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Retired head of the army, Benedicto Lucas Garca, and former head of military intelligence, Manuel Callejas y Callejas, have been charged with crimes of genocide, enforced disappearance and crimes against humanity which left at least 1,421 victims. Both men were convicted in 2018 on charges of rape, torture and enforced disappearance of political activist Emma Molina Theissen, and of the forced disappearance of her 14 year old brother, in 1981.
WOLA Senior Fellow Jo-Marie Burt, an international expert on transitional justice and long-time observer of war crimes trials in Guatemala, will be monitoring the proceedings in the Maya Ixil genocide case, with the support of Truth and Justice in Guatemala, an organization she founded and co-directs with Guatemalan human rights defender Paulo Estrada.
According to the report Guatemala Nunca Ms of the Catholic Church, between 1978 and 1982, the military high command deployed a military counter-offensive through operations that left at least 12,400 victims in the municipalities of Santa Mara Nebaj, San Gaspar Chajul and San Juan Cotzal located in the department of El Quiche.
CHART 1 (Responsibility for Acts of Violence): In its final report, the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH- Guatemalan Truth Commission) concluded that army massacres had destroyed 626 villages, more than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared, 1.5 million were displaced by the violence, and more than 150,000 were driven to seek refuge in Mexico. Further, the Commission found the state responsible for ninety-three percent of the acts of violence and the guerrillas (URNG-Guatemalan Revolutionary Union) responsible for three percent. [2]
The Ixil and Ixcan areas are located in the northern part of El Quiche with the Ixcan jungle north of the Ixil mountains. Between March 1981 and March 1983, the Guatemalan army carried out seventy-seven massacres in the Ixil/Ixcan region. There are 3,102 known victims of these massacres. If we locate the number of massacres and victims by date on the calendar of the regimes, Lucas Garcia is responsible for forty-five massacres with 1,678 victims from March 1981 to March 1982 and Rios Montt is responsible for thirty-two massacres with 1,424 victims from March 1982 to March 1983.[4]
CHART 4 (Number of Massacres-Northern El Quiche):If we focus only on comparing the number of massacres, we find a fifteen percent drop in the number of massacres and 200 less massacre victims in the Ixil/Ixcan area during the first year of Rios Montt.
CHART 6 (El Quiche Data):If we broaden our analysis to the entire department of El Quiche, our conclusions about the strategies and patterns of massacres in the Ixil/Ixcan areas during the regimes of Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt are systematically reaffirmed. [5] Under Lucas Garcia, from March 1981 to March 1982, 2,495 Maya were victims of ninety-seven army massacres in the department of El Quiche. Under Rios Montt, between March 1982 and March 1983, 3,180 Maya were victims of eighty-five massacres in El Quiche. Here again, while there is a thirteen percent drop in the number of massacres under Rios Montt, there is a twenty-five percent increase in the number of massacre victims during the first year of his regime. Again, under Rios Montt, there is an increase in the efficiency of the massacres with thirty percent more victims per massacre, on average. And again, I want to emphasize that this thirty percent increase represents the systematic inclusion of women, children and elderly as massacre victims.
CHART 7 (Command Responsibility by Percentage of Massacre Victims):Of all the Achi Maya who fell victim to army massacres between January of 1980 and December of 1982, fully 43 percent of massacre victims died during the first nine months of the Rios Montt regime. [6]
CHART 8 (Massacre Victims in Salama and Rabinal):If we combine the massacres in the municipality of Rabinal and the departmental capital of Salama, we find the ladino-dominated Salama suffered one percent of massacres while the predominantly Achi-Maya Rabinal suffered 99 percent of the massacres.
Between 1980 and 1983, 25 percent of massacres were committed by the army alone. Another 21 percent were committed by army troops with judiciales - local ladinos from Salama and Rabinal vestido de civil con pauelos rojos. Both Rabinal Achi and ladinos refer to these men interchangeably as judiciales and escuadrones. Moreover, 54 percent of all Rabinal massacres were committed by the army with army-controlled Civil Patrol (PAC) military commissioners and/or patrollers. Under the regime of Rios Montt, military commissioners and PACs were included in every army massacre in Rabinal.[8]
Given that PACs were an integral component of the 1982 Victory Campaign, I want to again look at the massacres, but this time analyzing the composition of the perpetrators. My questions here are: (1) Who carried out the massacres? (2) Does this reveal a pattern? (3) If there is a pattern, what are its implications?
