Atheism and moral relativism
Ananda Gupta
relativism, or vice versa (and by atheism I just mean the denial of any
omniscient, omnipotent beings). I am curious as to the general sense of
the group -- how common is it, in posters' experience, that atheists are
also moral relativists?
To lay down my own cards I am both an atheist and a moral realist, which is
to say I think there are such things as moral facts, just as there are
physical facts, and moreover that these facts are knowable by humans
through the faculty of moral intuition or conscience. To me the most
convincing argument for atheism is the argument from evil, which of course
is totally unpersuasive if one is a moral relativist (since to such a
person the word "evil" has only trivial meaning). Moral relativists can,
of course, appeal to other arguments, such as the argument from nonbelief
or the arguments from incoherence, depending on how strong their relativism
is. But losing the argument from evil because of some paralyzing fear of
seeming judgmental (which is, in my experience, the most common reason
people adopt moral relativism) seems like a bit of a waste, to say the
least.
What are others' experiences with this?
ASG
drchaffee
news:Xns9256135...@199.45.49.11...
<snip>
>To me the most
> convincing argument for atheism is the argument from evil, which of course
> is totally unpersuasive if one is a moral relativist (since to such a
> person the word "evil" has only trivial meaning).
The atheist can adopt the theistic postulates for the argument from evil
without believing in them, and upon finding an inconsistency, believe the
argument has merit - even if he is a moral relativist. Now a theist who was
a moral relativist, if there is such an animal, wouldn't necessarily be
persuaded - is that the person you are talking about?
<snip>
Cheers,
Dave
Ananda Gupta
<EuU%8.19746$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
It would depend on the flavor of relativist; after all, to some moral
relativists, the word "evil" is literally nonsense. It's like arguing with
someone who doesn't believe in logic; if that person appeals to logic to
make his case, then the argument is self-undermining. Nonetheless, you
have a point, although it would be very odd for a moral relativist to rely
on the argument from evil as his *primary* reason for disbelief.
And there are lots of theists who are moral relativists, specifically those
who believe that whatever is good is what God says is good. In that case
morals are relative to the perspective of a being, namely God. Of course
such theists rarely admit that they are moral relativists. :)
ASG
J Forbes
I'm not sure what my "experiences" are... :)
I think that everyone, atheist or theist, has some degree of
moral relativism. Else the theists who follow one particular
theology would all have the same morals, wouldn't they?
Instead, we see only a very few theists murdering abortion
providers.
But there are some morals that seem to be almost facts. The
"golden rule" can be discovered by different methods. However,
it always starts with the assumption that the person values his
own well being. This may instead be a matter of taste, a taste
which is held by most, but not all, people.
In the end, we all do (or feel bad about not doing) what "feels
right". It appears that most moral choices are made deep within
our minds, well below the level of conscious decision. This
makes it quite difficult to discover just how our morals are
developed and exactly how we will make each moral decision.
My gut feeling is that morals are actually very similar between
theists and atheists in any specific society. Atheists merely
recognize the fact that religions adopt the accepted moral
values of most people (then claim to be original).
Jim
Ananda Gupta
>
>I'm not sure what my "experiences" are... :)
>
>I think that everyone, atheist or theist, has some degree of
>moral relativism. Else the theists who follow one particular
>theology would all have the same morals, wouldn't they?
>Instead, we see only a very few theists murdering abortion
>providers.
Moral realism doesn't commit us to universal agreement about moral facts,
in the same sense that scientific realism doesn't commit us to universal
agreement about scientific facts. So it's not the case that theists who
share a religion would *necessarily* agree on all the moral propositions
advanced by that religion, even if they are all moral realists.
<some interesting stuff snipped>
>My gut feeling is that morals are actually very similar between
>theists and atheists in any specific society. Atheists merely
>recognize the fact that religions adopt the accepted moral
>values of most people (then claim to be original).
This I definitely agree with; certainly religious establishments make a big
point out of trying not to deviate from what people's consciences inform
them. Thus there are a great many shared values across religious lines in
most societies.
ASG
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <EuU%8.19746$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>>"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
>>news:Xns9256135...@199.45.49.11...
>>
>><snip>
>>
>>> To me the most
>>> convincing argument for atheism is the argument from evil, which of
>>> course is totally unpersuasive if one is a moral relativist (since to
>>> such a person the word "evil" has only trivial meaning).
>>
>>The atheist can adopt the theistic postulates for the argument from evil
>>without believing in them, and upon finding an inconsistency, believe
>>the argument has merit - even if he is a moral relativist. Now a theist
>>who was a moral relativist, if there is such an animal, wouldn't
>>necessarily be persuaded - is that the person you are talking about?
> It would depend on the flavor of relativist; after all, to some moral
> relativists, the word "evil" is literally nonsense. It's like arguing with
> someone who doesn't believe in logic; if that person appeals to logic to
> make his case, then the argument is self-undermining. Nonetheless, you
> have a point, although it would be very odd for a moral relativist to rely
> on the argument from evil as his *primary* reason for disbelief.
A person could very easily think that evil is pure bunk and yet use the
argument. It's known as "reduction to absurdity"; taking the other side's
postulates and showing how they result in an absurd conclusion and thus one
or more of the postulates must be wrong (in this case, the fact that "evil
can/does exist" is wrong but yet religions always say it does.)
It's much like if a religion said :
1: Square circles exist.
2: Squares have 4 straight sides.
3: Circles are round.
And you showed how they all can't be right. Doesn't mean you have to admit
that either circles OR squares exist, just that not all 3 statements can be
true.
> And there are lots of theists who are moral relativists, specifically those
> who believe that whatever is good is what God says is good. In that case
> morals are relative to the perspective of a being, namely God. Of course
> such theists rarely admit that they are moral relativists. :)
> ASG
--
Mike atheism: a non-prophet organization...
proof: god hates Baptists and likes gays... http://morons.org/articles/3/359
-------------------------------
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-------------------------------
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drchaffee
evil, which postulates the existence of God and some of his mandatory
characteristics. It's no different to believe that evil is really bunk, but
accept the theist definition towards showing that their system of postulates
is inconsistent.
Anyhow, I'm an atheist and a moral relativist. I also think the Argument
from Evil is a legitimate problem for theists and that it hasn't been
sufficiently addressed.
Cheers,
Dave
drchaffee
> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D4022A2...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >
> >I'm not sure what my "experiences" are... :)
> >
> >I think that everyone, atheist or theist, has some degree of
> >moral relativism. Else the theists who follow one particular
> >theology would all have the same morals, wouldn't they?
> >Instead, we see only a very few theists murdering abortion
> >providers.
>
> Moral realism doesn't commit us to universal agreement about moral facts,
> in the same sense that scientific realism doesn't commit us to universal
> agreement about scientific facts. So it's not the case that theists who
> share a religion would *necessarily* agree on all the moral propositions
> advanced by that religion, even if they are all moral realists.
A belief in an objective reality seems justified by the reliability of
science. People aren't reliable in this way, so I don't think the idea of
objective morality deserves such stature. But perhaps this is a digression.
<snip>
Dave
Ananda Gupta
<cK209.23761$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>A belief in an objective reality seems justified by the reliability of
>science. People aren't reliable in this way, so I don't think the idea
>of objective morality deserves such stature. But perhaps this is a
>digression.
Science has no "reliability" apart from people. There are, after all,
unreliable scientists. Some people use this as a reason to jettison
scientific reality as well; I take it as a good reason to consider that
conscience may be a faculty just as accurate (and yet just as fallible) as
any other human faculty.
ASG
drchaffee
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <cK209.23761$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
> >A belief in an objective reality seems justified by the reliability of
> >science. People aren't reliable in this way, so I don't think the idea
> >of objective morality deserves such stature. But perhaps this is a
> >digression.
>
> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart from us.
> There are, after all,
> unreliable scientists. Some people use this as a reason to jettison
> scientific reality as well; I take it as a good reason to consider that
> conscience may be a faculty just as accurate (and yet just as fallible) as
> any other human faculty.
You cite unreliable scientists (people), and not unreliable reality (the
observed universe) - which kinda makes my point that we have reason to
suspect an objective reality, and less reason to suspect an objective
morality. Science is of course a human endeavor, but the reliability of
science doesn't come from the consistency of people, it comes from the
consistency of the universe ... one experiment agreeing with a like
experiment done in a different place, time, and culture. I think our
evolution provided us with a moral heritage, but I don't think it is
objective or absolute.
Dave
J Forbes
which of course leads us to ask, just what is this "conscience"
thing you're talking about?
Jim
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
"Science" is reliable. People who use scientific principles and laws aren't
always reliable, due to incorrect application of science, poor logic, etc.
I.e. the theory of the internal combustion engine is sound and works every
time. If my car won't start, it's due to a breakdown of it's parts and not
due to any unreliability of the theory behind it.
Ananda Gupta
<xod09.25478$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
>"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
>news:Xns9257BC3...@199.45.49.11...
>> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
>> <cK209.23761$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>>
>>> A belief in an objective reality seems justified by the reliability
>>> of science. People aren't reliable in this way, so I don't think the
>>> idea of objective morality deserves such stature. But perhaps this is
>>> a digression.
>>
>> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
>
>Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart from
>us.
Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture for fun.
>
>> There are, after all,
>> unreliable scientists. Some people use this as a reason to jettison
>> scientific reality as well; I take it as a good reason to consider
>> that conscience may be a faculty just as accurate (and yet just as
>> fallible) as any other human faculty.
>
>You cite unreliable scientists (people), and not unreliable reality (the
>observed universe) - which kinda makes my point that we have reason to
>suspect an objective reality, and less reason to suspect an objective
>morality. Science is of course a human endeavor
Just so -- without human perception, or awareness of the world around us,
there wouldn't be any science. That perception is fallible, but that
doesn't mean the reality we perceive is somehow subjective. Ditto for
moral reality.
>, but the reliability of
>science doesn't come from the consistency of people, it comes from the
>consistency of the universe ...
I would say much the same thing about moral facts.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>which of course leads us to ask, just what is this "conscience"
>thing you're talking about?
It's like one of the five physical senses. As we become aware of feelings
through touch, of scents through smell, etc., so too do we become aware of
moral facts through conscience. Just as some people have impaired or
poorly developed vision or hearing, some people have impaired or poorly
developed consciences. At least that's my view; others who generally agree
disagree on particulars. There's lots of philosophical literature about
conscience, or as it is often called in that literature, moral intuition.
Philosophers who have written on it are, from early to recent: Thomas Reid,
H.A. Prichard, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Michael Huemer (the latter has some
interesting papers at his web site,
http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/papers.htm).
ASG
J Forbes
>
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <xod09.25478$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
> >
> >"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
> >news:Xns9257BC3...@199.45.49.11...
> >> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> >> <cK209.23761$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
> >>
> >>> A belief in an objective reality seems justified by the reliability
> >>> of science. People aren't reliable in this way, so I don't think the
> >>> idea of objective morality deserves such stature. But perhaps this is
> >>> a digression.
> >>
> >> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
> >
> >Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart from
> >us.
>
> Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture for fun.
if torture for fun were *universally* immoral, no one would do
it....but facts show otherwise.
Among torturers, there may be some who find it morally repulsive
to torure without compensation, while others may find that
torturing is worth doing with or without payment.
> >
> >> There are, after all,
> >> unreliable scientists. Some people use this as a reason to jettison
> >> scientific reality as well; I take it as a good reason to consider
> >> that conscience may be a faculty just as accurate (and yet just as
> >> fallible) as any other human faculty.
> >
> >You cite unreliable scientists (people), and not unreliable reality (the
> >observed universe) - which kinda makes my point that we have reason to
> >suspect an objective reality, and less reason to suspect an objective
> >morality. Science is of course a human endeavor
>
> Just so -- without human perception, or awareness of the world around us,
> there wouldn't be any science. That perception is fallible, but that
> doesn't mean the reality we perceive is somehow subjective. Ditto for
> moral reality.
What is moral for one person in one time/place is not
necessarily moral for another person in another time/place.
The "laws" of behavior of physical matter appear to be
universal. OTOH, human morals are widely variable, and can
change in a specific person drastically depending on the
situation, or among different people in the same situation.
There is no absolute moral reality. Reality is that morals are
highly variable, although there is a fairly common core of moral
values among most well functioning societies.
> >, but the reliability of
> >science doesn't come from the consistency of people, it comes from the
> >consistency of the universe ...
>
> I would say much the same thing about moral facts.
You'd probably be wrong.
Jim
Ananda Gupta
>>>>
>>>> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
>>>
>>> Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart
>>> from us.
>>
>> Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture for fun.
>
>if torture for fun were *universally* immoral, no one would do
>it....but facts show otherwise.
Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally immoral, no one
would do it? People do immoral things all the time. In another post I
mentioned the idea that just as people have impaired vision, hearing, etc.,
they can also have impaired consciences. Why are you (presumably) willing
to accept the fallibility of other senses, but appeal to a simplistic
argument from disagreement in the case of conscience?
>
>Among torturers, there may be some who find it morally repulsive
>to torure without compensation, while others may find that
>torturing is worth doing with or without payment.
... so? Scientists disagree about scientific facts all the time. People
disagree about moral facts all the time too. Scientific disagreement
doesn't entail that there are no scientific facts, and moral disagreement
doesn't entail that there are no moral facts.
>>
>> Just so -- without human perception, or awareness of the world around
>> us, there wouldn't be any science. That perception is fallible, but
>> that doesn't mean the reality we perceive is somehow subjective.
>> Ditto for moral reality.
>
>What is moral for one person in one time/place is not
>necessarily moral for another person in another time/place.
This is just an assertion of moral relativism, not an argument. Don't get
me wrong; I haven't really offered an argument either, just a statement of
my view and reasons why things like e.g. moral disagreement aren't really
good objections. But this does nothing to criticize that view. Of course,
to me, this discussion is analogous to someone telling me that because
people disagree sometimes about what they see, that means none of us really
see anything. It's not clear how to go about such an argument.
>
>The "laws" of behavior of physical matter appear to be
>universal.
As do moral propositions. Of course some people, such as creationists,
would say that the laws of matter, etc., do not appear to be universal.
They're wrong.
> OTOH, human morals are widely variable
By this you mean that people disagree. As before, so what? People
disagree about all sorts of questions; that doesn't mean they have no
answers.
>, and can
>change in a specific person drastically depending on the
>situation, or among different people in the same situation.
>There is no absolute moral reality. Reality is that morals are
>highly variable, although there is a fairly common core of moral
>values among most well functioning societies.
As before, I'd agree that large numbers of people disagree about moral
propositions. That doesn't mean there aren't any moral propositions. And
large groups of people do make (objective) moral progress, e.g. the West's
abandonment of slavery.
>>> , but the reliability of
>>> science doesn't come from the consistency of people, it comes from
>>> the consistency of the universe ...
>>
>> I would say much the same thing about moral facts.
>
>You'd probably be wrong.
Nah.
ASG
J Forbes
I disagree that moral intuition is like one of the physical
senses. It seems to me that it is just another aspect of the
general cognitive process. We just happen to have a word called
"moral" that we use to describe some types of decisions. I
don't see how it's anything solid, discrete, that you can
actually separate from the rest of how our brains work. I don't
see that morals are "learned" any differently than other aspects
of behavior. By "learned", I mean that there is probably some
genetic dispositon toward certain behaviors, which may or may
not be neglected or reinforced by social learning.
