
> > Another form of dualism is mind-body parallelism,
> > expounded in different forms by Malebranche and Leibnitz, but NOT Descartes.
> > Bill obviously did not read enough philosophy to learn about all this.
> >
> >
> >> I guess it's my turn to recommend that you actually read something.
> >
> > Looks like you BOTH need to do some reading.
I'm not sure which reading would benefit you, but by all means
read the closing dialogue in the Chandogya Upanishad between Indra and Prajapati
if you haven't done so already.
Peter Nyikos
Professor, Dept. of Mathematics -- standard disclaimer--
University of So. Carolina in Columbia
http://people.math.sc.edu/nyikos