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John Ashworth
May 25, 2024, 2:20:00 AMMay 25
to Group
1. Sudan: The violence is a symptom of a profound collective failure
The ongoing conflict is an existential threat to the very idea of
Sudan, not to be solved by negotiations featuring the usual suspects
working on the old power-sharing formula.
BY HALA AL-KARIB
MAY 24, 20240
The Conversation
Five years ago, Sudan was a tale of optimism, democratic transition
and stability. Today, the UN secretary-general describes it as a
“humanitarian travesty”, even as the UN’s Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide, warns of the risk of genocide in Darfur. We
are witnessing a campaign of atrocities and bloodbaths, hunger and
disease. Millions of Sudanese people fleeing their homes, hunted by
armed militia and aerial bombardments, stalked by poverty and a
campaign of deliberate starvation. The number of civilian casualties
could soon surpass 30,000. It feels like we are being punished for
wanting to achieve democracy through peaceful means.
It is fair to say that the geopolitical environment surrounding
Sudanese democratic aspirations was not favourable. The majority of
Sudan’s neighbours were wary about the possibility of Sudan’s
democratic transformation; the tales of justice and freedom going
viral across the region needed to be arrested before they became
infectious.
Numerous mistakes were made by international and regional actors
regarding Sudan. However, the fatal errors that led to the current
dreadful situation were committed by the country’s military and
civilian elites. Their complicity, ineptitude, and recklessness have
largely contributed to this situation.
On April 15, 2023, the people of Sudan found themselves trapped
between brutal armed militias, a weak and corrupt military that has
failed to protect them, and local political actors who are polarised
and unprepared to address the magnitude of the crisis or even
comprehend its repercussions.
The consequences of Sudan’s long period under an isolated, violent,
war-oriented, and militant Islamist, totalitarian regime have
significant implications on the country’s future – indeed, its very
existence. Sudan was in miserable shape at the dawn of the 2019
revolution. Decades of economic, social, and cultural isolation, the
result of almost 30 years of sanctions, had taken a toll on
generations of Sudanese. By 2019, the country was on the verge of
collapse, and corruption was skyrocketing.
Toward the end of his dictatorship, Al-Bashir began to lose trust in
his allies and subsequently worked to weaken the Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) as a means to ensure his own protection. He also strengthened
his alliance with the Janjaweed/RSF, the notorious tribal militia that
has played a major role in the waves of crimes against humanity in
Darfur since 2003. Al-Bashir became so close to RSF commander, Mohamed
Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) that he began referring to him by the
nickname: ‘Hemaity, my protector.’ This criminal alliance was based on
extortion of resources and illicit transactions, and such alliances
continue to operate in Sudan today, burrowing themselves in the very
soul of the nation.
On the morning of April 11, 2019, when the Al-Bashir regime was
toppled, multiple armies within the country watched closely to see
what they could gain.[1] With its historical relationship with the
military, the NCP, the Islamist former ruling party, assumed that a
smooth transition to power would not interfere with their control of
the national economy. This was a complete miscalculation on its part,
as the general population had thoroughly turned against them, along
with the majority, if not all, the regional forces.
Familiar with Al-Bashir’s regime, Sudan’s neighbours also watched the
events surrounding the 2019 revolution closely, weighing their options
for potential future alliances and being increasingly wary of the
prospects of a democratic Sudan. Among them, the UAE and Egypt emerged
as crucial actors. Egypt, with its historical ties and shared border
security anxieties. The Nile, the lifeline of the Nile Basin states,
held particular interest. Trade and movement across their shared
border have served as a lifeline for millions on both sides. Notably,
the Egyptian and the Sudanese armies had a strong connection, as the
two had been a unified military prior to Sudan’s full independence
from joint Egyptian and British rule, which ended in 1956. It is worth
remembering that Egypt has historically wielded significant influence
over Sudan’s political landscape, often undermining democratic
initiatives.
The UAE is a newer player that has primarily engaged with Sudanese
professionals who served as civil servants and technocrats in the
1970s and `80s to support the country’s growing economy primarily by
serving the construction sector. Later, the UAE and the Kingdom of
Saudia Arabia developed divergent relationships with Sudan when the
Al-Bashir regime began acting as a supplier of soldiers to the
Saudi-Emirati intervention in the Yemeni civil war. However, the UAE
was more proactive in scanning the political scene in Sudan and
building alliances with new emerging forces in the country.
The efficiency with which, since 2013, the RSF leadership has supplied
soldiers to the Saudi-Emirati coalition, undertaking an active
recruitment campaign among rural youth in Sudan and the eastern Sahel
region, seems to have impressed their Gulf patrons. The vigorous
engagement of the militia leadership in the extortion of gold and
other resources, subsequently repatriated to the UAE, has boosted the
position of the RSF as a favoured ally of the UAE. The UAE has also
built alliances among the civilian actors in Sudan, hoping that they
will act either as a form of managerial executive for the militia, or
that via soft power, they will bolster their influence among the
civilian elite and consolidate this position with their existing
strategic alliance with the RSF.
Egypt has been attempting to maintain its influence over its former
allies within the SAF. However, due to Egypt’s internal economic and
political crises, its ability to provide support to the SAF has
decreased significantly.
If a serious and comprehensive political process had been implemented
to support Sudan’s transition, the war may have been prevented.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. The international community’s
engagement with Sudan was minimal and superficial, downplaying the
complexity of the third-largest country in Africa, which has struggled
with wars and armed conflicts throughout its modern history.
Furthermore, acts of impotence (or indifference) by international
actors coupled with dangerous military build-ups and the limited
capacity of the civilian contingent of the transitional government
have manifested in the poorly drafted power-sharing agreement that
enabled both Burhan and Hemedti to have the upper hand.
This was followed by a sequence of strategic mistakes, such as ending
the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) in December 2020 – the peacekeeping mission that was
meant to absorb tensions and mitigate the risks of atrocities against
civilians in Darfur. Sudan’s transitional government, comprising
civilian and military branches, handed over all UNAMID bases in Darfur
to the RSF. It is important to note that the RSF and affiliated
militias have been actively carrying out aggressions against civilians
in the Darfur region, and these atrocities increased significantly
following the withdrawal of UNAMID in early 2021.
Moreover, the civilian government made another significant mistake by
failing to hold Al-Bashir and other key actors in his regime
accountable or hand them over to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) based on their indictment in 2008. The executive body of the
transitional government failed to push for accountability for the
crimes of the Al-Bashir regime, particularly the regime crimes in
Darfur and later the Khartoum Sit-in Massacre,[2] which was primarily
perpetrated by the RSF and Sudan’s political Islamists. Holding these
powerful actors accountable could have also helped the civilian actors
at the time gain popular support and establish themselves as agents of
change. None of this happened, and therefore, the RSF has become
increasingly confident as they continue to commit atrocities with
impunity.
Turning to General Burhan. He believed that being on good terms with
the RSF leader meant that Hemedti would continue acting as his
protector – much as the latter had done for Al-Bashir. At the same
time, the civilian contingent of the transitional government assumed
that the RSF would help them confront and limit the power of political
Islamists in Sudan, including the SAF. However, in doing so, both
failed to challenge the expanded authority of the RSF and the power
acquired by its leadership. Thus, the RSF leadership took advantage of
the weaknesses of the military and civilian elites and emerged as the
strongest actor, largely due to its capacity for brutality and support
from the UAE.
Nonetheless, the RSF, despite its ambition, brutal force, and loyalty
to the UAE, has nothing to offer Sudan other than a litany of
destruction and atrocities that continue to cultivate utmost hate and
rejection from Sudanese communities. The ongoing war has revealed the
RSF’s lack of capacity for organisation and governance, and its
inability to engage with the people of Sudan. The widespread
destruction of the country’s infrastructure, including schools,
universities, and hospitals, government facilities, as well as the
rampant looting, systemic sexual violence and mass atrocities
committed against civilians, all indicate a fundamental disconnect
between the RSF militia, the Sudanese population and the concept of
governance.
Conflicting Narratives:
I believe that this war is a significant turning point, not just for
Sudan but also for the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions.
Unfortunately, the RSF and its sponsors in the UAE and Russia, via the
Wagner mercenaries, have ignited a wildfire that is spreading beyond
Sudan’s borders.
It is puzzling to see that many Sudanese civilian politicians and some
international actors view the ongoing bloodshed in Sudan as a mere
political crisis. They seem to believe that the two generals hold the
solution to this crisis. They are, therefore, hoping to recycle the
same old power-sharing formula when seats at the political table are
reserved for the men in uniform responsible for the violence and
atrocities, adding subordinate civilian men under the pretext of
political transition. In my opinion, any power-sharing agreement that
brings back the old faces is a recipe for war.
It is evident that the primary perpetrator of violence in Sudan at the
moment is the RSF, which throughout its existence has relied on
violence as both a means and an end. As such it has failed utterly to
secure its place as a legitimate political outfit. Violence is
integral to its organisational structure, dictating the nature of its
mobilisations and operations. The RSF cannot function without
violence, meaning that it automatically locks itself out of a Sudanese
future without violence.