I think you are trying to make morals into something more
certain than it is. We can probably describe an emergent
property of the mind, which we call "conscience", but trying to
pin it down is probably impossible...because it's not really
something definite. It's just a way of looking at how the mind
works, it is not really a separate part of the mind.
Jim
Ananda Gupta
>Ananda Gupta wrote:
>>
>I disagree that moral intuition is like one of the physical
>senses. It seems to me that it is just another aspect of the
>general cognitive process. We just happen to have a word called
>"moral" that we use to describe some types of decisions.
Not just decisions, of course... motives, and (arguably) ideas can be
described as moral or not.
>I
>don't see how it's anything solid, discrete, that you can
>actually separate from the rest of how our brains work. I don't
>see that morals are "learned" any differently than other aspects
>of behavior. By "learned", I mean that there is probably some
>genetic dispositon toward certain behaviors, which may or may
>not be neglected or reinforced by social learning.
Well, if you're a determinist too then of course you can't accept the idea
of moral facts. (Not saying you're a determinist, although the above
passage suggests that.) But I guess I think there is in fact something
meaningful, above and beyond physical and social analysis, about the fact
that almost no one in the U.S. today believes slavery is a good thing,
whereas 250 years ago exactly the opposite was true. I mean, sure, you can
explain it by means of behavior... someone had this weird idea, was good at
persuading people of it, and eventually it "caught on." I think of it as
moral advancement, progress, enlightenment, whatever. But I don't think we
should be indifferent towards that development.
>I think you are trying to make morals into something more
>certain than it is. We can probably describe an emergent
>property of the mind, which we call "conscience", but trying to
>pin it down is probably impossible...because it's not really
>something definite. It's just a way of looking at how the mind
>works, it is not really a separate part of the mind.
Well, one can say the same thing about vision or hearing; after all, when
we speak of vision, it's difficult to divorce that notion from the mind.
ASG
J Forbes
>
> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D419EF2...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >>>>
> >>>> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
> >>>
> >>> Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart
> >>> from us.
> >>
> >> Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture for fun.
> >
> >if torture for fun were *universally* immoral, no one would do
> >it....but facts show otherwise.
>
> Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally immoral, no one
> would do it? People do immoral things all the time.
Then how do you judge what is moral or immoral? By your
opinions? By an 11 judge panel? Is it written somewhere? Is a
conflicting moral standard written somewhere else?
>In another post I
> mentioned the idea that just as people have impaired vision, hearing, etc.,
> they can also have impaired consciences. Why are you (presumably) willing
> to accept the fallibility of other senses, but appeal to a simplistic
> argument from disagreement in the case of conscience?
We can check the function of the other senses reasonably well
using scientific methods. We know what senses are supposed to
do, and it is the independent of social norms.
Morals are highly dependent on social norms. How do you measure
"conscience"? Is there a standard test where you put the
subjects in controlled situations and observe their behavior,
and somehow measure their level of guilt emotional response?
> >
> >Among torturers, there may be some who find it morally repulsive
> >to torure without compensation, while others may find that
> >torturing is worth doing with or without payment.
>
> ... so? Scientists disagree about scientific facts all the time. People
> disagree about moral facts all the time too. Scientific disagreement
> doesn't entail that there are no scientific facts, and moral disagreement
> doesn't entail that there are no moral facts.
But how do you observe "moral facts"? Do you rely on the
effects of moral or immoral behavior? Do you judge this by
immediate benefit to the individual? By long term benefit to
the society at large? By short term benefit to the entire
population of the speices of man?
I don't see how you can nail it down....
> >>
> >> Just so -- without human perception, or awareness of the world around
> >> us, there wouldn't be any science. That perception is fallible, but
> >> that doesn't mean the reality we perceive is somehow subjective.
> >> Ditto for moral reality.
> >
> >What is moral for one person in one time/place is not
> >necessarily moral for another person in another time/place.
>
> This is just an assertion of moral relativism, not an argument. Don't get
> me wrong; I haven't really offered an argument either, just a statement of
> my view and reasons why things like e.g. moral disagreement aren't really
> good objections. But this does nothing to criticize that view. Of course,
> to me, this discussion is analogous to someone telling me that because
> people disagree sometimes about what they see, that means none of us really
> see anything. It's not clear how to go about such an argument.
How do we separate the observer from the observed? I can
understand how to do this with many different topics which
science is used to study. But I don't see how to separate the
morals of the observer from the study of morals.
I agree that there is a set of common human moral values, but it
is not absolute, and in situations of extreme hardship, they can
change drastically. We are dealing with people, who are very
complex...
> >The "laws" of behavior of physical matter appear to be
> >universal.
>
> As do moral propositions. Of course some people, such as creationists,
> would say that the laws of matter, etc., do not appear to be universal.
> They're wrong.
Where are the moral propositions written? What are the
exceptions? Remember, war is a very commonly accepted practice
among humans.
> > OTOH, human morals are widely variable
>
> By this you mean that people disagree. As before, so what? People
> disagree about all sorts of questions; that doesn't mean they have no
> answers.
Actually, people agree that morals are widely variable. They
generally agree that specific conditions must guide moral
decisions.
> >, and can
> >change in a specific person drastically depending on the
> >situation, or among different people in the same situation.
> >There is no absolute moral reality. Reality is that morals are
> >highly variable, although there is a fairly common core of moral
> >values among most well functioning societies.
>
> As before, I'd agree that large numbers of people disagree about moral
> propositions. That doesn't mean there aren't any moral propositions. And
> large groups of people do make (objective) moral progress, e.g. the West's
> abandonment of slavery.
Yes, society has a lot to do with standardizing morals, and
enforcing acceptable behavior. But do *all* westerners really
feel that slavery is always wrong?
> >>> , but the reliability of
> >>> science doesn't come from the consistency of people, it comes from
> >>> the consistency of the universe ...
> >>
> >> I would say much the same thing about moral facts.
> >
> >You'd probably be wrong.
>
> Nah.
Well then, show me the book!
:)
Jim
drchaffee
argument whether or not one believes in an objective morality - since one
doesn't have to buy the postulates to play with them.
I do agree with you that atheism doesn't confine one to moral relativism. I
don't agree that there is an objective morality.
Cheers,
Dave
J Forbes
>
> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D41D777...@yahoo.com>:
>
> >Ananda Gupta wrote:
> >>
>
> >I disagree that moral intuition is like one of the physical
> >senses. It seems to me that it is just another aspect of the
> >general cognitive process. We just happen to have a word called
> >"moral" that we use to describe some types of decisions.
>
> Not just decisions, of course... motives, and (arguably) ideas can be
> described as moral or not.
I think this is where I really wasn't following what you have
been saying...I did some reading of the articles at the link you
provided, and now I think I have a better understanding of what
you're talking about.
Of course, I still think that moral intuition is not a separate
sense, but instead is just part of the general cognitive
process. We can perhaps isolate it to some extent...but it
doesn't seem to me to be anything special, or different. It is
just another bit of non-conscious (different word from
conscience) mental processing. It varies by who we are and how
we're raised...which is probably why there is so much conflict
in the world....
> >I
> >don't see how it's anything solid, discrete, that you can
> >actually separate from the rest of how our brains work. I don't
> >see that morals are "learned" any differently than other aspects
> >of behavior. By "learned", I mean that there is probably some
> >genetic dispositon toward certain behaviors, which may or may
> >not be neglected or reinforced by social learning.
>
> Well, if you're a determinist too then of course you can't accept the idea
> of moral facts. (Not saying you're a determinist, although the above
> passage suggests that.) But I guess I think there is in fact something
> meaningful, above and beyond physical and social analysis, about the fact
> that almost no one in the U.S. today believes slavery is a good thing,
> whereas 250 years ago exactly the opposite was true. I mean, sure, you can
> explain it by means of behavior... someone had this weird idea, was good at
> persuading people of it, and eventually it "caught on." I think of it as
> moral advancement, progress, enlightenment, whatever. But I don't think we
> should be indifferent towards that development.
I'll do a change in midstream here, and agree with you. Hope
you don't mind :)
It appears that as a nation, over time, we are learning some
objective moral facts.
> >I think you are trying to make morals into something more
> >certain than it is. We can probably describe an emergent
> >property of the mind, which we call "conscience", but trying to
> >pin it down is probably impossible...because it's not really
> >something definite. It's just a way of looking at how the mind
> >works, it is not really a separate part of the mind.
>
> Well, one can say the same thing about vision or hearing; after all, when
> we speak of vision, it's difficult to divorce that notion from the mind.
Perhaps I'm confusing moral "ideas" with human behavior...
Jim
Brian Henderson
wrote:
>A number of posters here seem to think that atheism commits them to moral
>relativism, or vice versa (and by atheism I just mean the denial of any
>omniscient, omnipotent beings). I am curious as to the general sense of
>the group -- how common is it, in posters' experience, that atheists are
>also moral relativists?
Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
over this.
Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
which are detrimental are discarded.
J Forbes
After reading up some on relativism, moral objectivity, and
moral subjectivity, I've found some intersting things out.
I started with your position also...but I think I made the
mistake of assuming that "an objective morality" means "one
absolute objective morality". Instead, it means that there are
*some* objective moral values. Also, this does not really apply
to observed human behavior, as much as it applies to philosophy
of preferred behavior.
It turns out that indeed there seems to be moral objectivity.
The moral values found objectively, happen to be similar to many
of the core moral values in most societies. What a
coincidence! This merely shows that somehow humans have figured
out what some objective morals are (perhaps by non-conscious
"moral intuition", perhaps by conscious philosophical
pondering, probaby actually by both methods).
I've sure been confused by the terms used in this branch of
discussion....there is some clarification to be found in the
"Ethics" papers at:
http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/papers.htm
as Ananda suggested.
Jim
J Forbes
>
> On Thu, 25 Jul 2002 05:48:21 GMT, a...@verizon.net (Ananda Gupta)
> wrote:
>
> >A number of posters here seem to think that atheism commits them to moral
> >relativism, or vice versa (and by atheism I just mean the denial of any
> >omniscient, omnipotent beings). I am curious as to the general sense of
> >the group -- how common is it, in posters' experience, that atheists are
> >also moral relativists?
>
> Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
> definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
> that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
> over this.
How about, there are *some* moral values that are objective;
they are independent of place and time. Humans do not always
have or behave according to these objective moral values, but
the values are there all the same.
> Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
> help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
> which are detrimental are discarded.
Observed human behavoir follows the pattern you describe...but
human behavior is not always in line with objective morality.
The important thing to remember is that not *all* moral values
are objective. Some moral values are indeed subjective, so
there is some moral relativism in a world which contains some
objective morality.
As usual, both sides are right to some extent :)
Jim
Ananda Gupta
<jge4kukpepll17r0t...@4ax.com>:
>On Thu, 25 Jul 2002 05:48:21 GMT, a...@verizon.net (Ananda Gupta)
>wrote:
>
>Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
>definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
>that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
>over this.
Yep, that's moral relativism :)
>Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
>help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
>which are detrimental are discarded.
I assume you mean "detrimental" in an evolutionary sense, not in a moral
sense. Regardless, this may be a good description of how people's moral
views come about, but it has nothing to do with the question of whether
moral facts exist.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
<ovp09.28228$Fq6.2...@news2.west.cox.net>:
> Well, at any rate, I hope I've shown that the argument from evil is a
> good argument whether or not one believes in an objective morality -
> since one doesn't have to buy the postulates to play with them.
Indeed you have.
ASG
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D419EF2...@yahoo.com>:
>>>>>
>>>>> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
>>>>
>>>> Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates reliably apart
>>>> from us.
>>>
>>> Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture for fun.
>>
>>if torture for fun were *universally* immoral, no one would do
>>it....but facts show otherwise.
> Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally immoral, no one
> would do it? People do immoral things all the time. In another post I
> mentioned the idea that just as people have impaired vision, hearing, etc.,
> they can also have impaired consciences. Why are you (presumably) willing
> to accept the fallibility of other senses, but appeal to a simplistic
> argument from disagreement in the case of conscience?
We can set up a test to see if gravity works. We can do likewise for speed
of light, etc. What's your test for objective morality?
<snip>
Ananda Gupta
<mTA09.30717$ND5.2...@e3500-atl2.usenetserver.com>:
>Ananda Gupta <a...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D419EF2...@yahoo.com>:
>
>
>> Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally immoral, no
>> one would do it? People do immoral things all the time. In another
>> post I mentioned the idea that just as people have impaired vision,
>> hearing, etc., they can also have impaired consciences. Why are you
>> (presumably) willing to accept the fallibility of other senses, but
>> appeal to a simplistic argument from disagreement in the case of
>> conscience?
>
>We can set up a test to see if gravity works. We can do likewise for
>speed of light, etc. What's your test for objective morality?
Reflection. Drawing out the consequences of certain moral views.
Discussion with others who do not agree. Thought experiments. Here is a
test for objective morality: suppose an alien race comes to orbit Earth and
says, "We are going to destroy the entire planet unless you press this big
blue button. Next to the big blue button is a kitten. You can either
strangle the kitten and then press the button, or just press the button."
Which course should you take?
If you say you should go ahead and strangle the kitten, or that you might
as well flip a coin, then that is the equivalent of an odd result in the
gravity test. Instead of saying, "Oh, gee, there's no gravity," we start
looking for strings attached to the ball, for weird magnetic fields, etc.
We might also look for experimenter bias. If you just press the button,
that's the equivalent of the ball falling to the ground.
Needless to say, morals are not exactly like science (although one of the
philosophers I mentioned, G.E. Moore, thought they were), so I don't claim
the analogy above is perfect. The point is that there are such things as
experiments in morality; they're thought experiments, and we apply our
consciences and see whether we are willing to accept the consequences.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
pieces at the link I gave! :) How novel, for Usenet.
drchaffee
"J Forbes" <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:3D42CEF7...@yahoo.com...
> drchaffee wrote:
<snip interesting comments>
> I've sure been confused by the terms used in this branch of
> discussion....there is some clarification to be found in the
> "Ethics" papers at:
>
> http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/papers.htm
Thanks, Jim. I'll check out the link. (I hope Ananda is sittin' down.)
>
> as Ananda suggested.
>
> Jim
drchaffee
Is moral realism just the claim that "mature, healthy" humans have a
tendency to consider the consequences of an action or idea, and potentially
modify their behavior or thoughts based on the perceived consequences? Does
it just mean that a person feels "good" about something and "bad" about
something else (and this may be different from person to person)?
Thanks,
Dave
Ananda Gupta
<iJB09.29173$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
> Which papers in particular did you find good for definitional
> background?
>
> Is moral realism just the claim that "mature, healthy" humans have a
> tendency to consider the consequences of an action or idea, and
> potentially modify their behavior or thoughts based on the perceived
> consequences?
No -- moral realism is a meta-ethical claim (an ethical claim is "We should
do X", a meta-ethical claim is "We know we should do X because of Y" or
"The nature of the proposition that we should do X is Z".). The claim you
give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
Moral realism makes the claim that there are moral facts -- that is, at
least some moral propositions are true or false. There is disagreement
among moral realists as to whether *all* moral propositions are true or
false, and of course there is some disagreement as to how we know which
they are.
