A Trial for South Sudan’s Frail Peace

[John Ashworth]

A Trial for South Sudan’s Frail Peace

The trial of South Sudan’s First Vice President Riek Machar represents
one of the greatest threats to the country’s stability since the end
of its civil war in 2018. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Daniel
Akech analyses the charges against Machar and the danger they pose.

Daniel Akech
International Crisis Group
27 November 2025

What is happening?

In September, the South Sudanese government charged First Vice
President and former rebel leader Riek Machar, along with seven of his
key allies, with criminal offences including treason, murder and
crimes against humanity. President Salva Kiir also suspended Machar,
his perennial arch-rival, from his position as vice president and
established a Special Court for National Crimes for the sole purpose
of trying Machar alongside the other seven accused. The trial – which
formally began on 22 September – is now entering a critical phase.
Prosecution witnesses have begun to testify, and the rapid pace of the
proceedings suggests that a verdict may be reached soon. The outcome
could convulse South Sudan’s political system.

The charges stem from a March uprising in the Nuer opposition hotbed
of Nasir, a town in eastern Upper Nile state near the border with
Ethiopia. Fighting erupted after Kiir announced plans to deploy Dinka
and Shilluk militias loyal to him to Nasir. Town leaders condemned the
move as a provocation, while a local militia known as the White Army
responded by overrunning a military base, killing Lieutenant General
Majur Dak, a Dinka, amid an evacuation attempt by the UN. The
government accuses Machar of orchestrating this attack, and since
March, it has mounted a steadily escalating crackdown. It arrested
Machar’s top political and military allies in the capital Juba,
including the oil minister and the deputy army chief, both Machar
appointees. Kiir’s administration launched airstrikes on Nuer villages
and military positions of Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) in the Upper Nile and Equatoria
regions. In late March, the authorities put Machar under house arrest
in Juba, allowing him no visitors or access to communication devices.

Machar’s trial sits at the heart of a systematic shakeup of Kiir’s
regime that has brought political upheaval to South Sudan. Since
October 2024, Kiir has staged a multi-phase campaign to purge other
powerful figures from his regime, including top security officials,
vice presidents and the main leaders of the ruling party. Those
dismissed included powerful intelligence chief Akol Koor and party
deputy chairman and vice president James Wani Igga. Until recently,
the main beneficiary of these changes was political newcomer Benjamin
Bol Mel, who was appointed as Kiir’s vice president and deputy party
chairperson in apparent line for the succession. But then, in
November, Bol Mel was fired and placed under house arrest himself,
also in dramatic fashion. In the aftermath of Bol Mel’s ouster, Kiir’s
family appears to be wading directly into politics and possibly into
competition for the presidency upon his departure. Kiir’s daughter
Adut, once allied with Bol Mel, played a critical role in his downfall
and is now a key figure in the president’s office. Among these various
shakeups, the prosecution of Machar could prove the deadliest for
South Sudanese.

What is behind the prosecutions?

The rivalry between Kiir and Machar has played an outsize role in
South Sudan’s politics and conflict. Kiir is from South Sudan’s
largest ethnic group, the Dinka, while Machar is the most prominent
politician from the Nuer, the second largest.

Both were among the early guerrilla commanders in the Sudan People’s
Liberational Movement (SPLM), formed in 1983 to fight the government
of Sudan, of which South Sudan was then a part. In 1991, however,
Machar created a splinter movement, leading to years of internecine
violence, largely along ethnic lines, in which the Sudanese government
in Khartoum often supplied his forces with arms. Machar rejoined the
main SPLM rebellion after a 2002 agreement that placed him third in
the party hierarchy, below John Garang (the SPLM’s founder, also a
Dinka) and Kiir. This reconciliation paved the way for the landmark
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM,
which in turn led to South Sudan’s secession in 2011. In a surprise
turn of events, Garang died in a helicopter crash three weeks after
taking office (and months after signing the accord), leaving Kiir as
the new chairman and president of South Sudan, with Machar as his
deputy.