The war in Sudan has been marked by conflicting narratives coming from
the multiple actors and their regional and international allies.
However, as Sudanese people, we are caught in the middle. From a
Sudanese perspective, it is important to understand the difference
between the SAF and the RSF. Although the SAF has a long history of
corruption and dysfunction, it still represents most of Sudan’s rule
of law and national identity. Therefore, when speaking about the
political process to address this crisis and governance, it is logical
to emphasise the militant and militarised state of Sudan as the root
cause of Sudan’s instability and to advocate for the rights of
Sudanese citizens as civilians to have a say in the running of their
country.
At this point, Sudan is falling apart very quickly. We need a third
path to centre the Sudanese people and their realities in a political
narrative beyond the ambitions of the political actors, civilian and
military, and their grievances against each other. We need a process
that speaks to our situation, reflects on our realities, and
acknowledges what is actually happening rather than denying it or
being apologetic about it, as is the case in the discourse of the
FFC/Taqdom coalition, or the NCP´s Islamist discourse. It seems to
demand that all Sudanese people act like jihadis, which we are not and
will never be, but that does not mean we should surrender to the
RSF/UAE and lose any say over how our country should be governed or
structured.
The FFC and NCP should not hold us hostage to their grievances and
hatred of each other. At this point, we don’t care about either of
them. While both are part of the civilian forces, they are not
representative of the full civilian population, which is highly
diverse. Many civilians at the moment are taking charge of their
communities’ welfare, providing protection, and making critical
decisions about aid, humanitarian support, and human rights. In the
states outside the active conflict zones, several communities have no
interest in supporting either the FFC/Taqdom or the political Islamist
/NCP. Instead, they envision a future Sudan with a higher degree of
state and regional sovereignty and self-determination.
The reality is that Sudan will not be the same country after this
brutal war. Therefore, we must anticipate and plan accordingly to
avoid repeating the same cycles of violence.
The past is constantly shaping the present. However, the present
evolves by the minute and shapes new realities and dynamics for the
future. I believe the FFC and the NCP are stuck playing an outdated
game, vying for control. Both forces need to be humbled and join a
third inclusive path that focuses on addressing the needs of the
people of Sudan.
Notes
[1] These included the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF), and The SPLM North with its multiple factions, and the
Darfur armed movements which are also comprised of multiple factions.
[2] The massacre occurred on the 3rd of June 2019, when hundred of
civilians were killed and sexually assaulted.
https://africanarguments.org/2024/05/sudan-the-violence-is-a-symptom-of-a-profound-collective-failure/
END1
2. It’s an open secret: the UAE is fuelling Sudan’s war – and there’ll
be no peace until we call it out
The Emirates is arming and supporting one side in the conflict, but UK
and US officials have shied from confronting it
Husam Mahjoub
Fri 24 May 2024 11.00 BST
Guardian
The war in Sudan has become one of the worst ongoing humanitarian
crises in the world. In a little over a year of fighting between the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), there
have been 6.8 million people internally displaced, 2 million fleeing
the country, and 24.8 million, almost half the population, in dire
need of humanitarian assistance.
The United Arab Emirates is the foreign player most invested in the
war. In fact, without its direct and all-around support, the RSF would
not have been able to wage war to the same extent.
Sudan is key to the UAE’s strategy in Africa and the Middle East,
aimed at achieving political and economic hegemony while curbing
democratic aspirations. Since 2015, it has sourced fighters from both
factions to join its conflict in Yemen. It is the primary importer of
Sudan’s gold and has multibillion-dollar plans to develop ports along
Sudan’s Red Sea coast. By supporting the RSF in Sudan, it has
undermined the democratic transition that followed the 2019 ouster of
Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s dictator for 30 years.
Upon the outbreak of war, it reportedly established logistical
operations to send weapons to the RSF through its networks in Libya,
Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda and the Haftar and
Wagner militias. It has reportedly disguised armament and supplies as
humanitarian aid. In addition, RSF business, finance, logistics and PR
operations are carried out from the UAE. Injured fighters are
reportedly airlifted to be treated in an Abu Dhabi military hospital.
And Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the RSF commander, is said to
have visited a few African countries on board an Emirati airplane
belonging to a company owned by an Emirati royal and adviser to the
president.
A UN report in January found the accusations of UAE military support
to RSF credible. The UAE has denied this support, but many US
lawmakers have publicly called it out. US and British officials have
been more cautious, tending to focus on the “negative roles” of
external actors or partners that support the RSF.
Nonetheless, the UAE has been bullish in rejecting the accusations,
explicit or not. Last April, it furiously cancelled ministerial
meetings with the UK because it did not leap to its defence at a UN
meeting about Sudan.
Meanwhile, famine, diseases and fighting are closing in on civilians.
Furthermore, the so-called international community has done little to
stop it, with only 12% of the $2.7bn aid sought for Sudan having been
raised. The pattern of targeting civilians, torching villages, and
committing mass murders and sexual violence has been witnessed in all
the areas that came under RSF control. Human Rights Watch suggested
RSF has committed genocide, crimes against humanity, widespread war
crimes and ethnic cleansing. SAF has committed its share of war
crimes, bombing civilians indiscriminately, and arresting, torturing
and killing civilians too. The US officially determined that both the
SAF and RSF have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and
ethnic cleansing.
Fighting for control of El Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in the
western region of Darfur, escalated last week. Hundreds of thousands
of people had taken refuge there after fleeing the atrocities
committed by RSF in other parts of Darfur, an area twice the size of
the UK. The battle for El Fasher may have significant implications for
the region. A win for the RSF gives it effective control over most
states to the west of the Nile River, which represents more than half
the area, population and resources of Sudan.
Peace prospects are dim. The most recognised effort to achieve peace
can be seen in the Jeddah platform: multiple rounds of talks organised
by the US and Saudi Arabia, which began shortly after the war broke
out. However, the SAF and RSF have consistently failed to honour the
commitments set out in the May 2023 declaration to ensure civilians
are protected and international humanitarian law is respected. Nor
have they honoured several agreements for ceasefire, facilitation of
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or confidence-building
measures, such as vacating civilian houses occupied by RSF combatants.
Tom Perriello, the US special envoy for Sudan, proposes reviving the
Jeddah platform, focusing on building and aligning political will in
the region to compel a peace deal, and enlisting the efforts of key
African and Arab leaders in the talks.
However, Sudan has a history of prolonged wars and endless peace
talks, and Jeddah risks becoming another entry in its list of “too
many agreements dishonoured” unless the international community pivots
away from its failed model of pressuring for peace deals that
reproduce violence and authoritarianism. The generals of both the SAF
and RSF must be held accountable for their numerous crimes against the
Sudanese people, and should not be rewarded again by allowing them to
be part of any arrangement sought to end the war.
Most crucially, the international community must confront the UAE’s
detrimental role in the conflict, which it has carried out with
impunity, leveraging its alliances with both the west and Russia. If
not, Sudan risks descending into a state of perpetual war.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/may/24/uae-sudan-war-peace-emirates-uk-us-officials
END2
3. World ignoring risk of Sudan genocide - UN expert
24 May 2024
BBC News
Sudan's Darfur region is facing a growing risk of genocide as the
world's attention is focused on conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, a UN
expert warns.
"We do have circumstances in which a genocide could be occurring or
has occurred," the UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, told BBC's Newsday
programme.
She said many civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity in
Sudan's besieged city of El Fasher, where fierce fighting has
intensified in recent days.
More than 700 deaths have been reported in 10 days by a medical
charity in the city.
El Fasher is the last major urban centre in the Darfur region that
remains in the hands of Sudan's army.
The military has been fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
(RSF) for more than a year, in a civil war that has killed thousands
and forced millions from their homes.
Local resident Ibrahim al-Tayeb al-Faki told the BBC his sister was
killed in a military airstrike that had also destroyed his home.
The 47-year-old told the BBC he had sent his three children to live
with their grandfather but his house was also hit. The family is now
sheltering in its ruins.
“There is no safe place in El Fasher right now,” he said.
The situation is unfolding to a "Rwanda-like" genocide of 1994, Ms
Nderitu said, citing a UN analysis on the increasing risk factors.
"Increased hostilities in El Fasher have now opened a really alarming
chapter in this conflict," she added.
"I'm calling for attention to this particular conflict. I have been
trying to get my voice out but my voice is drowned out by other wars -
in Ukraine and Gaza."
Similar fears of a possible genocide in Darfur were expressed by Human
Rights Watch (HRW) recently.
A report from the campaign group said ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity had been committed against ethnic Massalit and
non-Arab communities in the region by the paramilitary forces and its
Arab allies.
It called for sanctions against those responsible for the atrocities,
including the RSF leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as
Hemedti.
The current violence has erupted out of a long history of tensions
over resources between non-Arab farming communities, including the
Massalit, and Arab pastoralist communities.
The internet has been cut making access to the city difficult, as
soldiers from the RSF group continue to besiege the city.
The UN says about 15,000 people are feared to have been killed in the
West Darfur city of El Geneina last year.
Last June, West Darfur Governor Khamis Abakar was killed hours after
accusing the RSF of committing genocide. He is the most senior
official known to have been killed since the conflict began in April.