Moral subjectivism makes the opposite claim, in a variety of ways: some
subjectivists think that moral claims are expressions of emotion, some
think they are totally meaningless, and some think that they can be true or
false but that truth or falsity depends on someone's perspective (perhaps
the individual's, or the majority of people in a society, etc.).
> Does it just mean that a person feels "good" about
> something and "bad" about something else (and this may be different
> from person to person)?
No -- the idea that when someone says "X is good", he means "X makes me
feel good" or "I like X" is a type of subjectivism, sometimes called
emotivism. Moral realism would hold that a person's feelings about the
goodness of X are irrelevant to its actual goodness of X. There has been a
lot of work done lately on emotions, though, with some philosophers arguing
that moral realism is true AND that emotions, not some intuitive faculty
like I've been advocating, are the means by which we become aware of moral
facts. I'm not especially familiar with that view but it doesn't seem very
plausible to me.
ASG
Andrew Cady
> prab...@shamrocksgf.com wrote in
> <mTA09.30717$ND5.2...@e3500-atl2.usenetserver.com>:
>
> > We can set up a test to see if gravity works. We can do likewise
> > for speed of light, etc. What's your test for objective morality?
>
> Reflection. Drawing out the consequences of certain moral views.
> Discussion with others who do not agree. Thought experiments.
This would work even if the choices offered have nothing to do with
morality (press one button for vanilla, another for chocolate...). A
thought experiment can determine our preferences, but it seems to me
the very definition of objective morality is morality independent of
what any group or individual prefers. How do you test that? Or do
you disagree with that characterization?
--
(let ((let '`(let ((let ',let)) ,let))) `(let ((let ',let)) ,let))
Ananda Gupta
>> Reflection. Drawing out the consequences of certain moral views.
>> Discussion with others who do not agree. Thought experiments.
>
>This would work even if the choices offered have nothing to do with
>morality (press one button for vanilla, another for chocolate...).\
True, although in those cases you would not be using your moral sense, but
just deciding which flavor you liked better. Of course some subjectivists
will claim that it's the same thing going on, but I don't think so -- after
all, I wouldn't bother trying to persuade you that chocolate is better than
vanilla, but I might very well try to persuade you that e.g. racism is bad.
>A
>thought experiment can determine our preferences, but it seems to me
>the very definition of objective morality is morality independent of
>what any group or individual prefers. How do you test that? Or do
>you disagree with that characterization?
No, I don't disagree with that characterization.
Part of the confusion here involves the language, specifically "test" --
what you're really asking is how do we determine whether a given moral
proposition is true or false. In another post I mentioned that often
"tests", even scientific ones, test the observer more than they do the
proposition in question; for example, if I dropped a ball from four feet
up, and it didn't fall, then rather than rejecting gravity we would
probably suspect a trick of some kind. Similarly, if someone's reaction to
a thought experiment reveals that he thinks it's morally good to torture
people for fun, we wouldn't take that as a reason to doubt the contrary;
we'd wonder what the hell was wrong with that guy.
Thought experiments differ from scientific experiments in a very important
way: they are essentially practice for our conscience, whereas scientific
experiments aren't done for the sake of the scientist (except in school, of
course). Nonetheless, I argue they both bring us real knowledge. The
types of arguments that result, however, are very different, because many
moral propositions are fundamentally true or false -- they can't really be
argued against.
ASG
drchaffee
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <iJB09.29173$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
> > Which papers in particular did you find good for definitional
> > background?
> >
> > Is moral realism just the claim that "mature, healthy" humans have a
> > tendency to consider the consequences of an action or idea, and
> > potentially modify their behavior or thoughts based on the perceived
> > consequences?
>
> No -- moral realism is a meta-ethical claim (an ethical claim is "We
should
> do X", a meta-ethical claim is "We know we should do X because of Y" or
> "The nature of the proposition that we should do X is Z".).
Okay, that's part of what we might call a misunderstanding. I agree that
ethics is the adventure of telling people what they ought to do. Perhaps,
since you make a meta-ethical claim, you are an "ethical realist"?
Does a moral realist believe that morality exists independent of humanity?
Does objective morality require a soul or some other supernatural
(non-physical) construct to serve as the medium in which it exists? I'm
trying to figure out why moral realism can't just boil down to environment,
brain chemistry, and evolutionary heritage.
> The claim you
> give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
Yes ... I was talking about what I believe is the case, rather than what
perhaps ought to be the case. That, for me, has been a distinction between
morality and ethics.
> Moral realism makes the claim that there are moral facts -- that is, at
> least some moral propositions are true or false.
Does this mean that these moral facts are absolute?
> There is disagreement
> among moral realists as to whether *all* moral propositions are true or
> false, and of course there is some disagreement as to how we know which
> they are.
What side of that question are you on? It seems odd to support the idea that
only some moral propositions are true or false. That's seems like saying
some of the universe is an illusion - science will just study the real"
part.
> Moral subjectivism makes the opposite claim, in a variety of ways: some
> subjectivists think that moral claims are expressions of emotion, some
> think they are totally meaningless, and some think that they can be true
or
> false but that truth or falsity depends on someone's perspective (perhaps
> the individual's, or the majority of people in a society, etc.).
>
> > Does it just mean that a person feels "good" about
> > something and "bad" about something else (and this may be different
> > from person to person)?
>
> No -- the idea that when someone says "X is good", he means "X makes me
> feel good" or "I like X" is a type of subjectivism, sometimes called
> emotivism. Moral realism would hold that a person's feelings about the
> goodness of X are irrelevant to its actual goodness of X. There has been
a
> lot of work done lately on emotions, though, with some philosophers
arguing
> that moral realism is true AND that emotions, not some intuitive faculty
> like I've been advocating, are the means by which we become aware of moral
> facts. I'm not especially familiar with that view but it doesn't seem
very
> plausible to me.
>
> ASG
Thanks for bearing with me here. Also thanks for providing a
thought-provoking topic. Seems we've been running low on those.
Dave
Ananda Gupta
<oiH09.30791$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>> No -- moral realism is a meta-ethical claim (an ethical claim is "We
>> should do X", a meta-ethical claim is "We know we should do X because
>> of Y" or "The nature of the proposition that we should do X is Z".).
>
>Okay, that's part of what we might call a misunderstanding. I agree that
>ethics is the adventure of telling people what they ought to do.
>Perhaps, since you make a meta-ethical claim, you are an "ethical
>realist"?
Could be. I regard "ethical" and "moral" as synonyms.
>Does a moral realist believe that morality exists independent of
>humanity?
Yep.
>Does objective morality require a soul or some other
>supernatural (non-physical) construct to serve as the medium in which it
>exists?
That is an extreeeeeeeemely complicated question, because it opens up the
entire area of philosophy of mind. My short answer is "yes," although I do
not accept your equation of "non-physical" with "supernatural." Are
"redness" or "love" supernatural? Or "the history of France"?
My own view is that people have minds, and there are such things as mental
phenomena, and these phenomena are not physical. Certain physical objects
have the property called "consciousness." (This view is called "property
dualism" in the literature.) I hold this view not because I find it
especially attractive but because the alternatives are unacceptable. A
hundred years ago this was a very popular view. Nowadays it is not chic at
all, although it is making a comeback. I suppose one could think of this
view as supernaturalistic, although I don't think it is.
That, in fact, could be the heart of an entirely different thread -- does
atheism, or more generally naturalism, require one to deny any theory of
the mind that accepts the existence or some "special nature" of mental
phenomena? I don't think it does, but I am much less sure of that.
>I'm trying to figure out why moral realism can't just boil down
>to environment, brain chemistry, and evolutionary heritage.
I don't really see the connection. The things you mention influence a
person's development, but what has that to do with what we ought to do?
>> The claim you
>> give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
>
>Yes ... I was talking about what I believe is the case, rather than what
>perhaps ought to be the case. That, for me, has been a distinction
>between morality and ethics.
Oh, that's interesting. I am sniffing another misunderstanding. I've
never heard of drawing that distinction before. What exactly is the
difference in your view?
>> Moral realism makes the claim that there are moral facts -- that is,
>> at least some moral propositions are true or false.
>
>Does this mean that these moral facts are absolute?
Yep.
>> There is disagreement
>> among moral realists as to whether *all* moral propositions are true
>> or false, and of course there is some disagreement as to how we know
>> which they are.
>
>What side of that question are you on? It seems odd to support the idea
>that only some moral propositions are true or false. That's seems like
>saying some of the universe is an illusion - science will just study the
>real" part.
I agree it seems odd. I tend towards the view that all (interesting) moral
propositions are true or false.
<snip stuff about emotions>
>Thanks for bearing with me here. Also thanks for providing a
>thought-provoking topic. Seems we've been running low on those.
I'm glad you think it is thought-provoking; I wasn't sure whether it was on
topic, but the direction we're headed (re: supernaturalism, etc.) is pretty
important to atheists. To tie it together: the problem I suspect most
atheists would have with any kind of dualism (that is, any view advocating
the existence of the mind apart from the body) is that it opens the door to
all sorts of wacky religious phenomena. That's why I am so enamored of
arguments like the argument from evil and the argument from nonbelief; they
allow me to maintain some views that strict naturalists might find sketchy
while also rejecting theism, and remain consistent to boot.
ASG
drchaffee
enough ...
"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:Xns9258E30...@199.45.49.11...
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <oiH09.30791$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
> >> No -- moral realism is a meta-ethical claim (an ethical claim is "We
> >> should do X", a meta-ethical claim is "We know we should do X because
> >> of Y" or "The nature of the proposition that we should do X is Z".).
> >
> >Okay, that's part of what we might call a misunderstanding. I agree that
> >ethics is the adventure of telling people what they ought to do.
> >Perhaps, since you make a meta-ethical claim, you are an "ethical
> >realist"?
>
> Could be. I regard "ethical" and "moral" as synonyms.
>
> >Does a moral realist believe that morality exists independent of
> >humanity?
>
> Yep.
Independent of life? (What are some moral propositions for this case, or the
case independent of humans?)
> >Does objective morality require a soul or some other
> >supernatural (non-physical) construct to serve as the medium in which it
> >exists?
>
> That is an extreeeeeeeemely complicated question, because it opens up the
> entire area of philosophy of mind. My short answer is "yes," although I
do
> not accept your equation of "non-physical" with "supernatural." Are
> "redness" or "love" supernatural? Or "the history of France"?
Um ... <how would you say it?> ... Yep!
> My own view is that people have minds, and there are such things as mental
> phenomena, and these phenomena are not physical. Certain physical objects
> have the property called "consciousness." (This view is called "property
> dualism" in the literature.) I hold this view not because I find it
> especially attractive but because the alternatives are unacceptable. A
> hundred years ago this was a very popular view. Nowadays it is not chic
at
> all, although it is making a comeback. I suppose one could think of this
> view as supernaturalistic, although I don't think it is.
Well, being an atheist, I'm not terribly concerned with a view's popularity.
I am not a dualist, I am a materialist. I don't deny that there could be an
aspect of nature we cannot or do not perceive, but that being the case, I
have no reason to believe it, so I could be considered an agnostic
materialist. However, if we were to switch on a new aspect of nature sensing
capability, I would carefully examine the hypothesis that the new aspect is
both natural and material. If one wishes to suppose that the electrochemical
signals whizzing around in the neurons of the brain amount to a "higher" or
"different" plane of reality, e.g. consciousness, I still don't believe it
escapes materialism - just as chemistry doesn't escape physics. Physics and
chemistry can be profitably studied independently from one another, though
this doesn't cast them in a dualist light or imply that the scientists are
to think of them as being independent - they can just treat them as if they
were independent. (I'll reference this point again at the end.) (Also, other
scientists would work on the link between the two disciplines, explaining
the starting points of chemistry with a more fundamental causes from
physics.)
> That, in fact, could be the heart of an entirely different thread -- does
> atheism, or more generally naturalism, require one to deny any theory of
> the mind that accepts the existence or some "special nature" of mental
> phenomena? I don't think it does, but I am much less sure of that.
I think atheists can believe in the supernatural - as perhaps you do - so I
wouldn't say naturalism is a necessary generalization of atheism. If one
could produce a cogent argument for a belief in something supernatural, a
theist would be well served by advancing it.
> >I'm trying to figure out why moral realism can't just boil down
> >to environment, brain chemistry, and evolutionary heritage.
>
> I don't really see the connection. The things you mention influence a
> person's development, but what has that to do with what we ought to do?
I believe a person's development determines their (personal) ethical
opinions.
> >> The claim you
> >> give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
> >
> >Yes ... I was talking about what I believe is the case, rather than what
> >perhaps ought to be the case. That, for me, has been a distinction
> >between morality and ethics.
>
> Oh, that's interesting. I am sniffing another misunderstanding. I've
> never heard of drawing that distinction before. What exactly is the
> difference in your view?
The exact difference: Is vs. Ought. The former is the reality that we
sometimes consider consequences of actions and ideas against some acquired
(learned, inherited) measuring sticks (happiness, goodness, beauty, etc.).
(Naturally, I maintain the individualistic nature of the enterprise, making
it a relative morality.) The latter is the theory that given the unlikely
situation where we know all the facts, and have thought of all the possible
actions we could take, that there is a (perhaps sanctioned) procedure we
should follow to single out the proper course of action. (This is relative
ethics, unless one argues that everyone should adopt the same procedure for
a particular situation or that a person should use the same procedure in all
situations. For example, with some decisions I might weigh the "goodness" of
an action heavily regarding one person, and less heavily for another, and
affix a happiness criteria to another aspect of the proposed action.)
Consider the following question: "Should I slaughter tens of thousands of
civilian men, women, and children?" I don't presume to be able to answer the
question authoritatively - meaning that I can answer it, and even attempt to
persuade you to my answer, but I don't demand or presume the right to be
your authority on the matter. If I could demonstrate years of studying the
question, had praise from those I'd counseled, diplomas and books on the
subject, perhaps I'd be viewed as an expert and treated as an authority, but
this is a weaker sense of authority which is more like acclaim. I do answer
the question in the negative, however, as I don't see that it is the case
that I should slaughter a bunch of civilians. It could be that a
circumstance would have one reconsider the question. What if, for example,
this slaughter of tens of thousands saved more lives than were lost? Many
argue that dropping the hydrogen bombs on Japan resulted in a net savings of
lives as it helped close out World War II. None seem to doubt that the Axis
powers were close to this technology or that they would have employed the
weapon in a similar style. My purpose is, of course, not to debate this
particular question, but to illustrate the concepts towards a moral
proposition. There are some who would rather die themselves than take a
life. There are some who would take a life of one's ideological opponent -
even if they presented no bodily threat. That even a question as important
as this is answered, and I emphasize IS answered, in a relative sense -
completely overwhelms and obviates consideration of the notion that perhaps,
maybe, possibly, conjecturally one definitely ought to have answered the
question using the procedure outlined in an objectivist's scholarly, though
controversial effort: "How Every Human Should Decide Whether or Not to Take
the Lives of Civilians if my Guess at the Unknown Truthfulness of all
Employed Moral Propositions is Correct and I've Either Sufficiently Guessed
the Context of the Question as it Pertains to You or have Shown that Context
Doesn't Matter for Your Particular Context." (Note: I admit the proceeding
sentence is both long and ugly.)
