The 2002 JMM: Lessons for a Monitored Sudan Ceasefire
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John Ashworth
Jul 23, 2026, 1:59:35 AMJul 23
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For a sustained ceasefire or truce in Sudan, remember: Trust, but verify
Ernst Jan Hogendoorn
Atlantic Council
May 21, 2026
As Sudan enters its fourth year of conflict, the warring parties
appear to be as set as ever on military victory.
A tentative peace process led by the Quad (made up of the United
States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) is focusing
on pressuring the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF) to accept a ceasefire applying to all combatants. The
commendable aim is to stabilize the battlefield long enough to allow
humanitarian aid to reach affected populations and minimize direct
civilian harm. Perhaps it also may serve as the beginning of a more
robust peace process. But to do so, this effort must begin to rebuild
trust among the warring parties that their opponents will (or are
required to) abide by agreements they sign.
The Quad can help rebuild this trust by independently monitoring and
credibly verifying compliance with a ceasefire agreement. Arguably the
most successful example of such a mechanism is Sudan’s own Joint
Monitoring Mission (JMM) of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement
(signed in 2002), which successfully sustained a tenuous ceasefire
between the SAF and then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
from 2002 to 2005, until a peace agreement was signed and a United
Nations peacekeeping mission replaced the monitoring group.
The JMM was a relatively small mission with approximately twenty
international monitors, thirty-four Sudanese government and SPLA
monitors, and 160 support staff. The JMM used a “three in a Jeep”
model, with unarmed teams of one international, one Sudanese military,
and one rebel monitor based in the field. They performed their
monitoring activities only when monitors were present, to ensure
trust, impartiality, and safety. Their tasks included verifying troop
numbers and arms restrictions, transparently investigating and
reporting on alleged ceasefire violations, and helping resolve
disputes. The mission facilitated relief efforts and ensured safe
passage for tens of thousands of displaced people. Critical to its
work was an attentive public information unit, flexible organizational
structure, and high mobility (the mission had dedicated airplanes and
helicopters). Importantly, it also had active support—and political
intervention when necessary—from its international backers,
particularly their ambassadors, organized as the Friends of Sudan. The
mission’s strong field presence and excellent community relations led
to its success.
Having worked on and in the region for several decades and supported
the implementation of Sudan and South Sudan peace agreements, I have
found that it is critical to have impartial observers on the ground
who can monitor individual units, visit demilitarized locations, and
investigate alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement. This cannot
be done with sufficient confidence remotely with satellites or drones.
Under the proposed framework, parties would maintain their current
positions, disengage from active fighting, and adopt a defensive
posture only. It would also require them to demilitarize agreed-upon
cities, including El Fasher and other conflict-affected locations, to
create humanitarian corridors. The United States would chair a body
that would handle oversight, with the United Nations playing an
advisory role.
The warring parties have not yet accepted the proposed ceasefire, and
getting the parties to comply with such an agreement, particularly
requiring them to withdraw from heavily contested and militarily
valuable locations, will be a challenge—especially if they do not
trust the other side will also adhere to the agreement. Commanders
would be understandably leery and hesitant, given the tenuous command
and control both RSF and SAF leaders have over their units and allied
armed groups with their own parochial agendas. They would need
confirmation that their enemies are adopting defensive postures and
fully withdrawing from certain locations.
A small, independent monitoring mission could become operational in a
relatively short timeframe. Such a mission, operating much as
humanitarian-access negotiators have for decades, would not require
force protection units. That is the case seeing as local commanders
and community leaders would agree on granting access, and
representatives with direct links to forces embedded in the mission’s
field teams would ensure safety. Additionally, pressure from the Quad
and other diplomats, as well as the threat of the withdrawal of
humanitarian assistance for areas where local commanders refuse to
cooperate, would ensure the mission’s unhindered and continued
presence. Successful monitoring is often as much—or more—about
building confidence among warring parties and supporting
mutually-agreed-upon arrangements as it is about reporting on
ceasefire implementation.
The cost of the mission would depend on its size, mandate, and
capabilities. The JMM was relatively inexpensive (about eighteen
million dollars per year) and was financed directly by countries
supporting the peace process. This would be ideal, since it is often
quicker. Alternatively, some actors involved in the Quad-backed
negotiations are reportedly pushing for preexisting UN resources or
the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719,
which would allow United Nations peacekeeping funds to be used to
finance an African Union-led peace support mission.
Most important will be ensuring that a monitoring mission quickly
becomes operational, to prevent real or perceived ceasefire violations
from undermining the agreement and to hopefully create a virtuous loop
of trust building that other confidence-building measures can later
complement. Therefore, negotiators should insist any ceasefire or
truce agreement allows for a dedicated, on-the-ground monitoring
mechanism and should prepare to deploy monitoring teams as soon as
possible after an agreement is accepted by the warring parties.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/for-a-sustained-ceasefire-or-truce-in-sudan-remember-trust-but-verify/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
Ernst Jan Hogendoorn
Atlantic Council
May 21, 2026
As Sudan enters its fourth year of conflict, the warring parties
appear to be as set as ever on military victory.
