[PATCH] futex: Fix might_sleep() warning in futex_pivot_pending()

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2:50 AM (4 hours ago) 2:50 AM
to syzkall...@googlegroups.com, Yao Kai, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner, andre...@igalia.com, da...@stgolabs.net, dvh...@infradead.org, liuyong...@huawei.com, pet...@infradead.org, syz...@lists.linux.dev
From: Yao Kai <yaok...@huawei.com>

A recent change modified futex_pivot_pending() to acquire a mutex to fix a
race condition. However, futex_pivot_pending() is evaluated as a condition
inside wait_var_event() in futex_hash_allocate(). Since wait_var_event()
sets the task state to TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE before evaluating the
condition, calling a blocking operation like mutex_lock() is invalid and
triggers a might_sleep() warning:

do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=2 set at
[<ffffffff819e8c8d>] prepare_to_wait_event+0x3dd/0x480
kernel/sched/wait.c:317
WARNING: kernel/sched/core.c:9124 at __might_sleep+0x92/0xf0
kernel/sched/core.c:9120
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:623 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x118/0x1550 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
class_mutex_constructor include/linux/mutex.h:253 [inline]
futex_pivot_pending kernel/futex/core.c:1789 [inline]
futex_hash_allocate+0x7fb/0xf00 kernel/futex/core.c:1872
__do_sys_prctl kernel/sys.c:2885 [inline]
__se_sys_prctl+0x78c/0x1910 kernel/sys.c:2534

Fix this by reverting futex_pivot_pending() to a lockless implementation
using RCU and memory barriers, which is the idiomatic way to handle
conditions in wait_event loops. By reading the hash pointer first,
executing an smp_rmb() memory barrier, and then reading hash_new, we
leverage the Message Passing (MP) pattern to guarantee correctness without
blocking. This pairs with the rcu_assign_pointer() release barrier in
__futex_pivot_hash(). If the reader sees the new hash, it is guaranteed to
see the cleared hash_new and correctly return true. If the reader sees the
old hash, it will check futex_ref_is_dead(old), which will return true if
the writer has already completed the pivot. The old hash memory is
guaranteed to remain valid for the duration of the check in
futex_ref_is_dead() because futex_pivot_pending() executes within an RCU
read-side critical section and the old hash is freed using kvfree_rcu().

Fixes: 8e7ff730dd96 ("futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize")
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.6-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+350a93...@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=350a93852ac854927f45
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=29771462-e030-4501-832d-adbf8cb167c2
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaok...@huawei.com>

---
diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index 128c5752f..e84be5410 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static bool __futex_pivot_hash(struct mm_struct *mm, struct futex_private_hash *
fph = rcu_dereference_protected(mmph->hash, lockdep_is_held(&mmph->lock));
if (fph) {
if (!futex_ref_is_dead(fph)) {
- mmph->hash_new = new;
+ WRITE_ONCE(mmph->hash_new, new);
return false;
}

@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static void futex_pivot_hash(struct mm_struct *mm)

fph = mm->futex.phash.hash_new;
if (fph) {
- mm->futex.phash.hash_new = NULL;
+ WRITE_ONCE(mm->futex.phash.hash_new, NULL);
__futex_pivot_hash(mm, fph);
}
}
@@ -1786,12 +1786,18 @@ static bool futex_pivot_pending(struct mm_struct *mm)
struct futex_mm_phash *mmph = &mm->futex.phash;
struct futex_private_hash *fph;

- guard(mutex)(&mmph->lock);
+ guard(rcu)();

- if (!mmph->hash_new)
+ fph = rcu_dereference(mmph->hash);
+ /*
+ * Ensure that if we see the new hash, we will also see the cleared
+ * hash_new pointer. Pairs with rcu_assign_pointer() in
+ * __futex_pivot_hash().
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+ if (!READ_ONCE(mmph->hash_new))
return true;

- fph = rcu_dereference_raw(mmph->hash);
return futex_ref_is_dead(fph);
}

@@ -1879,7 +1885,7 @@ static int futex_hash_allocate(unsigned int hash_slots, unsigned int flags)
cur = rcu_dereference_protected(mm->futex.phash.hash,
lockdep_is_held(&mm->futex.phash.lock));
new = mm->futex.phash.hash_new;
- mm->futex.phash.hash_new = NULL;
+ WRITE_ONCE(mm->futex.phash.hash_new, NULL);

if (fph) {
if (cur && !cur->hash_mask) {
@@ -1889,7 +1895,7 @@ static int futex_hash_allocate(unsigned int hash_slots, unsigned int flags)
* the second one returns here.
*/
free = fph;
- mm->futex.phash.hash_new = new;
+ WRITE_ONCE(mm->futex.phash.hash_new, new);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (cur && !new) {


base-commit: db2ddb87143519e20a95aa36c60b36107b736a58
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