> >> Moral realism makes the claim that there are moral facts -- that is,
> >> at least some moral propositions are true or false.
So, unlike the theist, you are perhaps resigned to the situation where you
are bereft an authority to adjudicate the truthfulness or a moral
proposition. More strongly, you are perhaps resigned to conundrums. It seems
this would make it hard to produce evidence for your claim. Science, as I
understand it, has given up it's formal mission of discovering "Truth with a
capital T". Science is in the business of predicting the outcome of
experiments. Science is tentative and provisional - theories are supplanted
or supported (rather than proven), and there are no absolute authorities
(though experts abound:). Leaving objective and absolute ethics behind for a
majority vote ethics doesn't seem very satisfying.
> >Does this mean that these moral facts are absolute?
>
> Yep.
Does this mean that Jim was mistaken in interpreting your moral realism to
not mean one absolute morality (ethics)? (Or perhaps I misunderstood Jim.)
> >> There is disagreement
> >> among moral realists as to whether *all* moral propositions are true
> >> or false, and of course there is some disagreement as to how we know
> >> which they are.
> >
> >What side of that question are you on? It seems odd to support the idea
> >that only some moral propositions are true or false. That's seems like
> >saying some of the universe is an illusion - science will just study the
> >real" part.
>
> I agree it seems odd. I tend towards the view that all (interesting)
moral
> propositions are true or false.
If person A believes this, and person B does not, they are nevertheless
likely to wrangle over the question, invent a scheme to answer it in a
fashion agreeable to them, and yet aren't privy to the alleged absolute and
correct answer. If that is the case, what's the practical difference between
moral realism and it's opponents? (Not that you'd suggest this, but I don't
consider a potential "cosmic Zen feeling of Divine Purpose and Reality" to
be practical.)
> <snip stuff about emotions>
>
> >Thanks for bearing with me here. Also thanks for providing a
> >thought-provoking topic. Seems we've been running low on those.
>
> I'm glad you think it is thought-provoking; I wasn't sure whether it was
on
> topic, but the direction we're headed (re: supernaturalism, etc.) is
pretty
> important to atheists. To tie it together: the problem I suspect most
> atheists would have with any kind of dualism (that is, any view advocating
> the existence of the mind apart from the body) is that it opens the door
to
> all sorts of wacky religious phenomena. That's why I am so enamored of
> arguments like the argument from evil and the argument from nonbelief;
they
> allow me to maintain some views that strict naturalists might find sketchy
> while also rejecting theism, and remain consistent to boot.
Again, perhaps if you considered the mind as just another layer of
complexity built upon, and subject to, the physical; then you could have the
mind (consciousness) - and study it independently of biochemistry. (Maybe we
could call it psychology?) This wouldn't be dualism, but it would justify
independent study. Perhaps, in some cases, we are just using similar terms
differently. Does what I've just described equate to "property dualism"?
(Philosophy - the art of confusing, conflating, and/or inflating definitions
to at least book length!)
> ASG
Thanks again for your considered reply.
Dave
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
> prab...@shamrocksgf.com wrote in
> <mTA09.30717$ND5.2...@e3500-atl2.usenetserver.com>:
>>Ananda Gupta <a...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in <3D419EF2...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>>
>>> Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally immoral, no
>>> one would do it? People do immoral things all the time. In another
>>> post I mentioned the idea that just as people have impaired vision,
>>> hearing, etc., they can also have impaired consciences. Why are you
>>> (presumably) willing to accept the fallibility of other senses, but
>>> appeal to a simplistic argument from disagreement in the case of
>>> conscience?
>>
>>We can set up a test to see if gravity works. We can do likewise for
>>speed of light, etc. What's your test for objective morality?
> Reflection. Drawing out the consequences of certain moral views.
> Discussion with others who do not agree. Thought experiments.
None of the above are "tests."
Here is a
> test for objective morality: suppose an alien race comes to orbit Earth and
> says, "We are going to destroy the entire planet unless you press this big
> blue button. Next to the big blue button is a kitten. You can either
> strangle the kitten and then press the button, or just press the button."
> Which course should you take?
> If you say you should go ahead and strangle the kitten, or that you might
> as well flip a coin, then that is the equivalent of an odd result in the
> gravity test. Instead of saying, "Oh, gee, there's no gravity," we start
> looking for strings attached to the ball, for weird magnetic fields, etc.
> We might also look for experimenter bias. If you just press the button,
> that's the equivalent of the ball falling to the ground.
even that's not a valid test for several reasons, a couple of which are:
#1 The kitten is extraneous (sp?) in that you already have a situation set
up, i.e. "hit the button and save the planet or not hit it and the planet is
destroyed."
#2 There's no correlation shown betwen the fact that "90% of the people hit
the button and 10% let the planet be destroyed" and the theory that "an
objective morality exists." It could mean that 10% had a stronger desire to
see the best fireworks show around, it could mean that 90% of the people
hated seeing so much energy wasted during an energy crisis, etc, etc.
> Needless to say, morals are not exactly like science (although one of the
> philosophers I mentioned, G.E. Moore, thought they were), so I don't claim
> the analogy above is perfect. The point is that there are such things as
> experiments in morality; they're thought experiments, and we apply our
> consciences and see whether we are willing to accept the consequences.
#1 Thought experiments do little without actual experiments to back them up.
#2 "Apply our conciences..." only shows if that one person has a consistent
set of morals but does nothing to show that objective morals exist.
J Forbes
>
> By the way, I confess to surprise that someone actually READ some of the
> pieces at the link I gave! :) How novel, for Usenet.
Yeah, I like to blow people's minds by actually thinking, not
just arguing...sometimes the other guy is right, and I learn
something!
:)
Jim
J Forbes
Dave-
I read through "the subjectivist's dilemna", and mostly thru
"moral objectivism".
I came to realize that the philosophers talk about "ought",
while most of us talk about "is".
Jim
Ananda Gupta
<kcN09.33048$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>Gee, this one came out kind of long - I hope it's coherent and
>interesting enough ...
>
>"Ananda Gupta" <a...@verizon.net> wrote in message
>news:Xns9258E30...@199.45.49.11...
>> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
>> <oiH09.30791$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>>
>>>> No -- moral realism is a meta-ethical claim (an ethical claim is "We
>>>> should do X", a meta-ethical claim is "We know we should do X
>>>> because of Y" or "The nature of the proposition that we should do X
>>>> is Z".).
>>>
>>> Okay, that's part of what we might call a misunderstanding. I agree
>>> that ethics is the adventure of telling people what they ought to do.
>>> Perhaps, since you make a meta-ethical claim, you are an "ethical
>>> realist"?
>>
>> Could be. I regard "ethical" and "moral" as synonyms.
>>
>>> Does a moral realist believe that morality exists independent of
>>> humanity?
>>
>> Yep.
>
>Independent of life? (What are some moral propositions for this case, or
>the case independent of humans?)
Sure, just as there'd still be "red" if there were no one to see it. A
meaningful moral proposition in that case might be "If humans were to come
into existence, they shouldn't torture people for fun."
>>> Does objective morality require a soul or some other
>>> supernatural (non-physical) construct to serve as the medium in which
>>> it exists?
>>
>> That is an extreeeeeeeemely complicated question, because it opens up
>> the entire area of philosophy of mind. My short answer is "yes,"
>> although I do not accept your equation of "non-physical" with
>> "supernatural." Are "redness" or "love" supernatural? Or "the
>> history of France"?
>
>Um ... <how would you say it?> ... Yep!
You really think the history of France is supernatural? What about
emotions? Are those supernatural too?
>> My own view is that people have minds, and there are such things as
>> mental phenomena, and these phenomena are not physical. Certain
>> physical objects have the property called "consciousness." (This view
>> is called "property dualism" in the literature.) I hold this view not
>> because I find it especially attractive but because the alternatives
>> are unacceptable. A hundred years ago this was a very popular view.
>> Nowadays it is not chic at all, although it is making a comeback. I
>> suppose one could think of this view as supernaturalistic, although I
>> don't think it is.
>
>Well, being an atheist, I'm not terribly concerned with a view's
>popularity. I am not a dualist, I am a materialist.
Yeah, I sorta figured. :) I didn't mention the popularity as a reason to
believe one view or the other; I just wanted to put it in context a bit.
> I don't deny that
>there could be an aspect of nature we cannot or do not perceive, but
>that being the case, I have no reason to believe it, so I could be
>considered an agnostic materialist. However, if we were to switch on a
>new aspect of nature sensing capability, I would carefully examine the
>hypothesis that the new aspect is both natural and material. If one
>wishes to suppose that the electrochemical signals whizzing around in
>the neurons of the brain amount to a "higher" or "different" plane of
>reality, e.g. consciousness, I still don't believe it escapes
>materialism - just as chemistry doesn't escape physics.
Well, I don't want to characterize my view as believing in a "higher plane"
-- that's more along the lines of Cartesian dualism, which holds that minds
are actually entities unto themselves, and discretely different from
bodies. That's a little weird. Property dualism is sort of a compromise
view.
>> That, in fact, could be the heart of an entirely different thread --
>> does atheism, or more generally naturalism, require one to deny any
>> theory of the mind that accepts the existence or some "special nature"
>> of mental phenomena? I don't think it does, but I am much less sure
>> of that.
>
>I think atheists can believe in the supernatural - as perhaps you do -
>so I wouldn't say naturalism is a necessary generalization of atheism.
>If one could produce a cogent argument for a belief in something
>supernatural, a theist would be well served by advancing it.
Well, my own definition of "supernatural" is sort of rule-based. If there
are in principle some rules that X's behavior follows, X is not
supernatural. If there aren't, it is. I hadn't really thought about this
much before, though. But this way things like ghosts and God and the
Easter Bunny are supernatural, because there's no set of rules that one can
even in principle specify as to their behavior, whereas with things like
"red" and "the history of France" and "emotion" there are.
>>>> The claim you
>>>> give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
>>>
>>> Yes ... I was talking about what I believe is the case, rather than
>>> what perhaps ought to be the case. That, for me, has been a
>>> distinction between morality and ethics.
>>
>> Oh, that's interesting. I am sniffing another misunderstanding. I've
>> never heard of drawing that distinction before. What exactly is the
>> difference in your view?
>
>The exact difference: Is vs. Ought.
OK -- now I understand. I was confused because in philosophy both morality
and ethics have to do with the "ought" side, and indeed most philosophers
regard them as synonyms (although some, particularly Aristotelians and
their modern descendants the "virtue theorists", would not).
>"Should I slaughter tens of thousands of
>civilian men, women, and children?" I don't presume to be able to answer
>the question authoritatively - meaning that I can answer it, and even
>attempt to persuade you to my answer, but I don't demand or presume the
>right to be your authority on the matter. If I could demonstrate years
>of studying the question, had praise from those I'd counseled, diplomas
>and books on the subject, perhaps I'd be viewed as an expert and treated
>as an authority, but this is a weaker sense of authority which is more
>like acclaim.
Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy anyway, so while I might be more
disposed to pay attention to you, I'd have to resist the temptation to
think of you as more persuasive than someone less credentialed who was
saying the same thing.
> I do answer the question in the negative, however, as I
>don't see that it is the case that I should slaughter a bunch of
>civilians. It could be that a circumstance would have one reconsider the
>question.
Of course, that changes the question. "If I drop this ball, it will fall
to the ground" is true on Earth and false in lunar orbit. That's why
philosophers are very careful about specifying the questions they ask -- or
should be, anyway. However, many people assume that when no other
circumstances are specified, there's an implicit "all else equal" in there.
If that's how the common discourse works, then I think it's clear the
answer to your question is "no", and I don't see why anyone would be
uncomfortable in asserting that regardless of authority.
> What if, for example, this slaughter of tens of thousands
>saved more lives than were lost? Many argue that dropping the hydrogen
>bombs on Japan resulted in a net savings of lives as it helped close out
>World War II.
Indeed... and then some people find it counterintuitive to count up net
savings of lives. They dicker back and forth offering examples of why
these contrasting views are unacceptable, all the while implicitly
appealing to each other's conscience. For example, if I were to take the
view that dropping the A-bomb on Japan was a bad thing, you might appeal to
my intuition by saying that more lives were saved, on net. I might then
ask whether it's always better to save more lives on net, and raise some
kind of thought experiment (e.g. the old organ donation one, in which
you're a surgeon and you can go out and kill someone and steal his organs,
transplant them into five others who need them, and thereby save four lives
on net). Again this appeals to your intuition that this would be wrong,
and I'm exercising my own intuition that you would find such a result
distasteful.
>There are
>some who would rather die themselves than take a life. There are some
>who would take a life of one's ideological opponent - even if they
>presented no bodily threat. That even a question as important as this is
>answered, and I emphasize IS answered, in a relative sense - completely
>overwhelms and obviates consideration of the notion that perhaps, maybe,
>possibly, conjecturally one definitely ought to have answered the
>question using the procedure outlined in an objectivist's scholarly,
>though controversial effort: "How Every Human Should Decide Whether or
>Not to Take the Lives of Civilians if my Guess at the Unknown
>Truthfulness of all Employed Moral Propositions is Correct and I've
>Either Sufficiently Guessed the Context of the Question as it Pertains
>to You or have Shown that Context Doesn't Matter for Your Particular
>Context." (Note: I admit the proceeding sentence is both long and ugly.)
Rather than answer this objection at length here, I'll refer you to a paper
on the site I linked. The paper is "Reason, Objectivity, and Goodness."
You can read the whole thing if you like, but the salient point with regard
to the above parasentence is the section entitled "Objection #4: The plea
for rules."
>>>> Moral realism makes the claim that there are moral facts -- that is,
>>>> at least some moral propositions are true or false.
>
>So, unlike the theist, you are perhaps resigned to the situation where
>you are bereft an authority to adjudicate the truthfulness or a moral
>proposition.
Not strictly speaking, since my conscience is my authority. It's not
infallible, of course, but it's had a lot of practice.
> More strongly, you are perhaps resigned to conundrums. It
>seems this would make it hard to produce evidence for your claim.
>Science, as I understand it, has given up its formal mission of
>discovering "Truth with a capital T". Science is in the business of
>predicting the outcome of experiments. Science is tentative and
>provisional - theories are supplanted or supported (rather than proven),
>and there are no absolute authorities (though experts abound:). Leaving
>objective and absolute ethics behind for a majority vote ethics doesn't
>seem very satisfying.
Right; on the intuitionist view (which is NOT the same as moral realism,
but a branch of it), moral philosophy should concern itself not with
finding a set of ethical rules, but with drawing out the consequences of
what our consciences tell us, and then weighing what we see there with the
propositions we feel very confident about.
>>> Does this mean that these moral facts are absolute?
>>
>> Yep.
>
>Does this mean that Jim was mistaken in interpreting your moral realism
>to not mean one absolute morality (ethics)? (Or perhaps I misunderstood
>Jim.)
Not sure since I haven't read Jim's post yet. lol
>>>> There is disagreement
>>>> among moral realists as to whether *all* moral propositions are true
>>>> or false, and of course there is some disagreement as to how we know
>>>> which they are.
>>>
>>> What side of that question are you on? It seems odd to support the
>>> idea that only some moral propositions are true or false. That's
>>> seems like saying some of the universe is an illusion - science will
>>> just study the real" part.
>>
>> I agree it seems odd. I tend towards the view that all (interesting)
>> moral propositions are true or false.
