Why Sudan’s Long History of Negotiation Is Suddenly Failing
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John Ashworth
May 23, 2026, 2:45:32 AMMay 23
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Seventy Years at the Table: Why Sudan’s Long History of Negotiation Is
Suddenly Failing
By Hermela Kidane
Horn Review
22 May 2026
For generations Sudan’s arena has followed a grim but predictable
logic wars would always eventually return to the negotiating table.
From the Ethiopia Agreement of 1972 which briefly calmed the first
southern rebellion to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 that
ended the long North-South civil war and even the Juba Peace Agreement
of 2020 the nation’s history has been shaped by a paradoxical culture
of conflict resolution. Sudan’s political elite often described as
ruthless have historically treated military victory not as an end in
itself but as a prelude to political bargaining. Then why is current
negotiations fail? This is precisely why the current collapse of Quad
mediated negotiations involving the United States, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates and Egypt is not just a diplomatic setback. It
shows a break from Sudan’s political DNA.
Throughout Sudan’s history the road to peace has never been smooth.
Negotiations have often been plagued by mistrust, external meddling,
collapsing ceasefires and the exclusion of marginalized voices.
However, these persistent challenges and against considerable odds
most of the country’s major wars and conflicts have ultimately
concluded at the negotiating table. From the frail compromises of
Ethiopia in 1972 to the strategically driven Comprehensive Peace
Agreement of 2005 and even the Juba Peace Agreement of 2020 which is a
distinct pattern manifests Sudan’s warring parties however ruthless or
intransigent have consistently returned to dialogue. This culture of
negotiation flawed and incomplete as it may be has repeatedly proven
more powerful than the pull of permanent warfare. The challenges were
real but the outcome was consistent guns gave way to agreements.
That common ground has now evaporated. Unlike earlier wars which
pitted the periphery against the center or fought over the soul of the
state the current conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is something far more than a war within
the military Islamist elite itself. General Abdel Fattah al Burhan and
General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) were once allies co-architects
of the 2021 coup that crushed Sudan’s democratic transition. Their
falling out is not about ideology or marginalization it is a struggle
over resource and power competition who controls gold mines, trade
routes, banking networks, military contracts and the spoils of a
deeply predatory economic system.
This is what makes the current war radically different from Sudan’s
past conflicts. Previously warring parties shared a common interest in
preserving the state as a vehicle for rent seeking and future
bargaining. Negotiations succeeded because exhaustion and external
pressure could still push rivals toward a power sharing deal. Today
however resource and power competition has turned former allies into
mortal enemies with no shared interest in keeping the state intact.
The war involves the simultaneous disintegration of the state’s
monopoly on violence with the RSF functioning as a parallel army
leaving no higher authority, no institutional framework and no mutual
interest in preserving a collapsing system. Where past negotiations
ultimately worked today’s talks repeatedly fail. There is no exhausted
partner willing to compromise, no shared state to salvage and no
historical precedent for peace when the competition over resources and
power has become a zero sum fight to the finish.
The most major variable altering Sudan’s historical road is the depth
of its regional entanglement. The Quad mediators the United States,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are not a unified bloc but a house
divided, each pursuing distinct interests. This external sponsorship
has created a moral hazard for the belligerents. Historically Sudanese
parties negotiated because the cost of war exceeded the cost of peace.
Today both the SAF and the RSF receive a steady influx of weapons,
drones, and diplomatic cover from foreign backers. The SAF has
received critical military support. Because external actors are
willing to fuel the war indefinitely to protect their geostrategic
interests both have concluded that a decisive military victory might
be achievable or at least that a stalemate is survivable. mediation
only succeeds when parties view it as a viable option to achieve their
goals currently the battlefield appears more promising than the
conference room.
The claim that Sudanese culture inherently favors negotiation requires
a refinement. Historically, negotiations succeeded because they were
driven by discrete organized constituencies the Anya Nya rebels, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army or Darfuri factions who could mobilize
fighters and deliver votes. The current warring parties represent no
one but themselves. The pro-democracy civilian coalition the Forces
for Freedom and Change has been sidelined, arrested or killed since
the 2021 coup. There is no civilian counterweight at the table to
absorb the costs of compromise. The Quad’s proposal while ostensibly
advocating for a civilian led transition immediately faced rejection
from Burhan who dismissed the roadmap as an insult that sought to
eliminate the armed forces while leaving the RSF intact.
Without a unified civilian bloc to legitimize a power sharing formula
any agreement reached by the generals would likely collapse as quickly
as the Jeddah Declaration of May 2023.
If negotiation continues to fail the most plausible outcome is not a
conventional military victory but de facto partition. The RSF has
consolidated control over vast swathes of Darfur and the western
corridors effectively establishing a governance structure akin to a
stateless protectorate. The SAF having lost its last major stronghold
in El-Fasher retains control of the east and north including Port
Sudan the country’s lifeline to the Red Sea. This cartographic reality
suggests that Sudan may be approaching a Libyan style fragmentation
where two rival governments claim sovereignty but control distinct
territories.
In this environment a diplomatic win is infinitely more necessary than
a military one yet it remains the most elusive prize. Such a truce
would not end the war but it would halt the hemorrhaging of civilian
life and create conditions for local rather than national
ceasefires.The heritage of conflict originates in the failure to
sustain peace due to unaddressed structural grievances. Until external
donors cut the supply lines that make war profitable and until the
civilian voice is forcibly reintroduced into the process Sudan will
remain trapped in a negotiation fallacy acting out the rituals of
dialogue while preparing for the permanence of war.
https://hornreview.org/2026/05/22/seventy-years-at-the-table-why-sudans-long-history-of-negotiation-is-suddenly-failing/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
Suddenly Failing
By Hermela Kidane
Horn Review
22 May 2026
For generations Sudan’s arena has followed a grim but predictable
logic wars would always eventually return to the negotiating table.
