Preoccupations Arrangements Download
Eryn Diamante
N2 - This movement introduces the ethos of the collective project: its conceptual and practical preoccupations. It focuses on our concern with urban processes on the cusp of change, in the midst of being re-arranged, and thus homes in on the various polyrhythms of intersections, how things come together and diverge, how possibilities open and close in urban contexts of continuously shifting horizons.
AB - This movement introduces the ethos of the collective project: its conceptual and practical preoccupations. It focuses on our concern with urban processes on the cusp of change, in the midst of being re-arranged, and thus homes in on the various polyrhythms of intersections, how things come together and diverge, how possibilities open and close in urban contexts of continuously shifting horizons.
If the four-digit version had been available it is probable that it would have been used to design the coding system for international organizations. In experimenting with the various possibilities however it became apparent that there was a basic awkwardness and bias in making all the preoccupations of such bodies subservient to "knowledge" of "objects". This problem is particularly striking when a social reality like "homelessness" is classified under an intellectual discipline, namely "sociology", as in the case of the UNESCO Thesaurus (10). Similarly a value and condition of fundamental importance like "peace" is classified under an intellectual discipline such as "political science", or, again, "friendship", "love" and "hatred" are classified under "psychology". Positioning values, conditions and forms of praxis in this way can be seen as reinforcing the dominance of the knowledge function during a period when the international community recognizes a need to enhance action, the "will to change", as well as the emergence of new values. Many organizations perceive themselves as concerned with praxis and do not relate directly to the intellectual disciplines by which their actions are supposedly governed according to university faculties.
This study examines facets of gender differentiation ina middle school. Utilizing an ethnographic methodologyemphasis is placed upon the exploration of classroominteraction, inter-personal relations and participants'perceptual stances in order to explore how gender isimplicated in the process of schooling. Althoughinquiries are located within a micro sociologicalcontext, the study is conducted against a backdrop ofthe socio-economic position of women and particularattention is accorded to the educational experience ofgirls and its implications for gender inequality at astructural level.The research demonstrates gender differentiation to be aubiquitous feature of school life both in terms of itsmore formal routines and rituals and in its informalrelations at the interactive level. Conventionalconstructs of femininity and masculinity impinge uponteacher perceptions of,and interaction with pupils,with the result that girls' competencies are devalued,they are not subject to the same degree of educativerigour as boys and, consequently, are marginalizedwithin the classroom. Various dimensions of teacherpupilinteraction are presented which elucidate theintricacies of such differentiation and which suggesthow opportunities for enhancing pupils' self-esteem andfacilitating the acquisition of participatory learningskills are distributed in favour of boys.Certain preoccupations and predispositions are,moreover, presented by pupils and the inquiry elaborateshow these are reciprocated with institutionalarrangements and expectancies. In terms of school as aworking environment, educative processes aredemonstrated as potentially more anxiety prcvoking forgirls and, in relation to school as a social milieu,friendship networks are organized on a hierarchicalbasis in response to the contingencies of subjectsettings. Thus girls engage in certain ameliorativestrategies and it is maintained, that to the extent thatthe school colludes with these, femininity is fosteredin a way which is, in the longer term, educationallydisadvantaging for girls and, ultimately, socially andeconomically disadvantaging for women.
The role of the sub-national (or 'third') level of governance within theevolving structure of overall EU governance has, in recent years, becomesomething of a preoccupation on the part of EU scholars. For many, a shifttowards an multi-level governance system for the EU, in which regions play alarger role in the overall policy process, is considered to be both possibleand desirable.61Enhancing the authority of the regions not only permits EU economic and socialpolicies to be better adapted to dissimilar conditions within individual memberstates, it also represents a barrier to an over-concentration of power at thehighest - EU - governance level. Instead, a shift to genuine multi-levelgovernance in the EU will ensure that governance remains (will be brought)'close(r)' to the citizens and societies it serves and thus will retain(acquire) popular legitimacy as a result.62 However, much of this discussion of regionalismin EU governance is conducted in informal language. Multi-level governance ispresented as decision making system in which regions within EU member statesbecome involved as independent participants in the arrangements of EUpolicy-making and have competence for common policies which they are bestplaced to formulate and implement. The difficulty is - as the experience of UKdevolution shows - multi-level governance inevitably will be characterized by aplurality of sovereignties involving multiple agencies with shared andoverlapping constitutional authorities. In the context of the EU debate,subsidiarity as a 'rule of policy assignment' has been advanced as a device toensure coherence in an EU multi-level governance system that includessub-national authorities. The general subsidiarity 'rule' stipulates that thecompetence for a policy should be assigned to that level of governance whichcan discharge it most efficiently, and that wherever possible this should be atthat level which is 'closest' to the citizen. Given that policy overlap andpolicy contagion are unavoidable features of multi-level governance, this willyield an EU governance arrangement in which each of the EU institutions, themember state and the sub-national governments singly and severally exercisepolicy competencies.