>
>If person A believes this, and person B does not, they are nevertheless
>likely to wrangle over the question, invent a scheme to answer it in a
>fashion agreeable to them, and yet aren't privy to the alleged absolute
>and correct answer. If that is the case, what's the practical difference
>between moral realism and its opponents?
There are several practical differences. One is that a society buying into
relativism will often use it as an excuse for apathy ("So what if they're
mutilating the genitals of all their adolescent girls? In their culture
that's okay, so who are we to judge?").
Another, related, is that it impedes moral progress ("Why should we get rid
of slavery, if the resulting society is no better in any meaningful sense
than the one we have now?").
Still another is that it's used to crush dissent ("You disagree with what
your culture says about X, and morals are determined by cultures, so by
definition you are wrong.") If this sounds implausible, keep in mind that
it was a leading rationale for Communist repression in the Soviet Union and
China, although of course they substituted "the party" for "cultures".
Most bizarrely, it trickles into other, more concrete areas of life ("The
fact of whether OJ killed Nicole depends on what the jury says. If they
say he did it, then he did, and if they say he didn't, then he didn't.
After all, we can't say that the verdict is unjust or just, because that
kind of thing is relative.")
Of course, *none* of these reasons (except possibly the last, which is a
logical problem with relativism) is a reason to accept moral realism; the
only sound reason to accept moral realism is that it's true. (Of course
there's more to it than that.)
>Again, perhaps if you considered the mind as just another layer of
>complexity built upon, and subject to, the physical; then you could have
>the mind (consciousness) - and study it independently of biochemistry.
>(Maybe we could call it psychology?) This wouldn't be dualism, but it
>would justify independent study. Perhaps, in some cases, we are just
>using similar terms differently. Does what I've just described equate to
>"property dualism"? (Philosophy - the art of confusing, conflating,
>and/or inflating definitions to at least book length!)
No. That web site I keep linking has another good paper on this topic. It
does not advocate any particular view but rather tries to outline the
problem involved. It's here: http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm
It's a short and easy read and will give you a really good idea of what the
competing positions in philosophy of mind are.
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>Dave-
>
>I read through "the subjectivist's dilemna", and mostly thru
>"moral objectivism".
Those aren't bad at all, but my favorite is "Reason, Objectivity, and
Goodness." However, that paper does presuppose some of the other stuff, so
perhaps it's best read last (assuming you haven't OD'ed on moral
philosophy!)
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>Yeah, I like to blow people's minds by actually thinking, not
>just arguing...sometimes the other guy is right, and I learn
>something!
Well, consider my mind blown. heh
ASG
drchaffee
I hope I'm not being overly critical in suggesting that your proposition
isn't really independent of humans. I thought you'd come up with an ethics
for another animal, but ideally I was hoping for a moral proposition in the
absence of life altogether.
> >>> Does objective morality require a soul or some other
> >>> supernatural (non-physical) construct to serve as the medium in which
> >>> it exists?
> >>
> >> That is an extreeeeeeeemely complicated question, because it opens up
> >> the entire area of philosophy of mind. My short answer is "yes,"
> >> although I do not accept your equation of "non-physical" with
> >> "supernatural." Are "redness" or "love" supernatural? Or "the
> >> history of France"?
> >
> >Um ... <how would you say it?> ... Yep!
>
> You really think the history of France is supernatural? What about
> emotions? Are those supernatural too?
My bad - I meant to say that I believe redness, love, and the history of
France are natural (and physical given that I am a materialist).
But it is a compromise view that asserts that consciousness isn't derived
from an underlying biochemistry? There is still a genuine dualism - or is it
that the body and the mind can be studied as if they had independent
properties, as in my chemistry/physics example? (I will endeavor to read
some of the papers tonight in an attempt to answer my own questions.)
> >> That, in fact, could be the heart of an entirely different thread --
> >> does atheism, or more generally naturalism, require one to deny any
> >> theory of the mind that accepts the existence or some "special nature"
> >> of mental phenomena? I don't think it does, but I am much less sure
> >> of that.
> >
> >I think atheists can believe in the supernatural - as perhaps you do -
> >so I wouldn't say naturalism is a necessary generalization of atheism.
> >If one could produce a cogent argument for a belief in something
> >supernatural, a theist would be well served by advancing it.
>
> Well, my own definition of "supernatural" is sort of rule-based. If there
> are in principle some rules that X's behavior follows, X is not
> supernatural. If there aren't, it is.
Interesting. It seems like saying if something has at least one
deterministic aspect, it is natural, otherwise it is supernatural.
> I hadn't really thought about this
> much before, though. But this way things like ghosts and God and the
> Easter Bunny are supernatural, because there's no set of rules that one
can
> even in principle specify as to their behavior, whereas with things like
> "red" and "the history of France" and "emotion" there are.
Well, people will certainly tell you that God has chosen to subjugate
Himself to consistency, rationality, and good moral behavior. This seems to
suggest that a Christian conception of a supernatural God, is for you a
natural God.
> >>>> The claim you
> >>>> give is a descriptive, even a statistical, claim.
> >>>
> >>> Yes ... I was talking about what I believe is the case, rather than
> >>> what perhaps ought to be the case. That, for me, has been a
> >>> distinction between morality and ethics.
> >>
> >> Oh, that's interesting. I am sniffing another misunderstanding. I've
> >> never heard of drawing that distinction before. What exactly is the
> >> difference in your view?
> >
> >The exact difference: Is vs. Ought.
>
> OK -- now I understand. I was confused because in philosophy both
morality
> and ethics have to do with the "ought" side, and indeed most philosophers
> regard them as synonyms (although some, particularly Aristotelians and
> their modern descendants the "virtue theorists", would not).
Perhaps there is another word more conventional to take the place of what
I've used the word morality for. I was trying to recognize a "dimension to
reasoning", without the "ought" part.
> >"Should I slaughter tens of thousands of
> >civilian men, women, and children?" I don't presume to be able to answer
> >the question authoritatively - meaning that I can answer it, and even
> >attempt to persuade you to my answer, but I don't demand or presume the
> >right to be your authority on the matter. If I could demonstrate years
> >of studying the question, had praise from those I'd counseled, diplomas
> >and books on the subject, perhaps I'd be viewed as an expert and treated
> >as an authority, but this is a weaker sense of authority which is more
> >like acclaim.
>
> Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy anyway, so while I might be more
> disposed to pay attention to you, I'd have to resist the temptation to
> think of you as more persuasive than someone less credentialed who was
> saying the same thing.
Appealing to authority doesn't make an argument correct, but that doesn't
mean it's a bad procedure if the alternative is an argument from ignorance.
I think our abilities are consistently less than the logical ideal.
> > I do answer the question in the negative, however, as I
> >don't see that it is the case that I should slaughter a bunch of
> >civilians. It could be that a circumstance would have one reconsider the
> >question.
>
> Of course, that changes the question.
Then the context is necessary to the question.
> "If I drop this ball, it will fall
> to the ground" is true on Earth and false in lunar orbit. That's why
> philosophers are very careful about specifying the questions they ask --
or
> should be, anyway. However, many people assume that when no other
> circumstances are specified, there's an implicit "all else equal" in
there.
I don't think "all else equal" is a reliable context. It seems like
unwarranted reductionism.
If a physicist determines chemical property X is due to Y rather than Z, as
had previously been thought, the chemist is unaffected - because he works
from the property X. This is a case of warranted reductionism.
> If that's how the common discourse works, then I think it's clear the
> answer to your question is "no", and I don't see why anyone would be
> uncomfortable in asserting that regardless of authority.
>
> > What if, for example, this slaughter of tens of thousands
> >saved more lives than were lost? Many argue that dropping the hydrogen
> >bombs on Japan resulted in a net savings of lives as it helped close out
> >World War II.
>
> Indeed... and then some people find it counterintuitive to count up net
> savings of lives. They dicker back and forth offering examples of why
> these contrasting views are unacceptable, all the while implicitly
> appealing to each other's conscience.
Yes - a reasoning which is moral to the individual, but unethical to each
individual's opponent.
> For example, if I were to take the
> view that dropping the A-bomb on Japan was a bad thing, you might appeal
to
> my intuition by saying that more lives were saved, on net. I might then
> ask whether it's always better to save more lives on net, and raise some
> kind of thought experiment (e.g. the old organ donation one, in which
> you're a surgeon and you can go out and kill someone and steal his organs,
> transplant them into five others who need them, and thereby save four
lives
> on net). Again this appeals to your intuition that this would be wrong,
> and I'm exercising my own intuition that you would find such a result
> distasteful.
I might as well exercise my intuition and claim that my upbringing is what
confirms your intuition, rather than some independent moral reality.
Okay, the theist claims an infallible moral authority - the author of
morality itself. But you claim a fallible moral authority - your
conscience - that perceives a moral reality which has an independent
existence.
So objection one is that some people will misuse it? Or are you saying that
if relativism were true, it would be proper to exhibit apathy? I think
relativists judge just as much as those of any other philosophical stripe.
I, for one, honor the individual's right to hold a moral view contrary to my
own. Indeed, over the years, I sure many moral views of mine have been
modified. So, I can judge, and attempt to persuade you to my way of
thinking, but I don't have the authority or surgical capability to re-wiring
your brain to agree with me.
> Another, related, is that it impedes moral progress ("Why should we get
rid
> of slavery, if the resulting society is no better in any meaningful sense
> than the one we have now?").
Relative ethics, as I understand it, doesn't mean I can't try to persuade
you to my point of view. I think the term progress is misleading, and more
accurately means "is in closer agreement to my point of view".
> Still another is that it's used to crush dissent ("You disagree with what
> your culture says about X, and morals are determined by cultures, so by
> definition you are wrong.") If this sounds implausible, keep in mind that
> it was a leading rationale for Communist repression in the Soviet Union
and
> China, although of course they substituted "the party" for "cultures".
The improper use of an ideology isn't a strike against that ideology.
Darwin's scientific theory of evolution isn't less scientific because some
people murdered others for "survival of the fittest".
> Most bizarrely, it trickles into other, more concrete areas of life ("The
> fact of whether OJ killed Nicole depends on what the jury says. If they
> say he did it, then he did, and if they say he didn't, then he didn't.
> After all, we can't say that the verdict is unjust or just, because that
> kind of thing is relative.")
It's precisely because our opinions are relative that we can in fact say the
verdict was just or unjust!
> Of course, *none* of these reasons (except possibly the last, which is a
> logical problem with relativism) is a reason to accept moral realism; the
> only sound reason to accept moral realism is that it's true. (Of course
> there's more to it than that.)
>
> >Again, perhaps if you considered the mind as just another layer of
> >complexity built upon, and subject to, the physical; then you could have
> >the mind (consciousness) - and study it independently of biochemistry.
> >(Maybe we could call it psychology?) This wouldn't be dualism, but it
> >would justify independent study. Perhaps, in some cases, we are just
> >using similar terms differently. Does what I've just described equate to
> >"property dualism"? (Philosophy - the art of confusing, conflating,
> >and/or inflating definitions to at least book length!)
>
> No. That web site I keep linking has another good paper on this topic.
It
> does not advocate any particular view but rather tries to outline the
> problem involved. It's here: http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm
>
> It's a short and easy read and will give you a really good idea of what
the
> competing positions in philosophy of mind are.
Okay. I appreciate the link. I'm gonna make some popcorn and read it, and
the others.
Regards,
Dave
>
> ASG
Brian Henderson
wrote:
>Brian Henderson wrote:
>> Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
>> definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
>> that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
>> over this.
>
>How about, there are *some* moral values that are objective;
>they are independent of place and time. Humans do not always
>have or behave according to these objective moral values, but
>the values are there all the same.
You'd have to demonstrate that there are some moral values which have
been believed and accepted as the norm across all cultures and all
times, and I don't think it can be done.
>> Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
>> help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
>> which are detrimental are discarded.
>
>Observed human behavoir follows the pattern you describe...but
>human behavior is not always in line with objective morality.
>The important thing to remember is that not *all* moral values
>are objective. Some moral values are indeed subjective, so
>there is some moral relativism in a world which contains some
>objective morality.
You'd have to demonstrate that *ANY* morality is objective. Simply
claiming it is so does not demonstrate it. All morals are open to
change with time and circumstance, as the history of humanity clearly
shows. Morals simply do not exist without humans to practice it.
Brian Henderson
wrote:
>Brian Henderson <cep...@directvinternet.com> wrote in
>>Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
>>help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
>>which are detrimental are discarded.
>
>I assume you mean "detrimental" in an evolutionary sense, not in a moral
>sense. Regardless, this may be a good description of how people's moral
>views come about, but it has nothing to do with the question of whether
>moral facts exist.
Well, since you haven't demonstrated that they have...
Ananda Gupta
>On Sat, 27 Jul 2002 09:58:00 -0700, J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com>
>wrote:
>
>> Brian Henderson wrote:
>>> Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
>>> definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
>>> that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
>>> over this.
>>
>> How about, there are *some* moral values that are objective;
>> they are independent of place and time. Humans do not always
>> have or behave according to these objective moral values, but
>> the values are there all the same.
>
>You'd have to demonstrate that there are some moral values which have
>been believed and accepted as the norm across all cultures and all
>times, and I don't think it can be done.
Why on earth would I have to do that? Someone could very easily make this
argument in 1000 AD regarding the position of the sun relative to the
earth. Should Copernicus have just thrown up his hands? Of course not --
he'd have been perfectly justified in saying "I don't care if everyone
before me has disagreed, the earth really does revolve around the sun!"
>You'd have to demonstrate that *ANY* morality is objective. Simply
>claiming it is so does not demonstrate it. All morals are open to
>change with time and circumstance, as the history of humanity clearly
>shows. Morals simply do not exist without humans to practice it.
I agree that the history of humanity shows that people have disagreed about
moral propositions, but that says nothing about whether they were right.
The fact that people in the U.S. in 1750 thought slavery was okay has
nothing to do with whether slavery actually is okay.
As for claiming X without providing a reason, well, you have to start
somewhere, don't you?
ASG
Ananda Gupta
on the others, since I have to leave town for several days tomorrow, and am
short on time. But this has been very interesting indeed.
"drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
<mU319.36376$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>> Sure, just as there'd still be "red" if there were no one to see it.
>> A meaningful moral proposition in that case might be "If humans were
>> to come into existence, they shouldn't torture people for fun."
>
>I hope I'm not being overly critical in suggesting that your proposition
>isn't really independent of humans. I thought you'd come up with an
>ethics for another animal, but ideally I was hoping for a moral
>proposition in the absence of life altogether.
I don't see how it isn't independent of humans in the sense that its truth
or falsity does not depend on whether humans exist. Of course I'd say that
about all moral propositions, but I wanted to give a clear example. Of
course its truth or falsity may be *academic* if there are no humans, but
that doesn't render it dependent.
>>>> That, in fact, could be the heart of an entirely different thread --
>>>> does atheism, or more generally naturalism, require one to deny any
>>>> theory of the mind that accepts the existence or some "special
>>>> nature" of mental phenomena? I don't think it does, but I am much
>>>> less sure of that.
>>>
>>> I think atheists can believe in the supernatural - as perhaps you do
>>> - so I wouldn't say naturalism is a necessary generalization of
>>> atheism. If one could produce a cogent argument for a belief in
>>> something supernatural, a theist would be well served by advancing
>>> it.
