An existential battle of interests: what the Sudanese war is actually about
A bitter race to claim economic and political power has divided the
country and the human cost can no longer be ignored
Nesrine Malik
Wed 19 Nov 2025
The Guardian
Almost everywhere I go, I am asked about Sudan. The questions are
partly from concern for family and my birth country, and partly from a
genuine desire to understand how the conflict there has turned into
something so intense and seemingly unstoppable. This week, I break
down what is happening in the country, and why it has escalated to
catastrophic proportions.
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A sense of incredulity
The first answer I give when asked about my thoughts on the war is
always the same: I still can’t believe it is happening. Three years
into the conflict, there is still a sense of incredulity that Sudan
has unravelled so quickly. This is probably how it always feels to
those whose countries have suddenly succumbed to war. To outsiders,
war remains a story, a headline, a political event, and perhaps,
particularly in Africa, not a remote or unexpected occurrence. But it
is no one’s natural lot, and every day is as hard and bewildering as
the one before.
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Two histories of war
There are two histories to the war in Sudan. One long, and one short.
The long history is of a country where political and economic power
has always been in the hands of the few. Regions such as Darfur have
historically been marginalised and ignored. The region has suffered
competition for resources and conflict along ethnic lines between Arab
and African groups for decades, and a genocide against its non-Arab
population was perpetrated in the early 2000s by Arab militias known
as the Janjaweed, with the blessing and support of central government.
The result was that, even as Sudan as a whole never fell apart,
intense localised conflicts rumbled on for decades, leading to the
growth and empowerment of militarised groups. The most concrete legacy
of that history is the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia that was
formalised out of armed groups and is now at war with the Sudanese
Armed Forces (SAF).
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A sabotaged revolution
The short history has its roots in Sudan’s popular revolution of 2019,
in which president Omar al-Bashir who ruled Sudan for almost 30 years
was deposed after months of protest. It was a revolution that had two
demands: first the removal of a dictator, and second the ejection of
the military (from whose ranks Bashir came when he led a coup in 1989)
from power once and for all. In the aftermath of the revolution, it
became clear that the RSF, which had partnered with Bashir and his
government to suppress rebellion in Darfur, had amassed significant
power. With Bashir gone, the RSF and the SAF entered what was supposed
to be a transitional power-sharing agreement with civilians in order
to pave the way for civilian rule. It was short-lived. The SAF and RSF
turned on the civilians, and then each other. Sudan, it turned out,
was only big enough for one armed body.
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What the war is – and what it isn’t
Sudan’s conflict is often described as a “civil war”. But there is no
civilian feature to this war. They did not take up arms against one
another, and their lives and livelihoods have been the price of the
power struggle between the two parties. The war is also spoken of as
the “forgotten war”, but that glosses over the fact that the duration,
intensity, and reporting of the conflict leave little room for doubt
that it is anything other than a war that just isn’t proportionally
cared about. The war is not forgotten; it is ignored and sometimes
tolerated. The UN’s humanitarian response plan for Sudan remains
chronically underfunded. The Trump administration has gutted
humanitarian aid, hitting Sudan particularly hard, and scaled back the
entire Africa engagement effort. All the while, valiant accountability
and reporting efforts continue, as do dogged campaigns to raise
awareness and funds on the part of Sudanese at home and in the
diaspora.
You will also hear of Sudan’s conflict as a “proxy war”, which gives
the sense that outside forces are lining up equally behind all
parties. Several actors have been drawn in, but the main outside
influence in this war is the United Arab Emirates, which has pumped
funds and arms into the hands of the RSF while denying any
involvement. To the UAE, securing influence in Sudan, a strategically
located, gold-rich and fertile country, would significantly expand the
Emirates’ political and economic power.
What the war actually is: an existential battle between the old guard;
the Sudanese army and the associated parties and interests it
represents, and a new militia that amassed staggering influence and
support outside the official auspices of the state, and now seeks to
claim it.
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The violent, heartbreaking toll
It is difficult to know where to start. Again, statistics about the
millions of displaced, hundreds of thousands estimated to have been
killed, sexual violence, and humanitarian catastrophe and hunger still
cannot capture the individual tragedies or their reverberations. The
loss of home and loved ones resonates with my own family story. Our
house in Khartoum was taken over by the RSF, looted, and then left
gutted, deep holes dug in the ground and walls to extract even the
pipes and wires. There are the millions of elderly people scattered
around Sudan and the wider region, who now live their last days
wrenched and in painful impoverished exile.
And there is the systematic massacre by the RSF of the African
population in Darfur, re-opening the wounds of the earlier genocide.
The largest SAF Darfur stronghold city of El Fasher, fell last month
to the RSF after a year and a half of brutal siege, and the reports of
summary executions that have soaked the land in blood continue to
emerge.
With El Fasher’s takeover, the RSF consolidated its hold over the west
of the country, leaving Sudan essentially divided into two, with the
rest under the control of the SAF. Neither party seems to have the
capacity to decisively overwhelm the other, and few western powers
seem to have the appetite to decisively intervene to put pressure
either on sponsors like the UAE, or apply leverage on to either
belligerent party.
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The uncertain future
Another strange psychological feature of war is the inability to
conceive of a future other than the one that looks like the past.
There is still a part of me that believes in an unrealistic return of
the genie back in the bottle, a homecoming for all where we can pick
up the pieces and somehow reconcile the country. But I know, and
refuse to know, that this is not a likely scenario. In the meantime
there is only hope that this cannot continue forever, and that the
more the world learns about Sudan, the more its war becomes not just a
lamenting headline, but a matter of intolerable urgency.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/nov/19/an-existential-battle-of-interests-what-the-sudanese-war-is-actually-about?
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______________________
John Ashworth
ashwor...@gmail.com
+254 725 926 297 (Kenya mobile, WhatsApp and Signal)
PO Box 403 - 00206, Kiserian, Kenya