UAE Backs Massacres in Sudan: US Stopping Them Would Be Too Costly
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John Ashworth
Jul 5, 2026, 2:56:01 AMJul 5
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US Leaders Know UAE Backs Massacres in Sudan. Stopping Them Would Be Too Costly.
The Emirates’ promised $1.4 trillion investment in the US appears to
be incentivizing Washington to look the other way.
By Elfadil Ibrahim
ResponsibleStatecraft
July 4, 2026
Massad Boulos, the Trump Administration’s top adviser for Africa and
point man on Sudan, recently spoke before the United Nations Security
Council and warned that the international community “cannot sit back”
while El Obeid, a city of over roughly half a million people, becomes
another El Fasher.
El Fasher was the last major city in Sudan’s Darfur region still
outside the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary
force that has been fighting Sudan’s national army, the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF), in a civil war that recently entered its fourth year.
The war has morphed into a regional proxy conflict, with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) backing the RSF, while Egypt and Turkey have
emerged as the army’s primary backers, providing weapons, drones, and
training.
When El Fasher fell in October 2025, more than 6,000 civilians were
killed in three days. The U.N. said the campaign bore the “hallmarks
of genocide.” The Biden administration also determined that the RSF
had committed genocide in other parts of Darfur in 2024.
The same day that Boulos spoke before the Security Council, the U.S.
Treasury Department announced sanctions on individuals and entities
linked to both sides of Sudan’s civil war. Four days before that,
State Department Spokesman Tommy Piggot warned that “mass atrocities
could be imminent” in El Obeid.
At the time of these warnings from Trump administration officials,
Secretary of State Marco Rubio had just completed a Gulf tour,
reassuring allies shaken by the U.S.- Iran war. During the trip, Rubio
told reporters in Kuwait that Washington “continues to engage” on
Sudan with Gulf states at every opportunity.
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing weeks earlier, Rubio
acknowledged that Sudan’s war had “turned into a proxy war” where “the
divisions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have truly complicated our
ability to bring that to an end.” But rather than take the lead in
resolving those differences, his proposed solution was identifying
safe zones for aid distribution.
Saudi Arabia backs Sudan’s military politically, while the UAE is the
RSF’s principal supplier of arms and mercenaries — a finding that
Washington effectively endorsed through its own sanctions, having
designated multiple UAE-based companies in January 2025 for providing
the RSF with weapons and financial cover.
Despite Washington’s own warnings of what’s to come, the political
inaction means that the situation for the people of El Obeid is bleak.
The RSF has set its sights on El Obeid because of its strategic
location, linking Darfur to the Nile Valley and the capital, Khartoum.
Whoever controls the city controls the central axis of movement across
Sudan.
The RSF has been striking the city with drones for weeks, destroying
the main power transformer, fuel stations, bridges and supply routes
into the city. Food and water prices have risen dramatically and a
hunger crisis looms.
Against this background, Britain and six European Governments issued a
joint call for an immediate halt, stating that “this is a critical
moment, and the international community must act.” The U.N.
secretary-general’s personal envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, called
the RSF’s leader directly. The RSF commander assured him that
civilians would not be targeted. He said the same to diplomats before
the genocides of El Fasher and El Geneina.
Friday’s Treasury sanctions, meanwhile, reflect how much Washington
knows and how little it chooses to act.
On the RSF side, the Treasury sanctioned the middlemen who recruit
Colombian mercenaries to fight for the RSF, but those designations
ignore the Abu Dhabi-based security company that recruited, trained,
and transported them from Emirati airports to the battlefields of
Darfur.
An investigation by The Sentry found that Ahmed al-Humairi, a senior
Emirati official, founded and once fully owned the company at the
center of that network. He has since divested his shares, but he
remains closely linked to the company’s current CEO, fellow Emirati
businessman Mohamed Hamdan al-Zaabi.
The UAE denies all of this, but members of Congress and Secretary of
State Marco Rubio have all openly acknowledged the UAE’s role in
arming the RSF. Despite the fact that this is now public knowledge,
arms sales to the UAE have not been conditioned, nor has Abu Dhabi
faced any real consequences from Washington.
The reason is not hard to find. The UAE has pledged $1.4 trillion in
investment in the U.S. — a commitment reaffirmed even as the
U.S-Israel war on Iran left UAE infrastructure dangerously exposed to
Iranian strikes. At the G7 summit in mid-June, President Trump met
Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed, called him a “warrior,” and
marveled at his wealth, saying: “when you’re that rich, you can speak
that low.”
The United Kingdom is running the same calculation as Washington. This
has prevented any serious action at the U.N. Security Council, where
the U.K. holds the most consequential position as Sudan’s penholder,
meaning it is the country formally responsible for leading the
international response.