>>
>> Well, my own definition of "supernatural" is sort of rule-based. If
>> there are in principle some rules that X's behavior follows, X is not
>> supernatural. If there aren't, it is.
>
>Interesting. It seems like saying if something has at least one
>deterministic aspect, it is natural, otherwise it is supernatural.
Yeah. I haven't really thought through the implications of that claim.
I'll have to think about them on the train :)
>> I hadn't really thought about this
>> much before, though. But this way things like ghosts and God and the
>> Easter Bunny are supernatural, because there's no set of rules that
>> one can even in principle specify as to their behavior, whereas with
>> things like "red" and "the history of France" and "emotion" there are.
>
>Well, people will certainly tell you that God has chosen to subjugate
>Himself to consistency, rationality, and good moral behavior. This seems
>to suggest that a Christian conception of a supernatural God, is for you
>a natural God.
My first reaction to that is to zero in on the word "chosen" -- if X
creates all its own rules, then X is supernatural.
>>> I do answer the question in the negative, however, as I
>>> don't see that it is the case that I should slaughter a bunch of
>>> civilians. It could be that a circumstance would have one reconsider
>>> the question.
>>
>> Of course, that changes the question.
>
>Then the context is necessary to the question.
Of course.
>> "If I drop this ball, it will fall
>> to the ground" is true on Earth and false in lunar orbit. That's why
>> philosophers are very careful about specifying the questions they ask
>> -- or should be, anyway. However, many people assume that when no
>> other circumstances are specified, there's an implicit "all else
>> equal" in there.
>
>I don't think "all else equal" is a reliable context. It seems like
>unwarranted reductionism.
Certainly not always, but I think it is a reasonable inference in everyday
discourse. Certainly it is the duty of the person who poses a thought
experiment to specify odd contexts. After all, if you were taking a
physics exam, and one question read "Suppose you threw a ball with mass 10
grams into the air. How many seconds would elapse before it returned to
the ground?" and you did the necessary calculations, and came up with an
answer, and when the test came back the professor marked it wrong, saying
"Your refusal to consider the possibility that you are on Jupiter is
unwarranted reductionism."
>> Indeed... and then some people find it counterintuitive to count up
>> net savings of lives. They dicker back and forth offering examples of
>> why these contrasting views are unacceptable, all the while implicitly
>> appealing to each other's conscience.
>
>Yes - a reasoning which is moral to the individual, but unethical to
>each individual's opponent.
Not necessarily. A person may be willing to accept counterintuitive
consequences of his view (such as affirming the rightness of the transplant
surgeon in the example below), but the fact that people consider such
consequences reasons to at least reconsider that sort of view is a mark in
favor of realism, not against it.
>> For example, if I were to take the
>> view that dropping the A-bomb on Japan was a bad thing, you might
>> appeal to my intuition by saying that more lives were saved, on net.
>> I might then ask whether it's always better to save more lives on net,
>> and raise some kind of thought experiment (e.g. the old organ donation
>> one, in which you're a surgeon and you can go out and kill someone and
>> steal his organs, transplant them into five others who need them, and
>> thereby save four lives on net). Again this appeals to your intuition
>> that this would be wrong, and I'm exercising my own intuition that you
>> would find such a result distasteful.
>
>I might as well exercise my intuition and claim that my upbringing is
>what confirms your intuition, rather than some independent moral
>reality.
Sure, you could do that. In fact, that's more or less what we've been
doing in this entire thread. :)
>Okay, the theist claims an infallible moral authority - the author of
>morality itself. But you claim a fallible moral authority - your
>conscience - that perceives a moral reality which has an independent
>existence.
Just so.
>> There are several practical differences. One is that a society buying
>> into relativism will often use it as an excuse for apathy ("So what if
>> they're mutilating the genitals of all their adolescent girls? In
>> their culture that's okay, so who are we to judge?").
>
>So objection one is that some people will misuse it?
"Misuse" is the wrong word, but it's my fault because I said that
relativism would be an excuse for apathy. A better way to put it would be
that moral apathy logically follows from relativism.
>Or are you saying
>that if relativism were true, it would be proper to exhibit apathy?
No, since of course if relativism is true there's no meaningful difference
between "proper" and "improper" (in the moral sense).
> I
>think relativists judge just as much as those of any other philosophical
>stripe.
Not in my experience, lol. I've encountered *many* relativists who refuse
to pass moral judgment on e.g. the Nazis, because they believe that morals
are determined by cultural majorities.
> I, for one, honor the individual's right to hold a moral view
>contrary to my own. Indeed, over the years, I sure many moral views of
>mine have been modified. So, I can judge, and attempt to persuade you to
>my way of thinking, but I don't have the authority or surgical
>capability to re-wiring your brain to agree with me.
Well, if my view is correct, brain re-wiring is unnecessary. And moral
realism doesn't commit one to being dogmatic, since as we discussed above
the moral sense is fallible. In fact, I think the view I hold is very
conducive to a pluralist society, since it provides for a healthy approach
to moral disagreement, and suggests that reflection and discussion are the
keys to understanding moral truths.
>> Another, related, is that it impedes moral progress ("Why should we
>> get rid of slavery, if the resulting society is no better in any
>> meaningful sense than the one we have now?").
>
>Relative ethics, as I understand it, doesn't mean I can't try to
>persuade you to my point of view. I think the term progress is
>misleading, and more accurately means "is in closer agreement to my
>point of view".
My bad (although I can't imagine characterizing the abolition of slavery as
anything but progress). But the point isn't that you are somehow
prohibited from trying to persuade me of X; the point is that any attempt
to do so is doomed to failure, because in the absence of an independent
moral truth, what would be sufficient to sway me from a pro-slavery view?
Personal distaste? Maybe, but I could then say "Even if I felt distaste
towards slavery, others don't, and I don't want to force my personal tastes
on them."
>> Still another is that it's used to crush dissent ("You disagree with
>> what your culture says about X, and morals are determined by cultures,
>> so by definition you are wrong.") If this sounds implausible, keep in
>> mind that it was a leading rationale for Communist repression in the
>> Soviet Union and China, although of course they substituted "the
>> party" for "cultures".
>
>The improper use of an ideology isn't a strike against that ideology.
>Darwin's scientific theory of evolution isn't less scientific because
>some people murdered others for "survival of the fittest".
There's a difference. The parenthetical sentence above *logically follows*
if cultural relativism is true. The sentence "It's okay to murder the less
fit" does *not* follow, logically or otherwise, from any statement of
Darwin's theory.
>> Most bizarrely, it trickles into other, more concrete areas of life
>> ("The fact of whether OJ killed Nicole depends on what the jury says.
>> If they say he did it, then he did, and if they say he didn't, then he
>> didn't. After all, we can't say that the verdict is unjust or just,
>> because that kind of thing is relative.")
>
>It's precisely because our opinions are relative that we can in fact say
>the verdict was just or unjust!
So you're willing to agree that if the verdict was just, then OJ didn't
kill his wife, and if it was unjust, then he did? And since the verdict's
justice or injustice depends on our opinions, then the *physical fact* of
whether OJ killed his wife depends on our opinions?
>> No. That web site I keep linking has another good paper on this
>> topic. It does not advocate any particular view but rather tries to
>> outline the problem involved. It's here:
>> http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm
>>
>> It's a short and easy read and will give you a really good idea of
>> what the competing positions in philosophy of mind are.
>
>Okay. I appreciate the link. I'm gonna make some popcorn and read it,
>and the others.
I hope you like them. I like that guy's site because he is a good writer
(most philosophers are terrible writers) and he writes on a pretty wide
variety of topics. There are other pages that are far more technical and
harder to slog through, but which go into a lot more detail.
ASG
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
red: the color of radiant energy with wavelengths of approximately 630 to
750 nanometers;
It does not require humans (orany animal, for that matter) to exist for
'red' to exist. Now define morality in the same way, i.e. with no references
to humans, either direct or indirect.
<snip>
webgiant
<jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Ananda Gupta wrote:
>>
>> J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com> wrote in
>> <3D419EF2...@yahoo.com>:
>>
>> >>>> Science has no "reliability" apart from people.
>> >>>
>> >>> Interesting. I think gravity, for example, operates
>> >>> reliably apart from us.
>> >>
>> >> Right, just as is the immorality of, e.g., torture
>> >> for fun.
>> >
>> > if torture for fun were *universally* immoral, no one
>> > would do it....but facts show otherwise.
>>
>> Why is it the case that if torture for fun is universally
>> immoral, no one would do it? People do immoral things
>> all the time.
>
> Then how do you judge what is moral or immoral? By your
> opinions? By an 11 judge panel? Is it written somewhere?
> Is a conflicting moral standard written somewhere else?
[snip!]
>> > , and can
>> > change in a specific person drastically depending on the
>> > situation, or among different people in the same situation.
>> > There is no absolute moral reality. Reality is that morals
>> > are highly variable, although there is a fairly common core
>> > of moral values among most well functioning societies.
>>
>> As before, I'd agree that large numbers of people disagree
>> about moral propositions. That doesn't mean there aren't any
>> moral propositions. And large groups of people do make
>> (objective) moral progress, e.g. the West's abandonment of
>> slavery.
>
> Yes, society has a lot to do with standardizing morals, and
> enforcing acceptable behavior. But do *all* westerners really
> feel that slavery is always wrong?
I would argue that there is no moral realism because every single
viewpoint can be redefined to fit within what is considered to be
"moral".
Case in point: I would argue that the West never really abandoned
slavery, merely *redefined* and continues to redefine slavery so
that it can continue to exist while seemingly illegal under the
law. If you will, society cannot keep up with the redefining of
slavery in passing laws against it.
Slavery was replaced by Jim Crow laws, laws which left minorities
in the same situation as their slave forebears while the government
paid lip service to the idea that they were "free".
The Industrial revolution brought the concept of slavery to the
general population, reducing the latest crop of immigrants into
slaves for management. Remember, even the first slaves got basic
amenities in exchange for their forced servitude. The workers
of the early 20th century were essentially slaves: unable to do
anything other than work, unable to travel, unable to do work
other than what was demanded of them by the folks with the
"plantations".
The situation got a little better after the World Wars, but slavery
has steadily been creeping back into modern society, disguised as
and assisted by "buying politicians is freedom of speech" and
"what is so wrong about a monopoly?" Competition and free trade
may not have a special place in the heart of many Americans, but
at least it is better than what is coming, when so much of the
ownership of America will be tied up in so few hands that
individual choice will largely be sublimated by those more powerful
and wealthier than they are. Just as it was on the plantations.
Other examples of moral relativism within alleged "moral realism"
abound. A more pointed argument of what people declared by
new social norms to be "immoral" do to fit in is when people who
want to kill other people in mass numbers, go become soldiers so
they can kill masses of people with the stamp of approval from the
"moral realists". Move their actions back home and they are
"serial killers" or "mass murderers"; leave their actions abroad
and they are "decorated men of honour, fighting to keep America
safe".
Morality is determined by place, time, and the nearest large group
of people, not by any "moral absolutes" or even "moral for a time
absolutes". Moral relativism is the name of the game.
J Forbes
> Morality is determined by place, time, and the nearest large group
> of people, not by any "moral absolutes" or even "moral for a time
> absolutes". Moral relativism is the name of the game.
I think you are arguing without a clear understanding of the
terms...which is not surprising, I do/did the same thing. To a
particular philosopher, moral relativism does not mean a lack of
moral abolutes, it means that there are no objective morals at
all.
There do seem to be *some* objective moral truths, although they
do presuppose some very common human values, such as one's own
life, freedom from suffering, etc. But some does not mean all,
so there are indeed no absolutes. The philosophers tell us how
things might ought to be, but in real life we have to take it as
we find it.
Jim
J Forbes
>
> On Sat, 27 Jul 2002 09:58:00 -0700, J Forbes <jfor...@yahoo.com>
> wrote:
>
> >Brian Henderson wrote:
> >> Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
> >> definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
> >> that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
> >> over this.
> >
> >How about, there are *some* moral values that are objective;
> >they are independent of place and time. Humans do not always
> >have or behave according to these objective moral values, but
> >the values are there all the same.
>
> You'd have to demonstrate that there are some moral values which have
> been believed and accepted as the norm across all cultures and all
> times, and I don't think it can be done.
Not if we are merely philosophizing....we can instead assert
that there are some objective morals that apply to everyone,
whether or not all cultures are aware of them. There are some
unstated presuppositions, of course. Philosophy isn't science,
you know :)
> >> Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
> >> help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
> >> which are detrimental are discarded.
> >
> >Observed human behavoir follows the pattern you describe...but
> >human behavior is not always in line with objective morality.
> >The important thing to remember is that not *all* moral values
> >are objective. Some moral values are indeed subjective, so
> >there is some moral relativism in a world which contains some
> >objective morality.
>
> You'd have to demonstrate that *ANY* morality is objective. Simply
> claiming it is so does not demonstrate it. All morals are open to
> change with time and circumstance, as the history of humanity clearly
> shows. Morals simply do not exist without humans to practice it.
Morals exist because *some* humans are aware that they exist.
We can state a philosophy of objective morals about a culture
which is not aware of morals...although we can't expect them to
behave according to our philosophy. Especially if their values
are not in line with our presuppositions. But we can still
state the objective morals.
Jim
J Forbes
Actually, since human actions can have consequences which affect
the well being of other humans, it's kind of hard to avoid the
fact that there are moral facts.
Humans (or perhaps just any form of physically able sentient
beings) are required for there to be moral facts.
Jim
drchaffee
> I'm only going to respond to a couple of points, and concede the last word
> on the others, since I have to leave town for several days tomorrow, and
am
> short on time. But this has been very interesting indeed.
This *has* been fun. Whether or not reason leads me to your belief, I'm
learning about your belief and personally, I think understanding is far
superior to agreement. Feel free to drop me a line to my personal email, if
you ever want to bounce an idea off my head.
> "drchaffee" <drch...@cox.net> wrote in
> <mU319.36376$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>
> >> Sure, just as there'd still be "red" if there were no one to see it.
> >> A meaningful moral proposition in that case might be "If humans were
> >> to come into existence, they shouldn't torture people for fun."
> >
> >I hope I'm not being overly critical in suggesting that your proposition
> >isn't really independent of humans. I thought you'd come up with an
> >ethics for another animal, but ideally I was hoping for a moral
> >proposition in the absence of life altogether.
>
> I don't see how it isn't independent of humans in the sense that its truth
> or falsity does not depend on whether humans exist.
Perhaps you forgot about the logical structure of your proposition: "if X,
then Y". As in "If humans didn't exist, then the bit about torture is
meaningless". We could go down the semantics road a ways here, but hopefully
you can make it unnecessary by producing a moral proposition that doesn't
involve life at all. I think it's worth doing, Ananda, because otherwise
moral reality seems to be of a dependent nature. It's easily done on the
physical reality side of the house: "light has gravitational mass". This is
a proposition concerning physical reality whether or not we ever existed.
(Please note that I am not a solipsist.)
> Of course I'd say that
> about all moral propositions, but I wanted to give a clear example. Of
> course its truth or falsity may be *academic* if there are no humans, but
> that doesn't render it dependent.
I think you used the word academic as I used the word meaningless above.
