Hope and Scepticism around the Tumaini Peace Initiative

[John Ashworth]

1. Nairobi talks: Kenyan mediators face fresh test in PCCA admission

Yiep Joseph
June 6, 2024
The City Review

The Kenyan mediators in the Nairobi peace talks under the Tumaini
Initiative face a potential conundrum after an advocacy group which is
a long-term government critic joined the negotiation with a raft of
demands.

Abraham Awolich, the representative of the People’s Coalition for
Civil Action (PCCA), who represented the entity during the talks
highlighted many grievances, arguing their adoption would help bring
inclusive peace to the country.

According to Awolich, there is a need for the country to initiate an
inclusive constitution that would return power to the people of South
Sudan.

“The people of South Sudan need a constitution that restructures power
and restructures the state. This is the only way this country can move
forward,” he said.

The PCCA highlighted the need for South Sudan to conduct a national
constitutional conference on “safer ground”, preferably in Nairobi,
Kenya.

“The National Constitutional Conference must be held in Kenya in a
neutral environment. There is no political or civic space in Juba to
undertake a genuine constitutional process,” he said.

The group also advocated for the return of the presidential unit, the
Tiger Division, to the military barracks, where police should be made
to protect the top officials.

“The Tiger Division must go back to the mother unit, and a new
independent agency under the Ministry of Interior should be
established to protect the VIPs,” he said.

It also called for the dissolution of the National Security Service
and its re-establishment as the National Intelligence Service.

However, the group expressed that its team would not rush into signing
the agreement should the government be unwilling to adhere to some of
the grievances.

“If the government is unwilling to take these proposals seriously, we
are not in a hurry to sign another fake agreement,” he said.

PCCA, however, in their presentation, appealed to President Salva Kiir
and the First Vice President, Riek Machar, to step aside in the
upcoming election

“President Kiir and Dr Riek should prepare to step aside at the end of
the transitional period and should not contest in the next elections,”
he said.

The talks, which bring together the Government of South Sudan and the
holdout groups, preferably from SSOMA, were marred by ideological
differences in the beginning before the two sides committed to a
protocol settling the issues earlier this week.

But the entry of PCCA with fresh grievances could put the resolve of
the mediator to the test, with some of them inviting the response from
the Government of South Sudan as they remain administrative issues.

However, the Executive Director of the Community Empowerment for
Progress Organization (CEPO), Edmund Yakani, said the consultations
among the parties have been smooth.

“The Nairobi Peace Talks are progressing positively within the
rationale of building a nexus between Rome peace talks and R-ARCSS
implementation,” Yakani said.

“The deliberations among the mediation delegates are productive and
consultative,” he added.

Earlier this week, the Government of South Sudan and the South Sudan
Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA) hit yet another milestone after
reaching an agreement on the substance of their discussions on the
document for building trust.

The document was developed in a confidence-building process that was
initiated by the Kenyan mediators to align the contentious issues that
were brought up by the delegations during the discussion.

Speaking to the media, the government spokesperson, Michael Makuei,
noted that the negotiators are making progress.

“This document will pave the way forward and will be a guiding
principle for us in the course of our talks, so we are hopeful and
optimistic that we will reach peace and go back to the people of South
Sudan with peace,” Makuei said.

Negotiations began in 2019 but have failed to end violence in some
parts of the country, despite a ceasefire signed in January 2020.
Meanwhile, the current talks in Kenya bring more holdout groups to the
table.

https://cityreviewss.com/nairobi-talks-kenyan-mediators-face-fresh-test-in-pcca-admission/

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2. Overloaded? Hope and Scepticism around the Tumaini Peace Initiative
for South Sudan

BY IBRAHIM SAKAWA MAGARA AND JAN POSPISIL
MAY 27, 2024
African Arguments

On 10 May 2024, the Tumaini (‘hope’ in Swahili) Peace Initiative for
South Sudan was launched in Kenya’s capital Nairobi. The initiative
seeks a final peace settlement by including the holdout groups that
have not signed the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of
the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The launch was
a high-powered event graced by six heads of state and well-attended by
high-ranking officials and diplomats from across the world, witnessing
the declared attempt to settle the history of armed conflicts in South
Sudan once and for all. After some days of formal talks, on 16 May
2024, the participants signed a commitment document, stating their
willingness to remain engaged in the talks and to renounce violence.
Whilst optimists describe the initiative as a renewed hope and
confirmation in commitment to the document, others are sceptical of
the initiative’s ability to significantly change the landscape of
localised violence in South Sudan.