In the department of El Quiche during the last year of the Lucas Garcia regime, army platoons carried out ninety-seven massacres but sixteen of these massacres were different from the rest because, for the first time, army platoons carried out massacres with local PAC participation under army command.[17 Under Lucas Garcia, nineteen percent of massacres were carried out by army platoons with PAC participation (under army command) and eighty-one percent of massacres were carried out by army platoons alone. Reviewing the number of victims of each massacre, one finds that eighty-seven percent of the victims were killed in army platoon massacres and thirteen percent of the victims were killed in joint army/PAC massacres.
In its comprehensive investigation, the CEH found that 18 percent of human rights violations were committed by civil patrols. Further, it noted that 85 percent of those violations committed by patrollers were carried out under army order.[21] It is not insignificant that the CEH found that one out of every ten human rights violations was carried out by a military commissioner and that while these commissioners often led patrollers in acts of violence, eighty-seven percent of the violations committed by commissioners were in collusion with the army.[22]
Less than one month after the army organized all the men of San Jose and San Antonio Sinache, Zacualpa, into a PAC, army-ordered PAC violence began within the community. On May 24, 1982 (exactly two months after the coup), the army called all the 800 patrollers to gather in front of the church in San Antonio Sinache. After chastising them for failing to turn in any guerrillas in the preceding weeks, the army lieutenant sent them on a fruitless march through the mountains searching for guerrillas. When they returned empty-handed, the army and patrollers who had remained showed them the dead bodies of four PAC members and two local women. After ordering the patrollers to relinquish their palos (sticks) and machetes, the lieutenant accused Manuel Tol Canil, one of the local PAC chiefs of being a guerrilla. Two other patrollers protested that Canil was not a guerrilla and had committed no crime. The lieutenant then accused those two patrollers of also being guerrillas.[23]
IMAGE in CHART 13 (Chapel in memory of victims of the 1982 Plan de Sanchez massacre in Baja Verapaz): In July, 2004, the Inter-American Court made public its condemnation of the Guatemalan government for the July 18, 1982 massacre of 188 Achi-Maya in the village of Plan de Sanchez in the mountains above Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. In this judgment, and for the first time in its history, the Court ruled that a genocide had taken place. The Inter-American Court attributed the 1982 massacre and the genocide to Guatemalan army troops. This is the first ruling by the Inter-American Court against the Guatemalan state for any of the 626 massacres carried out by the army in its scorched earth campaign in the early 1980s.
Further, regarding the massacre in Plan de Sanchez, the Court indicated that the armed forces of the Guatemalan government had violated the following rights, each of which is enshrined in the Human Rights Convention of the Organization of American States:
The Plan de Sanchez case was considered by the Inter-American Court at the request of the Inter-American Commission which received the original petition from relatives of the massacres victims. These survivors requested consideration within the Inter-American Court because of the lack of justice in the Guatemalan legal system. Since the Plan de Sanchez case was initiated in 1995, there have been more than 200 exhumations of other clandestine cemeteries of massacre victims in Guatemala. Each of these exhumations has included the filing of a criminal case with forensic evidence against the Guatemalan army and its agents. To date, only the Rio Negro case has been heard in a Guatemalan court (in 1999) and no army officials were included in the case which found three low-ranking civil patrollers guilty.
[1] This draws from Violencia y Genocidio en Guatemala (Guatemala City: FyG Editores, 2003) and Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). The author thanks Allison Downey for her assistance in developing the massacre databases, Raul Figueroa Sarti for publishing this critical material in Guatemala, and Ben Kiernan for making it available on this website.
[28] Ejercito de Guatemala. 1984. Las patrullas de autodefensa civil: La respuesta popular al proceso de integracian socio-economico-politico en la Guatemala actual. (Guatemala City: Editorial del Ejercito, 16).
ON 2 DECEMBER 1990, THE Guatemalan Army opened automatic weapons fire on an unarmed crowd of between 2,000 and 4,000 Tzutujil Mayas from the town of Santiago Atitl n in highland Guatemala, about 100 miles west of the capital. Fourteen people, ranging in age from 10 to 53, were killed; another 21 were wounded. Two weeks later, as a result of massive popular pressure and national and international outcry, the army was forced to vacate its garrison, and Atitl n became one of the few Guatemalan communities of more than 10,000 inhabitants to not have a military base.
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