Hopefully there is a distinction.
Interestingly, in most of my physics classes, the profs typically wanted a
generic solution - the form of the equation, with the conventional variables
in their traditional places, solved for the variable in question - not
presupposing any planet at all.
But besides that, it is your *professor* who asked the question without
sufficient context. If the student wrote: "Well, prof, you didn't even tell
me what planet I was throwing the ball on, and you didn't even specify which
direction I threw the ball. So let's say I threw the ball straight down from
a height of 1.5 meters with an initial velocity of 50 meters per second on a
planet where the local gravity is 3.3 meters per second per second.
When a question is asked, and context not provided, people occasionally get
into trouble by unconsciously presuming a set of assumptions that are not in
alignment with the professor's or philosopher's unstated assumptions. "All
else being equal", in a sea of unequal individuals is not realistic. It's
hard to find a serious book that doesn't spend time explaining what "all
else being equal" is supposed to mean.
> >> Indeed... and then some people find it counterintuitive to count up
> >> net savings of lives. They dicker back and forth offering examples of
> >> why these contrasting views are unacceptable, all the while implicitly
> >> appealing to each other's conscience.
> >
> >Yes - a reasoning which is moral to the individual, but unethical to
> >each individual's opponent.
>
> Not necessarily. A person may be willing to accept counterintuitive
(i.e. willing to accept anti-intuitionism)
> consequences of his view (such as affirming the rightness of the
transplant
> surgeon in the example below), but the fact that people consider such
> consequences reasons to at least reconsider that sort of view is a mark in
> favor of realism, not against it.
Not in my opinion. I would say it's closer to being evidence of a fallible
consciousness than of an ultimate reality. A person will consider something,
then reconsider it when someone raises an argument - all with a potiential
shifts in moral opinion. The wind might blow you one way, then the next. I
guess from that you can conclude that it's windy, but that doesn't mean the
wind is independent or distinct from your natural inheritance and nurtural
experience.
> >> For example, if I were to take the
> >> view that dropping the A-bomb on Japan was a bad thing, you might
> >> appeal to my intuition by saying that more lives were saved, on net.
> >> I might then ask whether it's always better to save more lives on net,
> >> and raise some kind of thought experiment (e.g. the old organ donation
> >> one, in which you're a surgeon and you can go out and kill someone and
> >> steal his organs, transplant them into five others who need them, and
> >> thereby save four lives on net). Again this appeals to your intuition
> >> that this would be wrong, and I'm exercising my own intuition that you
> >> would find such a result distasteful.
> >
> >I might as well exercise my intuition and claim that my upbringing is
> >what confirms your intuition, rather than some independent moral
> >reality.
>
> Sure, you could do that. In fact, that's more or less what we've been
> doing in this entire thread. :)
Hee hee. :)
> >Okay, the theist claims an infallible moral authority - the author of
> >morality itself. But you claim a fallible moral authority - your
> >conscience - that perceives a moral reality which has an independent
> >existence.
>
> Just so.
>
> >> There are several practical differences. One is that a society buying
> >> into relativism will often use it as an excuse for apathy ("So what if
> >> they're mutilating the genitals of all their adolescent girls? In
> >> their culture that's okay, so who are we to judge?").
> >
> >So objection one is that some people will misuse it?
>
> "Misuse" is the wrong word, but it's my fault because I said that
> relativism would be an excuse for apathy. A better way to put it would be
> that moral apathy logically follows from relativism.
So, if I'm not apathetic, then I'm dishonest in claiming to be a relativist?
I could rant about this one, but I'd rather you think about it and let me
know if this is how you really feel.
> >Or are you saying
> >that if relativism were true, it would be proper to exhibit apathy?
>
> No, since of course if relativism is true there's no meaningful difference
> between "proper" and "improper" (in the moral sense).
Well, that may be beside the point, but you answered my question above when
you claimed that apathy is a logical deduction from relativism.
> > I
> >think relativists judge just as much as those of any other philosophical
> >stripe.
>
> Not in my experience, lol. I've encountered *many* relativists who refuse
> to pass moral judgment on e.g. the Nazis, because they believe that morals
> are determined by cultural majorities.
Oh, *cultural* relativism again (I'm going through your post backwards.) If
you believe X is wrong, and for some reason you thought I should be an avid
cheerleader for your point of view, would you find it acceptable if I merely
(but honestly) said "I think X is wrong too!"? (I'm just concerned that in
your enthusiasm and zeal regarding Truth, you might have (subconsciously?)
expected others to proclaim your truths as objective, absolute, and grounded
in an independent reality.)
> > I, for one, honor the individual's right to hold a moral view
> >contrary to my own. Indeed, over the years, I sure many moral views of
> >mine have been modified. So, I can judge, and attempt to persuade you to
> >my way of thinking, but I don't have the authority or surgical
> >capability to re-wiring your brain to agree with me.
>
> Well, if my view is correct, brain re-wiring is unnecessary. And moral
> realism doesn't commit one to being dogmatic, since as we discussed above
> the moral sense is fallible.
Then I have the logical potential to lead you to one conclusion and then
another on the same moral premise. (See my rant below.)
> In fact, I think the view I hold is very
> conducive to a pluralist society, since it provides for a healthy approach
> to moral disagreement, and suggests that reflection and discussion are the
> keys to understanding moral truths.
>
> >> Another, related, is that it impedes moral progress ("Why should we
> >> get rid of slavery, if the resulting society is no better in any
> >> meaningful sense than the one we have now?").
> >
> >Relative ethics, as I understand it, doesn't mean I can't try to
> >persuade you to my point of view. I think the term progress is
> >misleading, and more accurately means "is in closer agreement to my
> >point of view".
>
> My bad (although I can't imagine characterizing the abolition of slavery
as
> anything but progress).
Even a moral relativist isn't obligated to feel wishy-washy on a moral
question!
> But the point isn't that you are somehow
> prohibited from trying to persuade me of X; the point is that any attempt
> to do so is doomed to failure, because in the absence of an independent
> moral truth, what would be sufficient to sway me from a pro-slavery view?
Doomed to failure? C'mon! <begin rant> The more I think of your objection,
the more ludicrous it seems to me! (Jeeps, I'm a rather passionate
relativist tonight, maybe the wife will ease my tensions :) First, in the
*presence* of alleged independent moral truth, why would we have slavery in
the first place?? Holy cow - what would have been sufficient to sway someone
to pro-slavery, or how could the human race have started out diametrically
opposed to the soup of moral reality in which we were evolved!? Towards an
answer, note that arguments - even horrifically illogical arguments - are
known to be persuasive to people. Even in this "modern age" people are being
convinced that the earth is only a few thousand years old, that people and
dinosaurs peacefully co-existed, that God wiped out nearly all life in a
flood - and was ethically good and just in doing so! Switching moral
opinions around through the ages doesn't inspire me towards confidence in an
objective morality. <end rant>
> Personal distaste? Maybe, but I could then say "Even if I felt distaste
> towards slavery, others don't, and I don't want to force my personal
tastes
> on them."
Timidity is a separate issue!
> >> Still another is that it's used to crush dissent ("You disagree with
> >> what your culture says about X, and morals are determined by cultures,
> >> so by definition you are wrong.") If this sounds implausible, keep in
> >> mind that it was a leading rationale for Communist repression in the
> >> Soviet Union and China, although of course they substituted "the
> >> party" for "cultures".
> >
> >The improper use of an ideology isn't a strike against that ideology.
> >Darwin's scientific theory of evolution isn't less scientific because
> >some people murdered others for "survival of the fittest".
>
> There's a difference. The parenthetical sentence above *logically
follows*
> if cultural relativism is true. The sentence "It's okay to murder the
less
> fit" does *not* follow, logically or otherwise, from any statement of
> Darwin's theory.
Ah, then you tricked me! I was talking about moral relativism, and you snuck
in an objection to cultural relativism. I think ethics are determined as
nature and nurture play out in the individual, and that they are subject to
change. The culture is some sort of smeared average of what the individuals
think (i.e. not just by what ideology has majority governmental control).
Now, the culture's averaged stance is indeed a relative stance - and it is
an influence on the individual - but the individual can and does disagree
with ethical elements of his own culture.
> >> Most bizarrely, it trickles into other, more concrete areas of life
> >> ("The fact of whether OJ killed Nicole depends on what the jury says.
Missed that the first time. I'm not a physical relativist - I don't claim
physical reality is merely what you think it is. I just claim, so far, that
moral reality if true is superfluous, but is most likely not true. I think
moral realism has many traits in common with theism, and I'm not surprised
that many atheists are not of your viewpoint. (I don't count any parallels
between the two different beliefs to constitute proof or disproof, as they
are different topics in my current, but evolving, opinion.)
> >> If they say he did it, then he did, and if they say he didn't, then he
> >> didn't. After all, we can't say that the verdict is unjust or just,
> >> because that kind of thing is relative.")
> >
> >It's precisely because our opinions are relative that we can in fact say
> >the verdict was just or unjust!
>
> So you're willing to agree that if the verdict was just, then OJ didn't
> kill his wife, and if it was unjust, then he did?
The other way around: If OJ didn't kill his wife, then the verdict was just.
If OJ killed his wife, then the verdict was unjust. I don't know that OJ
killed his wife. But, if I believe that OJ killed his wife, then I would
also believe that the verdict was unjust. (Belief vs. Knowledge) The
physical fact of whether OJ killed his wife is not a fact in my possession,
I have not pursued the facts of the case with any rigor. If I dug through
all the case history and testimony, I may find that I've reached a
sufficient level of evidence one way or the other, to declare OJ's guilt or
"reasonable doubt" a fact - not in the sense of certainty, but in the sense
of extreme likelihood. (Just as the ancient age of the earth is claimed as a
fact.) And just because I haven't bothered to attempt the elevation of my
knowledge of the case to the potential level of factuality, doesn't mean I
don't have an opinion. I believe he murdered his wife, and consequently I
believe the verdict was unjust.
> And since the verdict's
> justice or injustice depends on our opinions, then the *physical fact* of
> whether OJ killed his wife depends on our opinions?
No. Hopefully I explained that above. Enjoy your trip.
<snip>
> ASG
Cheers,
Dave
Brian
>
> Depends on how you define moral relativism. If you mean, are there
> definate morals which are unchangable through time and location,
> that's plainly not true and I would certainly choose moral relativism
> over this.
>
> help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
> which are detrimental are discarded.
Perhaps natural selection has evolved morality as a solution to social
problems and to ensure the survival of the species. The claim is made
that there are moral principles that are apparently universal among
human cultures (which I tentatively agree with). This may suggest an
objective morality exists. Alternatively, evolution may explain this
observation. Natural selection and evolution have provided several
dissimilar species similar solutions to environmental problems, but
this does not lead one to conclude that these "solutions" are
objective or absolute. I forget what this evolutionary principle is
called, but echolocation in bats and dolphins is a good example. Both
bats and dolphins evolved similar solutions to adapt and survive in
their given environments. Similarly, evolution may have provided
dissimilar human cultures similar solutions to social and moral
problems. Or perhaps I'm comparing apples and oranges...
Just a thought,
Brian
Brian Henderson
>Brian Henderson <cep...@directvinternet.com> wrote in message news:<jge4kukpepll17r0t...@4ax.com>...
>> Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend to
>> help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while others
>> which are detrimental are discarded.
>
>Perhaps natural selection has evolved morality as a solution to social
>problems and to ensure the survival of the species. The claim is made
>that there are moral principles that are apparently universal among
>human cultures (which I tentatively agree with). This may suggest an
>objective morality exists.
However, you cannot find a single moral precept which has been held
true across all cultural lines. Not murder, not adultery, nothing.
As such, it doesn't suggest anything about an objective morality other
than it's simply not true.
Don't make the mistake of trying to link moral evolution to biological
evolution, they are two entierly different animals, although they do
follow some of the same principles.
Brian
>
>>Brian Henderson <cep...@directvinternet.com> wrote in message
>>news:<jge4kukpepll17r0t...@4ax.com>...
>>> Morality, like biology, evolves over time. Those values which tend
>>> to help society and individuals, and those values are kept, while
>>> others which are detrimental are discarded.
>>
>>Perhaps natural selection has evolved morality as a solution to social
>>problems and to ensure the survival of the species. The claim is made
>>that there are moral principles that are apparently universal among
>>human cultures (which I tentatively agree with). This may suggest an
>>objective morality exists.
>
> However, you cannot find a single moral precept which has been held
> true across all cultural lines. Not murder, not adultery, nothing.
> As such, it doesn't suggest anything about an objective morality other
> than it's simply not true.
I agree with you 100%. I didn't suggest that an objective morality
exists, only that many use the observation that similar moral precepts
exist in dissimilar cultures as evidence of objective morality. I was
suggesting that this observation can be explained by evolutionary
principles and didn't require an objective morality.
>
> Don't make the mistake of trying to link moral evolution to biological
> evolution, they are two entierly different animals, although they do
> follow some of the same principles.
Again, I agree with you. But the evolutionary principle I cited (I
believe it is called convergent evolution) provides an explanation for
how similar moral precepts could evolve across several dissimilar
cultures without objective or absolute morality. Many suggest that
there are certain moral precepts that exist independently of any human
culture and the manifestation of these precepts, particularly in several
cultures, cannot be explained without objective morality. I was simply
offering an alternate explanation - convergent moral evolution.
Sorry for the misunderstanding. ;)
Brian
webgiant
>>
>> >which of course leads us to ask, just what is this "conscience"
>> >thing you're talking about?
>>
>> It's like one of the five physical senses. As we become aware of feelings
>> through touch, of scents through smell, etc., so too do we become aware of
>> moral facts through conscience. Just as some people have impaired or
>> poorly developed vision or hearing, some people have impaired or poorly
>> developed consciences. At least that's my view; others who generally agree
>> disagree on particulars. There's lots of philosophical literature about
>> conscience, or as it is often called in that literature, moral intuition.
>> Philosophers who have written on it are, from early to recent: Thomas Reid,
>> H.A. Prichard, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Michael Huemer (the latter has some
>> interesting papers at his web site,
>> http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/papers.htm).
>>
>> ASG
>
> I disagree that moral intuition is like one of the physical
> senses. It seems to me that it is just another aspect of the
> general cognitive process. We just happen to have a word called
> "moral" that we use to describe some types of decisions. I
> don't see how it's anything solid, discrete, that you can
> actually separate from the rest of how our brains work. I don't
> see that morals are "learned" any differently than other aspects
> of behavior. By "learned", I mean that there is probably some
> genetic dispositon toward certain behaviors, which may or may
> not be neglected or reinforced by social learning.
>
> I think you are trying to make morals into something more
> certain than it is. We can probably describe an emergent
> property of the mind, which we call "conscience", but trying to
> pin it down is probably impossible...because it's not really
> something definite. It's just a way of looking at how the mind
> works, it is not really a separate part of the mind.
I've always considered the "conscience" to be the "status quo" of
the brain: it only gives people pause when they attempt something
that is not in parallel with their conscience.
So the way you're used to doing things is your "conscience". When
you do something different, you get a pang of "conscience" which
resists you doing something which goes against the way you have
done things in the past.
This goes along with relative morality, why some people can kill
without compunction but who consider child molesters the scum of
the earth: they developed a conscience which permits murder but
which condemns child molestation. I'm thinking of the kind of
treatment child molestors get when surrounded by prisoners who
committed other kinds of crimes.