The Tumaini initiative is significant in two ways. First, it may
rearrange the political chessboard in South Sudan by generating
international goodwill and, ideally, financial support for the
forthcoming elections – planned for December 2024 – by presenting the
current political leadership as peacemakers. Second, the initiative
thrusts Kenya, which hosted talks between the government of Sudan and
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) that led to the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, once again to the
forefront of the politics of peacemaking in South Sudan. The latter
comes with its fair share of transnational dynamics and implications
on the regional peace and security governance in the wider Horn of
Africa.

Initially, talks between the South Sudanese government, especially
representatives from the ruling SPLM and the movements that did not
sign the 2018 peace agreement, were held in Rome. Building on the
strong role of Christian churches in peacemaking in South Sudan, the
Rome process was facilitated by the Community Sant’Egidio and
supported by the Vatican. The main organisations involved were the
former SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum’s Real SPLM, the former SPLA
Chief of Staff Paul Malong’s South Sudan United Front (SSUF), and the
former SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Cirillo’s National Salvation
Front (NAS). Together with smaller factions, these holdout groups
formed a variety of shifting alliances such as the South Sudan
Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and, later, the Non-Signatory
South Sudan Opposition Group (NSSOG).

The negotiations went through several rounds starting in January 2020
but finally stalled in 2022 without having reached a conclusive
agreement. Several agreements on ceasefires and security arrangements
between the government and the involved holdout groups were signed but
never implemented due to a lack of commitment by the South Sudanese
government and persistent splits within the umbrella organisations of
the holdout groups due to their divergent and shifting political
interests.

During a visit to Nairobi in February 2023, South Sudan’s President
Salva Kiir officially requested Kenyan President William Ruto to take
over the facilitation of the Rome process. The move was surprising for
many, including the Community Sant’Egidio who were not consulted prior
to this decision. President Ruto accepted the request and Kenyan’s
diplomatic corps started to establish communication channels with the
holdout groups. Ruto appointed retired General Lazarus Sumbeiywo as
the lead mediator. Sumbeiywo facilitated negotiations between the SPLM
and the Sudanese government leading to the CPA, which was instrumental
in South Sudan’s eventual independence.

The holdout groups reacted differently to the Kenyan-led initiative.
Some actors, such as Malong (who resides in Nairobi) and Amum, sent
positive signals and have since joined the talks. Others, especially
Thomas Cirillo, showed scepticism and have kept out of this round of
talks so far. Given that Cirillo’s NAS is, by far, the strongest in
military terms of the initial parties to the Rome talks, his absence
is a significant setback to the talks. On the other hand, in a
surprising move, the Kenyan negotiators convinced another holdout
group, Stephen Buay’s South Sudan’s People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A),
to participate in the talks. Buay’s Bul Nuer militia is militarily
relevant in parts of Unity State and Warrap and, as reports indicate,
has a strong contingent fighting in Sudan’s war at the side of the
Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

However, even with Buay’s inclusion, the armed capacities of the
involved holdout groups are confined to comparably small areas of
South Sudan, which renders the idea that these talks would indeed
‘end’ the armed violence in the country highly unrealistic. Even the
participation of a significant contingent of civil society
protagonists in the talks, among them the exiled founders of the
People’s Coalition for Civil Action (PCCA), is unlikely to make a
difference. Against this background, which is well known by all the
lead protagonists, it is imperative to reappraise the interests of the
main actors of these peace talks.

What’s in it for Kenya?

The Tumaini Peace Initiative signals Kenya’s grand (re)entry into the
heart of regional mediation efforts and the politics of peace in South
Sudan. The choice of Lazaro Sumbeiywo – a seasoned mediator who has
been a constant figurehead in peace processes in Sudan and South Sudan
for three decades – as the lead mediator signals Kenya’s unyielding
interest in South Sudan’s affairs and affirms the keen and persistent
interest of the Kenyan presidency to influence and shape processes and
outcomes of South Sudan’s fragile transition process. Regionally, the
Tumaini Peace Initiative affords Kenya a real and timely opportunity
to rival Ethiopia in Nairobi’s perceived quest for regional hegemonic
(re)positioning.