Following independence, Machar challenged Kiir as party leader in
2013, giving rise to a power struggle that morphed into a five-year
civil war. A 2015 peace deal collapsed less than a year later, when a
tense meeting between Kiir and Machar ended in a firefight between
their bodyguards. Kiir’s forces then chased Machar and his entourage
into the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the UN evacuated them
from Garamba National Park. Machar’s next stop was in South Africa,
where he lived as the civil war in South Sudan spread. Eventually, in
2018, Kiir and Machar agreed to a new peace deal under pressure from
Uganda, which backed Kiir, and Sudan, which favoured Machar. Under the
terms of that accord, Machar returned to South Sudan as Kiir’s vice
president in 2020. Even so, the government has yet to honour the
deal’s main provisions, including unifying the national army, adopting
a new constitution and holding the country’s first elections.

More broadly, Kiir’s systemic purge of the top elite is a response to
intense pressures on his regime. These include the collapse of oil
revenues following the war in neighbouring Sudan, which halted the
bulk of its oil exports, its main source of revenue, for more than a
year. At the same time, competition among South Sudan’s elites over
Kiir’s succession has simmered amid rumours that his health is
failing. Seeing an existential threat, Kiir began in October 2024 to
remove those potential successors, despite the risks these actions
would pose to political stability and the country’s ailing economy.

What have the effects of Machar’s prosecution been so far?

Kiir’s purge is destabilising South Sudan on several fronts – in terms
of security, governance and humanitarian conditions – and pushing the
country closer to renewed conflict than at any point since the 2018
accord. The Machar trial has cast a shadow over Juba and put the
country on edge: traffic in the capital halts during court sessions.
The tensions heightened further upon Bol Mel’s dismissal. On the eve
of his sacking, the city streets were nearly empty as residents braced
for violent repercussions.

Paralysis in the government coincides with dire economic and security
conditions. In response to the prosecution of its leader, Machar’s
SPLM-IO declared the 2018 peace deal “abrogated” in September.
Military action soon followed, with clashes between the army and
SPLM-IO forces intensifying, particularly in Equatoria and Upper Nile.
Machar’s group has also forged a new tactical alliance with other
insurgent forces, above all in Equatoria, where Juba is located.

The security threats have exacerbated an already bleak humanitarian
situation. An estimated 9.3 million people – nearly 70 per cent of the
population – now require assistance, with 7.7 million facing acute
food insecurity and 83,000 at risk of famine, according to the UN. A
worldwide squeeze on humanitarian aid funding means that many of these
needs are going unmet. The World Food Programme, which faces a
potential 40 per cent cut in its spending in 2025, has already
suspended assistance for millions in East Africa and directly linked
the funding gaps to the heightened danger of famine in South Sudan.

The loss of oil revenue has made matters even worse. Oil is now
flowing, but at lower rates than before the cutoff, and the war in
Sudan poses a continuing threat of further interruptions to South
Sudan’s oil production. With security forces unpaid for months,
attacks on the population by frustrated soldiers have increased, and
confrontations between rival units are frequent. Insecurity is
restricting the already irregular delivery of humanitarian aid and
disrupting economic activity at the grassroots.

How might the trial end, and what might its effect be?

Machar and his fellow accused have slim chances of the court finding
them innocent. While the constitution provides for an independent
judiciary, in practice the country’s legal system faces profound
challenges, including political interference and a lack of resources.
These weaknesses are central to the defence’s claim that a fair trial
is not possible.

Prosecutors have presented a detailed account of Machar’s supposedly
premeditated plot, using digital communications and official testimony
as evidence, with the aim of connecting him and the other defendants
to the uprising in Nasir. They are making their arguments before a
Special Court panel of three judges in Juba, behind a heavy security
cordon, with the proceedings broadcast live on state television.
Private media workers, civil society representatives and relatives of
the accused, meanwhile, have been barred from attending the court
sessions in person.