In recent testimony before a British parliamentary committee, Yale
Human Rights investigator Nathanial Raymond revealed that the Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office has suppressed evidence linking the
UAE to the RSF due to its prioritization of “economic, security, and
diplomatic relationships with the UAE above preventing the intentional
starvation, forced displacement, and the genocidal slaughter of tens
of thousands of civilians living in El Fasher and its surrounding
communities.”
But Raymond’s testimony implicates Washington equally. He shared
information linking UAE facilities to the RSF directly with the U.S.
Treasury and State Departments, which in turn used the data to
sanction RSF-linked companies in 2025. The Guardian reported
separately that the State Department had blocked its own intelligence
assessments on El Fasher that would have produced a formal genocide
determination — one that would have potentially triggered mandatory
government-wide responses under the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act, a law that President Trump himself signed
into law in 2019. A source told the Guardian that the assessment was
stopped in order to protect the strategic relationship with the UAE.
Given the inaction at the executive level, it has fallen to Congress
to try to force a different accounting. So far, it has failed.
In the House, the U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act, led by Rep.
Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) alongside 32 Democratic co-sponsors, would
require the administration to name the countries arming the RSF and
stop selling them weapons. It also demands a report tracing how
American weapons ended up in Sudan.
But the same legislation contains a presidential waiver. If
sanctioning a country is deemed against the national interest, the
president notifies Congress within fifteen days and walks away. The
bill, it seems, was designed to corner the UAE, but the waiver also
allows it to escape actual consequences.
The Senate’s Preventing External Aggression and Conflict Escalation in
Sudan Act of 2026, known as the PEACE in Sudan Act, is even softer on
foreign arms suppliers. Where the House bill mandates sanctions, the
Senate bill gives the president discretion: he “may” impose sanctions,
according to the language of the bill. The national interest waiver is
also present here.
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee markup in mid-June, Sen. Chris
Van Hollen (D-Md.) tried to harden the government’s obligations, when
he introduced an amendment to the PEACE in Sudan Act that would have
barred arms transfers to the UAE explicitly while it continues
supplying the RSF. It failed in a 15-7 vote.
Van Hollen’s response was the most concise summary of American policy
on Sudan offered by a government official: “The United States
shouldn’t just be talking about ending the slaughter in Sudan. We
should actually be using our leverage.”
Despite the growing movement at the congressional level, the
administration has shown at every turn that Gulf relationships come
first.
The civilians of El Obeid know none of this will save them. They are
simply listening for drones and hoping they are not the next El
Fasher.
https://truthout.org/articles/us-leaders-know-uae-backs-massacres-in-sudan-stopping-them-would-be-too-costly/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
The Emirates’ promised $1.4 trillion investment in the US appears to
be incentivizing Washington to look the other way.
By Elfadil Ibrahim
ResponsibleStatecraft
July 4, 2026
Massad Boulos, the Trump Administration’s top adviser for Africa and
point man on Sudan, recently spoke before the United Nations Security
Council and warned that the international community “cannot sit back”
while El Obeid, a city of over roughly half a million people, becomes
another El Fasher.
El Fasher was the last major city in Sudan’s Darfur region still
outside the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary
force that has been fighting Sudan’s national army, the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF), in a civil war that recently entered its fourth year.
The war has morphed into a regional proxy conflict, with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) backing the RSF, while Egypt and Turkey have
emerged as the army’s primary backers, providing weapons, drones, and
training.
When El Fasher fell in October 2025, more than 6,000 civilians were
killed in three days. The U.N. said the campaign bore the “hallmarks
of genocide.” The Biden administration also determined that the RSF
had committed genocide in other parts of Darfur in 2024.
The same day that Boulos spoke before the Security Council, the U.S.
Treasury Department announced sanctions on individuals and entities
linked to both sides of Sudan’s civil war. Four days before that,
State Department Spokesman Tommy Piggot warned that “mass atrocities
could be imminent” in El Obeid.
At the time of these warnings from Trump administration officials,
Secretary of State Marco Rubio had just completed a Gulf tour,
reassuring allies shaken by the U.S.- Iran war. During the trip, Rubio
told reporters in Kuwait that Washington “continues to engage” on
Sudan with Gulf states at every opportunity.
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing weeks earlier, Rubio
acknowledged that Sudan’s war had “turned into a proxy war” where “the
divisions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have truly complicated our
ability to bring that to an end.” But rather than take the lead in
resolving those differences, his proposed solution was identifying
safe zones for aid distribution.
Saudi Arabia backs Sudan’s military politically, while the UAE is the
RSF’s principal supplier of arms and mercenaries — a finding that
Washington effectively endorsed through its own sanctions, having
designated multiple UAE-based companies in January 2025 for providing
the RSF with weapons and financial cover.
Despite Washington’s own warnings of what’s to come, the political
inaction means that the situation for the people of El Obeid is bleak.
