Sudan Cannot Wait: Reflections on the Berlin Conference
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John Ashworth
Apr 20, 2026, 3:54:17 AM (11 days ago) Apr 20
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1. Attached please find a reflection on the Berlin Conference entitled
"Sudan Cannot Wait!" and headed "Sudanese can not wait for another
Conference. People in the Kordofans are under siege as they were in El
Fashr last year. No crocodile tears ever again - but robust action
NOW" by Marina Peter, 18 April 2026.
END1
2. Berlin Conference Strength and Weaknesses: Is the Quad Declaration
Dead and did the Quintet Roadmap take over? Relief before Politics
By Yasir Arman
April 16, 2026
We are living in a complex situation where none of us possesses the
absolute truth. We need more dialogue among the forces of revolution,
change, and anti-war advocates, and we must make concessions to one
another before others, for the wheat is bitter in the fields of the
advocates for war.
Much ink has been spilled regarding the importance of the Berlin
Conference and the Joint Call for Sudan, which was signed by the
Sudanese civil and political groups out of Addis Abba and Berlin.
Indeed, the Berlin Conference illuminated the darkness of the war in
Sudan and attracted regional and international attention during thorny
circumstances. However, it is essential to discuss the manifestations
of weakness. Berlin was not the first conference, but the third, while
the war continues and the humanitarian disaster worsens. Discussing
these weaknesses aims to address them and move toward unifying the
forces of revolution and change, a unity that can only be achieved
through sound propositions capable of attracting a solid, weighty bloc
for democracy.
The African Union and the Quintet
Four months after the outbreak of the ill-fated April 15 war, which
destroyed the country and humiliated the people, we met in 2023 at the
African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa with the Chairperson of the
AU Commission, Moussa Faki, and Dr. Mohamed El Hassan Lebatt. At the
beginning of the meeting, Dr. Lebatt stated that he had a complete
vision and roadmap to stop the war. He mentioned that two days prior,
in the very seats we occupied, he had met with Dr. Al-Dirdiri Mohamed
Ahmed and Dr. Ibrahim Ghandour, two leaders from the Islamic Movement
and former Foreign Ministers, who were ready to be part of a
Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. Simultaneously, social media circulated a
list for the Sudanese dialogue containing 150 names biased toward the
National Congress Party.
At the time, we rejected Dr. Lebatt’s remarks and refused to reward
the Islamic Movement for their crimes in obstructing the transition.
Later, Lebatt's mission ended, but the path he paved and the roadmap
he initiated still govern the African Union’s trajectory. It is vital
to emphasize the AU's importance in addressing the Sudanese issue, but
the interests of the Sudanese people are paramount. We must recognize
that the AU and the EU signed a joint agreement months before the
Berlin Conference, giving greater momentum to the aforementioned AU
path and a political process designed in the absence of Sudanese
civilian democratic forces.
The Berlin Conference was preceded by preparations and management by
the "Quintet”, which is the African Union, IGAD, Arab League, United
Nations and the European Union. In Berlin itself, the AU held its
most significant meeting with the German Chancellor, who represents
the highest authority in Germany. This meeting strengthened the
partnership between the EU and AU, given Germany's position in Europe
and Europe's search for new spaces amidst divergence from current U.S.
policy. Another meeting was held for foreign ministers or their
representatives and regional and international organizations, followed
by the meeting with Sudanese parties. The Berlin Conference arrived
while the "Quad" parties were preoccupied with the Gulf war and
differing positions among some of its countries, pushing the winds of
mediation toward the AU-led Quintet. This enabled the Quintet to pass
its agenda, including the Joint Call, which is being pushed as a
substitute for the Quad Declaration—the latter being more accurate in
addressing the Sudanese crisis and fairer to the demands of the people
and civilian forces.
The Truce and the Political Process
We must treat the truce and the political process as a single package,
adopting the resolution of the humanitarian disaster as the entry
point to the political process, not vice versa. What happened in
Berlin was that the political process and the Joint Call became the
entry point, bypassing the humanitarian catastrophe. The agreement
among civilian forces celebrated the political process with a voice
drowning out the humanitarian one, using the usual language regarding
the truce and disaster without actual pressure on the warring parties
or a clear roadmap for a ceasefire. It relied on promises of funds,
most of which will likely never be fulfilled.
The humanitarian disaster simply means the right to life: the right of
millions to safety, food, housing, and healthcare. These are natural
rights that precede political rights, civil rights, and power-sharing.
In the Paris Conference, external parties tried to place the political
agenda before the humanitarian disaster, and we rejected that.
However, between Addis and Berlin, a new position has been taken that
moves away from the urgent demand to stop the war before transitioning
to how to end it as a comprehensive package with a humanitarian entry
point. A humanitarian truce is the gateway to expanding the civilian
space and the return of the displaced to their homes. The agreement of
civilian forces in Addis and Berlin dropped the Quad Declaration and
the Nairobi Declaration, not by oversight, but to clear the path for
the Quintet. This weakens civilian forces and millions of
stakeholders.
