44 Secret Keys To Universal Power Pdfl

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Hadda Condino

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Aug 19, 2024, 2:11:31 AM8/19/24
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This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

44 Secret Keys To Universal Power Pdfl


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Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST.

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at

These guidelines provide technical requirements for federal agencies implementing digital identity services and are not intended to constrain the development or use of standards outside of this purpose. These guidelines focus on the authentication of subjects interacting with government systems over open networks, establishing that a given claimant is a subscriber who has been previously authenticated. The result of the authentication process may be used locally by the system performing the authentication or may be asserted elsewhere in a federated identity system. This document defines technical requirements for each of the three authenticator assurance levels. This publication supersedes corresponding sections of NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-63-2.

This table contains changes that have been incorporated into Special Publication 800-63B. Errata updates can include corrections, clarifications, or other minor changes in the publication that are either editorial or substantive in nature.

The ongoing authentication of subscribers is central to the process of associating a subscriber with their online activity. Subscriber authentication is performed by verifying that the claimant controls one or more authenticators (called tokens in earlier versions of SP 800-63) associated with a given subscriber. A successful authentication results in the assertion of an identifier, either pseudonymous or non-pseudonymous, and optionally other identity information, to the relying party (RP).

This document provides recommendations on types of authentication processes, including choices of authenticators, that may be used at various Authenticator Assurance Levels (AALs). It also provides recommendations on the lifecycle of authenticators, including revocation in the event of loss or theft.

This technical guideline applies to digital authentication of subjects to systems over a network. It does not address the authentication of a person for physical access (e.g., to a building), though some credentials used for digital access may also be used for physical access authentication. This technical guideline also requires that federal systems and service providers participating in authentication protocols be authenticated to subscribers.

The strength of an authentication transaction is characterized by an ordinal measurement known as the AAL. Stronger authentication (a higher AAL) requires malicious actors to have better capabilities and expend greater resources in order to successfully subvert the authentication process. Authentication at higher AALs can effectively reduce the risk of attacks. A high-level summary of the technical requirements for each of the AALs is provided below; see Sections 4 and 5 of this document for specific normative requirements.

To satisfy the requirements of a given AAL, a claimant SHALL be authenticated with at least a given level of strength to be recognized as a subscriber. The result of an authentication process is an identifier that SHALL be used each time that subscriber authenticates to that RP. The identifier MAY be pseudonymous. Subscriber identifiers SHOULD NOT be reused for a different subject but SHOULD be reused when a previously-enrolled subject is re-enrolled by the CSP. Other attributes that identify the subscriber as a unique subject MAY also be provided.

Cryptographic authenticators used at AAL1 SHALL use approved cryptography. Software-based authenticators that operate within the context of an operating system MAY, where applicable, attempt to detect compromise (e.g., by malware) of the user endpoint in which they are running and SHOULD NOT complete the operation when such a compromise is detected.

Communication between the claimant and verifier (using the primary channel in the case of an out-of-band authenticator) SHALL be via an authenticated protected channel to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.

Periodic reauthentication of subscriber sessions SHALL be performed as described in Section 7.2. At AAL1, reauthentication of the subscriber SHOULD be repeated at least once per 30 days during an extended usage session, regardless of user activity. The session SHOULD be terminated (i.e., logged out) when this time limit is reached.

The CSP SHALL employ appropriately-tailored security controls from the low baseline of security controls defined in SP 800-53 or equivalent federal (e.g. FEDRAMP) or industry standard. The CSP SHALL ensure that the minimum assurance-related controls for low-impact systems, or equivalent, are satisfied.

The CSP shall comply with its respective records retention policies in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, including any National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records retention schedules that may apply. If the CSP opts to retain records in the absence of any mandatory requirements, the CSP SHALL conduct a risk management process, including assessments of privacy and security risks, to determine how long records should be retained and SHALL inform the subscriber of that retention policy.

At AAL2, authentication SHALL occur by the use of either a multi-factor authenticator or a combination of two single-factor authenticators. A multi-factor authenticator requires two factors to execute a single authentication event, such as a cryptographically-secure device with an integrated biometric sensor that is required to activate the device. Authenticator requirements are specified in Section 5.

Cryptographic authenticators used at AAL2 SHALL use approved cryptography. Authenticators procured by government agencies SHALL be validated to meet the requirements of FIPS 140 Level 1. Software-based authenticators that operate within the context of an operating system MAY, where applicable, attempt to detect compromise of the platform in which they are running (e.g., by malware) and SHOULD NOT complete the operation when such a compromise is detected. At least one authenticator used at AAL2 SHALL be replay resistant as described in Section 5.2.8. Authentication at AAL2 SHOULD demonstrate authentication intent from at least one authenticator as discussed in Section 5.2.9.

Communication between the claimant and verifier (the primary channel in the case of an out-of-band authenticator) SHALL be via an authenticated protected channel to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks.

When a device such as a smartphone is used in the authentication process, the unlocking of that device (typically done using a PIN or biometric) SHALL NOT be considered one of the authentication factors. Generally, it is not possible for a verifier to know that the device had been locked or if the unlock process met the requirements for the relevant authenticator type.

When a biometric factor is used in authentication at AAL2, the performance requirements stated in Section 5.2.3 SHALL be met, and the verifier SHOULD make a determination that the biometric sensor and subsequent processing meet these requirements.

Periodic reauthentication of subscriber sessions SHALL be performed as described in Section 7.2. At AAL2, authentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated at least once per 12 hours during an extended usage session, regardless of user activity. Reauthentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated following any period of inactivity lasting 30 minutes or longer. The session SHALL be terminated (i.e., logged out) when either of these time limits is reached.

Reauthentication of a session that has not yet reached its time limit MAY require only a memorized secret or a biometric in conjunction with the still-valid session secret. The verifier MAY prompt the user to cause activity just before the inactivity timeout.

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