Defence lawyers argue that Machar and his allies have been gravely
wronged. They say Machar and his co-defendants were not involved in
the revolt, claiming that the Nasir clashes were triggered by a local
dispute that spiralled out of control. Though the White Army often
fought alongside Machar’s forces during the civil war, it has also
often acted independently, complicating the prosecution’s effort to
prove a direct command link between Machar and the Nasir incident. The
defence team has also pointed out that, before the fighting in Nasir,
Machar had asked for a meeting with Kiir to quell rising tensions
between them, but the president ignored the request. The lawyers have
gone on to argue that the prosecution’s evidence was illegally
obtained and mishandled, challenging the admissibility and reliability
of the key digital communications and testimony in court.

Lastly, Machar’s defence team has contested the legality of the trial
itself, arguing that the Special Court hearing the case is
unconstitutional, primarily because the 2018 peace deal mandates that
alleged crimes against humanity be tried by an African Union-led
hybrid court, not a South Sudanese tribunal appointed by the
president. The lawyers insist that the authorities are pursuing a
political vendetta masquerading as a criminal trial; in any case, they
say, the constitution grants Machar, as first vice president, immunity
from prosecution. Nonetheless, the Special Court dismissed these
objections in September, ruling that it had jurisdiction.

Should the trial proceed to its conclusion, a simple acquittal would
seem unlikely. In similar high-profile treason cases – such as the
2014 trial of former SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum and the 2018
conviction of former SPLM-IO spokesman James Gatdet – the judiciary
has rarely ruled against the state. Legal analysts suggest that the
most likely endgame is a conviction followed by a presidential pardon,
a manoeuvre that would allow Kiir to brand Machar a criminal while
appearing magnanimous himself. Alternatively, Kiir might use the
threat of a guilty verdict to force Machar’s exit from the domestic
political scene. In any event, exoneration by the court itself would
seem improbable, given Kiir’s firm support for the prosecution.

Still, a conviction could backfire. Especially if it results in forced
exile, it could well intensify the violent backlash from Machar’s
allies. But many scenarios could play out. Machar and his allies might
seek to fight on militarily, but they would need more money if they
were to wage anything more than a low-intensity insurgency. With
Machar held incommunicado, his movement could also break apart,
resulting in further fragmentation of South Sudan’s political and
security landscape.

Are there any ways out of worsening conflict?

The downfall of Bol Mel has for now upended Kiir’s succession plan.
Moreover, the prosecution of Machar is a high-stakes gambit that even
many of his foes think is unwise and dangerous for the country.

Given that Machar was originally arrested as part of efforts to push
aside rivals to Bol Mel, the subsequent fall of Kiir’s heir apparent
could be an opportunity for the president to change course. Some
speculate that Kiir could do so, blaming Bol Mel (who appeared to be
personally overseeing the case against Machar) for the entire affair
and seeking to turn the political page. The uncertainty generated by
Bol Mel’s fall from grace has already led Kiir to bring some purged
officials back into the fold, including Wani Igga, Kiir’s long-time
deputy and vice president.

Countries with close ties to South Sudan that want to avoid another
violent breakdown in the country – particularly Uganda, Kenya,
Ethiopia and South Africa – should try to persuade Kiir to seize this
opportunity. They should push for an immediate suspension of the
prosecutions along with direct negotiations with Machar over his
future.

While many foreign countries are still urging Kiir to return to the
roadmap in the 2018 peace deal, this option may not be realistic or
even desirable, given the accord’s tattered state and South Sudan’s
compound crises. The most viable roadmap would be a wider political
conversation, brokered by the African states above, on South Sudan’s
political future. Given their previous efforts to bolster the 2018
peace deal and bring about political reconciliation in South Sudan,
the Vatican, the Anglican church and other global religious
institutions, such as Sant’Egidio, could also play a vital public or
private role.

Dialogue in South Sudan must take into account today’s realities,
whether the neutralisation of the old guard or the rise of new
factions such as the one formed in October by former foreign minister
Nhial Deng Nhial. Negotiations are the only plausible way to prevent
the country’s political fissures from widening. Without talks, the
threat of a return to conflict will loom ever larger.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/south-sudan/trial-south-sudans-frail-peace

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John Ashworth

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