He concludes: "Western Europe's successful transcendence of thesovereign state and of state sovereignty is greatly to be welcomed".66 Later he suggests thatsubsidiarity can be a basis for recognizing "...further levels of systemdifferentiation...",67where this points to arrangements of governance 'beneath' the nation state aswell as beyond it. In short, subsidiarity is seen as offering a mechanism forreconciling the demands of sub-national groups for a greater measure oflegislative autonomy in a way that does not undermine the coherent and unitaryeconomic and political framework of the EU. It provides a non-divisive methodfor promoting self-determination and cultural diversity. But is this a correctreading of subsidiarity?
It is certainly true that European integration has changed the nature ofnational sovereignty available to the EU member states. Similarly, subsidiarityprovides a conceptual framework for assigning competencies between national andEU levels of authority. However, we take issue with two propositions implicitor explicit in the aspirations for EU multi-level governance as suggested byMacCormick. First, is it true to say that European integration has transcended"the sovereign state [and] state sovereignty"? Second, is subsidiarity capableof providing an intellectual framework for determining policy assignmentbeneath the level of the nation-state as well as beyond that level? Theconclusion we derive from our analysis of the devolved governance arrangementsin the UK instead is that subsidiarity, as defined in the TEU, has a meaningonly within the unique setting of the European Union as a union of sovereignstates. And, insofar as the EU remains solely a union comprising of nationstates, while subsidiarity may continue to 'inspire' thinking about thestructure of multi-level governance in the EU, it cannot be appliedinstrumentally to achieving that end.
On the other hand, subsidiarity is advanced as a (potentiallyjusticiable) procedural rule for assigning powers between different levels ofgovernment according to specific 'efficiency' criteria, within the constraintsimposed by compliance with democratic principles.71 When presented as a doctrine or canon of 'good'governance, the appeal of subsidiarity is self-evident. Further, it is adoctrine that plausibly can be applied to conceptualise a range of alternativearrangements for the governance of a system in which public policies exist, andin which decisions about the nature of these policies have to be taken.
But persuasive as it may be as a doctrine, subsidiarity suffers from twoprincipal defects as a constitutional tool. In the first place the complexitiesarising from policy externalities already described (i.e. overlap andcontagion) have to be effectively managed if a binary rule of policy assignmentis to be avoided and, instead, subsidiarity applied meaningfully.72 This is because subsidiarityis a process for managing competing claims with respect to the application ofconcurrent powers. To achieve this, subsidiarity has to have a capacity todirect a legislative inquiry to determine the consequences should one level ofgovernance refrain from exercising its legitimate authority over a measure indeference to considerations raised by another level of governance with whom itshares competence over that measure.73 If it is to command legitimacy, such an inquirymust be transparent and engage the legislatures involved (not the executives).It must evaluate both elements (legitimacy and efficiency) that comprise the'principle' of subsidiarity, and the process should be justiciable.74 Second, the corollary to a consistentapplication of subsidiarity is the requirement that the multi-level governancestructure is sufficiently fluid to permit policy competencies to be re-assignedbetween the different levels as circumstances dictate. It is unlikely that aparticular configuration of policy assignment will remain optimal indefinitely.As the barriers that separate the internal economy and society (i.e. the policyjurisdictions) of the EU progressively fall, the interdependencies between theregions will intensify. The logic of this, as the history of the EU hasdemonstrated, is for more and more authority automatically to gravitate to the'higher' level of governance.75 This can be avoided only by correctly specifyingthe conditions necessary to facilitate that application of subsidiarity as aprocess - that is, as an on-going and ever present legislative inquiry. If weare to define a constitutional architecture for EU governance, first we have tostipulate the objectives that we wish it to meet, and the criteria by which wemight appraise or revise it. This is not a novel argument. Any account of theorigins of the prevailing constitutional arrangements of EU governance wouldfocus on the primary objective of designing a governance system that revolvedaround (and buttressed) the nation state but which, at the same time, eroded orcontained particular elements of national sovereignty through a partial shiftto supranational governance.76 Further, a prominent role would be accorded tothe judicial process within that arrangement. In a similar way, only acomprehensive analysis of the role that subsidiarity can play in legitimatingthe EU governance system will enable us to design the constitutionalarrangements necessary for its realization.77