Under the prevailing geopolitics and changing international political
order, however, it may prove more difficult for Kenya and its
presidency to pursue the foregoing interests compared to the times of
the CPA negotiation in the mid-2000s. President Ruto’s perceivable
eagerness to work with traditional Western allies will have to contend
with how to simultaneously maintain good relations with the Gulf
countries, China and other key actors that are now playing significant
roles in South Sudan’s economy, security, and politics. It will be of
great interest, therefore, to observe how the Tumaini Peace Initiative
unfolds, at what costs and benefits for Kenya and the region, as well
as the implications for conflict dynamics and peace in South Sudan.

This process has been initiated and is led by the Kenyan president at
the invitation of his South Sudanese counterpart. The two leaders and
their respective interests are, therefore, most likely going to shape
the process and its outcomes. This (re)affirms a regular pattern of
mediation initiatives within the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), which are often presidency-led processes pursued
through executive decision-making.

At a personal level, Ruto is likely to take advantage of this
initiative to enhance his popularity both in Kenya and beyond by
portraying himself as a peacemaker and a regional integrationist with
a pan-African stance. This is implied in the sheer size, number, and
distribution of the delegates during the launch event. It also
coincides with Ruto’s appointment of a special envoy to champion AU
reforms. Thus, Ruto is likely to instrumentalise the South Sudan talks
to pursue both his personal political interests as well as Kenya’s
interests (hegemonic, economic and security) in South Sudan and
beyond.

Bringing peace to South Sudan?

As highlighted above, the talks are unlikely to have significant
impact on violent conflicts in most parts of South Sudan. They are
also not going to result in a return of refugees from neighbouring
countries, especially since Thomas Cirillo, whose militia has its
stronghold in the border regions with Uganda, is absent. However, the
initiative is a promising offer to South Sudan’s ‘outcast big men’.
Figures such as Pagan Amum and Paul Malong, once centrepieces of the
political-military marketplace in the country, have been dwelling in
its political margins since being exiled. This peace initiative
carries with it a promise for these individuals to negotiate their
re-entry into Juba and assume some appointive political positions.

The initiative, therefore, offers them a chance to return to South
Sudan’s political inner circle. Thus, it supports their individual
aspirations while, at the same time, broadens the SPLM’s power base,
especially among the Shilluk – the constituency of Pagan Amum, who
would then follow the reintegration of the influential Shilluk
military figure Johnson Olonyi into the national army SSPDF – and in
Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, the home turf of seasoned military leader
Paul Malong.

The inclusion of Stephen Buay in the talks offers an opportunity to
appease the long-standing violent turmoil among Bul Nuer clans in
Mayom, Unity State, which features Kiir’s security advisor Tut Kew
Gatluak as Buay’s main adversary. The killing of Tut’s brother by then
Mayom’s county commissioner sparked significant controversy and a
spill-over of this localised conflict to the already fragile areas of
Twic in Warrap and Abyei. Furthermore, making peace with Buay would
probably weaken his military support for the RSF in Sudan, which is
one of South Sudan’s regional interests guided by the idea of being
seen as neutral in the Sudanese conflict to become a credible player
in the IGAD negotiation efforts. However, soon after the end of the
first round of the talks, Buay accused Tut of trying to assassinate
him in Nairobi through US-sanctioned security agents and threatened to
leave the talks.

Considering all these peculiar impacts, that do not justify the
considerable interest the talks are generating internationally, the
initiative is benefiting President Kiir more than any other actor.
This process is likely to boost the legitimacy and credibility of
South Sudan’s transitional government in its quest to generate
interest and practical support for the planned elections. By being
present in-person and taking the opportunity to engage in
conversations with leaders of the holdout groups as well as
controversial civil society representatives, Kiir is projecting an
image of a statesperson committed to peace in his country. The
audience is the international community and South Sudan’s lost friends
in the West, in particular. A success of the talks, which is likely
for at least some of the participating groups given Malong’s and
Amum’s appetite to settle, may result in a more sympathetic appraisal
of Kiir’s place and role in shaping South Sudan’s tumultuous political
transition.

Therefore, this round of talks might bring back a few once formidable
figures to the political marketplace, even though their stars have
been waning significantly in recent years. The talks may also generate
momentum behind an electoral process that the SPLM leadership
desperately wants in its quest to finally end the lifecycle of the
transitional power-sharing government. However, a healthy portion of
realism regarding these negotiations’ ability to lead to a final peace
settlement in order as they are highly unlikely to bring peace to
South Sudan.

https://africanarguments.org/2024/05/overloaded-hope-and-scepticism-around-the-tumaini-peace-initiative-for-south-sudan/

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______________________
John Ashworth

ashwor...@gmail.com

+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)

PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya