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Baltasar Tae
Yes there is no compiled version of ROOT for MacOS 12.2.1. See Release 62408 - ROOT
At that time MacOS version was 11.7.
You can recompile root from source as explained here:
Installing ROOT - ROOT
This seems to be a leftover of a previous installation of ROOT (presumably from Homebrew) in /opt/homebrew/opt/rootinstall/.
Probably your $ROOTSYS environment variable is pointing to that directory instead of pointing to where ROOT is currently installed.
I think what you are running into is the compiled version. A binary for ROOT is compiled with either 11, 14, or 17. Unless you are compiling yourself (if I understand correctly, you are interested in running in CI, so you want binaries), so what you are interested in is the chosen binary version. Conda has been 17 for a while. I think the main docker image is 14 still.
I have five EX4200 switches in a Virtual Chassis (VC) configuration running 12.1R3.5. During a recent power outtage, one of those 5 switches did boot boot properly from it's active root partition, it booted from its backup root partition. It turned out that the backup root partition had JUNOS 11.4 installed, so the switch did not properly rejoin the VC.
To add to what jtb mentioned, you can snapshot to all members in a virtual chassis by running request system snapshot slice alternate all-members. That way you can ensure all members in a chassis have a consistent version of Junos.
It could also be possible to implement a solution off-box as well, which could be driven by a number of options using Junos PyEZ Python library which could be leveraged by an off-box Python script, or via a tool such as Ansible/Salt, or even off-box SLAX using JUISE.
I did take a look at this in more detail and the following is a script that I have written that demonstrates some of this. With the approach shown below it should be good for some early versions of Junos as well, I suspect that it will probably work for Junos 9.6 and higher, although I only tested it with 12.1.
It shows examples of sending SNMP traps, and also updating OIDs in the Juniper Utility MIB that could then be polled without too much effort. Or, with minimal changes it could just as easily send to syslog.
I added the event script to the configuration, and setup a timer event and policy for the event-script within the script itself, so that there is less configuration that needs to be applied. But the event-definition could be removed from the script, and instead an event policy could be configured instead.
With this in place, the script is executed every hour. Don't forget that if the script is modified, then it will be necessary to reload the script via the CLI, e.g. request system scripts event-scripts reload
And even when I build in the production environment, it seems to be present. I don't know what's the main goal for adding that information there ? Isn't it a security issue to show the angular version publicly ? Thanks
It's an old question, but still relevant and the accepted answer could be misleading.According to Miško Hevery: "This is there intentionally, so that tools such an augury, can detect that it is an angular page and can provide useful UI."
It is not a security issue in itself, but hiding it isn't "security by obscurity" either, as that would mean that's all the security measures you take.In fact using obscurity is a good practice as it makes information gathering (recon) harder for the attacker, but one must never rely on this alone.
FAILED! => "changed": false, "msg": "Composer could not detect the root package (roots/bedrock) version, defaulting to '1.0.0'. See -version No vendor dir present, checking non-dev platform requirements from the lock file", "stdout": "Composer could not detect the root package (roots/bedrock) version, defaulting to '1.0.0'. See -version\nNo vendor dir present, checking non-dev platform requirements from the lock file\n", "stdout_lines": ["Composer could not detect the root package (roots/bedrock) version, defaulting to '1.0.0'. See -version", "No vendor dir present, checking non-dev platform requirements from the lock file"]
When using them as composite builds, would each project be able to depend on each other?
So in my local checkout i would have a folder full of these builds and for example, one module is a networking module, this would then need to depend on it.
Using the old way i would normally do
Yes, they can depend on each other with composite builds too.
Just not as project-dependency as they are projects in another build.
But you would use the normal coordinates at which they are created so for example implementation("my.group:logging-shared") or whatever.
If they are always coming through composite build, you can leave out the version.
So I am able to compile locally using the coordinates without the version number, but when i then perform a publish to maven local, the output is referencing the coordinates without the version number which means the consuming clients/projects cannot use it.
I was expecting that when i publish to maven local that it would then be able to reference the others but maybe not.
I guess the other option is to add the android client to the mega project containing all the other modules.
Then just declare the version you want published in the dependency.
The included build wins anyway (by default) so for building the version is ignored, but it should then hopefully be in the published metadata.
ah ok that makes my build scripts far more simple. I guess the only issue is that if there is a mismatch of versions then it will end up using a remote version.
e.g. if Analytics develop code relies on networking 1.0.0 but develop of networking is on 1.0.1 then the remote would end up being used - this is the only caveat.
If that is your concern, you should probably take some measures to protect against that, like an integration test that uses published versions, or some version consistency check or whatever. Hard to tell how to do it best without having the concrete situation at hand.
Thats fine for my use case, i actually prefer this, i think in my scenario i need to also include the client project in the mega project as a composite build, this way it will then include all the local dependancies it needs.
Though uncommon, websites can also use certificates to identify clients (e.g., users) connecting to them. Besides ensuring it is well-formed, Chrome passes this type of certificate to the server, which then evaluates and enforces its chosen policy. The policies on this page do not apply to client authentication certificates.
Chrome Root Program Participants MUST satisfy the requirements defined in this policy, including taking responsibility for ensuring the continued compliance of all corresponding subordinate CAs and delegated third parties participating in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Google includes or removes self-signed root CA certificates in the Chrome Root Store as it deems appropriate at its sole discretion. The selection and ongoing inclusion of CA certificates is done to enhance the security of Chrome and promote interoperability. CA certificates that do not provide a broad service to all browser users will not be added to, or may be removed from the Chrome Root Store. CA certificates included in the Chrome Root Store must provide value to Chrome end users that exceeds the risk of their continued inclusion.
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To phase-in these requirements in a manner that reduces negative impact to the ecosystem, affected root CA certificates included in the Chrome Root Store will be removed according to the schedule in the table below.
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