And this also goes to disprove ultimate morality arguments. "If
your're evil then you're evil" means that child molestors and
armed robbers would get along just fine, since they both committed
henious crimes against humanity. But they don't get along, so
obviously morality is relative to your situation. The same goes
for differences between robbers, such as the ones who steal
everything and the ones who refuse to take from poor people (yes,
there are a few still out there). The robbers who kill and the
robbers who don't, or at least don't kill.
Ananda Gupta
<slrnakaoof....@localhost.localdomain>:
>>> As before, I'd agree that large numbers of people disagree
>>> about moral propositions. That doesn't mean there aren't any
>>> moral propositions. And large groups of people do make
>>> (objective) moral progress, e.g. the West's abandonment of slavery.
>>
>> Yes, society has a lot to do with standardizing morals, and
>> enforcing acceptable behavior. But do *all* westerners really
>> feel that slavery is always wrong?
>
>I would argue that there is no moral realism because every single
>viewpoint can be redefined to fit within what is considered to be
>"moral".
<long post displaying a level of historical and economic ignorance
unfamiliar to me since I was a college freshman snipped>
That wasn't a real post, was it? You're pulling our legs.
Ananda Gupta
<hiq19.42677$Fq6.3...@news2.west.cox.net>:
>>>> There are several practical differences. One is that a society
>>>> buying into relativism will often use it as an excuse for apathy
>>>> ("So what if they're mutilating the genitals of all their adolescent
>>>> girls? In their culture that's okay, so who are we to judge?").
>>>
>>> So objection one is that some people will misuse it?
>>
>> "Misuse" is the wrong word, but it's my fault because I said that
>> relativism would be an excuse for apathy. A better way to put it
>> would be that moral apathy logically follows from relativism.
>
>So, if I'm not apathetic, then I'm dishonest in claiming to be a
>relativist? I could rant about this one, but I'd rather you think about
>it and let me know if this is how you really feel.
Not dishonest, just not accepting the consequences of one of your views.
People do that all the time without being dishonest. But the implication
is pretty simple. If the proposition "slavery is wrong" is purely a matter
of opinion, then what reason do I have to change my view?
>>> I
>>> think relativists judge just as much as those of any other
>>> philosophical stripe.
>>
>> Not in my experience, lol. I've encountered *many* relativists who
>> refuse to pass moral judgment on e.g. the Nazis, because they believe
>> that morals are determined by cultural majorities.
>
>Oh, *cultural* relativism again (I'm going through your post backwards.)
>If you believe X is wrong, and for some reason you thought I should be
>an avid cheerleader for your point of view, would you find it acceptable
>if I merely (but honestly) said "I think X is wrong too!"? (I'm just
>concerned that in your enthusiasm and zeal regarding Truth, you might
>have (subconsciously?) expected others to proclaim your truths as
>objective, absolute, and grounded in an independent reality.)
Well, cultural relativism is a member of the class of views described
generally as moral relativism generally (much like Christianity is a member
of the class of theistic views).
>>> I, for one, honor the individual's right to hold a moral view
>>> contrary to my own. Indeed, over the years, I sure many moral views
>>> of mine have been modified. So, I can judge, and attempt to persuade
>>> you to my way of thinking, but I don't have the authority or surgical
>>> capability to re-wiring your brain to agree with me.
>>
>> Well, if my view is correct, brain re-wiring is unnecessary. And
>> moral realism doesn't commit one to being dogmatic, since as we
>> discussed above the moral sense is fallible.
>
>Then I have the logical potential to lead you to one conclusion and then
>another on the same moral premise. (See my rant below.)
Maybe, but I'm not sure how that matters -- after all, I can infer lots of
(true) conclusions from the same scientific premises. Or did you mean you
could lead me to contradictory conclusions?
>>> Relative ethics, as I understand it, doesn't mean I can't try to
>>> persuade you to my point of view. I think the term progress is
>>> misleading, and more accurately means "is in closer agreement to my
>>> point of view".
>>
>> My bad (although I can't imagine characterizing the abolition of
>> slavery as anything but progress).
>
>Even a moral relativist isn't obligated to feel wishy-washy on a moral
>question!
True -- they're obligated to feel that the moral question has no answer (or
is meaningless, or is an expression of arbitrary emotions, etc.). Whether
those things count as being "wishy-washy" is, I suppose, a matter of
opinion.
>> But the point isn't that you are somehow
>> prohibited from trying to persuade me of X; the point is that any
>> attempt to do so is doomed to failure, because in the absence of an
>> independent moral truth, what would be sufficient to sway me from a
>> pro-slavery view?
>
>Doomed to failure? C'mon! <begin rant> The more I think of your
>objection, the more ludicrous it seems to me! (Jeeps, I'm a rather
>passionate relativist tonight, maybe the wife will ease my tensions :)
>First, in the *presence* of alleged independent moral truth, why would
>we have slavery in the first place??
<begin rant defusing operation>
Lots of reasons -- people blinded by self-interest, or prejudice, or
psychosis. Any of those things can drown out our consciences. But it's
worth noting that historically, even as far back as the Romans, there have
always been objectors to slavery, on grounds very similar to modern ones.
>Holy cow - what would have been
>sufficient to sway someone to pro-slavery, or how could the human race
>have started out diametrically opposed to the soup of moral reality in
>which we were evolved!?
People did come up with detailed arguments in favor of slavery, mostly
paternalistic ones (non-whites were like children and needed to be
supervised and civilized, essentially).
> Towards an answer, note that arguments - even
>horrifically illogical arguments - are known to be persuasive to people.
>Even in this "modern age" people are being convinced that the earth is
>only a few thousand years old, that people and dinosaurs peacefully
>co-existed, that God wiped out nearly all life in a flood - and was
>ethically good and just in doing so!
Indeed. The reasons why religious claims persuade people of ridiculous
conclusions could be the subject of interesting speculation. I suspect
many have been blinded by self-interest -- the prospect of going to heaven
if foolish proposition X is accepted. There is some economics literature
about why people believe irrational things. See, e.g.,
http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/ratirnew.doc . In that
paper, Caplan develops an interesting theory of "rational irrationality."
One concept that he doesn't explain in the paper, but refers to quite a
lot, is that of "rational ignorance." Rational ignorance works like this.
Suppose I have two choices: researching an important public policy issue
that will be voted on soon, and researching financial opportunities that
can provide me with wealth. I value a good policy outcome at $100, and the
financial research has an expected return of $100 as well. Suppose further
that there are ten voters, and all of them face exactly the same choice as
I do.
If I become informed about the policy decision, I'll vote correctly and get
$100 of value *only if* a majority of the other voters do so as well. If I
become informed about the financial opportunities, I'll get $100 of
expected return, AND I'll get $100 if the correct policy decision is
ratified. Therefore I have an incentive to remain ignorant about the
policy issue. And of course all the other voters do too; hence, it's
highly likely that all the voters will be ignorant about the policy issue,
and the wrong decision will be made.
Caplan argues that certain religious beliefs (e.g. that certain people are
witches and have the power to cause disease to cattle and people, change
form into cats or bats, etc.) are *not* like this, although it's tempting
to write them off this way. (He does believe that much voter behavior can
be explained this way, though.) I'm only belaboring this point because if
you decide to read or skim the paper, it won't make much sense unless you
know what view he's criticizing. If you already knew what rational
ignorance was, forgive my pedantry.
The upshot, however, is that there are perfectly reasonable explanations
for why people buy into absurd arguments and accept ridiculous or
irrational conclusions. None of these explanations require us to reject
moral realism.
> Switching moral opinions around
>through the ages doesn't inspire me towards confidence in an objective
>morality.
Does shifting scientific opinion reduce your confidence in the existence of
scientific truths?
<end rant defuse>
>
>> Personal distaste? Maybe, but I could then say "Even if I felt
>> distaste towards slavery, others don't, and I don't want to force my
>> personal tastes on them."
>
>Timidity is a separate issue!
It's hardly timidity. Am I timid for not wanting to force my preference
for chocolate ice cream over vanilla on you? No, I'm just being polite,
and recognizing that tastes differ. To the relativist, distaste for
slavery and distaste for vanilla ice cream are basically the same thing --
either may be very strongly felt, but fundamentally are just matters of
individual opinion, and not reasons for anyone else to share such distaste.
>>>> Most bizarrely, it trickles into other, more concrete areas of life
>>>> ("The fact of whether OJ killed Nicole depends on what the jury
>>>> says.
>
>Missed that the first time. I'm not a physical relativist - I don't
>claim physical reality is merely what you think it is. I just claim, so
>far, that moral reality if true is superfluous, but is most likely not
>true. I think moral realism has many traits in common with theism, and
>I'm not surprised that many atheists are not of your viewpoint. (I don't
>count any parallels between the two different beliefs to constitute
>proof or disproof, as they are different topics in my current, but
>evolving, opinion.)
Well, theism's biggest relevant claim here is that faith is a valid method
of achieving knowledge. One can certainly accept moral realism and reject
that.
I also do feel strongly that the tendency of atheists to affirm moral
relativism has materially hurt the acceptability of atheism in American
society. I think that if more atheists rejected relativism, and affirmed
moral facts, that atheism would be a much more "successful meme." That is,
I imagine there'd be a lot more of us.
>>>> If they say he did it, then he did, and if they say he didn't, then
>>>> he didn't. After all, we can't say that the verdict is unjust or
>>>> just, because that kind of thing is relative.")
>>>
>>> It's precisely because our opinions are relative that we can in fact
>>> say the verdict was just or unjust!
>>
>> So you're willing to agree that if the verdict was just, then OJ
>> didn't kill his wife, and if it was unjust, then he did?
>
>The other way around: If OJ didn't kill his wife, then the verdict was
>just. If OJ killed his wife, then the verdict was unjust.
Are you saying that it's a *moral fact* that if OJ killed his wife, then he
deserved to go to prison (and the converse -- that if he didn't kill his
wife, he didn't deserve to go to prison)? Or is it just your opinion?
>I don't know
>that OJ killed his wife. But, if I believe that OJ killed his wife, then
>I would also believe that the verdict was unjust. (Belief vs. Knowledge)
The usual definition of knowledge is "justified, true belief." So belief
is necessary for knowledge. If I don't believe X, I can't know X. Suppose
your belief that OJ killed his wife is justified and true. Would it be a
moral fact that the verdict was unjust in that case?
>The physical fact of whether OJ killed his wife is not a fact in my
>possession, I have not pursued the facts of the case with any rigor. If
>I dug through all the case history and testimony, I may find that I've
>reached a sufficient level of evidence one way or the other, to declare
>OJ's guilt or "reasonable doubt" a fact - not in the sense of certainty,
>but in the sense of extreme likelihood.
Suppose you were in the bushes and saw him stab his wife. Now, a true
skeptic will say that it's possible we're all living in the Matrix and OJ
didn't stab his wife at all, because OJ is actually lying in a fluid bath
hooked up to all manner of machines, so you couldn't even be sure in that
case that your belief that OJ stabbed his wife is a true belief. But let's
dismiss that particular skeptic for now, and focus on the moral skeptic.
We're stipulating that your belief that OJ killed his wife is true and
justified, and therefore knowledge. Is it a moral fact that the verdict
was unjust, given this knowledge?
ASG
Ananda Gupta
>However, you cannot find a single moral precept which has been held
>true across all cultural lines. Not murder, not adultery, nothing.
>As such, it doesn't suggest anything about an objective morality other
>than it's simply not true.
Are you willing to accept the logical consequence of this view, which is
that if cultures disagree about X, then there is no fact of the matter with
respect to X? Suppose two cultures disagree about the shape of the moon
(whether it is a perfect sphere or whether it has craters, canyons, and
other geometric imperfections). Does that mean the moon has no shape at
all? That there's no objectively true proposition we can compose about the
shape of the moon?
ASG
Ananda Gupta
<slrnakr57b....@localhost.localdomain>:
>I've always considered the "conscience" to be the "status quo" of
>the brain: it only gives people pause when they attempt something
>that is not in parallel with their conscience.
>
>So the way you're used to doing things is your "conscience". When
>you do something different, you get a pang of "conscience" which
>resists you doing something which goes against the way you have
>done things in the past.
I doubt it.
>This goes along with relative morality, why some people can kill
>without compunction but who consider child molesters the scum of
>the earth: they developed a conscience which permits murder but
>which condemns child molestation. I'm thinking of the kind of
>treatment child molestors get when surrounded by prisoners who
>committed other kinds of crimes.
So people have warped consciences. Some people are deaf or blind too.
>And this also goes to disprove ultimate morality arguments. "If
>your're evil then you're evil" means that child molestors and
>armed robbers would get along just fine, since they both committed
>henious crimes against humanity.
Why on earth would anyone believe this? Did you even think for a second
about this argument? How could you possibly infer that "child molesters
and armed robbers would get along just fine" from "child molesters and
armed robbers both did immoral things" and "it's immoral to do certain
things"?! Except for your other post, that's the silliest thing I've seen
on this newsgroup. Even morally GOOD people don't "get along just fine"
all the time.
>But they don't get along, so
>obviously morality is relative to your situation.
Oh, yes, obviously. <rolls eyes>
Here's another argument that's just like yours. "Everyone who believes in
the Tooth Fairy gets along just fine, because quarters exist, and they all
got quarters under their pillows when they lost baby teeth." Same logical
form.
> The same goes
>for differences between robbers, such as the ones who steal
>everything and the ones who refuse to take from poor people (yes,
>there are a few still out there). The robbers who kill and the
>robbers who don't, or at least don't kill.
I must say, you have excellent spelling and punctuation. But you're going
into the plonk file anyway, because you obviously don't like to think very
much.
ASG
prab...@shamrocksgf.com
False equivication. One is a concept and the other is a physical object. The
concept depends on us to formulate and define it. The other does not.
drchaffee
<snip>
> I also do feel strongly that the tendency of atheists to affirm moral
> relativism has materially hurt the acceptability of atheism in American
> society. I think that if more atheists rejected relativism, and affirmed
> moral facts, that atheism would be a much more "successful meme." That
is,
> I imagine there'd be a lot more of us.
From what I've read in your post, I think my position may not fit into your
view of relativism. First, I feel that the morality of ~individuals~ is
relative to their nature and nurture. For me, this doesn't roll up into some
"cultural relativism" philosophy. I guess it could, if cultures were really
extremely homogeneous, but I don't know of any. Secondly, when I say I'm a
relativist, I don't mean that I don't have an answer to a moral question, or
that I don't care what other people's opinions are, or that I wouldn't argue
for my interpretation of the answer. All I mean is that I don't presume to
be a moral authority, or to have access to some (in my view) imagined moral
reality, or to proclaim my viewpoint as Truth. Now, being a moral realist,
do you actually claim to be a moral authority? Do you have some greater
access to moral reality, say compared to me, because you believe in it? Do
you claim your moral convictions are infallibly True? (I don't mean these
questions in a personal sense, just philosophically. I think moral realism
amounts to the Aether (with which you're familiar?), in that it's a
superfluous concept - unnecessary for the description, prediction, and
outcome of (moral) experiment.)
<snip>
I'll get to the rest of your post when I have time. Thanks for writing back!
Dave