The RSF says it is not involved in what it describes as a "tribal
conflict" in Darfur.
The paramilitary group emerged from the Janjaweed militia which was
accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing against non-Arab communities
in Darfur in 2003, after rebels took up arms, accusing the government
of ignoring the region.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c511vgzvl2eo
END3
4. Sudan’s Alea Iacta Est: The Battles of El-Fasher
Hemedti is not John Garang, and the “Rapid Support Forces” are not a
social liberation movement
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Fikra for Studies and Development
24 May 2024
Over the past few weeks, the siege and attacks by the “Rapid Support
Forces” (RSF) militia have escalated on the city of El-Fasher, the
capital of North Darfur state, which is the last remaining state in
the Darfur region that has not yet fallen under the control of the
militia.
The increase in the siege and attacks coincided with the RSF militia’s
retreat from the capital, Khartoum, after the Sudanese army forces
succeeded in liberating the city of Omdurman, which is located in the
western part of the capital. Simultaneously, the RSF presence
diminished throughout the remainder of the capital, while its soldiers
went busy wiping out villages and towns in the Gezira state,
plundering residents' goods and houses, and tarnishing the land and
infrastructure with a scorched earth policy. This seems to be a
prelude to the withdrawal of militia forces to intensify the attacks
and tighten control over the Darfur and Kordofan regions in western
Sudan.
The RSF and their political allies have sought vigorously since the
outbreak of the war to consolidate their claim of representing social
incubators of western Sudan. In July 2023, three months after the
outbreak of the war, and after the political leadership of the “Forces
of Freedom and Change” coalition left the country and toured the
region, the “Rapid Support Forces” organized a consultative conference
for Darfur leaders in Togo to mobilize political support for their
raging war in Sudan. Two members of the “Taqadum” coalition
leadership, currently headed by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok,
participated in the Togo conference, namely Nasr al-Din Abdul Bari and
Mohammed Hassan al-Taayishi, with papers on governance systems,
administration, and historical imbalances in the 1956 state in the
context of justifying the war, in addition to others who later
participated in the formation of the “Civil Support Agency for Rapid
Support Forces”. After that, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, the deputy
commander of the “Rapid Support Forces” and the brother of its leader
“Hemedti”, met in separate meetings with the leaders of the Darfur
factions that signed the Juba peace agreement, in the Chadian capital
N’Djamena, under the arrangement, sponsorship, and pressure of Chadian
President Mohammed Deby.
These meetings resulted in some movements converging with the
positions of the “RSF”, and to the division of the “Justice and
Equality Movement”, and the joining of the divided faction led by
Suleiman Sandal and Ahmed Tugud to the “Taqadum” coalition aligned
with the “RSF” and adopting its war justification discourse. Things
became clearer after the statements of the leading member of the
“Taqadum”, Taha Osman Ishaq, about the impossibility of excluding RSF
militia from political participation, then came the statements of
Khalid Omar Yousif, deputy chairperson of the Sudanese Congress party,
and the statements of former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, which try
to formulate a new analysis of the war on power that is taking place
in Sudan by linking it to the historical conflict of the margin and
the center in Sudan.
All these attempts aim directly at changing the image of Hemedti from
a bandit and professional mercenary used by the “Muslim Brotherhood”
regime as one of the tools of repression, intimidation, and terror
during its years of rule, and diverting attention from all the crimes
committed by Hemedti and his forces by proxy for the Bashir regime in
Darfur in the raging war in the region since 2003, which he continues
to commit in his own right now on a larger scale that includes all
parts of Sudan in his quest to rule Sudan and mortgage it to the
interests of his foreign allies. To reintroduce Mohammed Hamdan Daglo
(Hemedti) in the image of the righteous mutineer who carries the
nobility of the margin’s issues and the burden of defending the
marginalized communities of Sudan. It is an attempt to whitewash and
redraw the image of Hemedti in the portrait of John Garang, as one of
the heroes of national liberation. But Hemedti is not John Garang, and
the “Rapid Support Forces” are not a social liberation movement that
resulted from the interactions of society and its issues, but rather a
repressive tool that was established on flawed bases in the service of
a totalitarian regime and for the purpose of practicing political
violence against specific social and ethnic groups that it now claims
to represent.
The massacre of Al-Geneina by the "Rapid Support Forces" in West
Darfur against the Masalit community in June 2023, which killed
between 10,000 and 15,000 civilians and forced hundreds of thousands
of people to flee to refugee camps in Chad, shows how dangerous these
attempts are. The chants of joy and racist encouragement that
accompanied the videos of the assassination of the late governor of
West Darfur, Khamis Abkar, and the mutilation of his corpse, reflect
the racist nature in the DNA of this militia, which is inconsistent
with the claims of its representation of the margin or its war in
order to achieve its interests.
The RSF continues to intensify the attack on El-Fasher - which has so
far resisted falling into the hands of the militia - as a prelude to
declaring an independent government in western Sudan. The militia has
already appointed a civilian administration for the Gezira region,
headed by Siddiq Ahmed, a member of the Umma Party: one of the parties
under the umbrella of the “Taqadum” coalition. But this administration
has not done anything in the context of stopping the violations and
atrocities committed by the militia in the villages of Gezira.
This scheme feeds on the power ambitions that have blinded some of the
civilian politicians, especially since two of those mentioned in the
list above, who are striving to promote the discourse of whitening the
militia’s page and promoting its claims, are descended from the Darfur
region and were among the candidates whose names were pushed to assume
the prime-ministership of Sudan should the framework agreement be
signed prior to the war. The first is Nasr al-Din Abdul Bari, who was
the Minister of Justice during the transitional period, and was the
preferred candidate for the western circles, to the extent that the
former American ambassador in Khartoum, John Godfrey, kept promoting
his name to run the government even before the conclusion of the
negotiations. The other is Taha Osman Ishaq, who has long been the
link between the leadership of the “Forces of Freedom and Change”
coalition, and the “RSF”, and who has gone far in washing the image of
the militia leader Hemedti, affirming in a television interview that
Hemedti is with stopping the war and does not have any personal
ambition. As for Abdul Bari, he declared his allegiance in the first
week of the war when he met with members of the US government
officials and congressional staff to try to convince them that the way
to stop the war is to recognize Hemedti as the legitimate head of
state in Sudan.
The success of the attempt to split up Sudan will have far-reaching
devastating consequences beyond the Sudanese population. The ongoing
conflict in Darfur is likely to result in prolonged and violent
instability within the community. This is especially alarming given
the massacres and atrocities committed by the RSF militia against
various social groups in the Darfur region. Furthermore, the
involvement of certain political allies who are attempting to
manipulate the war along ethnic lines adds to the situation's
complexity. It is important to note that even if a violent separation
occurs, the war is unlikely to cease between the Sudanese army and the
"Rapid Support" forces. The emergence of such a new state maybe
serving the foreign interests of the RSF sponsoring countries, who are
actively seeking to benefit from the war by gaining control over
Sudan's resources and wealth. However, it will also result in a
significant shift in the political geography of the Sahel and Horn of
Africa regions. The RSF's political and military influence extends
beyond the region's national borders. It is commonly known that the
RSF intervened in early 2023 to help quash a military coup in Central
Africa, as well as its presence in Chad, Libya, and other neighboring
countries.
The scheme of dividing Sudan is based fundamentally on a deadly ethnic
political heresy, that aims to render identities into political
weapons without a project or a political thesis related to the people,
or the state service apparatus responsible for preserving their rights
and caring for their interests. It feeds on a self-craving for power
among some who are deluded by their continuous entitlement to it, and
for that, they do not care about breaking the principles of democracy,
resorting to the militia’s pickups, or even pledging to the will of
external powers as long as that serves to satisfy their continuous
lust for power.
الحرب ومشروع تقسيم السودان
هجوم "الدعم السريع" على الفاشرتمهيد لإعلان حكومة مستقلة في المنطقة الغربية
أمجد فريد الطيب
آخر تحديث 24 مايو 2024
على مدى الأسابيع الماضية، تفاقم حصار وهجمات "قوات الدعم السريع" على
مدينة الفاشر، حاضرة ولاية شمال دارفور، وهي الولاية الأخيرة المتبقية في
إقليم دارفور والتي لم تقع تحت سيطرة الميليشيا حتى الآن.
تزامن تزايد الحصار والهجمات مع تقهقر سيطرة الميليشيا على العاصمة
الخرطوم، بعد أن نجحت قوات الجيش السوداني في تحرير مدينة أم درمان التي
تقع في الجزء الغربي من العاصمة. وفي الوقت ذاته، تناقص حضور "الدعم
السريع" في بقية أجزاء العاصمة، بينما انهمكت جموعها في مسح قرى ومدن
ولاية الجزيرة ونهب ممتلكات وبيوت المواطنين وإفساد الأراضي والبنية
التحتية بمنهجية الأرض المحروقة، فيما يبدو أنه تمهيد لسحب قوات
الميليشيا لتكثيف الهجوم وإحكام السيطرة على إقليمي دارفور وكردفان غربي
السودان.