The RSF has set its sights on El Obeid because of its strategic
location, linking Darfur to the Nile Valley and the capital, Khartoum.
Whoever controls the city controls the central axis of movement across
Sudan.
The RSF has been striking the city with drones for weeks, destroying
the main power transformer, fuel stations, bridges and supply routes
into the city. Food and water prices have risen dramatically and a
hunger crisis looms.
Against this background, Britain and six European Governments issued a
joint call for an immediate halt, stating that “this is a critical
moment, and the international community must act.” The U.N.
secretary-general’s personal envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, called
the RSF’s leader directly. The RSF commander assured him that
civilians would not be targeted. He said the same to diplomats before
the genocides of El Fasher and El Geneina.
Friday’s Treasury sanctions, meanwhile, reflect how much Washington
knows and how little it chooses to act.
On the RSF side, the Treasury sanctioned the middlemen who recruit
Colombian mercenaries to fight for the RSF, but those designations
ignore the Abu Dhabi-based security company that recruited, trained,
and transported them from Emirati airports to the battlefields of
Darfur.
An investigation by The Sentry found that Ahmed al-Humairi, a senior
Emirati official, founded and once fully owned the company at the
center of that network. He has since divested his shares, but he
remains closely linked to the company’s current CEO, fellow Emirati
businessman Mohamed Hamdan al-Zaabi.
The UAE denies all of this, but members of Congress and Secretary of
State Marco Rubio have all openly acknowledged the UAE’s role in
arming the RSF. Despite the fact that this is now public knowledge,
arms sales to the UAE have not been conditioned, nor has Abu Dhabi
faced any real consequences from Washington.
The reason is not hard to find. The UAE has pledged $1.4 trillion in
investment in the U.S. — a commitment reaffirmed even as the
U.S-Israel war on Iran left UAE infrastructure dangerously exposed to
Iranian strikes. At the G7 summit in mid-June, President Trump met
Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed, called him a “warrior,” and
marveled at his wealth, saying: “when you’re that rich, you can speak
that low.”
The United Kingdom is running the same calculation as Washington. This
has prevented any serious action at the U.N. Security Council, where
the U.K. holds the most consequential position as Sudan’s penholder,
meaning it is the country formally responsible for leading the
international response.
In recent testimony before a British parliamentary committee, Yale
Human Rights investigator Nathanial Raymond revealed that the Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Office has suppressed evidence linking the
UAE to the RSF due to its prioritization of “economic, security, and
diplomatic relationships with the UAE above preventing the intentional
starvation, forced displacement, and the genocidal slaughter of tens
of thousands of civilians living in El Fasher and its surrounding
communities.”
But Raymond’s testimony implicates Washington equally. He shared
information linking UAE facilities to the RSF directly with the U.S.
Treasury and State Departments, which in turn used the data to
sanction RSF-linked companies in 2025. The Guardian reported
separately that the State Department had blocked its own intelligence
assessments on El Fasher that would have produced a formal genocide
determination — one that would have potentially triggered mandatory
government-wide responses under the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act, a law that President Trump himself signed
into law in 2019. A source told the Guardian that the assessment was
stopped in order to protect the strategic relationship with the UAE.
Given the inaction at the executive level, it has fallen to Congress
to try to force a different accounting. So far, it has failed.
In the House, the U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act, led by Rep.
Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) alongside 32 Democratic co-sponsors, would
require the administration to name the countries arming the RSF and
stop selling them weapons. It also demands a report tracing how
American weapons ended up in Sudan.
But the same legislation contains a presidential waiver. If
sanctioning a country is deemed against the national interest, the
president notifies Congress within fifteen days and walks away. The
bill, it seems, was designed to corner the UAE, but the waiver also
allows it to escape actual consequences.
The Senate’s Preventing External Aggression and Conflict Escalation in
Sudan Act of 2026, known as the PEACE in Sudan Act, is even softer on
foreign arms suppliers. Where the House bill mandates sanctions, the
Senate bill gives the president discretion: he “may” impose sanctions,
according to the language of the bill. The national interest waiver is
also present here.
At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee markup in mid-June, Sen. Chris
Van Hollen (D-Md.) tried to harden the government’s obligations, when
he introduced an amendment to the PEACE in Sudan Act that would have
barred arms transfers to the UAE explicitly while it continues
supplying the RSF. It failed in a 15-7 vote.
Van Hollen’s response was the most concise summary of American policy
on Sudan offered by a government official: “The United States
shouldn’t just be talking about ending the slaughter in Sudan. We
should actually be using our leverage.”
Despite the growing movement at the congressional level, the
administration has shown at every turn that Gulf relationships come
first.
The civilians of El Obeid know none of this will save them. They are
simply listening for drones and hoping they are not the next El
Fasher.
https://truthout.org/articles/us-leaders-know-uae-backs-massacres-in-sudan-stopping-them-would-be-too-costly/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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