Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • In Medias Res
Re: Dan Everett
I am trying to represent two readings of the three juxtaposed sentences in English. The first reading is that the judge
and the jury both know that Malcolm is guilty. The second is that the judge knows that the jury thinks that Malcolm is
Do these purported EGs of mine seem correct to you?
Apologies for the delay in responding … I won't have much of use to say about those particular graphs as I've long been
following a different fork in Peirce's work about how to get from Alpha to Beta, from propositional to quantificational
logic via graphical syntax.
But the examples raise one of the oldest issues I've bothered about over the years, going back to the days when I read
PQR (Peirce, Quine, Russell) in tandem and many long discussions with my undergrad phil advisor. That is the question
of intentional contexts and ”referential opacity”. The thing is Peirce's pragmatic standpoint yields a radically
distinct analysis of belief, knowledge, and indeed truth from the way things have been handled down the line from
logical atomism and empiricism to analytic philosophy in general. As it happens, there was a critical branch point in
time when Russell almost got a clue but Wittgenstein bullied him into dropping it, at least so far as I could tell from
a scattered sample of texts.
At any rate, I fell down the Wayback Machine rabbit hole looking for things I wrote about all this on the Peirce List
and other places around the web at the turn of the millennium …
I'd almost be tempted to start a blog series on this, probably simulcast on the Facebook Peirce Matters page if you're
into discussing it online … I have enough off the cuff to start an anchor post or two, but it might be the middle of
August before I could do much more.