وقد سعت "قوات الدعم السريع" وحلفاؤها السياسيون بشكل حثيث منذ اندلاع
الحرب إلى ترسيخ ادعائها بتمثيل حواضن اجتماعية غربي السودان. وفي
يوليو/تموز 2023، بعد ثلاثة أشهر من اندلاع الحرب، وبعد خروج القيادات
السياسية لتحالف "قوى الحرية والتغيير" من البلاد وجولتها في المنطقة،
نظمت "قوات الدعم السريع" مؤتمرا تشاوريا لقيادات دارفور في دولة توغو
بهدف حشد الدعم السياسي لحربها المستعرة في السودان. وقد شارك في مؤتمر
توغو عضوا قيادة تحالف "تقدم" الذي يرأسه حاليا رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد
الله حمدوك، وهما نصر الدين عبد الباري، ومحمد حسن التعايشي، بأوراق حول
نظم الحكم والإدارة والاختلالات التاريخية في دولة 1956 في سياق تبرير
الحرب، بالإضافة إلى آخرين شاركوا لاحقا في تكوين "هيئة الإسناد المدني
لقوات الدعم السريع". بعد ذلك، التقى عبدالرحيم حمدان دقلو، نائب قائد
"قوات الدعم السريع" وشقيق زعيمها "حميدتي"، في اجتماعات منفصلة بقادة
الفصائل الدارفورية الموقعة على اتفاق سلام جوبا، في العاصمة التشادية
إنجمينا، وذلك بترتيب ورعاية وضغط من الرئيس التشادي محمد ديبي.
وأدت تلك الاجتماعات إلى تقارب بعض الحركات مع مواقف "الدعم السريع"،
وإلى انقسام "حركة العدل والمساواة"، وانضمام الفصيل المنقسم بقيادة
سليمان صندل وأحمد تقد إلى تحالف "تقدم" المتماهي مع "الدعم السريع"
وتبنيه لخطاب تبرير الحرب. مضى الأمر ليصبح أوضح بعد تصريحات عضو قيادة
"تقدم" طه عثمان إسحق عن عدم إمكانية إبعاد الميليشيا من المشاركة
السياسية ثم جاءت تصريحات خالد عمر يوسف نائب رئيس حزب "المؤتمر"
السوداني وتصريحات رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد الله حمدوك التي تحاول صياغة
تحليل جديد للحرب على السلطة التي تدور في السودان بربطها بصراع الهامش
والمركز التاريخي في السودان.
كل هذه المحاولات تهدف مباشرة إلى تغيير صورة حميدتي من قاطع طريق ومرتزق
محترف استخدمته سلطة "الإخوان المسلمين" كإحدى أدوات القمع والترويع
والإرهاب خلال سنين حكمها، وصرف النظر عن كل الجرائم التي ارتكبها حميدتي
وقواته بالوكالة عن نظام البشير في دارفور في الحرب المستعرة بالإقليم
منذ 2003 والتي يواصل ارتكابها بالأصالة حاليا في نطاق واسع يشمل كافة
أنحاء السودان في سعيه لحكم السودان ورهنه لمصالح حلفائه الخارجية وإعادة
تقديم محمد حمدان دقلو في صورة المناضل الذي يحمل نبل قضية الهامش وعبء
الدفاع عن مهمشي السودان. وهي محاولة لإعادة رسم صورة حميدتي على شاكلة
جون قرنق، كأحد أبطال التحرر الوطني. ولكن حميدتي ليس جون قرنق، كما أن
"قوات الدعم السريع" ليست حركة تحرر اجتماعي نتجت عن تفاعلات المجتمع
وقضاياه، بل هي أداة قمع تأسست على قواعد مختلة في خدمة نظام شمولي وبغرض
ممارسة العنف السياسي ضد فئات اجتماعية وإثنية محددة تحاول ادعاء تمثيلها
الآن.
وليس أكثر دلالة على خطر هذه المحاولة من مجزرة الجنينة التي ارتكبتها
"قوات الدعم السريع" في غرب دارفور ضد مجتمع المساليت، فقتلت ما بين عشرة
آلاف إلى خمسة عشر ألفا من المدنيين في يونيو/حزيران 2023، وشردت مئات
الآلاف من المواطنين إلى معسكرات النازحين في تشاد. فيما شهدت صيحات
الفرح والتشجيع العنصرية التي صاحبت فيديوهات اغتيال والي غرب دارفور
الراحل خميس أبكر والتمثيل بجثته، على الطبيعة العنصرية في الحمض النووي
لهذه الميليشيا، بما لا يتسق مع ادعاءات نسبة تمثيلها للهامش أو حربها في
سبيل تحقيق مصالحه.
يبقى سعي "الدعم السريع" في تكثيف الهجوم على الفاشر- والتي استعصت حتى
الآن على السقوط في يد الميليشيا- وهو تمهيد لإعلان حكومة مستقلة في غرب
السودان. وكانت الميليشيا قد قامت بالفعل بتعيين إدارة مدنية لإقليم
الجزيرة برئاسة صديق أحمد عضو حزب الأمة وهو أحد الأعضاء المنضوين تحت
مظلة تحالف "تقدم".
لكن هذه الإدارة لم تصنع شيئا في سياق إيقاف الانتهاكات والفظائع التي
ترتكبها الميليشيا في قرى الجزيرة. تغذي هذه الخطة مطامع السلطة التي
أعمت البعض، خصوصا أن اثنين من المذكورين في القائمة أعلاه والذين
يجتهدون في الترويج لخطاب تبييض صفحة الميليشيا وترويج مزاعمها، ينحدران
من إقليم دارفور وكانا من المرشحين الذين تم الدفع بأسمائهم لتولي رئاسة
الوزراء في حال اكتمال الاتفاق الإطاري. الأول هو نصر الدين عبدالباري
الذي كان وزيرا للعدل خلال الفترة الانتقالية، وكان المرشح المفضل
للدوائر الغربية، إلى درجة أن السفير الأميركي السابق في الخرطوم جون
غودفري، ما فتئ حينها يروج له لتولي رئاسة الحكومة. والآخر هو طه عثمان
إسحق الذي ظل لفترة طويلة صلة الربط بين قيادة "تحالف الحرية والتغيير"،
و"الدعم السريع"، والذي مضى بعيدا في غسل صورة قائد الميليشيا حميدتي،
مؤكدا في مقابلة تلفزيونية على أن حميدتي مع إيقاف الحرب وليس له أي طموح
شخصي. أما نصر الدين عبد الباري فقد أعلن منذ الأسبوع الأول من الحرب
ولاءه عندما اجتمع مع أفراد من موظفي الحكومة والكونغرس الأميركيين
ليحاول إقناعهم بأن السبيل إلى إيقاف الحرب هو في الاعتراف بحميدتي كرأس
الدولة الشرعي في السودان.
نجاح مشروع تقسيم السودان لن تنحصر آثاره الكارثية على السودانيين فحسب.
فهو سيؤدي إلى عدم استقرار طويل الأمد وعنيف بين العناصر المجتمعية في
دارفور، خصوصا بعد المذابح والفظائع التي ارتكبتها الميليشيا ضد فئات
اجتماعية متعددة في الإقليم، وطبيعة الامتدادات الاجتماعية وصبغة التمثيل
الإثني الذي يحاول بعض حلفائها السياسيين صبغ هذه الحرب بها، بالإضافة
إلى أن الحرب لن تتوقف بين الجيش السوداني و"الدعم السريع" حتى في حالة
الانفصال العنيف هذا.
وبينما قد يخدم نشوء هذه الدولة الجديدة بعض المصالح الخارجية للدول التي
ترعى الحرب في السودان وتحاول جاهدة الاستفادة منها في حصد المغانم
والثروات، فإنها ستؤدي أيضا إلى تغيير الجغرافيا السياسية في منطقة
الساحل والقرن الأفريقيين بشكل كبير، خصوصا أن الامتدادات السياسية
والعسكرية لـ"الدعم السريع" عابرة للحدود القطرية في هذا الإقليم. وليس
بعيدا عن الأذهان تدخل "الدعم السريع" في مطلع عام 2023 للمشاركة في قمع
انقلاب عسكري في أفريقيا الوسطى، ذلك غير امتداداتها في تشاد وليبيا
وغيرها من دول الإقليم.
مشروع تقسيم السودان يستند في أساسه إلى منظومة هويات قاتلة، تريد ترجمة
هذه الهويات إلى كسب سياسي دون مشروع وأطروحة سياسية متعلقة بالناس أو
جهاز الدولة الخدمي المعني بحفظ حقوقهم ورعاية مصالحهم. يغذي هذا المشروع
شبق ذاتي إلى السلطة لدى بعض المتوهمين باستحقاقهم لها بشكل مستمر، وفي
سبيل ذلك لا يعنيهم تكسير مبادئ الديمقراطية أو الاستعانة بسلاح
الميليشيا أو حتى الارتهان لإرادة أطراف خارجية ما دام ذلك يخدم إشباع
شبقهم المستمر إلى السلطة.
https://mailchi.mp/75902094e969/sudans-alea-iacta-est-the-battles-of-el-fasher?