To avoid straying too far into the political path without its
humanitarian entry point, a robust dialogue must occur between the
forces of revolution and change. This dialogue should firmly link the
issues of war, revolution, and democratic civilian transformation,
adopting a roadmap that helps the link between the humanitarian and
political agendas. Relief must always come before politics.
Sudanese experience shows that the political process and negotiations
are the rocks upon which political alliances shatter. This happened to
the National Front in 1976, the National Democratic Alliance from
1999–2005, and the December Revolution forces in 2019. We must hold a
conference similar to the 1995 Conference on Fundamental Issues to
link the agenda of ending the war with the agenda of the Sudanese
revolution.
The Khartoum and Berlin camps: harmony or contradiction?
It struck me that the Khartoum camp, after returning from Port Sudan
with great effort, worked in Berlin on three levels: a group
participating inside the hall, a group protesting outside, and a group
abstaining and demanding more - like "Oliver Twist" - led by Dr. Kamel
Idris and Ambassador Ilham Shantir in Berlin. I could not discern if
this was a harmonious plan or a set of contradictions, an attempt at
creativity or rampant chaos. Regardless, all three levels served the
same purpose of demonstrating a lack of commitment.
The Political Process and the Warring Forces
The political process cannot succeed without a clear commitment from
the Armed Forces and their allies, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
and their allies, to a humanitarian truce that expands civilian space
and creates a suitable climate for stakeholders, following a binding
schedule for a humanitarian truce for all parties with their
participation.
Ending the War and the Position of the Army [SAF]
The army is an institution belonging to the Sudanese state, funded by
the sweat of a laboring people. A distinction must be made between the
army and the Islamic Movement, which hijacked state apparatuses. This
hijacking and "Empowerment" (Tamkin) must end. The army must be
rebuilt on a professional basis, correcting structural and historical
imbalances and adopting Sudanese diversity with a military doctrine
that serves the nation and excludes the Islamic Movement from
hijacking the state, especially since it is now the largest armed
party in Sudan.
Ending the War and the Position of the RSF
Demanding the surrender of the RSF is impractical and prolongs the
war. Negotiations must be held with the RSF and its allies within the
framework of building a "New Sudan”, a state that accommodates
everyone, and rebuilding a single national professional army that ends
the multiplicity of armies and militias.
Lastly, the importance of Berlin Conference lies in the fact that the
dialogue around it has re-ignited the fundamental issues of war and
revolution. Revolutionary forces must agree on what unites them rather
than what divides them, engaging in internal dialogue before taking
new steps.
END2
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
"Sudan Cannot Wait!" and headed "Sudanese can not wait for another
Conference. People in the Kordofans are under siege as they were in El
Fashr last year. No crocodile tears ever again - but robust action
NOW" by Marina Peter, 18 April 2026.
END1
2. Berlin Conference Strength and Weaknesses: Is the Quad Declaration
Dead and did the Quintet Roadmap take over? Relief before Politics
By Yasir Arman
April 16, 2026
We are living in a complex situation where none of us possesses the
absolute truth. We need more dialogue among the forces of revolution,
change, and anti-war advocates, and we must make concessions to one
another before others, for the wheat is bitter in the fields of the
advocates for war.
Much ink has been spilled regarding the importance of the Berlin
Conference and the Joint Call for Sudan, which was signed by the
Sudanese civil and political groups out of Addis Abba and Berlin.
Indeed, the Berlin Conference illuminated the darkness of the war in
Sudan and attracted regional and international attention during thorny
circumstances. However, it is essential to discuss the manifestations
of weakness. Berlin was not the first conference, but the third, while
the war continues and the humanitarian disaster worsens. Discussing
these weaknesses aims to address them and move toward unifying the
forces of revolution and change, a unity that can only be achieved
through sound propositions capable of attracting a solid, weighty bloc
for democracy.
The African Union and the Quintet
Four months after the outbreak of the ill-fated April 15 war, which
destroyed the country and humiliated the people, we met in 2023 at the
African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa with the Chairperson of the
AU Commission, Moussa Faki, and Dr. Mohamed El Hassan Lebatt. At the
beginning of the meeting, Dr. Lebatt stated that he had a complete
vision and roadmap to stop the war. He mentioned that two days prior,
in the very seats we occupied, he had met with Dr. Al-Dirdiri Mohamed
Ahmed and Dr. Ibrahim Ghandour, two leaders from the Islamic Movement
and former Foreign Ministers, who were ready to be part of a
Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue. Simultaneously, social media circulated a
list for the Sudanese dialogue containing 150 names biased toward the
National Congress Party.
At the time, we rejected Dr. Lebatt’s remarks and refused to reward
the Islamic Movement for their crimes in obstructing the transition.
