Why 2012 will be a deadly deadline

[CBZ]

Why 2012 will be a deadly deadline

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/07/15/2003448701

By J. Michael Cole 寇謐將

Wednesday, Jul 15, 2009, Page 8

At no time since the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government fled
to Taiwan has the Chinese Communist Party been so close to
accomplishing its objective of annexing Taiwan.

Rather than achieve this through threat of force or diplomatic
pressure, Beijing is using economic integration — a process launched
soon after President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) came to office last year — to
reel Taiwan in.

Through three rounds of talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation
and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, direct
cross-strait charter flights, increased Chinese tourism, large
purchases of Taiwanese electronics by Chinese corporations and direct
investment in 100 industries in Taiwan’s manufacturing, services and
public infrastructure sectors, China has successfully increased
Taiwan’s dependence on its economy.

Despite the Ma government’s claims to the contrary, a proposed
economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and
China would only exacerbate that dependence by forcing all of Taiwan’s
exports to ASEAN countries to pass through China, thus killing
Taiwan’s chances of striking bilateral trade agreements with countries
in that bloc — the very kind of market diversification that Taiwan
should be aiming for.

As Taiwan inexorably drifts into China’s sphere of influence,
politicians and academics around the world have hailed Ma’s policy,
calling him a “masterful” politician who is not only “saving” Taiwan’s
struggling economy, but more importantly, defusing tensions in the
Taiwan Strait and creating the conditions for a peace agreement.

Amid enthusiasm for Ma’s “pragmatic” policymaking, the apprehensions
of millions of people who fear for their livelihoods and the future of
their country have been ignored, as has the fact that poll after poll
has shown high levels of dissatisfaction with the Ma administration
for its failure, among other things, to meet election promises and to
halt the erosion of democracy.

Over and over again, experts and foreign media have portrayed the
Taiwanese independence movement and the majority of Taiwanese who want
to maintain a political “status quo” on the question of unification as
immature throwbacks of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Lee Teng-hui (李登輝)
administrations whose political agendas supposedly risk war with
China.

Very few China and Taiwan “experts” have asked why the Lee and Chen
administrations acted the way they did, and an equally small number
seem to have bothered to explore the local political impact of Ma’s
pro-China policies — or, for that matter, what the consequences would
be should his plans be sidetracked.

Lee — a statesman of a standing that Ma could never match — and Chen
were childish, irrational and dangerous because they were more
cautious and patient in their engagement with China. Ma, on the other
hand, has plunged in head first, and for this he is being called
mature.

As economic integration intensifies, we are hearing calls for cross-
strait talks on more convoluted political matters, which, despite
Taipei’s claim to proceeding cautiously on that front, are inevitable
given that Beijing has already made it clear that it sees economic
integration as a stepping stone to political integration.

But few experts have asked what a “peace” agreement between Taipei and
Beijing entails, namely Taiwan’s capitulation and admission that it is
part of China. If things continue apace, it is possible that a few
years from now Beijing will accomplish its objective by “peaceful”
means — peaceful in the sense of a hostile corporate takeover.

Only recently have specialists started asking why, if things are going
so well in the Strait, should China continue to modernize its military
and expand its arsenal with equipment at least partly intended for a
Taiwan contingency, including increasingly accurate short-range
missiles?

What some experts fail to see is that by celebrating cross-strait
detente of the kind initiated by the Ma administration and its
counterpart in Beijing, and by deliberately ignoring the very
substantial opposition that existed and is now growing within Taiwan,
they are helping to create the conditions for a conflict in the not-so-
distant future that could be far more serious than anything seen
before — one that would almost inevitably involve deadly force.

Unless political dissent in Taiwan can be smothered, democratic forces
could threaten to derail Ma’s efforts, especially as more
controversial aspects of cross-strait exchanges grow nearer. And the
principal threat will not be referendums on an ECFA or public
protests, but the 2012 presidential election.

Despite its lack of experience with democracy, Beijing is aware of the
threat of electoral retribution in Taiwan, which could bring into
office a pro-independence party or a KMT administration that is not as
pliant as Ma’s. At the least, legislative elections could correct the
imbalance that the Ma administration has enjoyed since it came to
power and weaken the KMT’s control of the executive and legislative
branches, which is part of the reason why Ma has been able to ignore
calls for caution, transparency and accountability in his China
policy.

As such, Beijing is probably calculating that if it is to succeed in
annexing Taiwan, it must do so before 2012. We can expect pressure to
build very soon for accelerated economic integration and for political
matters to be put on the agenda of cross-strait talks.

In this light, it is easier to explain why cross-strait detente has
not been accompanied by an expected military drawdown on Beijing’s
part. In fact, 2012 will not be much different from the 1996
elections, when the Chinese military fired missiles off Taiwan’s major
ports to influence the country’s first free presidential elections.
Back then, Beijing was sending the signal that if Taiwanese voted for
Lee, they were choosing war — a threat that, as history showed, was
hollow given the power disparity between China on one side and the US
and Taiwan on the other.

This time around, however, after more than a decade of major
investment in its military and new weapons systems, such as second-
generation nuclear submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles,
Beijing is in a much better position to intimidate not only Taiwan but
also the US, should it feel compelled to dispatch carrier battle
groups to or near the Strait amid tensions.

During the presidential election campaign in 2011 and early 2012 the
KMT could also exploit public fears of renewed tensions with Beijing
to its advantage and accuse its opponents of risking war. A divided
polity will by that time face a choice between irreversible political
annexation or military attack.

Another factor that makes 2012 such a dangerous time in the Strait —
especially if there is a possibility of the KMT suffering defeat — is
Beijing’s awareness that time is not on its side, and that the longer
Taiwan remains separate from China, the further Taiwanese identity
will consolidate and more so under a pro-independence government.

Just as dangerous would be Beijing sensing that it had come close to
realizing its dream of annexation only to see the chance slip as the
result of a democratic process. Chances are that rather than admit
defeat, it would use force to complete its agenda, an option all the
more attractive given the cuts the Ma administration has made to the
defense establishment.

To experts looking in from the outside, Ma may appear to be a
masterful and pragmatic politician, but by refusing to address the
concerns of a majority of Taiwanese, and by undermining democracy in
his pursuit of what he sees as a sacred mission, Ma is sowing the
seeds for disaster.

By hailing Ma as a hero yet failing to understand the dynamics within
Taiwan, and by neglecting to challenge him to act more democratically,
all that the experts are doing is increasing the probability that 2012
will augur a grave threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait.



J. Michael Cole is a writer based in Taipei and the author of
Democracy in Peril: Taiwan’s Struggle for Survival from Chen Shui-bian
to Ma Ying-jeou.
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