END4
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
The ongoing conflict is an existential threat to the very idea of
Sudan, not to be solved by negotiations featuring the usual suspects
working on the old power-sharing formula.
BY HALA AL-KARIB
MAY 24, 20240
The Conversation
Five years ago, Sudan was a tale of optimism, democratic transition
and stability. Today, the UN secretary-general describes it as a
“humanitarian travesty”, even as the UN’s Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide, warns of the risk of genocide in Darfur. We
are witnessing a campaign of atrocities and bloodbaths, hunger and
disease. Millions of Sudanese people fleeing their homes, hunted by
armed militia and aerial bombardments, stalked by poverty and a
campaign of deliberate starvation. The number of civilian casualties
could soon surpass 30,000. It feels like we are being punished for
wanting to achieve democracy through peaceful means.
It is fair to say that the geopolitical environment surrounding
Sudanese democratic aspirations was not favourable. The majority of
Sudan’s neighbours were wary about the possibility of Sudan’s
democratic transformation; the tales of justice and freedom going
viral across the region needed to be arrested before they became
infectious.
Numerous mistakes were made by international and regional actors
regarding Sudan. However, the fatal errors that led to the current
dreadful situation were committed by the country’s military and
civilian elites. Their complicity, ineptitude, and recklessness have
largely contributed to this situation.
On April 15, 2023, the people of Sudan found themselves trapped
between brutal armed militias, a weak and corrupt military that has
failed to protect them, and local political actors who are polarised
and unprepared to address the magnitude of the crisis or even
comprehend its repercussions.
The consequences of Sudan’s long period under an isolated, violent,
war-oriented, and militant Islamist, totalitarian regime have
significant implications on the country’s future – indeed, its very
existence. Sudan was in miserable shape at the dawn of the 2019
revolution. Decades of economic, social, and cultural isolation, the
result of almost 30 years of sanctions, had taken a toll on
generations of Sudanese. By 2019, the country was on the verge of
collapse, and corruption was skyrocketing.
Toward the end of his dictatorship, Al-Bashir began to lose trust in
his allies and subsequently worked to weaken the Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) as a means to ensure his own protection. He also strengthened
his alliance with the Janjaweed/RSF, the notorious tribal militia that
has played a major role in the waves of crimes against humanity in
Darfur since 2003. Al-Bashir became so close to RSF commander, Mohamed
Hamdan Dagalo (a.k.a. Hemedti) that he began referring to him by the
nickname: ‘Hemaity, my protector.’ This criminal alliance was based on
extortion of resources and illicit transactions, and such alliances
continue to operate in Sudan today, burrowing themselves in the very
soul of the nation.
On the morning of April 11, 2019, when the Al-Bashir regime was
toppled, multiple armies within the country watched closely to see
what they could gain.[1] With its historical relationship with the
military, the NCP, the Islamist former ruling party, assumed that a
smooth transition to power would not interfere with their control of
the national economy. This was a complete miscalculation on its part,
as the general population had thoroughly turned against them, along
with the majority, if not all, the regional forces.
Familiar with Al-Bashir’s regime, Sudan’s neighbours also watched the
events surrounding the 2019 revolution closely, weighing their options
for potential future alliances and being increasingly wary of the
prospects of a democratic Sudan. Among them, the UAE and Egypt emerged
as crucial actors. Egypt, with its historical ties and shared border
security anxieties. The Nile, the lifeline of the Nile Basin states,
held particular interest. Trade and movement across their shared
border have served as a lifeline for millions on both sides. Notably,
the Egyptian and the Sudanese armies had a strong connection, as the
two had been a unified military prior to Sudan’s full independence
from joint Egyptian and British rule, which ended in 1956. It is worth
remembering that Egypt has historically wielded significant influence
over Sudan’s political landscape, often undermining democratic
initiatives.
The UAE is a newer player that has primarily engaged with Sudanese
professionals who served as civil servants and technocrats in the
1970s and `80s to support the country’s growing economy primarily by
serving the construction sector. Later, the UAE and the Kingdom of
Saudia Arabia developed divergent relationships with Sudan when the
Al-Bashir regime began acting as a supplier of soldiers to the
Saudi-Emirati intervention in the Yemeni civil war. However, the UAE
was more proactive in scanning the political scene in Sudan and
building alliances with new emerging forces in the country.
The efficiency with which, since 2013, the RSF leadership has supplied
soldiers to the Saudi-Emirati coalition, undertaking an active
recruitment campaign among rural youth in Sudan and the eastern Sahel
region, seems to have impressed their Gulf patrons. The vigorous
engagement of the militia leadership in the extortion of gold and
other resources, subsequently repatriated to the UAE, has boosted the
position of the RSF as a favoured ally of the UAE. The UAE has also
built alliances among the civilian actors in Sudan, hoping that they
will act either as a form of managerial executive for the militia, or
that via soft power, they will bolster their influence among the
civilian elite and consolidate this position with their existing
strategic alliance with the RSF.
Egypt has been attempting to maintain its influence over its former
allies within the SAF. However, due to Egypt’s internal economic and
political crises, its ability to provide support to the SAF has
decreased significantly.
If a serious and comprehensive political process had been implemented
to support Sudan’s transition, the war may have been prevented.
Unfortunately, that was not the case. The international community’s
engagement with Sudan was minimal and superficial, downplaying the
complexity of the third-largest country in Africa, which has struggled
with wars and armed conflicts throughout its modern history.
Furthermore, acts of impotence (or indifference) by international
actors coupled with dangerous military build-ups and the limited
capacity of the civilian contingent of the transitional government
have manifested in the poorly drafted power-sharing agreement that
enabled both Burhan and Hemedti to have the upper hand.
This was followed by a sequence of strategic mistakes, such as ending
the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) in December 2020 – the peacekeeping mission that was
meant to absorb tensions and mitigate the risks of atrocities against
civilians in Darfur. Sudan’s transitional government, comprising
civilian and military branches, handed over all UNAMID bases in Darfur
to the RSF. It is important to note that the RSF and affiliated
militias have been actively carrying out aggressions against civilians
in the Darfur region, and these atrocities increased significantly
following the withdrawal of UNAMID in early 2021.
Moreover, the civilian government made another significant mistake by
failing to hold Al-Bashir and other key actors in his regime
accountable or hand them over to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) based on their indictment in 2008. The executive body of the
transitional government failed to push for accountability for the
crimes of the Al-Bashir regime, particularly the regime crimes in
Darfur and later the Khartoum Sit-in Massacre,[2] which was primarily
perpetrated by the RSF and Sudan’s political Islamists. Holding these
powerful actors accountable could have also helped the civilian actors
at the time gain popular support and establish themselves as agents of
change. None of this happened, and therefore, the RSF has become
increasingly confident as they continue to commit atrocities with
impunity.
Turning to General Burhan. He believed that being on good terms with
the RSF leader meant that Hemedti would continue acting as his
protector – much as the latter had done for Al-Bashir. At the same
time, the civilian contingent of the transitional government assumed
that the RSF would help them confront and limit the power of political
Islamists in Sudan, including the SAF. However, in doing so, both
failed to challenge the expanded authority of the RSF and the power
acquired by its leadership. Thus, the RSF leadership took advantage of
the weaknesses of the military and civilian elites and emerged as the
strongest actor, largely due to its capacity for brutality and support
from the UAE.
Nonetheless, the RSF, despite its ambition, brutal force, and loyalty
to the UAE, has nothing to offer Sudan other than a litany of
destruction and atrocities that continue to cultivate utmost hate and
rejection from Sudanese communities. The ongoing war has revealed the
RSF’s lack of capacity for organisation and governance, and its
inability to engage with the people of Sudan. The widespread
destruction of the country’s infrastructure, including schools,
universities, and hospitals, government facilities, as well as the
rampant looting, systemic sexual violence and mass atrocities
committed against civilians, all indicate a fundamental disconnect
between the RSF militia, the Sudanese population and the concept of
governance.
Conflicting Narratives:
I believe that this war is a significant turning point, not just for
Sudan but also for the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions.
Unfortunately, the RSF and its sponsors in the UAE and Russia, via the
Wagner mercenaries, have ignited a wildfire that is spreading beyond
Sudan’s borders.
It is puzzling to see that many Sudanese civilian politicians and some
international actors view the ongoing bloodshed in Sudan as a mere
political crisis. They seem to believe that the two generals hold the
solution to this crisis. They are, therefore, hoping to recycle the
same old power-sharing formula when seats at the political table are
reserved for the men in uniform responsible for the violence and
atrocities, adding subordinate civilian men under the pretext of
political transition. In my opinion, any power-sharing agreement that
brings back the old faces is a recipe for war.
It is evident that the primary perpetrator of violence in Sudan at the
moment is the RSF, which throughout its existence has relied on
violence as both a means and an end. As such it has failed utterly to
secure its place as a legitimate political outfit. Violence is
integral to its organisational structure, dictating the nature of its
mobilisations and operations. The RSF cannot function without
violence, meaning that it automatically locks itself out of a Sudanese
future without violence.
The war in Sudan has been marked by conflicting narratives coming from
the multiple actors and their regional and international allies.