A tentative peace process led by the Quad (made up of the United
States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) is focusing
on pressuring the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support
Forces (RSF) to accept a ceasefire applying to all combatants. The
commendable aim is to stabilize the battlefield long enough to allow
humanitarian aid to reach affected populations and minimize direct
civilian harm. Perhaps it also may serve as the beginning of a more
robust peace process. But to do so, this effort must begin to rebuild
trust among the warring parties that their opponents will (or are
required to) abide by agreements they sign.
The Quad can help rebuild this trust by independently monitoring and
credibly verifying compliance with a ceasefire agreement. Arguably the
most successful example of such a mechanism is Sudan’s own Joint
Monitoring Mission (JMM) of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement
(signed in 2002), which successfully sustained a tenuous ceasefire
between the SAF and then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
from 2002 to 2005, until a peace agreement was signed and a United
Nations peacekeeping mission replaced the monitoring group.
The JMM was a relatively small mission with approximately twenty
international monitors, thirty-four Sudanese government and SPLA
monitors, and 160 support staff. The JMM used a “three in a Jeep”
model, with unarmed teams of one international, one Sudanese military,
and one rebel monitor based in the field. They performed their
monitoring activities only when monitors were present, to ensure
trust, impartiality, and safety. Their tasks included verifying troop
numbers and arms restrictions, transparently investigating and
reporting on alleged ceasefire violations, and helping resolve
disputes. The mission facilitated relief efforts and ensured safe
passage for tens of thousands of displaced people. Critical to its
work was an attentive public information unit, flexible organizational
structure, and high mobility (the mission had dedicated airplanes and
helicopters). Importantly, it also had active support—and political
intervention when necessary—from its international backers,
particularly their ambassadors, organized as the Friends of Sudan. The
mission’s strong field presence and excellent community relations led
to its success.
Having worked on and in the region for several decades and supported
the implementation of Sudan and South Sudan peace agreements, I have
found that it is critical to have impartial observers on the ground
who can monitor individual units, visit demilitarized locations, and
investigate alleged violations of the ceasefire agreement. This cannot
be done with sufficient confidence remotely with satellites or drones.
Under the proposed framework, parties would maintain their current
positions, disengage from active fighting, and adopt a defensive
posture only. It would also require them to demilitarize agreed-upon
cities, including El Fasher and other conflict-affected locations, to
create humanitarian corridors. The United States would chair a body
that would handle oversight, with the United Nations playing an
advisory role.
The warring parties have not yet accepted the proposed ceasefire, and
getting the parties to comply with such an agreement, particularly
requiring them to withdraw from heavily contested and militarily
valuable locations, will be a challenge—especially if they do not
trust the other side will also adhere to the agreement. Commanders
would be understandably leery and hesitant, given the tenuous command
and control both RSF and SAF leaders have over their units and allied
armed groups with their own parochial agendas. They would need
confirmation that their enemies are adopting defensive postures and
fully withdrawing from certain locations.
A small, independent monitoring mission could become operational in a
relatively short timeframe. Such a mission, operating much as
humanitarian-access negotiators have for decades, would not require
force protection units. That is the case seeing as local commanders
and community leaders would agree on granting access, and
representatives with direct links to forces embedded in the mission’s
field teams would ensure safety. Additionally, pressure from the Quad
and other diplomats, as well as the threat of the withdrawal of
humanitarian assistance for areas where local commanders refuse to
cooperate, would ensure the mission’s unhindered and continued
presence. Successful monitoring is often as much—or more—about
building confidence among warring parties and supporting
mutually-agreed-upon arrangements as it is about reporting on
ceasefire implementation.
The cost of the mission would depend on its size, mandate, and
capabilities. The JMM was relatively inexpensive (about eighteen
million dollars per year) and was financed directly by countries
supporting the peace process. This would be ideal, since it is often
quicker. Alternatively, some actors involved in the Quad-backed
negotiations are reportedly pushing for preexisting UN resources or
the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719,
which would allow United Nations peacekeeping funds to be used to
finance an African Union-led peace support mission.
Most important will be ensuring that a monitoring mission quickly
becomes operational, to prevent real or perceived ceasefire violations
from undermining the agreement and to hopefully create a virtuous loop
of trust building that other confidence-building measures can later
complement. Therefore, negotiators should insist any ceasefire or
truce agreement allows for a dedicated, on-the-ground monitoring
mechanism and should prepare to deploy monitoring teams as soon as
possible after an agreement is accepted by the warring parties.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/for-a-sustained-ceasefire-or-truce-in-sudan-remember-trust-but-verify/
END
______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya
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