Later, Lebatt's mission ended, but the path he paved and the roadmap
he initiated still govern the African Union’s trajectory. It is vital
to emphasize the AU's importance in addressing the Sudanese issue, but
the interests of the Sudanese people are paramount. We must recognize
that the AU and the EU signed a joint agreement months before the
Berlin Conference, giving greater momentum to the aforementioned AU
path and a political process designed in the absence of Sudanese
civilian democratic forces.
The Berlin Conference was preceded by preparations and management by
the "Quintet”, which is the African Union, IGAD, Arab League, United
Nations and the European Union. In Berlin itself, the AU held its
most significant meeting with the German Chancellor, who represents
the highest authority in Germany. This meeting strengthened the
partnership between the EU and AU, given Germany's position in Europe
and Europe's search for new spaces amidst divergence from current U.S.
policy. Another meeting was held for foreign ministers or their
representatives and regional and international organizations, followed
by the meeting with Sudanese parties. The Berlin Conference arrived
while the "Quad" parties were preoccupied with the Gulf war and
differing positions among some of its countries, pushing the winds of
mediation toward the AU-led Quintet. This enabled the Quintet to pass
its agenda, including the Joint Call, which is being pushed as a
substitute for the Quad Declaration—the latter being more accurate in
addressing the Sudanese crisis and fairer to the demands of the people
and civilian forces.
The Truce and the Political Process
We must treat the truce and the political process as a single package,
adopting the resolution of the humanitarian disaster as the entry
point to the political process, not vice versa. What happened in
Berlin was that the political process and the Joint Call became the
entry point, bypassing the humanitarian catastrophe. The agreement
among civilian forces celebrated the political process with a voice
drowning out the humanitarian one, using the usual language regarding
the truce and disaster without actual pressure on the warring parties
or a clear roadmap for a ceasefire. It relied on promises of funds,
most of which will likely never be fulfilled.
The humanitarian disaster simply means the right to life: the right of
millions to safety, food, housing, and healthcare. These are natural
rights that precede political rights, civil rights, and power-sharing.
In the Paris Conference, external parties tried to place the political
agenda before the humanitarian disaster, and we rejected that.
However, between Addis and Berlin, a new position has been taken that
moves away from the urgent demand to stop the war before transitioning
to how to end it as a comprehensive package with a humanitarian entry
point. A humanitarian truce is the gateway to expanding the civilian
space and the return of the displaced to their homes. The agreement of
civilian forces in Addis and Berlin dropped the Quad Declaration and
the Nairobi Declaration, not by oversight, but to clear the path for
the Quintet. This weakens civilian forces and millions of
stakeholders.
To avoid straying too far into the political path without its
humanitarian entry point, a robust dialogue must occur between the
forces of revolution and change. This dialogue should firmly link the
issues of war, revolution, and democratic civilian transformation,
adopting a roadmap that helps the link between the humanitarian and
political agendas. Relief must always come before politics.
Sudanese experience shows that the political process and negotiations
are the rocks upon which political alliances shatter. This happened to
the National Front in 1976, the National Democratic Alliance from
1999–2005, and the December Revolution forces in 2019. We must hold a
conference similar to the 1995 Conference on Fundamental Issues to
link the agenda of ending the war with the agenda of the Sudanese
revolution.
The Khartoum and Berlin camps: harmony or contradiction?
It struck me that the Khartoum camp, after returning from Port Sudan
with great effort, worked in Berlin on three levels: a group
participating inside the hall, a group protesting outside, and a group
abstaining and demanding more - like "Oliver Twist" - led by Dr. Kamel
Idris and Ambassador Ilham Shantir in Berlin. I could not discern if
this was a harmonious plan or a set of contradictions, an attempt at
creativity or rampant chaos. Regardless, all three levels served the
same purpose of demonstrating a lack of commitment.
The Political Process and the Warring Forces
The political process cannot succeed without a clear commitment from
the Armed Forces and their allies, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
and their allies, to a humanitarian truce that expands civilian space
and creates a suitable climate for stakeholders, following a binding
schedule for a humanitarian truce for all parties with their
participation.
Ending the War and the Position of the Army [SAF]
The army is an institution belonging to the Sudanese state, funded by
the sweat of a laboring people. A distinction must be made between the
army and the Islamic Movement, which hijacked state apparatuses. This
hijacking and "Empowerment" (Tamkin) must end. The army must be
rebuilt on a professional basis, correcting structural and historical
imbalances and adopting Sudanese diversity with a military doctrine
that serves the nation and excludes the Islamic Movement from
hijacking the state, especially since it is now the largest armed
party in Sudan.
Ending the War and the Position of the RSF
Demanding the surrender of the RSF is impractical and prolongs the
war. Negotiations must be held with the RSF and its allies within the
framework of building a "New Sudan”, a state that accommodates
everyone, and rebuilding a single national professional army that ends
the multiplicity of armies and militias.
Lastly, the importance of Berlin Conference lies in the fact that the
dialogue around it has re-ignited the fundamental issues of war and
revolution. Revolutionary forces must agree on what unites them rather
than what divides them, engaging in internal dialogue before taking
new steps.
END2
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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