However, as Sudanese people, we are caught in the middle. From a
Sudanese perspective, it is important to understand the difference
between the SAF and the RSF. Although the SAF has a long history of
corruption and dysfunction, it still represents most of Sudan’s rule
of law and national identity. Therefore, when speaking about the
political process to address this crisis and governance, it is logical
to emphasise the militant and militarised state of Sudan as the root
cause of Sudan’s instability and to advocate for the rights of
Sudanese citizens as civilians to have a say in the running of their
country.
At this point, Sudan is falling apart very quickly. We need a third
path to centre the Sudanese people and their realities in a political
narrative beyond the ambitions of the political actors, civilian and
military, and their grievances against each other. We need a process
that speaks to our situation, reflects on our realities, and
acknowledges what is actually happening rather than denying it or
being apologetic about it, as is the case in the discourse of the
FFC/Taqdom coalition, or the NCP´s Islamist discourse. It seems to
demand that all Sudanese people act like jihadis, which we are not and
will never be, but that does not mean we should surrender to the
RSF/UAE and lose any say over how our country should be governed or
structured.
The FFC and NCP should not hold us hostage to their grievances and
hatred of each other. At this point, we don’t care about either of
them. While both are part of the civilian forces, they are not
representative of the full civilian population, which is highly
diverse. Many civilians at the moment are taking charge of their
communities’ welfare, providing protection, and making critical
decisions about aid, humanitarian support, and human rights. In the
states outside the active conflict zones, several communities have no
interest in supporting either the FFC/Taqdom or the political Islamist
/NCP. Instead, they envision a future Sudan with a higher degree of
state and regional sovereignty and self-determination.
The reality is that Sudan will not be the same country after this
brutal war. Therefore, we must anticipate and plan accordingly to
avoid repeating the same cycles of violence.
The past is constantly shaping the present. However, the present
evolves by the minute and shapes new realities and dynamics for the
future. I believe the FFC and the NCP are stuck playing an outdated
game, vying for control. Both forces need to be humbled and join a
third inclusive path that focuses on addressing the needs of the
people of Sudan.
Notes
[1] These included the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF), and The SPLM North with its multiple factions, and the
Darfur armed movements which are also comprised of multiple factions.
[2] The massacre occurred on the 3rd of June 2019, when hundred of
civilians were killed and sexually assaulted.
https://africanarguments.org/2024/05/sudan-the-violence-is-a-symptom-of-a-profound-collective-failure/
END1
2. It’s an open secret: the UAE is fuelling Sudan’s war – and there’ll
be no peace until we call it out
The Emirates is arming and supporting one side in the conflict, but UK
and US officials have shied from confronting it
Husam Mahjoub
Fri 24 May 2024 11.00 BST
Guardian
The war in Sudan has become one of the worst ongoing humanitarian
crises in the world. In a little over a year of fighting between the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), there
have been 6.8 million people internally displaced, 2 million fleeing
the country, and 24.8 million, almost half the population, in dire
need of humanitarian assistance.
The United Arab Emirates is the foreign player most invested in the
war. In fact, without its direct and all-around support, the RSF would
not have been able to wage war to the same extent.
Sudan is key to the UAE’s strategy in Africa and the Middle East,
aimed at achieving political and economic hegemony while curbing
democratic aspirations. Since 2015, it has sourced fighters from both
factions to join its conflict in Yemen. It is the primary importer of
Sudan’s gold and has multibillion-dollar plans to develop ports along
Sudan’s Red Sea coast. By supporting the RSF in Sudan, it has
undermined the democratic transition that followed the 2019 ouster of
Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s dictator for 30 years.
Upon the outbreak of war, it reportedly established logistical
operations to send weapons to the RSF through its networks in Libya,
Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda and the Haftar and
Wagner militias. It has reportedly disguised armament and supplies as
humanitarian aid. In addition, RSF business, finance, logistics and PR
operations are carried out from the UAE. Injured fighters are
reportedly airlifted to be treated in an Abu Dhabi military hospital.
And Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the RSF commander, is said to
have visited a few African countries on board an Emirati airplane
belonging to a company owned by an Emirati royal and adviser to the
president.
A UN report in January found the accusations of UAE military support
to RSF credible. The UAE has denied this support, but many US
lawmakers have publicly called it out. US and British officials have
been more cautious, tending to focus on the “negative roles” of
external actors or partners that support the RSF.
Nonetheless, the UAE has been bullish in rejecting the accusations,
explicit or not. Last April, it furiously cancelled ministerial
meetings with the UK because it did not leap to its defence at a UN
meeting about Sudan.
Meanwhile, famine, diseases and fighting are closing in on civilians.
Furthermore, the so-called international community has done little to
stop it, with only 12% of the $2.7bn aid sought for Sudan having been
raised. The pattern of targeting civilians, torching villages, and
committing mass murders and sexual violence has been witnessed in all
the areas that came under RSF control. Human Rights Watch suggested
RSF has committed genocide, crimes against humanity, widespread war
crimes and ethnic cleansing. SAF has committed its share of war
crimes, bombing civilians indiscriminately, and arresting, torturing
and killing civilians too. The US officially determined that both the
SAF and RSF have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and
ethnic cleansing.
Fighting for control of El Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in the
western region of Darfur, escalated last week. Hundreds of thousands
of people had taken refuge there after fleeing the atrocities
committed by RSF in other parts of Darfur, an area twice the size of
the UK. The battle for El Fasher may have significant implications for
the region. A win for the RSF gives it effective control over most
states to the west of the Nile River, which represents more than half
the area, population and resources of Sudan.
Peace prospects are dim. The most recognised effort to achieve peace
can be seen in the Jeddah platform: multiple rounds of talks organised
by the US and Saudi Arabia, which began shortly after the war broke
out. However, the SAF and RSF have consistently failed to honour the
commitments set out in the May 2023 declaration to ensure civilians
are protected and international humanitarian law is respected. Nor
have they honoured several agreements for ceasefire, facilitation of
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or confidence-building
measures, such as vacating civilian houses occupied by RSF combatants.
Tom Perriello, the US special envoy for Sudan, proposes reviving the
Jeddah platform, focusing on building and aligning political will in
the region to compel a peace deal, and enlisting the efforts of key
African and Arab leaders in the talks.
However, Sudan has a history of prolonged wars and endless peace
talks, and Jeddah risks becoming another entry in its list of “too
many agreements dishonoured” unless the international community pivots
away from its failed model of pressuring for peace deals that
reproduce violence and authoritarianism. The generals of both the SAF
and RSF must be held accountable for their numerous crimes against the
Sudanese people, and should not be rewarded again by allowing them to
be part of any arrangement sought to end the war.
Most crucially, the international community must confront the UAE’s
detrimental role in the conflict, which it has carried out with
impunity, leveraging its alliances with both the west and Russia. If
not, Sudan risks descending into a state of perpetual war.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/may/24/uae-sudan-war-peace-emirates-uk-us-officials
END2
3. World ignoring risk of Sudan genocide - UN expert
24 May 2024
BBC News
Sudan's Darfur region is facing a growing risk of genocide as the
world's attention is focused on conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, a UN
expert warns.
"We do have circumstances in which a genocide could be occurring or
has occurred," the UN Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu, told BBC's Newsday
programme.
She said many civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity in
Sudan's besieged city of El Fasher, where fierce fighting has
intensified in recent days.
More than 700 deaths have been reported in 10 days by a medical
charity in the city.
El Fasher is the last major urban centre in the Darfur region that
remains in the hands of Sudan's army.
The military has been fighting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
(RSF) for more than a year, in a civil war that has killed thousands
and forced millions from their homes.
Local resident Ibrahim al-Tayeb al-Faki told the BBC his sister was
killed in a military airstrike that had also destroyed his home.
The 47-year-old told the BBC he had sent his three children to live
with their grandfather but his house was also hit. The family is now
sheltering in its ruins.
“There is no safe place in El Fasher right now,” he said.
The situation is unfolding to a "Rwanda-like" genocide of 1994, Ms
Nderitu said, citing a UN analysis on the increasing risk factors.
"Increased hostilities in El Fasher have now opened a really alarming
chapter in this conflict," she added.
"I'm calling for attention to this particular conflict. I have been
trying to get my voice out but my voice is drowned out by other wars -
in Ukraine and Gaza."
Similar fears of a possible genocide in Darfur were expressed by Human
Rights Watch (HRW) recently.
A report from the campaign group said ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity had been committed against ethnic Massalit and
non-Arab communities in the region by the paramilitary forces and its
Arab allies.
It called for sanctions against those responsible for the atrocities,
including the RSF leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as
Hemedti.
The current violence has erupted out of a long history of tensions
over resources between non-Arab farming communities, including the
Massalit, and Arab pastoralist communities.
The internet has been cut making access to the city difficult, as
soldiers from the RSF group continue to besiege the city.
The UN says about 15,000 people are feared to have been killed in the
West Darfur city of El Geneina last year.
Last June, West Darfur Governor Khamis Abakar was killed hours after
accusing the RSF of committing genocide. He is the most senior
official known to have been killed since the conflict began in April.
