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Endgame Scenarios: The Fate of War in Sudan
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Entering its second year, the prospects for ending the war in Sudan remain elusive. Nevertheless, the potential outcomes will likely align with the following scenarios:
- A complete military victory for the Sudanese army by eliminating the "Rapid Support Forces" militia across Sudan seems improbable. The "Rapid Support Forces" control significant parts of the country, including four states out of five in the Darfur region, Gezira state, and their substantial presence in the states of Khartoum and Kordofan. Moreover, ongoing regional and international support continues to supply the militia with weapons and equipment, providing political, diplomatic, and media backing. This support allows them to persist in the war while offering institutional immunity to their leaders for the crimes and violations committed by their soldiers.
- The victory of the "Rapid Support Forces" and their control over Sudan is also an unlikely and unrealistic prospect. The militia's military retreat in the capital, Khartoum, and the burgeoning popular resistance against them, coupled with the increasing local and international condemnation of their documented violations, make this scenario far-fetched. The political support from parties and alliances that align with obfuscating the "Rapid Support Forces" and justifying their authoritarian war has failed to mitigate the widespread crimes committed by the militia. These crimes include the occupation and looting of homes and private properties, identity-based killings, genocide, rapes, and kidnappings. The inability of the "Rapid Support Forces" militia and their allies to curb these crimes, and their resort to misleading media narratives to cover them up, has only intensified public outrage and rejection.
- The division of Sudan into two practically independent states, akin to the Libyan model, may be supported by military dynamics on the ground. The militia's expansion in the Darfur region and the imminent battle of El Fasher, where they besiege the sixth division of the Sudanese army, along with the prolonged battles in the Kordofan region and the siege of Al-Obeid, contrast with the Sudanese army's firm control over the north and east of the country. However, the militia's failure to maintain any semblance of state apparatus or governance in the areas under their control, as evidenced by the spontaneous civilian exodus from "Rapid Support Forces" territories to army-controlled regions, renders this prospect catastrophic. The areas under militia control are plagued by chaos and lawlessness, dominated by gangs and militias. This was highlighted when "Doctors Without Borders" had to cease their activities at Wad Madani Hospital in the militia-controlled capital of Gezira state just days ago, on May 5th.
These scenarios portend a dire future for Sudan. An absolute victory for the army might temporarily alleviate the Sudanese people's suffering from the war currently ravaging the country and could provide a respite for life to resume its normal course. However, it might also pave the way for a prolonged autocratic rule based on military triumph, quashing the Sudanese revolution's dreams of a civil democratic transition. This would perpetuate the cycle of political and social instability that has engulfed the country since its independence, which it has endured for 55 of its 68 years. The army's role is to protect the nation and uphold the law, not to govern. Its duty is to safeguard, not to supervise.
Militia control over Sudan would equate to fascism's dominance. The "Rapid Support Forces" militia's history of racism and criminality against Sudanese, and the war did not begin on April 15, 2023. It is now documented by United Nations reports in West Darfur and human rights organizations' accounts, indicating that there can be no prosperous, stable, or secure future for Sudanese under the militia's continued institutional presence, much less their rule.
Sudan's division is a catastrophic scenario leading to a bleak path of further suffering and destruction. It would result in two weakened, beleaguered states, embroiled in ongoing conflict and internal strife, subject to external and regional powers vying for influence. Such instability would foster an environment conducive to the growth of extremist groups, beyond the current political hyperbole.
Both states would lack the economic resources and infrastructure necessary for stability or the prosperity of their citizens. Amid such turmoil, the aspiration for a civil democratic government attentive to citizen interests becomes increasingly unattainable.
These catastrophic scenarios and possibilities should motivate civil parties invested in Sudan's stable and peaceful future to forge a path that preserves what remains of the nation and restores some dignity and genuine national sovereignty to the Sudanese, scattered by this war. This path begins by breaking the toxic dichotomy of war that some politicians attempt to impose to justify their biases towards the warring factions. The Sudanese are not fated to choose between lesser evils. To end these abhorrent biases, civil political actors across the spectrum must cease seeking political gains through the warring parties. All actors in the Sudan's current political scene, whether openly biased or cloaked in deceitful neutrality, are advancing their agendas at the expense of Sudanese blood, lives, and ongoing suffering. Political objectives, regardless of their intent, should be pursued through a political process that follows a sustained halt to hostilities, which ought to be the sole focus of civil politicians at present.
Continuing to impose political conditions and agendas linked to the cessation of war equates to reprehensible extortion of the Sudanese for their livelihood and security, akin to the actions of those bearing arms.
The ongoing war in Sudan is existential, threatening the nation's independence and sovereignty, and jeopardizing its people's safety. It stems from a power struggle between two harmful sides, each varying in degree of harm. This disparity is not merely numerical but reflects a qualitative difference in the nature of the parties. The conflict pits the corrupted Sudanese army institution, long entangled in politics and ideological sabotage, against the "Rapid Support Forces," a fascist entity whose existence is fundamentally at odds with the normal and safe life of Sudanese. This war is distinct from previous armed conflicts and civil wars in Sudan, which arose from developmental disparities or political demands. Attempts to rationalize this war, regardless of its origin, must be rejected. Solutions to end the war should not involve denying or justifying the committed crimes but holding each party accountable for their actions. Any attempt to excuse these crimes or divert attention from them is tantamount to complicity.
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