From the Ethiopia Agreement of 1972 which briefly calmed the first
southern rebellion to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 that
ended the long North-South civil war and even the Juba Peace Agreement
of 2020 the nation’s history has been shaped by a paradoxical culture
of conflict resolution. Sudan’s political elite often described as
ruthless have historically treated military victory not as an end in
itself but as a prelude to political bargaining. Then why is current
negotiations fail? This is precisely why the current collapse of Quad
mediated negotiations involving the United States, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates and Egypt is not just a diplomatic setback. It
shows a break from Sudan’s political DNA.
Throughout Sudan’s history the road to peace has never been smooth.
Negotiations have often been plagued by mistrust, external meddling,
collapsing ceasefires and the exclusion of marginalized voices.
However, these persistent challenges and against considerable odds
most of the country’s major wars and conflicts have ultimately
concluded at the negotiating table. From the frail compromises of
Ethiopia in 1972 to the strategically driven Comprehensive Peace
Agreement of 2005 and even the Juba Peace Agreement of 2020 which is a
distinct pattern manifests Sudan’s warring parties however ruthless or
intransigent have consistently returned to dialogue. This culture of
negotiation flawed and incomplete as it may be has repeatedly proven
more powerful than the pull of permanent warfare. The challenges were
real but the outcome was consistent guns gave way to agreements.
That common ground has now evaporated. Unlike earlier wars which
pitted the periphery against the center or fought over the soul of the
state the current conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and
the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is something far more than a war within
the military Islamist elite itself. General Abdel Fattah al Burhan and
General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) were once allies co-architects
of the 2021 coup that crushed Sudan’s democratic transition. Their
falling out is not about ideology or marginalization it is a struggle
over resource and power competition who controls gold mines, trade
routes, banking networks, military contracts and the spoils of a
deeply predatory economic system.
This is what makes the current war radically different from Sudan’s
past conflicts. Previously warring parties shared a common interest in
preserving the state as a vehicle for rent seeking and future
bargaining. Negotiations succeeded because exhaustion and external
pressure could still push rivals toward a power sharing deal. Today
however resource and power competition has turned former allies into
mortal enemies with no shared interest in keeping the state intact.
The war involves the simultaneous disintegration of the state’s
monopoly on violence with the RSF functioning as a parallel army
leaving no higher authority, no institutional framework and no mutual
interest in preserving a collapsing system. Where past negotiations
ultimately worked today’s talks repeatedly fail. There is no exhausted
partner willing to compromise, no shared state to salvage and no
historical precedent for peace when the competition over resources and
power has become a zero sum fight to the finish.
The most major variable altering Sudan’s historical road is the depth
of its regional entanglement. The Quad mediators the United States,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt are not a unified bloc but a house
divided, each pursuing distinct interests. This external sponsorship
has created a moral hazard for the belligerents. Historically Sudanese
parties negotiated because the cost of war exceeded the cost of peace.
Today both the SAF and the RSF receive a steady influx of weapons,
drones, and diplomatic cover from foreign backers. The SAF has
received critical military support. Because external actors are
willing to fuel the war indefinitely to protect their geostrategic
interests both have concluded that a decisive military victory might
be achievable or at least that a stalemate is survivable. mediation
only succeeds when parties view it as a viable option to achieve their
goals currently the battlefield appears more promising than the
conference room.
The claim that Sudanese culture inherently favors negotiation requires
a refinement. Historically, negotiations succeeded because they were
driven by discrete organized constituencies the Anya Nya rebels, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army or Darfuri factions who could mobilize
fighters and deliver votes. The current warring parties represent no
one but themselves. The pro-democracy civilian coalition the Forces
for Freedom and Change has been sidelined, arrested or killed since
the 2021 coup. There is no civilian counterweight at the table to
absorb the costs of compromise. The Quad’s proposal while ostensibly
advocating for a civilian led transition immediately faced rejection
from Burhan who dismissed the roadmap as an insult that sought to
eliminate the armed forces while leaving the RSF intact.
Without a unified civilian bloc to legitimize a power sharing formula
any agreement reached by the generals would likely collapse as quickly
as the Jeddah Declaration of May 2023.
If negotiation continues to fail the most plausible outcome is not a
conventional military victory but de facto partition. The RSF has
consolidated control over vast swathes of Darfur and the western
corridors effectively establishing a governance structure akin to a
stateless protectorate. The SAF having lost its last major stronghold
in El-Fasher retains control of the east and north including Port
Sudan the country’s lifeline to the Red Sea. This cartographic reality
suggests that Sudan may be approaching a Libyan style fragmentation
where two rival governments claim sovereignty but control distinct
territories.
In this environment a diplomatic win is infinitely more necessary than
a military one yet it remains the most elusive prize. Such a truce
would not end the war but it would halt the hemorrhaging of civilian
life and create conditions for local rather than national
ceasefires.The heritage of conflict originates in the failure to
sustain peace due to unaddressed structural grievances. Until external
donors cut the supply lines that make war profitable and until the
civilian voice is forcibly reintroduced into the process Sudan will
remain trapped in a negotiation fallacy acting out the rituals of
dialogue while preparing for the permanence of war.
https://hornreview.org/2026/05/22/seventy-years-at-the-table-why-sudans-long-history-of-negotiation-is-suddenly-failing/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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