The RSF says it is not involved in what it describes as a "tribal
conflict" in Darfur.
The paramilitary group emerged from the Janjaweed militia which was
accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing against non-Arab communities
in Darfur in 2003, after rebels took up arms, accusing the government
of ignoring the region.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c511vgzvl2eo
END3
4. Sudan’s Alea Iacta Est: The Battles of El-Fasher
Hemedti is not John Garang, and the “Rapid Support Forces” are not a
social liberation movement
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Fikra for Studies and Development
24 May 2024
Over the past few weeks, the siege and attacks by the “Rapid Support
Forces” (RSF) militia have escalated on the city of El-Fasher, the
capital of North Darfur state, which is the last remaining state in
the Darfur region that has not yet fallen under the control of the
militia.
The increase in the siege and attacks coincided with the RSF militia’s
retreat from the capital, Khartoum, after the Sudanese army forces
succeeded in liberating the city of Omdurman, which is located in the
western part of the capital. Simultaneously, the RSF presence
diminished throughout the remainder of the capital, while its soldiers
went busy wiping out villages and towns in the Gezira state,
plundering residents' goods and houses, and tarnishing the land and
infrastructure with a scorched earth policy. This seems to be a
prelude to the withdrawal of militia forces to intensify the attacks
and tighten control over the Darfur and Kordofan regions in western
Sudan.
The RSF and their political allies have sought vigorously since the
outbreak of the war to consolidate their claim of representing social
incubators of western Sudan. In July 2023, three months after the
outbreak of the war, and after the political leadership of the “Forces
of Freedom and Change” coalition left the country and toured the
region, the “Rapid Support Forces” organized a consultative conference
for Darfur leaders in Togo to mobilize political support for their
raging war in Sudan. Two members of the “Taqadum” coalition
leadership, currently headed by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok,
participated in the Togo conference, namely Nasr al-Din Abdul Bari and
Mohammed Hassan al-Taayishi, with papers on governance systems,
administration, and historical imbalances in the 1956 state in the
context of justifying the war, in addition to others who later
participated in the formation of the “Civil Support Agency for Rapid
Support Forces”. After that, Abdul Rahim Hamdan Daglo, the deputy
commander of the “Rapid Support Forces” and the brother of its leader
“Hemedti”, met in separate meetings with the leaders of the Darfur
factions that signed the Juba peace agreement, in the Chadian capital
N’Djamena, under the arrangement, sponsorship, and pressure of Chadian
President Mohammed Deby.
These meetings resulted in some movements converging with the
positions of the “RSF”, and to the division of the “Justice and
Equality Movement”, and the joining of the divided faction led by
Suleiman Sandal and Ahmed Tugud to the “Taqadum” coalition aligned
with the “RSF” and adopting its war justification discourse. Things
became clearer after the statements of the leading member of the
“Taqadum”, Taha Osman Ishaq, about the impossibility of excluding RSF
militia from political participation, then came the statements of
Khalid Omar Yousif, deputy chairperson of the Sudanese Congress party,
and the statements of former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, which try
to formulate a new analysis of the war on power that is taking place
in Sudan by linking it to the historical conflict of the margin and
the center in Sudan.
All these attempts aim directly at changing the image of Hemedti from
a bandit and professional mercenary used by the “Muslim Brotherhood”
regime as one of the tools of repression, intimidation, and terror
during its years of rule, and diverting attention from all the crimes
committed by Hemedti and his forces by proxy for the Bashir regime in
Darfur in the raging war in the region since 2003, which he continues
to commit in his own right now on a larger scale that includes all
parts of Sudan in his quest to rule Sudan and mortgage it to the
interests of his foreign allies. To reintroduce Mohammed Hamdan Daglo
(Hemedti) in the image of the righteous mutineer who carries the
nobility of the margin’s issues and the burden of defending the
marginalized communities of Sudan. It is an attempt to whitewash and
redraw the image of Hemedti in the portrait of John Garang, as one of
the heroes of national liberation. But Hemedti is not John Garang, and
the “Rapid Support Forces” are not a social liberation movement that
resulted from the interactions of society and its issues, but rather a
repressive tool that was established on flawed bases in the service of
a totalitarian regime and for the purpose of practicing political
violence against specific social and ethnic groups that it now claims
to represent.
The massacre of Al-Geneina by the "Rapid Support Forces" in West
Darfur against the Masalit community in June 2023, which killed
between 10,000 and 15,000 civilians and forced hundreds of thousands
of people to flee to refugee camps in Chad, shows how dangerous these
attempts are. The chants of joy and racist encouragement that
accompanied the videos of the assassination of the late governor of
West Darfur, Khamis Abkar, and the mutilation of his corpse, reflect
the racist nature in the DNA of this militia, which is inconsistent
with the claims of its representation of the margin or its war in
order to achieve its interests.
The RSF continues to intensify the attack on El-Fasher - which has so
far resisted falling into the hands of the militia - as a prelude to
declaring an independent government in western Sudan. The militia has
already appointed a civilian administration for the Gezira region,
headed by Siddiq Ahmed, a member of the Umma Party: one of the parties
under the umbrella of the “Taqadum” coalition. But this administration
has not done anything in the context of stopping the violations and
atrocities committed by the militia in the villages of Gezira.
This scheme feeds on the power ambitions that have blinded some of the
civilian politicians, especially since two of those mentioned in the
list above, who are striving to promote the discourse of whitening the
militia’s page and promoting its claims, are descended from the Darfur
region and were among the candidates whose names were pushed to assume
the prime-ministership of Sudan should the framework agreement be
signed prior to the war. The first is Nasr al-Din Abdul Bari, who was
the Minister of Justice during the transitional period, and was the
preferred candidate for the western circles, to the extent that the
former American ambassador in Khartoum, John Godfrey, kept promoting
his name to run the government even before the conclusion of the
negotiations. The other is Taha Osman Ishaq, who has long been the
link between the leadership of the “Forces of Freedom and Change”
coalition, and the “RSF”, and who has gone far in washing the image of
the militia leader Hemedti, affirming in a television interview that
Hemedti is with stopping the war and does not have any personal
ambition. As for Abdul Bari, he declared his allegiance in the first
week of the war when he met with members of the US government
officials and congressional staff to try to convince them that the way
to stop the war is to recognize Hemedti as the legitimate head of
state in Sudan.
The success of the attempt to split up Sudan will have far-reaching
devastating consequences beyond the Sudanese population. The ongoing
conflict in Darfur is likely to result in prolonged and violent
instability within the community. This is especially alarming given
the massacres and atrocities committed by the RSF militia against
various social groups in the Darfur region. Furthermore, the
involvement of certain political allies who are attempting to
manipulate the war along ethnic lines adds to the situation's
complexity. It is important to note that even if a violent separation
occurs, the war is unlikely to cease between the Sudanese army and the
"Rapid Support" forces. The emergence of such a new state maybe
serving the foreign interests of the RSF sponsoring countries, who are
actively seeking to benefit from the war by gaining control over
Sudan's resources and wealth. However, it will also result in a
significant shift in the political geography of the Sahel and Horn of
Africa regions. The RSF's political and military influence extends
beyond the region's national borders. It is commonly known that the
RSF intervened in early 2023 to help quash a military coup in Central
Africa, as well as its presence in Chad, Libya, and other neighboring
countries.
The scheme of dividing Sudan is based fundamentally on a deadly ethnic
political heresy, that aims to render identities into political
weapons without a project or a political thesis related to the people,
or the state service apparatus responsible for preserving their rights
and caring for their interests. It feeds on a self-craving for power
among some who are deluded by their continuous entitlement to it, and
for that, they do not care about breaking the principles of democracy,
resorting to the militia’s pickups, or even pledging to the will of
external powers as long as that serves to satisfy their continuous
lust for power.
الحرب ومشروع تقسيم السودان
هجوم "الدعم السريع" على الفاشرتمهيد لإعلان حكومة مستقلة في المنطقة الغربية
أمجد فريد الطيب
آخر تحديث 24 مايو 2024
على مدى الأسابيع الماضية، تفاقم حصار وهجمات "قوات الدعم السريع" على
مدينة الفاشر، حاضرة ولاية شمال دارفور، وهي الولاية الأخيرة المتبقية في
إقليم دارفور والتي لم تقع تحت سيطرة الميليشيا حتى الآن.
تزامن تزايد الحصار والهجمات مع تقهقر سيطرة الميليشيا على العاصمة
الخرطوم، بعد أن نجحت قوات الجيش السوداني في تحرير مدينة أم درمان التي
تقع في الجزء الغربي من العاصمة. وفي الوقت ذاته، تناقص حضور "الدعم
السريع" في بقية أجزاء العاصمة، بينما انهمكت جموعها في مسح قرى ومدن
ولاية الجزيرة ونهب ممتلكات وبيوت المواطنين وإفساد الأراضي والبنية
التحتية بمنهجية الأرض المحروقة، فيما يبدو أنه تمهيد لسحب قوات
الميليشيا لتكثيف الهجوم وإحكام السيطرة على إقليمي دارفور وكردفان غربي
السودان.
وقد سعت "قوات الدعم السريع" وحلفاؤها السياسيون بشكل حثيث منذ اندلاع
الحرب إلى ترسيخ ادعائها بتمثيل حواضن اجتماعية غربي السودان. وفي
يوليو/تموز 2023، بعد ثلاثة أشهر من اندلاع الحرب، وبعد خروج القيادات
السياسية لتحالف "قوى الحرية والتغيير" من البلاد وجولتها في المنطقة،
نظمت "قوات الدعم السريع" مؤتمرا تشاوريا لقيادات دارفور في دولة توغو
بهدف حشد الدعم السياسي لحربها المستعرة في السودان. وقد شارك في مؤتمر
توغو عضوا قيادة تحالف "تقدم" الذي يرأسه حاليا رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد
الله حمدوك، وهما نصر الدين عبد الباري، ومحمد حسن التعايشي، بأوراق حول
نظم الحكم والإدارة والاختلالات التاريخية في دولة 1956 في سياق تبرير
الحرب، بالإضافة إلى آخرين شاركوا لاحقا في تكوين "هيئة الإسناد المدني
لقوات الدعم السريع". بعد ذلك، التقى عبدالرحيم حمدان دقلو، نائب قائد
"قوات الدعم السريع" وشقيق زعيمها "حميدتي"، في اجتماعات منفصلة بقادة
الفصائل الدارفورية الموقعة على اتفاق سلام جوبا، في العاصمة التشادية
إنجمينا، وذلك بترتيب ورعاية وضغط من الرئيس التشادي محمد ديبي.
وأدت تلك الاجتماعات إلى تقارب بعض الحركات مع مواقف "الدعم السريع"،
وإلى انقسام "حركة العدل والمساواة"، وانضمام الفصيل المنقسم بقيادة
سليمان صندل وأحمد تقد إلى تحالف "تقدم" المتماهي مع "الدعم السريع"
وتبنيه لخطاب تبرير الحرب. مضى الأمر ليصبح أوضح بعد تصريحات عضو قيادة
"تقدم" طه عثمان إسحق عن عدم إمكانية إبعاد الميليشيا من المشاركة
السياسية ثم جاءت تصريحات خالد عمر يوسف نائب رئيس حزب "المؤتمر"
السوداني وتصريحات رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد الله حمدوك التي تحاول صياغة
تحليل جديد للحرب على السلطة التي تدور في السودان بربطها بصراع الهامش
والمركز التاريخي في السودان.
كل هذه المحاولات تهدف مباشرة إلى تغيير صورة حميدتي من قاطع طريق ومرتزق
محترف استخدمته سلطة "الإخوان المسلمين" كإحدى أدوات القمع والترويع
والإرهاب خلال سنين حكمها، وصرف النظر عن كل الجرائم التي ارتكبها حميدتي
وقواته بالوكالة عن نظام البشير في دارفور في الحرب المستعرة بالإقليم
منذ 2003 والتي يواصل ارتكابها بالأصالة حاليا في نطاق واسع يشمل كافة
أنحاء السودان في سعيه لحكم السودان ورهنه لمصالح حلفائه الخارجية وإعادة
تقديم محمد حمدان دقلو في صورة المناضل الذي يحمل نبل قضية الهامش وعبء
الدفاع عن مهمشي السودان. وهي محاولة لإعادة رسم صورة حميدتي على شاكلة
جون قرنق، كأحد أبطال التحرر الوطني. ولكن حميدتي ليس جون قرنق، كما أن
"قوات الدعم السريع" ليست حركة تحرر اجتماعي نتجت عن تفاعلات المجتمع
وقضاياه، بل هي أداة قمع تأسست على قواعد مختلة في خدمة نظام شمولي وبغرض
ممارسة العنف السياسي ضد فئات اجتماعية وإثنية محددة تحاول ادعاء تمثيلها
الآن.
وليس أكثر دلالة على خطر هذه المحاولة من مجزرة الجنينة التي ارتكبتها
"قوات الدعم السريع" في غرب دارفور ضد مجتمع المساليت، فقتلت ما بين عشرة
آلاف إلى خمسة عشر ألفا من المدنيين في يونيو/حزيران 2023، وشردت مئات
الآلاف من المواطنين إلى معسكرات النازحين في تشاد. فيما شهدت صيحات
الفرح والتشجيع العنصرية التي صاحبت فيديوهات اغتيال والي غرب دارفور
الراحل خميس أبكر والتمثيل بجثته، على الطبيعة العنصرية في الحمض النووي
لهذه الميليشيا، بما لا يتسق مع ادعاءات نسبة تمثيلها للهامش أو حربها في
سبيل تحقيق مصالحه.
يبقى سعي "الدعم السريع" في تكثيف الهجوم على الفاشر- والتي استعصت حتى
الآن على السقوط في يد الميليشيا- وهو تمهيد لإعلان حكومة مستقلة في غرب
السودان. وكانت الميليشيا قد قامت بالفعل بتعيين إدارة مدنية لإقليم
الجزيرة برئاسة صديق أحمد عضو حزب الأمة وهو أحد الأعضاء المنضوين تحت
مظلة تحالف "تقدم".
لكن هذه الإدارة لم تصنع شيئا في سياق إيقاف الانتهاكات والفظائع التي
ترتكبها الميليشيا في قرى الجزيرة. تغذي هذه الخطة مطامع السلطة التي
أعمت البعض، خصوصا أن اثنين من المذكورين في القائمة أعلاه والذين
يجتهدون في الترويج لخطاب تبييض صفحة الميليشيا وترويج مزاعمها، ينحدران
من إقليم دارفور وكانا من المرشحين الذين تم الدفع بأسمائهم لتولي رئاسة
الوزراء في حال اكتمال الاتفاق الإطاري. الأول هو نصر الدين عبدالباري
الذي كان وزيرا للعدل خلال الفترة الانتقالية، وكان المرشح المفضل
للدوائر الغربية، إلى درجة أن السفير الأميركي السابق في الخرطوم جون
غودفري، ما فتئ حينها يروج له لتولي رئاسة الحكومة. والآخر هو طه عثمان
إسحق الذي ظل لفترة طويلة صلة الربط بين قيادة "تحالف الحرية والتغيير"،
و"الدعم السريع"، والذي مضى بعيدا في غسل صورة قائد الميليشيا حميدتي،
مؤكدا في مقابلة تلفزيونية على أن حميدتي مع إيقاف الحرب وليس له أي طموح
شخصي. أما نصر الدين عبد الباري فقد أعلن منذ الأسبوع الأول من الحرب
ولاءه عندما اجتمع مع أفراد من موظفي الحكومة والكونغرس الأميركيين
ليحاول إقناعهم بأن السبيل إلى إيقاف الحرب هو في الاعتراف بحميدتي كرأس
الدولة الشرعي في السودان.
نجاح مشروع تقسيم السودان لن تنحصر آثاره الكارثية على السودانيين فحسب.
فهو سيؤدي إلى عدم استقرار طويل الأمد وعنيف بين العناصر المجتمعية في
دارفور، خصوصا بعد المذابح والفظائع التي ارتكبتها الميليشيا ضد فئات
اجتماعية متعددة في الإقليم، وطبيعة الامتدادات الاجتماعية وصبغة التمثيل
الإثني الذي يحاول بعض حلفائها السياسيين صبغ هذه الحرب بها، بالإضافة
إلى أن الحرب لن تتوقف بين الجيش السوداني و"الدعم السريع" حتى في حالة
الانفصال العنيف هذا.
وبينما قد يخدم نشوء هذه الدولة الجديدة بعض المصالح الخارجية للدول التي
ترعى الحرب في السودان وتحاول جاهدة الاستفادة منها في حصد المغانم
والثروات، فإنها ستؤدي أيضا إلى تغيير الجغرافيا السياسية في منطقة
الساحل والقرن الأفريقيين بشكل كبير، خصوصا أن الامتدادات السياسية
والعسكرية لـ"الدعم السريع" عابرة للحدود القطرية في هذا الإقليم. وليس
بعيدا عن الأذهان تدخل "الدعم السريع" في مطلع عام 2023 للمشاركة في قمع
انقلاب عسكري في أفريقيا الوسطى، ذلك غير امتداداتها في تشاد وليبيا
وغيرها من دول الإقليم.
مشروع تقسيم السودان يستند في أساسه إلى منظومة هويات قاتلة، تريد ترجمة
هذه الهويات إلى كسب سياسي دون مشروع وأطروحة سياسية متعلقة بالناس أو
جهاز الدولة الخدمي المعني بحفظ حقوقهم ورعاية مصالحهم. يغذي هذا المشروع
شبق ذاتي إلى السلطة لدى بعض المتوهمين باستحقاقهم لها بشكل مستمر، وفي
سبيل ذلك لا يعنيهم تكسير مبادئ الديمقراطية أو الاستعانة بسلاح
الميليشيا أو حتى الارتهان لإرادة أطراف خارجية ما دام ذلك يخدم إشباع
شبقهم المستمر إلى السلطة.
https://mailchi.mp/75902094e969/sudans-alea-iacta-est-the-battles-of-el-fasher?
END4
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John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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